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ABSTRACT 
 
On September 13, 2008, Hurricane Ike, a huge storm with tropical storm force or 
greater winds extending 275 miles from the eye, made landfall in Galveston, Texas 
submerging over 75% of the city.  In response to this crisis, Texas A&M University at 
Galveston, a small ocean oriented satellite school of 2000 students, deployed a never-
before-attempted business continuity plan, relocating 91% of the student body and 
campus operations 150 miles inland to the mother campus of Texas A&M University in 
nine days.  As a result, Texas A&M University at Galveston successfully weathered the 
storm and enjoyed a record enrollment the following spring semester. 
 This dissertation utilized a case study methodology to look at the 
approach/planning process that went into the plan, the deployment of the plan, and the 
learning that took place throughout the crisis.  In addition, the case study was considered 
through the use of a performance management system, specifically the Quality Texas 
Foundation - Engagement Level Criteria based on the Malcom Baldrige Quality 
Management Criteria, to determine whether this criteria might be appropriate for 
assessing future crisis response in higher education.  All Texas A&M University at 
Galveston crisis team members were interviewed using the criteria to guide the 
discussion. 
 The study revealed that the approach taken by the Texas A&M University at 
Galveston crisis team members was very timely in that a number of significant changes 
were implemented in the plan only a year prior to Hurricane Ike, initiated in response to 
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Hurricanes Katrina and Rita’s impact on other universities.  Furthermore while the 
approach outlined a plan that guided the relocation effort, significant areas that were not 
directly related to the relocation of the students, such as plans for the workforce not 
directly involved in the relocation and community involvement, were not adequately 
addressed.  In deployment of the plan, the development of guiding principles to further 
align the thousands of decisions that would take place proved critical.  The study further 
identified that the crisis team members incorporated learning into the approach and 
deployment of the plan, and established a very comprehensive assessment process 
immediately after the crisis.  The study also revealed a number of valuable lessons for 
practice for use by other institutions as they develop their own crisis management plans.  
Lastly, the Quality Texas Foundation - Engagement Level Criteria provided a solid 
platform for crisis management assessment in higher education, particularly in large 
scale disaster type crises. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Texas A&M University at Galveston is a satellite campus of Texas A&M 
University. Located 150 miles southeast of College Station and situated on the Gulf of 
Mexico, its close proximity to the ocean is ideal for the 1700 students studying any of 
the nine undergraduate programs and two graduate programs that focus on the ocean.  
Classes spent in salt marshes collecting samples or on board ships learning maritime 
skills provide a hand’s on experience that greatly enhances the instruction in the 
classrooms.  Furthermore, the high quality of faculty teaching in small classroom 
settings further augments the reputation of the small institution, attracting students from 
49 states and nearly 20 countries (Texas A&M University at Galveston website, 2010). 
The Galveston campus’s motto is “The Ocean is my classroom,” and many of the 
faculty, staff, and students believe they have found the perfect place to live and explore 
their passion for the ocean.  
 At 2:10 am September 13, 2008, the eye wall of Hurricane Ike made landfall in 
Galveston, Texas.  Ike was a huge storm with tropical storm force or greater winds 
extending 275 miles from the eye, creating a massive storm surge across the Gulf Coast 
that would range up to 20 feet high (Johnson, 2010). The wall of water pushed ahead of 
Hurricane Ike would cause devastation throughout the Gulf Coast region, resulting in 
Hurricane Ike going on record as the third most costly hurricane in the history of Federal 
Emergency Management Administration (FEMA, 2008).  Galveston, lying in the direct 
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path of the storm, suffered extensive damage to the city’s infrastructure and over 75% of 
the city of Galveston was submerged before the storm had passed (Spinner, 2010). With 
no electricity, gas, or sanitation, massive destruction to many of the homes and 
buildings, and lack of access to the island due to the mountains of debris left by the 
storm, the city of Galveston and much of the Gulf Coast were in the midst of a crisis that 
had not been seen since Hurricane Katrina had wreaked similar devastation to New 
Orleans.  To a small campus like Texas A&M University at Galveston, the crisis and its 
impact on the campus almost seemed insurmountable. Roof damage was extensive to a 
number of campus buildings, but even those without roof damage suffered extensive 
water damage from sheets of rain pouring through storm shattered windows.  Flood 
waters from the storm surge completely devastated the waterfront of the campus 
carrying off those boats that couldn’t be moved before the storm and leaving large piles 
of debris in their stead.  This debris was left throughout the campus as the surge 
completely covered the campus grounds, and although the surge water only permeated a 
few of the campus buildings, the two private student housing complexes located across 
the street, where nearly 25% of the student body called home during the school year, 
were rendered uninhabitable. Power lines were knocked down, and transformers were 
shattered leaving the campus without power.  To further complicate any potential 
recovery, the Pelican Island causeway which provided the one road into campus had 
been washed completely out and was traversable only by foot traffic. The future of 
Texas A&M University at Galveston was in crisis. 
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 Texas A&M University at Galveston had a crisis management team in place well 
before Hurricane Ike landed.  A two tiered team that aligned critical staff and faculty 
into the executive team or strategic operations team, the crisis management plan clearly 
identified critical staff and their role during a crisis (Texas A&M University at 
Galveston website, 2010).  As a small campus, the team members had worked together 
in non-crisis situations and were fairly close-knit, but had the additional experience of 
working together in crisis mode through numerous table top exercises and previous 
hurricane evacuations.  However, all of the drills and practices could never completely 
replicate the thousands of management decisions that would need to be made by the 
crisis management team in the wake of Hurricane Ike. These decisions, which included 
the relocation of the student body and integrating into the mother campus for a semester, 
were often required to be made with partial information and no previous body of 
knowledge that was relevant to the situation.  In many ways, they were operating in new, 
untested territory with high stakes decisions being made moment by moment.  These 
decisions, although certainly difficult under the circumstances, had far reaching 
consequences and needs to be examined with regards to their impact, organizational 
learning and implications for future crisis management in higher education. 
 
Statement of the Problem 
The crisis management team of Texas A&M University at Galveston was 
required to make numerous difficult decisions after Hurricane Ike devastated Galveston 
Island.  As with most natural disasters, many of the specifics of the crisis were somewhat 
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unique to the incident which creates difficulty in assessing the success or failure of the 
management decisions purely by comparisons to similar crises on other university 
campuses.  Consequently a need exists to examine the crisis management process and 
crisis management team’s performance in order to improve the preparedness for and 
management of future crisis events. 
 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study was twofold: (1) to examine the Texas A&M 
University at Galveston’s crisis management team’s approach, deployment, and learning 
as a consequence of Hurricane Ike in the effort to return the campus to Pre-Ike status; (2) 
to evaluate the Baldrige Criteria (Quality Texas Foundation - Engagement Level 
Criteria) as a framework for assessing crisis management in higher education.   
 
Research Questions 
1.  What approach did Texas A&M University at Galveston utilize in their crisis 
management process?  
2. What strategies did Texas A&M University at Galveston deploy in applying their 
approach consistently and ensuring the approach was utilized by all appropriate work 
units? 
3. What learning occurred as a result of refining the approach through cycles of 
evaluation and improvement? 
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4. To what extent is the Quality Texas Foundation- Engagement Level Criteria an 
effective framework for assessing crisis management in higher education? 
 
Operational Definitions 
Approach – the first of four factors used to evaluate processes in the Baldrige Criteria.  
Approach refers to: 
 the methods used to accomplish the process 
 the appropriateness of the methods to the Baldrige category item 
requirements and the organization’s operating environment 
 the effectiveness of the use of the methods 
 the degree to which the approach is repeatable and based on reliable data and 
information (i.e., systematic) (National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, 2011). 
Baldrige Criteria – The Baldrige Criteria for performance excellence is a framework 
that any organization can use to evaluate and improve overall organizational 
performance. Seven categories make up the award criteria (National Institute of 
Standards and Technology, 2011) : 
 Leadership—Examines how senior executives guide the organization and 
how the organization addresses its responsibilities to the public and practices 
good citizenship. 
 Strategic planning—Examines how the organization sets strategic directions 
and how it determines key action plans. 
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 Customer focus—Examines how the organization determines requirements 
and expectations of customers and markets; builds relationships with 
customers; and acquires, satisfies, and retains customers. 
 Measurement, analysis, and knowledge management—Examines the 
management, effective use, analysis, and improvement of data and 
information to support key organization processes and the organization’s 
performance management system. 
 Workforce focus—Examines how the organization enables its workforce to 
develop its full potential and how the workforce is aligned with the 
organization’s objectives. 
 Process management—Examines aspects of how key production/delivery 
and support processes are designed, managed, and improved. 
 Results—Examines the organization’s performance and improvement in its 
key business areas: customer satisfaction, financial and marketplace 
performance, human resources, supplier and partner performance, operational 
performance, and governance and social responsibility. The category also 
examines how the organization performs relative to competitors. 
The Baldrige Criteria are used by thousands of organizations of all kinds for self-
assessment and training and as a tool to develop and improve performance and business 
processes. Several million copies have been distributed since the first edition in 1988, 
and heavy reproduction and electronic access multiply that number many times (The 
Quality Texas Foundation, 2009). 
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For many organizations, using the Baldrige Criteria results in better employee 
relations, higher productivity, greater customer satisfaction, increased market share, and 
improved profitability. According to a report by the Conference Board, a business 
membership organization, “A majority of large U.S. firms have used the criteria of the 
Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Award for self-improvement, and the evidence 
suggests a long-term link between use of the Baldrige Criteria and improved business 
performance.”  
 Case Study – a form of qualitative research that is characterized by intensive, holistic 
description and analysis of a single unit or bounded system (Merriam, 1998). 
Crisis - events, often sudden or unexpected, that disrupt the normal operations of the 
institution or its educational mission and threaten the well-being of personnel, property, 
financial resources and/or the reputation of the institution, have occurred on campuses as 
long as there have been college campuses (Zdziarski, 2006). 
Crisis Management- effective crisis management involves minimizing potential risk 
before a triggering event.  In response to a triggering event, effective crisis management 
involves improvising and interacting by key stakeholders so that individual and 
collective sense making, shared meaning, and roles are reconstructed.  Following a 
triggering event, effective crisis management entails individual and organizational 
readjustment of basic assumptions, as well as behavioral and emotional responses aimed 
at recovery and readjustment (Pearson & Clair, 1998). 
Crisis Management Team – the team of Texas A&M University at Galveston 
administration, faculty, and staff who were charged with handling the preparation and 
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response to Hurricane Ike.  The Vice President and CEO, although not an assigned 
member of the crisis management team, shall be considered part of the team for this 
research due to considerable involvement in managing the crisis. 
Deployment – The second of four factors used to evaluate process in the Baldrige 
Criteria. Deployment refers to the extent to which: 
 the approach is applied in addressing Baldrige category Item requirements 
relevant and important to your organization 
 the approach is applied consistently 
 the approach is used (executed) by all appropriate work units (National 
Institute of Standards and Technology, 2011) 
Disaster – an unexpected event that disrupts normal operations of not only the 
institution but the surrounding community as well (Zdziarski, 2006). 
Engagement Level- The Quality Texas Foundation recognizes that Texas institutions 
may seek feedback and guidance along their journey to implementing and refining a 
management system for performance excellence. To assist such organizations, Quality 
Texas has developed four Criteria Levels that are designed to assess the degree to which 
an organization has developed and deployed sound, balanced approaches resulting in 
improved performance levels and trends.  The four levels are Engagement, Commitment, 
Progress, and Award.  The first level, Engagement Level, is for those organizations that 
have made a commitment to use performance improvement principles, but are early in 
their journey.  This level involves developing the Organizational Profile and responding 
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to the Engagement questions which are a much smaller subset of the full award level list 
of questions (The Quality Texas Foundation, 2009). 
Integration – the fourth of four factors used to evaluate process in the Baldrige Criteria.  
Integration refers to the extent to which: 
 your approach is aligned with your organizational needs identified in the 
Organizational Profile and other Process Items 
 your measures, information, and improvement systems are complementary 
across processes and work units 
 your plans, processes, results, analysis, learning, and actions are harmonized 
across processes and work units to support organization-wide goals(National 
Institute of Standards and Technology, 2011). 
Learning – the third of four factors used to evaluate process in the Baldrige Criteria. 
Learning refers to: 
 refining your approach through cycles of evaluation and improvement 
 encouraging breakthrough change to your approach through innovation 
 sharing refinements and innovations with other relevant work units and 
processes in your organization (National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, 2011). 
The Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Award - The Malcolm Baldrige National 
Quality Award is given by the President of the United States to businesses—
manufacturing and service, small and large—and to education, health care and nonprofit 
organizations that apply and are judged to be outstanding in seven areas: leadership; 
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strategic planning; customer and market focus; measurement, analysis, and knowledge 
management; workforce focus; process management; and results. 
Congress established the award program in 1987 to recognize U.S. organizations 
for their achievements in quality and performance and to raise awareness about the 
importance of quality and performance excellence as a competitive edge. The award is 
not given for specific products or services. Three awards may be given annually in each 
of these categories: manufacturing, service, small business, education, health care and 
nonprofit (National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2011). 
“While the Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Award and the Baldrige 
recipients are the very visible centerpiece of the U.S. quality movement, a broader 
national quality program has evolved around the award and its criteria. A report, 
Building on Baldrige: American Quality for the 21st Century, by the private Council on 
Competitiveness, said, “More than any other program, the Baldrige Quality Award is 
responsible for making quality a national priority and disseminating best practices across 
the United States.” 
The U.S. Commerce Department’s National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST) manages the Baldrige National Quality Program in close cooperation with the 
private sector” (National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2011). 
“The award was established because in the early and mid-1980s, many industry 
and government leaders saw that a renewed emphasis on quality was no longer an option 
for American companies but a necessity for doing business in an ever expanding, and 
more demanding, competitive world market. But many American businesses either did 
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not believe quality mattered for them or did not know where to begin. The Malcolm 
Baldrige National Quality Award was envisioned as a standard of excellence that would 
help U.S. organizations achieve world-class quality. 
The Baldrige Criteria have played a major role in achieving the goals established 
by Congress. They now are accepted widely, not only in the United States but also 
around the world, as the standard for performance excellence. The criteria are designed 
to help organizations enhance their competitiveness by focusing on two goals: delivering 
ever improving value to customers and improving overall organizational performance. 
The award program has proven to be a remarkably successful government and 
private-sector team effort. The annual government investment of about $8 million is 
leveraged by a contribution of over $100 million from private-sector and state and local 
organizations, including $10 million raised by private industry to help launch the 
program and the time and efforts of hundreds of largely private-sector volunteers. 
The cooperative nature of this joint government/private-sector team is perhaps best 
captured by the award’s Board of Examiners. Each year, more than 500 experts from 
industry, educational institutions, governments at all levels, and non-profit organizations 
volunteer many hours reviewing applications for the award, conducting site visits, and 
providing each applicant with an extensive feedback report citing strengths and 
opportunities to improve. In addition, board members have given thousands of 
presentations on quality management, performance improvement, and the Malcolm 
Baldrige National Quality Award” (National Institute of Standards and Technology, 
2011). 
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“The Baldrige Award winners also have taken seriously their charge to be quality 
advocates. Their efforts to educate and inform other companies and organizations on the 
benefits of using the Baldrige Award framework and criteria have far exceeded 
expectations. To date, the recipients have given tens of thousands of presentations 
reaching thousands of organizations” (National Institute of Standards and Technology, 
2011). 
 Texas A&M University at Galveston – One of two satellite campuses of Texas A&M 
University, Texas A&M University at Galveston (TAMUG) is a small campus of about 
1900 students with a focus on marine and maritime studies.  
Texas Award for Performance Excellence – Patterned after the Malcolm Baldrige 
National Quality Award, the Texas Award for Performance Excellence is an annual 
recognition of Texas organizations that excel in performance, quality, and customer 
satisfaction.  The benefits of participation are in the self-assessment that occurs during 
application, and the extensive feedback report prepared for the applicant by a team of 
trained, certified examiners who review and analyze the application (The Quality Texas 
Foundation, 2011). 
 
Assumptions 
1. Administrators, faculty, and staff will understand the purpose of the study and 
will answer the questions honestly and to the best of their ability. 
2. The researcher will be impartial in collecting and analyzing the data gathered. 
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3. The Malcolm Baldrige Criteria for Performance Excellence system is an 
effective system to assess crisis management. 
 
Limitations 
1. Findings from this study may not be generalized beyond Texas A&M University 
at Galveston. 
2. Objectivity of the responses in the interviews may be biased by interviewees who 
perceive that their performance during the crisis is being assessed. 
3. After two years, accurate recollection of events may have faded to some extent. 
4. The Performance Management system being used to assess the management 
decisions are typically used during standard business practice situations, and may 
demonstrate some gaps in assessing management decisions made in a crisis 
situation (ie. necessary decisions made with lack of proper time and/or data) 
 
Significance of the Study 
As long as there are college campuses, there will be crises on those campuses.  
Furthermore as colleges and universities continue to grow, so does the variety and 
severity of the crises facing them.  Universities have realized this fact and assembled 
crisis management teams who further develop Critical Incident Response Teams and 
Behavioral Intervention Teams, who attend seminars and conferences, and are ready to 
respond to their institution’s next impending crisis.  When the crisis occurs, the crisis 
management team addresses it the best way it can. 
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 But was the crisis managed successfully?  What determines success?  What data 
set best demonstrates that success?  Whereas it is impossible to standardize all crises to 
compare and contrast what is success versus failure, there are certain performance 
management systems that may allow crisis management teams to assess their 
performance under national quality standards.  Many researchers have documented what 
actions were taken during and shortly after a crisis, but the Baldrige Criteria allow for a 
much more robust and systemic assessment of all aspects of the organization during 
crisis management. 
Texas A&M University at Galveston was forced to literally shut down the 
campus for a semester after Hurricane Ike hit Galveston in Fall, 2008.  Within two 
weeks after the hurricane hit, 92% of the student body was re-enrolled on the main 
campus of Texas A&M University in College Station (referred to as TAMU- College 
Station hereafter), Texas with no additional cost to the student and no loss of academic 
credit.  The students were able to return to Galveston the next semester and now two 
years later, the students are still on track academically and enrollment at the campus is at 
record levels, as if the storm never hit.  This study will examine the management 
decisions made during that time of crisis in order to identify lessons learned and further 
the understanding of crisis management in higher education. 
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CHAPTER II  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The Study of Crisis 
 Crisis is not a new phenomenon.  In fact one could easily argue that as long as 
mankind has been on earth, there has been crisis.  And just as mankind has evolved to 
live in the complex and diverse societies of today, the variety, breadth and depth of crisis 
has expanded at a dramatic rate as well.  Consider the following examples: 
 
 On September 11, 2001, 19 militants associated with the Islamic extremist group 
al-Qaeda hijacked four airliners and carried out suicide attacks against targets in 
the United States. With planes being crashed into the World Trade Center, the 
Pentagon, and a field in Pennsylvania, the attacks resulted in over 3,000 people 
being killed, including more than 400 police officers and firefighters.  In 
addition, the world’s financial industry, much of it headquartered at the World 
Trade Center, was thrown into chaos. (History.com) 
 
 British Petroleum’s oil rig, the Deepwater Horizon, was drilling for oil in depths 
of over a mile when a gas bubble caused the rig to explode, killing eleven men on 
board.  Although the technology for drilling in deep water was rapidly 
developing, the technology for handling deep water crises had not kept up.  
Before the well would be capped nearly three months later, 4.9 million gallons of 
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crude oil would gush into the Gulf of Mexico creating a state of emergency that 
covered nearly 500 miles of coast line and the entire Gulf of Mexico (Bourne, 
2010). 
   
 NASA’s shuttle program began in the 1970’s to develop reusable craft to 
transport cargo into space.  The Challenger was the second ship in a fleet of four 
that represented the pinnacle of American ingenuity and determination.  On 
January 28, 1986, the Challenger lifted off to take a teacher into space along with 
assorted cargo and experiments, only to explode seventy three seconds into the 
mission, killing all seven crew members and sending the United States Space 
program into turmoil (space.about.com) 
 
 The Enron Corporation was an American energy, commodities and service 
company that employed over 20,000 employees and claimed revenues of over 
$101 billion.  After being named America’s Most Innovative company for six 
consecutive years, wide spread fraud was discovered causing the company and 
many others associated with it to spin into bankruptcy and dissolution.  (Thomas, 
2002) 
 
 Greece has slowly accumulated debt to the point where their debt far exceeds 
their annual Gross Domestic Product.  In response to the threat of default, the 
international banks and lenders have increased the interest rates to unsustainable 
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levels and refused to loan further until Greece reigns in their debt and 
entitlements.  The Greek political system is in a logjam with citizens protesting 
the proposed cuts and the threat of Greece defaulting affecting financial systems 
around the world.  
 
 On December 26, 2004, a magnitude nine earthquake struck off the course of 
Indonesia creating a tsunami that struck thirteen countries.  Over 226,000 people 
were killed with another 500,000 injured.  Estimated cost of aid and 
reconstruction is over $7.5 billion.  (Pickrell, 2005) 
 
From terrorism, environmental, scientific, financial, political to natural disasters, crisis 
can occur in any arena, and if not managed effectively, the devastation and ramifications 
can extend beyond borders and even generations.  Although these are major examples of 
disasters that created an impact at least at the national, and often at the world, level, 
crisis most often strikes at the organizational level and can strike from a surprising 
variety of directions.  Pearson and Clair (1998) composed a well cited array of 
organizational crises in Table 1. 
 Yet even with the alarming and often devastating history of wide-ranging crises 
that have impacted mankind throughout time, the study of crisis and, perhaps more 
importantly, the study of crisis management is a fairly new discipline.  The study of 
crisis management in general is a relatively young field that really only began to be 
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discussed in the 1970’s (Coombs, 2012; Pauchant & Mitroff, 1992).  Many researchers 
attribute the 1982 poisonings of Tylenol capsules with cyanide in a suburb outside of 
  
Table 1. An Array of Organizational Crises 
 Extortion  Bribery 
 Hostile takeover  Information sabotage 
 Product tampering  Workplace bombing 
 Vehicular fatality  Terrorist attack 
 Copyright infringement  Plant explosion 
 Environmental spill  Sexual harassment 
 Computer tampering  Escape of hazardous materials 
 Executive kidnapping  Personnel assault 
 Product/services boycott  Assault of customers 
 Work-related homicide  Product recall 
 Malicious rumor  Counterfeiting 
 Natural disaster that disrupts a 
major product or service 
 Natural disaster that destroys 
corporate headquarters 
 Natural disaster that destroys 
organizational information base 
 Natural disaster that eliminates key 
stakeholders 
 
 
 
Chicago as the event that significantly kick started the field and initiated the beginnings 
of the modern field of study ( Mitroff, Diamond, & Alpaslan, 2006).  Although most of 
the crisis management literature originated from the business sector, particularly from 
the fields of management, organizational behavior, and public relations, crisis 
management has become prominent in other fields as well including communications, 
public administration, education, political science, and psychology (Harper, Paterson, & 
Zdziarski, 2006).  Understandably, as with many new areas of research, these studies 
lack adequate integration with one another, but even further, the very cross-disciplinary 
nature of crisis management itself has specifically contributed to this lack of integration 
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(Shrivastava, 1993).  This is problematic for a number of reasons.  For one, there is no 
common or agreed upon theoretical construct for crisis management (Zdziarski, Dunkel, 
Rollo, & Assoc., 2007; Pearson &Clair, 1998; Auerbach & Kilmann, 1977; Hermann, 
1972).  In fact, although all of the various disciplines agree upon the general concept of 
crisis management, there is not even a standard or widely accepted definition of crisis 
(Zdziarski, E., Dunkel, N., Rollo, M., & Assoc. 2007; Coombs, 2012; Hermann, 1972; 
Levitt, 1997).  Instead each discipline has promulgated the field through its own distinct 
lens or perspective which has led to a “fragmentation” of the broad field of crisis 
management literature (Coombs, 2012).  Further complicating the field, some scholars 
incorporate a multidisciplinary approach (Pearson &Clair, 1998; Shrivastava, Mitroff, 
Miller, and Miglani, 1988; Staw, Sandelands, & Dutton,1981) whereas many others 
analyze the causes, consequences, and management of organizational crisis from a single 
disciplinary frame (Shrivastava, 1993).  In many ways, this evolution has created a 
“Tower of Babel” effect with “many different disciplinary voices, talking in different 
languages to different issues and audiences” (Shrivastava, 1993: 33) about the same 
important topic: organizational crisis (Pearson & Clair, 1998). 
 However in reviewing the literature, there are certain recurring themes that are 
common throughout the disciplines.  For one, crises are perceptual.  Although few would 
dispute that a hurricane or industrial accident can be considered a crisis event, it is truly 
up to the stakeholders’ perception of the event to help define any event as a crisis 
(Coombs, 2012).   This is particularly true when crises violate expectations that 
stakeholders hold about how organizations should act.  Planes should land safely, 
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products should not harm us, management should not steal money, and organizations 
should reflect societal values (Coombs. 2012).  As a result, crises are most often 
characterized as highly ambiguous situations where causes and effects are unknown that 
could potentially negatively impact the stakeholders of an organization (Abent, 1999; 
Albrecht, 1996; Fink, 1986; Hermann, 1972; Holsti, 1978; Kovoor-Misra, 1995; 
Lerbinger, 1997; Pauchant & Mitroff, 1992; Phelps, 1986; Quarantelli, 1988).  
Depending on the nature and extent of the crisis, these threats can target an 
organization’s mission and goals (Hermann, 1972; Holsti, 1978; Kovoor-Misra, 1995); 
its financial stability ( Levitt, 1997); its reputation (Abent, 1999; Barton, 2001; 
Lerbinger, 1997); or in the most significant crisis situation, the entire organization 
existence can be at risk (Albrecht, 1996; Pauchant & Mitroff, 1992; Shrivastava, Mitroff, 
Miller, & Miglani, 1988).  Of course organizations are not the only things at risk from 
crises.  Crises threaten people and property as well and may include death or injury, 
damage to facilities or harm to the environment (Harper, Paterson, & Zdziarski, 2006).   
 Another prevalent theme relates to the suddenness of crises which often occur 
without warning (Barton, 1993; Coombs, 2012; Hermann, 1972, Holsti, 1978; Phelps, 
1986).  A crisis incident is unpredictable, but not always unexpected.  Well-managed 
organizations know that crisis will eventually strike their organization; they just do not 
know when.  Crises can be anticipated, but most crises strike suddenly, giving them an 
element of surprise or unpredictability (Barton, 2001; Coombs, 2012; National Research 
Council, 1996, Zdziarski, E., Dunkel, N., Rollo, M., & Assoc. 2007).  Others can give a 
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great deal of warning (Coombs, 2012; Irvine & Millar, 1996).  The most obvious 
examples of this are hurricanes which are often known days before they strike. 
  A third element commonly associated with crisis is the growing complexity of 
modern crisis.  As organizations have evolved and their systems have become more 
entwined, crises have become much more expansive and difficult to manage (Boin, 
2004; Coombs, 2012; Kouzman & Haynes, 1999; Mitroff, 2001, Rosenthal, 1998).  The 
modern crisis requires collective capabilities far beyond the technical realm (Rosenthal, 
1998).  Arjen Boin and Patrick Lagadec (2000) describe this growing complexity as “ 
the result of many converging factors: specific risks that are increasingly difficult to 
evaluate, large systems consisting of entangled networks with a hitherto unknown 
complexity, the immediate ‘mediatisation’ of incidents, abrupt changes in collective 
perceptions and social demands suddenly condemning what was hitherto tolerated.  
Every local dysfunctionality, even if apparently harmless, has the potential, often 
unsuspected, to develop into a trans-boundary crisis” (p.186).  This changing nature of 
crisis appears to be a logical development considering such long-term trends as 
globalization, increased mass communication (“inter-wiredness”), social fragmentation, 
and the coupling of ever-larger, more complex systems continue to increase. 
 Another element closely associated to the last two themes of surprise and 
complexity is the urgency of response (Birch, 1994; Zdziarski, E., Dunkel, N., Rollo, M., 
& Assoc. 2007).  Managers and administrators must be prepared to respond before a 
crisis evolves and expands.  Massive advances in communications technology and the 24 
hour news cycle have resulted in an environment with an extremely limited response 
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time.  When thousands died at Bhopal, India in the worst industrial accident in history, 
there was no CNN to break the news worldwide in minutes, or even a fax line between 
Union Carbide’s headquarters in Danbury, Connecticut and Bhopal (Birch, 1994).  Now 
stakeholders expect to be notified within moments of crisis, and failure to do so 
potentially invites further crises.  Indeed, every crisis is capable of being the cause and 
effect of other crises within the organization (Mitroff, 2001) 
Another common theme that is prevalent in the literature relates to the disruptive 
nature of crisis events which have the potential to significantly interfere with the normal 
operations of an organization (Harper, Paterson, & Zdziarski, 2006; Pauchant & Mitroff, 
1992; Seymour & Moore, 2000).  Seymour and Moore (2000) focus on the disruptive 
nature of crisis as “the disruption of normal patterns of corporate activity by a sudden or 
overpowering and initially uncontrollable event” (p.10).  Other researchers have 
proposed to differentiate levels of crisis based on the level of disruption so as to clarify 
terminology and conceptual distinctions.  By acknowledging that scale of any collective 
crisis has to be taken into account in any analysis, researchers are able to differentiate 
between the largest community disasters, referred to as catastrophes, which are a 
qualitative jump over disasters, which are just as distinct from everyday emergencies 
(Quarantelli, 2006).  Obviously as the scale of destruction increases, the potential for 
more and less familiar agencies to become involved with the organization, resulting in 
potentially more public private interface and greater loss of autonomy and freedom of 
action, which all further compound the disruption of normal activities (Quarantelli, 
2006).  
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Yet another common theme is the belief that crises present a dilemma in need of 
a decision or judgment that will result in change for better or worse (Aguilera, 1990; 
Pearson & Clair, 1998; Slaikeu, 1990).  Although crises are generally perceived 
negatively, many companies have taken advantage of crisis to improve their 
organization’s standing.  The Chinese have longed believed in the positive potential of 
crisis.  In fact, the symbol of their word “crisis” – called wei-ji – is actually a 
combination of two words, “danger” and “opportunity” (Fink, 1986).  
 
A Definition of Crisis 
 Webster’s Dictionary defines crisis as “a stage in a sequence of events at 
which the trend of all future events, especially for better or for worse, is determined; 
turning point.; a condition of instability or danger, as in social, economic, political, or 
international affairs, leading to a decisive change (p.307).  Through the various 
disciplines, a number of other definitions of crisis have evolved.  The three most 
frequently cited include: 
 A crisis is “an unstable time or state of affairs in which a decisive change is 
impending- either one with the distinct possibility of a highly undesirable outcome or 
one with a distinct possibility of a highly desirable and extremely positive outcome 
(Fink, 1986, p.15). 
 A crisis is “a disruption that physically affects a system as a whole and threatens its 
basic assumptions, its subjective sense of self, its existential core” (Pauchant & 
Mitroff, 1992, p.12). 
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 A crisis is “a major unpredictable event that has potentially negative results.  The 
event and its aftermath may significantly damage an organization and its employees, 
products, services financial condition and reputation.” (Barton, !993, p.2). 
These definitions were put forth by some of the earliest and most prolific writers in the 
field of crisis management. More recently, two other definitions that reference the 
current themes of research are also receiving a lot of attention.  In a seminal work by 
Christine Pearson and Judith Clair (1998), they consolidated the current elements of 
crisis research and established “an organizational crisis is a low-probability, high-impact 
event that threatens the viability of the organization and is characterized by ambiguity of 
cause, effect, and means of resolution, as well as by a belief that decisions must be made 
swiftly” (p.60).   Several years later, Gene Zdziarski (2006) refined the definition further 
in applying it to the field of higher education.  He defined crisis as “an event, which is 
often sudden or unexpected, that disrupts the normal operations of the institution or its 
educational mission and threatens the well- being of personnel, property, financial 
resources, and/or reputation of the institution” (p.5).  This is the definition that will be 
utilized for the purpose of this paper. 
 
Crisis in the Academy 
 Crises are not new to colleges and universities.  Dating back to the 1906 San 
Francisco earthquake, Stanford University has struggled through a number of 
earthquakes, floods and other calamities (Loftus, 1999). Early on, many of these crises 
resulted from natural disasters that impacted the surrounding community, but as 
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campuses have grown and diversified to become their own little cities, so have the types 
of crises to include a wide array of incidents and tragedies.  Consider the following 
examples: 
 Seung-Hui Cho, a student who had been diagnosed as mentally ill, stalks the 
campus of Virginia Tech killing 32 people and wounding another 25.  Often 
called Higher Education’s 9/11, his four hour rampage on April 16, 2007 is still 
the deadliest shooting incident in U.S. history involving a single gunman 
(Rinehart, 2007).  
 Hurricane Katrina was one of the greatest natural disasters to ever strike the 
United States.  Although the eye of the storm narrowly missed the city of New 
Orleans, the failure of three levees resulted in 80% of the city being flooded.  
Tulane University’s president must cancel the Fall semester for the university’s 
12,000 students, but reopening in the Spring is critical for the university’s 
continued existence.  It seems an impossible task to reopen a university in an 
area that is so completely devastated that operations must be headquartered in 
Houston nearly 350 miles away (Selingo, 2005; Krane, Kahn, Et al, 2007). 
 A student is found badly beaten and tied to a fence in sub-freezing temperatures.  
Further investigation reveals that the young man is a student at the University of 
Wyoming who was targeted because he was gay.  The student, Matthew 
Shepard, soon dies of his injuries, leaving a grief stricken campus struggling to 
deal with a hate crime in their very midst (Hurst, 1999). 
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 Texas A&M University’s student Bonfire is no small trash heap.  A mammoth 
project where students spend weekends throughout the Fall cutting down full 
grown trees with axes to stack together for the annual burning, the bonfire has 
reached as high as 109 feet.  Scaled back to 55 feet and built in wedding cake-
like tiers, the student spirit activity became deadly when the structure collapsed 
early one morning in November 1999, killing twelve and injuring another 27, 
some very seriously (Harper, Paterson, & Zdziarski, 2006). 
 A young University of Colorado coed reports being raped by a football player 
during a party in her apartment.  Within a short amount of time, several other 
women came forward to report other sexual assaults by football players.  Soon 
rumors of hired strippers and booze laden parties for the football team and 
potential recruits begin to surface, depicting a football program completely out 
of control (Johnson, Sink, & Pennington, 2004).  The toll on the university is 
significant.  Not only is the president forced to resign, but admissions are down 
in the immediately following years for out of state students (19%) and Colorado 
students (4%) (Mitroff, Diamond, & Alpaslan, 2006) 
These are just a select few of the varied examples of major crises occurring at our 
institutions of higher education.  Beyond these, Ian Mitroff, Michael Diamond, and 
Murat Alpaslan (2006) further describe “the widespread and perennial crises such as 
grade tampering; the alteration of key files and student records; computer hacking; major 
fires and explosions; student unrest; civil disturbances; confrontations, sometimes 
violent, between students of different political, religious, and ideological viewpoints; 
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ethical breeches by top administrators, faculty, and students; the fraudulent use of tutors 
by student athletes; the stealing of body parts from university medical schools and so 
on” (p.1).  Furthermore, when crimes and other crises occur on the college campus, the 
world treats them differently from the way it treats such events when they occur off 
campus- whether or not they involve students.  Campus crises are looked at, rightly or 
wrongly, as the institution’s problem (Siegel, 1991).   
Yet despite the long and very diverse history of crises affecting colleges and 
universities, the study of crisis and crisis management in higher education is still a 
relatively new phenomenon, and they are only now becoming prepared (Dolan, 2006).  
Hartzog (1981) was one of the first to research crisis preparedness at institutions of 
higher education.  His study analyzed four year public institutions with an enrollment of 
at least 5,000 students to assess their activity in planning for crises.  The study looked at 
four planning elements: 1) objectives, 2) strategies, policies, and plans, 3) organization, 
and 4) review and evaluation.  The study found that mid-size to very large institutions 
were actively engaged in emergency management planning whereas smaller institutions 
with fewer resources were not. 
Over a decade later, Wilson (1992) analyzed the crisis management processes at 
three institutions of higher education.  Wilson hoped to determine: 1) whether a crisis 
management plan had been developed, 2) how the existence, or lack thereof, of a crisis 
management plan affected the decision-making before, during and after a crisis, 3) the 
nature of the crisis management plans, and 4) whether these institutions were more likely 
to develop a new or redesign their current plan after actually experiencing a crisis.    Not 
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surprising, the study found that the pre-existing crisis management plans were fairly 
inadequate in meeting the needs of the institution once they were actually in crisis. 
It was not until Zdziarski’s (2001) study nearly another decade later that another 
truly comprehensive study was conducted concerning crisis management in higher 
education.   Zdziarski surveyed student affairs administrators who were members of the 
National Association of Student Personnel Administrators (NASPA) and worked at 
institutions with at least an 8,000 student enrollment concerning the four critical factors 
put forth in an earlier study concerning crisis management in the private sector.  The 
four factors associated with organizational crisis preparedness were types, phases, 
systems, and stakeholders (Mitroff, et al., 1996).  The study found that many of the 146 
colleges and universities that participated considered themselves to be prepared for a 
campus crisis.  The nature of the study prevented the researcher from determining 
whether the institutions were actually prepared versus feeling prepared (Zdziarski, 
2001). 
This notion was further reinforced when in the fall of 2004, Ian Mitroff, Michael 
Diamond, and Murat Alpaslan (2006) distributed a survey to the provosts of 350 major 
U.S. colleges and universities that identified fourteen types of crises that had previously 
been determined to most likely affect institutions of higher education.  They received a 
33% response rate of 117 institutions with a fairly broad range of responding institutions 
(36% urban, 39% suburban and 24% rural; 41% private and 59% public).  The average 
number of undergraduate students was 9,700, of professional or master’s students 3000, 
and of doctoral students 1200.  In addition the average budget was nearly half a billion 
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dollars.  The provosts were asked to indicate how prepared their institution was for any 
of fourteen ‘most likely” crises.  In addition, they were also asked which of the fourteen 
potential crises their institution had actually experienced.  The results for these two 
questions are listed and compared in Table 2 and demonstrate that the surveyed colleges 
and universities were quite often only prepared for those crises that they had already 
experienced and were often under prepared for other crises that they frequently 
experienced. 
   
Table 2. Preparation for and Experience of Crises 
 Preparation Experienced Diff=Exp-Prep 
Fires 1 (highest) 1 0 
Lawsuits 2 2 0 
Crimes 3 3 0 
Environmental Disasters 4 12 +8 
Athletic Scandals 5 11 +6 
Natural Disasters 6 7 +1 
Outbreaks 7 5 -2 
Revenue Shortfalls 8 4 -4 
Reputation 9 6 -3 
Ethical Problems 10 9 -1 
Data Loss 11 8 -3 
Data Tampering 12 14 +2 
Sabotage 13 9 -4 
Terrorism 
 
14 (lowest) 13 -1 
 
 
 
The survey demonstrated that the crises that were experienced the most –fires, lawsuits, 
and crimes- were also the crises for which they were best prepared.  This pattern changes 
significantly with environmental disasters and athletic scandals which were the fourth 
and fifth most prepared even though they were among the least experienced.  Mitroff, 
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Diamond, and Alpaslan indicated that this information could be interpreted in several 
ways: 
“We could conclude that the surveyed institutions over prepared for, say, 
environmental disasters (such as the release of toxic chemicals). But given the 
importance of these crises and their potential impact on campuses and 
surrounding communities, it could very well be that preparation for them 
substantially lowered their frequency of occurrence.  A third explanation is that 
the state and federal laws mandate most colleges and universities to prepare for 
environmental disasters and that the regulations are working, in that the number 
of such disasters is relatively low in the surveyed institutions. Similarly, the 
experience of athletic scandals was comparably low, a somewhat surprising 
finding given the prominence of several recent cases in the national news, 
Nonetheless, preparation for these scandals has been high, possibly in light of the 
media coverage.  At the same time, there are several important types of crises 
that were frequently experienced but not prepared for.  These tended to be softer 
areas such as reputation and ethics, as well as non-physical crises such as data 
loss and sabotage.  They represent areas in which the survey colleges and 
universities have gaps in their crisis-management plans. What emerges clearly 
from these data is that few of the surveyed institutions have broad based crisis 
management plans” (p.5). 
  
Obviously it impossible to prepare for every conceivable eventuality, but pro-active 
organizations typically attempt to be prepared for at least one set of risks in each of the 
fourteen major categories (Mitroff, Diamond, & Alpaslan, 2006).  
 The terrorist attacks of 9/11 had brought heightened attention to crisis 
management in higher education, leading colleges and universities to develop disaster 
plans and even hire emergency coordinator positions (Lipka, 2005).  However as pointed 
out in the Mitroff et al. study in 2006, many of the plans and strategies were responsive 
in nature, identifying specific steps to respond to limited and specific crises and unable 
in their specificity to handle the complexity of institutional operations. For instance, the 
University of Southern California was described as “operating twenty different 
businesses, including food preparation and services, hotel services, retail outlets, health-
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care facilities, sports events, and many other activities besides teaching and scholarship 
(each of which has its own sub-“businesses” such as distance education with each of 
these activities presenting the university with different risks” (Mitroff, Diamond, & 
Alpaslan, 2006). Edward Foote, president of the University of Miami during the 
Hurricane Andrew crisis suggests that quite often further complicating the crises 
response for academic administrators is the complexity involved in the shared leadership 
across the various constituencies across the institution (Foote, 1996).  Simply put, most 
colleges and universities were unprepared to effectively and efficiently manage disasters 
or complex crises that threatened them (Dolan, 2006; Cavanaugh, 2006; Marsh, Carlson, 
& Irons, 2010). 
However within the next few years, two major crises, Hurricane Katrina in 2005 
and the Virginia Tech massacre in 2007, would finally move college administrators to 
put aside their old disaster plans and work to develop crisis management plans (Mann, 
2007).  Sara Lipka (2005) writes “Hurricane Katrina was an unprecedented disaster for 
higher education.  It forced full institutional closures longer than any on record, and it 
ravaged a whole region of colleges and universities….Katrina taught colleges new 
lessons: to plan for the possibility of extended shutdowns and to look beyond their 
neighbors for assistance” (p.A28).  College and University administrators across the 
nation followed the impact of Katrina as many campuses worked to accommodate 
displaced students from the devastated Gulf Coast schools.  With the ever present media 
providing real-time reporting, Katrina became a real time lesson on potential challenges 
facing schools in a disaster.  Evolving institutional challenges such as the time frame for 
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bringing campus facilities back on line, the successful recruitment of next year’s classes, 
the evaluation of the financial impact of the losses, the assessment of the strength of 
insurance coverage, and the ability to restore the campus infrastructure including 
sanitation, clean water, and the power supply were played in the media across the world 
(Mann, 2007).  In response to the media exposure, Michael F. Middaugh, president of 
the Society for College and University Planning and assistant vice president for 
institutional research and planning at the University of Delaware states, “I would be 
amazed if there was an institution in this country that’s not going back and reviewing its 
disaster policy” (Lipka, 2005).  At the same time, researchers began to pay more 
attention to the field as well. Johnson (2007) conducted a comparative analysis of the 
disaster recovery efforts of two institutions that had endured catastrophes – Hurricane 
Ivan striking the University of West Florida and Hurricane Katrina’s devastating effect 
on Tulane University.  She identified six strategies that contributed to a successful 
recovery as well as four actions.  The strategies include 1) prepare for disaster in 
advance, 2) quick and decisive leadership, 3) work to maintain your employee base, 4) 
use multiple channels of communication, 5) empower your key people, and 6) think 
creatively about academics.  The study’s recommended actions included 1) establish an 
alternative campus site, 2) reach out to partners and vendors, 3) gain rapid access to data 
and information, and 4) implement immediate remediation (Johnson, 2007). Many of 
these strategies had been common in the private sector but now were being applied 
directly to higher education (Barton, 2001; Cavanaugh, 2006; Coombs, 2012). 
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The more recent crisis at Virginia Tech further encouraged senior campus 
officials to engage in an ongoing evaluation of institutional assessment and preparedness 
and consider a more comprehensive and collaborative approach to emergency planning 
(Mann, 2007). Several new strategies came out of the Virginia Tech tragedy that could 
be applied to any crisis.  These items included the development and even requirement of 
institutional communications systems that could provide immediate and effective 
notification to community members, behavioral intervention teams, the evaluation and 
development of a university’s ability to shut down a campus, and lastly the institutional 
and public policy environment for effectively managing students with serious mental 
health concerns; specifically with regards to what information can be shared and the 
associated risk assessment perspective for the student and community (Mann, 2007).  
However most importantly, the tragedy reinforced the message that had come out of 
Katrina and was stated in the Report to the President of Virginia Tech regarding their 
recommendation for a crisis management system – “ any system needs to be dynamic in 
nature to adjust to the changes that continually emerge from the needs of the university 
community and the new lessons learned from on-going evaluation of the system and the 
best practices of our peers” (Rinehart, 2007).  Catullo (2008) had investigated whether 
the crisis preparedness had changed since the 9/11 tragedy but prior to the Virginia Tech 
massacre.  Chief student affairs officers at doctoral degree granting institutions with over 
5,000 students and residence halls were surveyed relative to their campus’ preparedness.  
Once again as Zdziarski (2001) had found, the senior student affairs officers perceived 
themselves prepared to handle various types of crises.  The findings were significant in 
 34 
 
that it demonstrated that university officials were looking at crises from a broader 
standpoint and were especially focusing on issues originating from the residence halls 
(Catullo, 2008).   
Within the past few years, research into the crisis management processes of 
higher education has grown with many of the more recent research filling in some of the 
broad gaps left between the scarce previous research findings.  For example, Jenkins 
(2008) explored factors affecting crisis preparedness among Texas community colleges 
with a residential population and found that most had not developed adequate crisis 
response plans.  Chun (2008) analyzed seven four year residential institutions in 
Northern California and found that considerable progress was being made in sharing best 
practices in collaborating with outside agencies.  Burrell (2009) duplicated Zdziarski’s 
2001 survey with a focus on small Christian affiliated institutions of higher education 
versus the larger public schools of the original study.  Seventy seven presidents returned 
the questionnaire with the majority reporting that they perceived their university to be 
well prepared for crises.   Jones (2010) focused on the leadership aspect of crisis 
management in his study of the Hurricane Katrina response by various leaders in the 
community.  Although not directly utilizing college/university leaders, the study 
identified key attributes that are critical in crisis leadership.  Just as crises are not limited 
to one industry, neither are the lessons that can be learned isolated to a single industry.  
Higher education as an industry has begun to look to best practices and other industries 
to re-shape their crisis management systems to better plan for and manage crises. 
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The Crisis Management Team 
 The first step in the process of successful crisis management is the selection of a 
crisis management team (Barton, 2006; Coombs, 2012; Gonzalez-Herrero & Pratt, 1995; 
Kovoor-Misra, 1995; Mitroff, Pearson, & Harrington, 1996; Pauchant, & Mitroff, 1992; 
Sherwood & McKelfresh, 2007). The use of crisis management teams is generally 
considered best practice in crisis management literature (Mitroff, Pearson, & Harrington, 
1996).  As Spillan (2003) states “There are very convincing arguments supporting the 
formation of crisis management teams which can take charge of planning for a crisis 
before it occurs, as well as managing the problems that emerge during a crisis” (p.162).  
The effectiveness of the crisis team is critical to minimizing the impact of the crisis on 
the organization (Reader & Seacroft, 1999).  Andy Podolak (2002) states “every crisis 
management program starts with a competent crisis management team (p.1). A crisis 
management team is typically charged with three primary duties: 1. developing and 
maintaining a crisis management plan; 2. implementing the plan; and 3. dealing with any 
contingencies that are not addressed by the plan (Coombs, 2012; Harper, Paterson, & 
Zdziarski, 2006).  Furthermore, crisis teams are operational in nature so determining 
who should be placed on the team is of great importance (Reader & Seacroft, 1999).  
The specific makeup of a crisis management team will primarily depend upon the culture 
and dynamics of an organization (Harper, Paterson, & Zdziarski, 2006).  In most 
organizations, membership on the crisis management team is determined by position and 
area of responsibility/functional area (Coombs, 2012).  Some organizations advocate 
using a stakeholder analysis to determine which internal stakeholders have the necessary 
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authority over the critical areas of the institution. (Harper, Paterson, & Zdziarski, 2006).  
In Zdziarski’s 2001 study, it was determined that stakeholders with the greatest level of 
involvement in their crisis management process were university police, university 
relations/public information office, vice president for student affairs, residence life, 
student counseling services, dean of students, student health services, physical plant, and 
environmental health and safety (Zdziarski, 2001).   
Functional areas are not the only factors that should be considered (Barton, 2006; 
Coombs, 2012; Zdziarski, Dunkel, Rollo, & Associates, 2007).  Crisis team members 
should also have a general set of crisis management skills (Shrivastava & Mitroff, 1987).  
In the recent book, Campus Crisis Management, the authors, Zdziarski, Dunkel, Rollo, 
and Associates, describe several criteria that should be considered in determining 
membership on the crisis management team: 
 Institutional criteria –The size and setting of an institution can play a huge role.  
Simply smaller institutions may need to go outside their organization to secure 
expertise such as mental health professionals.  Also location can play a huge role 
as there are typically more security issues at urban institutions which could 
necessitate security personnel playing a larger role on the team. 
 Availability – Team members must not only be available to work on the crisis 
management plan but also must be available during times of crisis.  Quite often 
back ups are identified as part of the contingency planning. 
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 Knowledge of resources – Team members must be aware of campus and 
community resources as well as the organizational structures necessary to access 
those resources. 
 Team Player mindset – Team cohesion will always improve member 
performance under stress and individual ego must be set aside to develop creative 
solutions. 
 Trainability – Team members may often need to work in areas outside their 
normal realm of expertise, so a commitment to train and review new protocols 
can be very advantageous. 
 Diversity communication skills – Different perspectives are valued.  The goal is 
to create an opportunity to explore a variety of solutions in a timely manner. 
 Assessment skills – Team members must be able to assess the crisis and develop 
a strategic response.  Also as the crisis recovery winds down, the ability to assess 
and learn from the crisis is critical. 
 Motivation to serve – Dealing with crisis can result in extremely long hours in 
very stressful situations.  It is important to have crisis team members who are 
dedicated to the institution.   
 Personality Type – Stable extroverted individuals are better suited to crisis 
response work.  Good listening and processing skills and the confidence level to 
make decisions expeditiously are important. 
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 Territorial issues – Institutions that are large complex organizations can have 
territorial issues come into play.  It is important that there is clear designation of 
who is in charge. (Zdziarski, Dunkel, Rollo, & Associates, 2007) 
Once the team has been identified and assembled, they can begin working on the 
institution’s crisis management plan. 
 
The Process of Crisis Management 
 As long as there have been crises, there have been plans to manage them.  
Sometimes they were simple strategies to help mitigate crisis.  General Tam Dalyell, 
commander in chief of the royal forces in seventeenth-century Scotland, wore square toe 
riding boots that could be worn on either foot so that the boots could be pulled on in a 
sudden crisis without losing precious time (Fink, 1986).  More often, they were 
reactionary instructions on how to respond if certain things occurred, a certain set of 
actions (Harper, Paterson, & Zdziarski, 2006).  Chuck Novak, manager of corporate 
communications for United Airlines and key member of their crisis management team, 
described how in the early days when the airlines were still trying to convince people of 
the safety of their airplanes, the first job of the guy in the field was to rush to the crash 
scene with a bucket of white paint and obliterate the name of the airline before the 
photographers showed up.  He stated that was one of the first things written down in 
their emergency management plan (Fink, 1986).   
 Today, crisis management is a systemic, multi-phase continuous process (Abent, 
1999; Augustine, 2000; Barton, 2006; Coombs, 2012; Dorn, 2001; Federal Emergency 
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Management Administration, 2003; Gonzalez-Herrero & Pratt, 1995; Guth, 1995; 
Kovoor-Misra, 1995; Mitroff, Diamond, & Alpaslan, 2006; Smith & Elliot, 2006; 
Zdziarski, Dunkel, Rollo, & Assoc., 2007).  Pearson & Clair (1998) state “effective 
crisis management involves minimizing potential risk before a triggering event, effective 
crisis management involves improvising and interacting by key stakeholders so that 
individual and collective sense making, shared meaning, and roles are reconstructed.  
Following a triggering event, effective crisis management entails individual and 
organizational readjustment of basic assumptions, as well as behavioral and emotional 
responses aimed at recovery and readjustment” (p. 66).  Several crisis management 
processes have been developed to achieve this objective.  The most basic crisis 
management system is a three phase process that is broken into pre-crisis, crisis, and 
post crisis stages (Birch, 1994; Coombs, 2012; Guth, 1995; Kovoor-Misra, 1995) or pre-
disaster, impact/rescue, and recovery (Barton, 2006).  The three phase models often have 
sub-phases, but for the most part, break the crisis management process into the actions 
taken before the crisis, during the crisis, and after the crisis.  These crisis management 
models were the earliest crisis management processes and are still prevalent in 
management literature today.  This evolution away from the emergency response plans 
was important as it emphasized thoughtful, planned, & deliberate actions before, during 
and after a crisis event (Zdziarski, Dunkel, Rollo, & Assoc., 2007). 
 Some crisis management teams prefer to be more deliberate with their processes 
and identify additional critical steps.  Most often this takes the form of breaking the pre-
crisis stage into multiple distinct stages focused on planning, prevention or avoidance 
 40 
 
(Gonzalez-Herrero & Pratt, 1995), breaking the actual crisis stage into important 
components (Augustine, 2000; Fink, 1986) or creating a fourth stage after the first three 
with an emphasis on mitigation of future crises or learning. (Federal Emergency 
Management Administration, 2003; Zdziarski, E., Dunkel, N., Rollo, M., & Assoc.; 
2007).  This perspective on a fourth stage focused on mitigation became much more 
prevalent with the 1996 release of the State and Local Guide for all-hazard Emergency 
Operations Planning by the Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA).   
This document provided guidelines for dealing with emergencies and crisis situations by 
the local, state, and federal emergency management professionals and standardized the 
language to some extent among the practioners in the field.  In 2003, an additional 
document, Building a Disaster Resistant University, was also released applying many of 
the same principles and philosophies to crisis prevention at the university.  The four 
phases that were recommended included Preparedness, Response, Recovery, and 
Mitigation and are based on the continuous improvement process of the Deming cycle.  
Preparedness includes plans and preparations to save lives and property and to facilitate 
response operations;  response is the actual crisis response and includes actions to 
provide emergency assistance, save lives, minimize property damage and speed recovery 
after a disaster;  recovery includes those actions taken to return to a normal or improved 
operating condition; and mitigation refers to activities that eliminate or reduce the 
chance of occurrence or the effects of disasters (FEMA, 2003).  FEMA further states 
“this guide takes a multi-hazard approach, recognizing that institutions face a wide 
variety of potential man-made and natural disasters.  Not every disaster can be avoided, 
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but steps can be taken to reduce the consequences of many extreme events; however 
these threats can only be identified and mitigated through systematic, comprehensive, 
pre-disaster planning that leads to the creation, adoption, and implementation of a hazard 
mitigation plan (p.3) (FEMA, 2003).  Through the wide dissemination of the FEMA 
documents, the four phase plan is the most widely used model of government agencies.  
 A third crisis management system proposed specifically for use in higher 
education utilizes five continuous phases – planning, prevention, response, recovery, and 
learning (Zdziarski, Dunkel, Rollo, & Assoc., 2007).  The primary difference between 
this model and the four stage process is the added emphasis on pre-crisis activity.  
Instead of simply defaulting to preparedness, colleges and universities are encouraged to 
actively identify and plan for campus crises with an extra focus on preventing or 
avoiding crises as much as possible.  The learning phase includes updating existing plans 
and debriefing crisis responders, a critical piece of the crisis response process (Zdziarski, 
Dunkel, Rollo, & Assoc., 2007). 
 
The Phases of Crisis Management 
The Planning Phase 
 The initial step in developing the crisis management plan once the crisis 
management team is selected is the assessment or crisis audit (Zdziarski, Dunkel, Rollo, 
& Assoc., 2007).  This process entails scanning the internal and external environments 
for potential threats and deciding which have the highest likelihood of occurrence 
(Burrell, 2009).  Once these threats are identified, strategies are drawn up to avoid, 
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prevent, or mitigate their occurrence including the availability of essential resources – 
human, physical and fiscal.  The plans must be sufficiently detailed to provide guidance 
and direction during a crisis situation which often does not allow much time, but also be 
generalized enough to allow for easy adaptation to any of the many nuances that may 
occur within a crisis (Barton, 2001).  Furthermore the review of all current plans and 
protocols must be reviewed to ensure there is no conflict, particularly at a different 
organizational level.  With the allocation of resources, the identification of affected 
stakeholders and development of the physical plan often take place in this stage.   
Zdziarski, Dunkel, Rollo, & Assoc.(2007) identified several critical components of a 
crisis management plan: 
 Purpose – defines the crisis that has been planned for and identifies the resources  
 Plan activation – how will the crisis management plan be activated 
 Lines of authority – provide appropriate direction to all as to who is in charge 
during the time of crisis  
 Action steps – broad general action steps to respond to the crisis 
 Crisis protocols – more specific actions to respond to certain situations or threats 
 Establish the scope of the plan – clear directions to the responsible staff should 
clarify the scope and depth of the plan 
 Identify key response modes – clearly identify the limits and areas of emphasis 
for response based on staff capabilities and resource limitations 
 Establish communication methods – communication must be with one voice, 
clear and consistent and through a number of different mediums 
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 Establish an emergency operations center 
 Ensure redundancy of critical staff and facilities – quite often crisis may result in 
loss of critical staff or facilities making redundancy critical to plan success. 
 Clarify media responsibilities – who is and who is not to speak to the media 
 Specify the role of campus security and role of outside agencies 
 Plan for business resumption 
Developing a plan with all of these attributes that is reviewed and constantly updated 
will greatly contribute to successfully navigating through a crisis (Zdziarski, Dunkel, 
Rollo, & Assoc., 2007). 
The Prevention Phase 
 Crisis Prevention is proactive crisis management.  The goal of crisis prevention is 
to avoid a crisis (Coombs, 2012).  Understanding the potential threats and training to 
counter those threats is the best way to prevent a crisis from occurring.  Testing the plan 
through crisis simulations can be an effective tool in reproducing a crisis situation as 
closely as possible (Burrell, 2009).  Crisis simulations should aim at producing similar 
reactions and feelings in participants such as tension, uncertainty, time pressure, 
inadequate information, frustration, and other elements (Borodzicz & Van Haperen, 
2002). The simulations should be followed by rigorous debriefings (Boin, & Lagadec, 
2000). 
The Response Phase 
 During an actual crisis, the plan is put into effect in real time.  Team members 
are tested on their preparation and knowledge of the plan and protocols.  Tension can run 
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high and communication can be strained.  If the plan has been well thought out, tested  
and practiced, it will make this phase much easier for the organization to endure.  
Zdziarski, Dunkel, Rollo, & Assoc. (2007) state “A well crafted plan with clear working 
relations established between the various players will allow for a coordinated response 
that uses the campus energy and resources to respond to the crisis, rather than to work on 
its own inner conflicts.” (p. 48) 
The Recovery Phase 
 The type of crisis greatly affects how the recovery process will occur.  Some 
disasters devastate whole communities and change the organization forever whereas 
other crisis may not result in a significant change in operations once it has been 
mitigated.  Still this phase can be characterized by closure events, memorials, 
recognitions, and other ceremonial events designed to bring closure and initiate healing.  
It is very important to ensure that the crisis team and other critical staff are given the 
opportunity to rest and heal so that they may be ready and willing to serve in future 
crises. 
The Learning Phase 
Regardless of the number of phases in the crisis response continuum, the crisis 
management literature emphasizes the importance of all stages as equally critical to a 
successful crisis management program (Abent, 1999; Augustine, 2000; Barton, 2006; 
Coombs, 2012; Federal Emergency Management Administration, 2003; Guth, 1995; 
Kovoor-Misra, 1995; Mitroff, Diamond, & Alpaslan, 2006; Zdziarski, Dunkel, Rollo, & 
Assoc., 2007).  However perhaps due to the more generalized nature of the initial 
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planning and preparation process that applies to all institutions compared to the much 
smaller proportion that actually endure a crisis compared to the even fewer who actually 
learn information that might be valuable to their peers through their own crisis 
experience, there is not very much written about the learning phase of the crisis 
management process.  This is certainly not to suggest that there are not numerous articles 
detailing the lessons learned from various crises across the nation, but rather to state that 
there seems to be a gap in the literature concerning the actual debriefing process that 
generates the lesson learned.  It is possible this is due to the individualized nature of each 
institution so that any debriefing process, beyond that of the counseling-type stress 
debriefing, would need to be customized to the activities and work processes of the 
organization.  There does not seem to be a guide for debriefing many of the critical 
processes that are affected during a crisis incident which could generate the learning.  
Crises are important opportunities for learning (Kovoor-Misra & Nathan, 2000).  
However it is a mistake to believe that learning and reform always follows a crisis 
incident (Boin, 2004; Kovoor-Misra & Nathan, 2000).  First, post-crises learning is time 
sensitive with the opportunity for learning transitioning through three processes: first 
defensiveness then openness to learning, and finally followed by forgetfulness (Kovoor-
Misra & Nathan, 2000).  If the organization does not properly debrief and codify the 
learning within the appropriate window of time, potential opportunities for progress may 
be lost and organizational behavior may revert to pre-crisis standards.  Secondly, the 
process of evaluation and assessment can be political in nature such as the framing of the 
impacts of the crisis, processes of accountability, and blame allocation (‘t Hart & Boin, 
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2001).  Arjen Boin (2004) also observed this possible gap in the literature when he stated 
“an interesting question for further research concerns how these political processes relate 
to conventional questions regarding learning and prevention” (p.173).  The truth is 
organizations often fail to learn (Lagadec, 1997), refuse to learn (Perrow, 1984), learn 
the wrong things as in superstitious learning (Kovoor-Misra & Nathan, 2000) learn only 
in symbolic ways or learn in slow ways (Boin, 2004). This is a critical issue as it is often 
during the assessment and learning phase that the determination of the success or failure 
of the previous phases is determined and to what extent.  Too often, organizations are 
deemed to have either failed or, much less likely, succeeded at managing a particular 
crisis.  The truth is that success and failure should be measured in relative degrees 
(Pearson& Clair, 1998; Perrow, 1984).  As Pearson and Clair (1998) state, “Evidence of 
organizational failure is plentiful, whether in loss of life, depletion of resources, 
contamination of the environment or damage to organizational reputation.  These 
outcomes are measureable, newsworthy, and visible to academics, the press, and the 
community; conversely, full success at crisis management is, by definition, invisible – to 
academics, the press, and the community” (p. 67).  It is much more likely that success 
and failure in crisis management falls along a continuum where success in many areas of 
the organization my end up being overshadowed by a significant failure in one area 
(Pearson & Claire, 1998).  Having an established process that guides in the assessment 
and learning could enhance the overall learning phase of a crisis management plan. 
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Texas A&M University at Galveston’s Crisis Management Plan 
 Texas A&M University at Galveston had a crisis management team in place well 
before Hurricane Ike landed.  A two tiered team that aligned critical staff and faculty 
into the executive/strategic operations team or incident command team, the crisis 
management plan clearly identified critical staff and their role during a crisis (Texas 
A&M University at Galveston website, 2010).  As a small campus, the team members 
had worked together in non-crisis situations and were fairly close-knit, but had the 
additional experience of working together in crisis mode through numerous table top 
exercises and previous hurricane evacuations.  In fact, the campus had developed the 
hurricane evacuation into a well honed process with regular meetings, assigned 
leadership and detailed emergency plans.  However, all of the drills and practices could 
never completely replicate the thousands of management decisions that would need to be 
made by the crisis management team in the wake of Hurricane Ike. These decisions were 
often required to be made with partial information and no previous body of knowledge 
that was relevant to the situation.  In many ways, they were operating in new, untested 
territory with high stakes decisions being made moment by moment.  These decisions, 
although certainly difficult under the circumstances, had far reaching consequences and 
need to be examined with regards to their impact, organizational learning and 
implications for future crisis management in higher education. 
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Texas A&M University’s Risk Management Process 
 After a number of high profile crises, TAMU- College Station developed their 
university risk and compliance department to mitigate future crises.  This department 
works with all university departments, including Texas A&M University at Galveston, to 
identify, assess, mitigate, and follow up on various risks.  On their website, they 
advocate for an enterprise-wide risk management program which entails the following 
steps: 
 Identifying major activities, processes, and functions after reviewing missions, 
goals, and objectives.  
o Categorizing and prioritizing the major activities. 
 Identifying and assessing risks and building risks portfolios.  
o Receive input from representatives within the University. 
o Prioritize and rank those risks identified as to potential impact and 
probability of occurrence while considering the day-to-day activities to 
control risk. 
 Identifying risk mitigation strategies.  
o Review mitigating activities performed for all risks while focusing on 
how we deal with those risks ranked highest. 
o Review mitigation where two or more parties (groups) are identified as 
responsible. 
o Evaluate the effectiveness of current mitigation and identify any gaps. 
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o Evaluate whether resources and mitigating strategies are appropriately 
allocated based on the level of risk and desired level of effectiveness. 
 Review the monitoring and executive management reporting.  
o Identify who is responsible for monitoring that the mitigating activity is 
effectively managing the risk and being performed as planned.  
 Performing status/follow-up reviews.  
o Review executive management reporting and communication. 
o Assess the efficiency and effectiveness of mitigation, monitoring, and 
communication. (Texas A&M University Website, 2012) 
Although University Risk and Compliance did not have a strong role with the Galveston  
campus, they have been an important resource after the storm. 
 
Performance Management Systems 
In considering the performance of any management team, performance 
management systems are tools to holistically consider the performance of a group of 
employees to work toward optimum performance of a particular task or groups of tasks. 
There are a number of performance management systems that can be considered.   The 
ISO 9000 is a series of quality management system standards and guidelines based on 
eight principles (International Organization for Standardization, 2010). Quality 
Operating System, as developed in the late eighties by Ford Motor Company, is focused 
on teams, use of standards, quality tools, reporting forms, and a closed loop feedback 
process. Lean Thinking, as developed by Toyota, is focused on eliminating waste within 
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a system which translates to zero waiting time, zero inventory, efficient scheduling, less 
down time, etc. (Holweg, 2007). Six Sigma, as developed by Motorola, is a methodology 
for improving the capability of business processes by focusing on eliminating variation 
and reducing defects and creates an infrastructure of people who are specially trained in 
these areas (Antony, 2008). Capability Maturity Model® Integration (CMMI®) is a 
process improvement approach that provides organizations with the essential elements of 
effective processes.  In other words, it is a model for building process improvement 
systems.  In the same way that models are used to guide thinking and analysis on how to 
build other things (algorithms, buildings, molecules), CMMI is used to build process 
improvement systems (Entinex, 2010). The Malcolm Baldrige Criteria for Performance 
Excellence ( hereto after referred to as the Baldrige Criteria), established in 1987 by an 
act of Congress, establishes a set of criteria for making awards for quality and 
performance and for giving feedback to applicants.  These criteria are based on eleven 
interrelated core values and are designed to help improve organizational performances, 
capabilities, and results; to facilitate communication and sharing of information on best 
practices among U.S. organizations of all types; and to serve as a working tool for 
understanding and managing performance and for guiding organizational planning and 
appropriate learning (The Quality Texas Foundation, 2009). 
 
The Baldrige Criteria 
 In selecting which of these performance management systems would be the most 
effective tool to utilize for assessing Texas A&M University at Galveston’s crisis 
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management team and its performance related to the effects of Hurricane Ike, the 
Baldrige Criteria stands out above the others for this particular scenario.  For one, the 
Baldrige Criteria are much broader than the ISO 9000, Lean Thinking, or Six Sigma in 
its perspective and application.  Secondly, the Baldrige Criteria is non-prescriptive and 
adaptable which allows it to be more effective at assessing past management processes 
(Johnson, 2006; Moore, 1996; Padro, 2003).  Third, although the Baldrige Criteria are 
based on eleven core values of high performing organizations and could be used 
generically in any organization, the Baldrige management system is the only system that 
has a criterion set that specifically addresses educational organizations.   Fourth, the 
Baldrige Criteria have been tested empirically and proven to demonstrate content and 
face validity in their measurements (Jayamaha, Grigg, & Mann, 2008).  Lastly, the 
Baldrige Criteria provide several levels of self assessment tools that are responsive to a 
college or university’s unique situation, a critical component when considering the 
individualized learning that comes out of a crisis incident (Quality Texas, 2003). 
 The Baldrige Criteria for education provide the accountability measures that are 
critical for higher education (Seymour & Assoc., 1996).  Nitschke (2000) went further 
declaring the Baldrige Criteria “the world’s most widely accepted model for leading an 
effective organization…” (p. 3).  The Baldrige Criteria provide a systemic process for 
performance improvement without mandating how colleges and universities must run 
their institutions (Nitschke, 2000).  The Baldrige Criteria’s focus on quality performance 
and the assessment, results, and improvement cycle have influenced higher education 
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accreditation agencies as well as inspired similar quality based award programs in nearly 
all fifty states (Bender & Schuh, 2002; Ruben, 2004).   
 
The Texas Quality Foundation 
 In 1994, the Quality Texas Foundation was chosen to administer the Texas 
Award for Performance Excellence, an award which is based on the Baldrige Criteria 
(Quality Texas Foundation, 2009).  The Texas Award for Performance Excellence for 
Education utilizes the same core values as the Baldrige Criteria for education: visionary 
leadership; learning centered education: organizational and personal learning; valuing 
faculty, staff, and partners; agility; focus on the future; managing for innovation; 
management by fact; social responsibility; focus on results and creating value; and a 
systems perspective.  This translates to seven categories to review for quality in 
education: leadership; strategic planning; student, stakeholder, and staff focus; 
measurement, analysis, and knowledge management; faculty and staff focus; process 
management; and organizational performance results (Quality Texas Foundation, 2009).    
In addition, the Texas Award for Performance Excellence has a phased level approach to 
achieving the Baldrige Criteria.  The first level, Engagement, is developed for 
organizations that are just beginning the quality process.  The second level, 
Commitment, is for those organizations that have made a commitment to utilize the 
quality principles and are very early in their journey.  The third phase, Progress, is for 
those organizations that are making significant progress toward applying for the quality 
award.  Quite often, these organizations are reaping the benefits of their transition.  The 
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fourth phase, Award, is for those organizations that have fully adopted the quality 
process and are actually applying for the Texas Award for Performance Excellence 
(Quality Texas Foundation, 2009).  Although there does not seem to be any literature 
indicating its use in assessing crisis response and learning,  the Engagement level of the 
Quality Texas program (Appendix A) may be ideal for such assessment particularly due 
to the self assessment nature of reviewing crisis response as well as its focus on 
educational institutions. 
  
Summary of Literature Review 
 Although crises have long affected organizations, the study of crisis and the 
successful management of crisis are a relatively new phenomenon.  This is even more 
the case in the field of higher education.  Recent major crises such as 9/11, Hurricane 
Katrina and the Virginia Tech Massacre have re-emphasized the need for crisis 
management teams and well developed crisis management plans at institutions of higher 
education.  Furthermore, this focus on the first stages of crisis management has lead to a 
perception among higher education leaders of readiness for crises. Unfortunately 
research and experience inform us that all too often they are not nearly as prepared as 
they needed to be once crisis actually strikes.  Furthermore very little focus has been 
placed on the formalized assessment and organizational learning process after a crisis 
occurs. The only studies available offer individualized anecdotal “lessons learned” or 
comparative studies between similar disasters with no system- wide assessment.  There 
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is a distinct knowledge gap in this area as to how to assess the performance of the crisis 
management teams and formalize the learning process after a crisis. 
 The Baldrige Criteria offer a system based assessment process to evaluate 
organizational performance.  Due to its non-prescriptive and adaptable nature it can be 
used to assess past performance such as a recent crisis situation.  Although it may be 
ideally suited to provide a system assessment of an organization that has just 
experienced a crisis event, there is nothing in the literature suggesting it has ever been 
used in such a manner.  In addition, the Baldrige Criteria has specifically been tailored 
for education, and the Texas Quality Foundation has further adapted the criteria for use 
by organizations that have not previously utilized the process. Their phased approach, 
allowing educational institutions who have not yet embraced the quality tools to still 
benefit from the quality process, may be an ideal process to assess the performance of a 
management team that has recently dealt with a crisis.   
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CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Introduction 
 This chapter details the research approach for this study to include the rationale 
for a qualitative research design, more specifically the case study research methodology.  
After detailing the numerous benefits of applying this design and methodology to this 
subject matter, this chapter will further detail the theoretical framework, participant 
selection, data collection and recording processes, and data analysis techniques.  The 
chapter will conclude with a description of the techniques used to ensure the quality of 
the study. 
 
Restatement of the Purpose 
The purpose of this study is two-fold: (1) to examine the Texas A&M University 
at Galveston’s crisis management team’s approach, deployment, and learning as a 
consequence of Hurricane Ike in the effort to return the campus to Pre-Ike status; (2) To 
evaluate the Quality Texas Foundation- Engagement Level Criteria as a framework for 
assessing crisis management in higher education. 
  
Research Questions 
1.  What approach did Texas A&M University at Galveston utilize in their crisis 
management process?  
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2. What strategies did Texas A&M University at Galveston deploy in applying their 
approach consistently and ensuring the approach was utilized by all appropriate work 
units? 
3. What learning occurred as a result of refining the approach through cycles of 
evaluation and improvement? 
4. To what extent is the Baldrige Criteria an effective framework for assessing crisis 
management in higher education? 
 
Selection of Methodology 
 Qualitative research methods were adopted in this study of the decisions, actions, 
and events occurring during a singular bounded event, Texas A&M University at 
Galveston’s crisis management team’s response to Hurricane Ike.  Qualitative research is 
defined as “an inquiry into the process of understanding a social or human problem, 
based on building a complex, holistic picture, formed with words, reporting detailed 
views of information, and conducted in a natural setting” (Cresswell. 1994). Many 
scholars have recommended the use of qualitative research methods to help increase our 
understanding of the human experience (Maykutt & Morehouse, 1994).  In addition, 
qualitative research is best utilized in an effort “to understand situations in their 
uniqueness as part of a particular context and the interactions there.  This understanding 
is an end in itself, so that it is not attempting to predict what may happen in the future 
necessarily, but to understand the nature of that setting –what it means for participants to 
be in that setting, what their lives are like, what’s going on for them, what their 
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meanings are, what the world looks like in that particular setting – and in the analysis to 
be able to communicate that faithfully to others who are interested in that setting…The 
analysis strives for depth of understanding” (pg. 1) (Patton, 1985).  Qualitative, in-depth 
interviews, exploratory and descriptive in nature, provided the researcher the opportunity 
to gain a deeper understanding of the participants’ experiences and perceptions within a 
particular context and thereby provide a thick, rich description of the event being 
studied. 
 In their seminal work concerning qualitative research methods, Lincoln and Guba 
(1985) advocate five axioms of the naturalistic paradigm.  These principles guided this 
study through the process of research design, data collection and analysis.  The first 
axiom concerns the nature of reality and states “there are multiple constructed realities 
that can be studied only holistically; inquiry into these realities inevitably diverge (each 
inquiry raises more questions than it answers) so that prediction and control are unlikely 
outcomes although some level of understanding can be achieved” (p. 37) (Lincoln & 
Guba, 1985).  The very nature of crisis response is incredibly complex and often tailored 
to the exact crisis during that exact moment.  The same scale of a hurricane striking even 
three weeks earlier could have resulted in a completely different response and reality.  
Add to this concept the diverse backgrounds, experiences and perceptions of the crisis 
management team members, and there is a broad array of realities that could occur.  This 
study assumed the existence of multiple realities and focused on processes with the goal 
of achieving some level of understanding rather than being able to predict future 
outcomes.   
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 The second axiom refers to the relationship of knower to known and states “the 
inquirer and the ‘object’ of inquiry interact to influence one another; knower and known 
are inseparable” (p.37) (Lincoln & Guba, 1985).  The researcher and participants must 
interact and eventually influence each other as well as the outcome of the study by the 
very nature of the interview process.  Furthermore, the researcher, as part of the crisis 
management team, experienced many of the same difficulties and interacted heavily with 
the participants throughout the crisis and even today.  Sustained engagement with the 
participants has provided additional insight into the participants’ crisis experiences, the 
meaning they derived from those experiences, and the context in which they operate.   
This relationship between researcher and participants exists invariably and is taken into 
account through the study. 
 The third axiom considers the possibility of generalization and specifies that the 
“aim of inquiry is to develop an idiographic body of knowledge in the form of ‘working 
hypotheses’ that describe the individual case” (p.38) (Lincoln & Guba, 1985).  They go 
on to state “local conditions, in short, make it impossible to generalize.  If there is a 
‘true’ generalization, it is that there can be no generalization.  And note that the ‘working 
hypotheses’ are tentative both for the situation in which they are first uncovered and for 
other situations; there are always differences in context from situation to situation, and 
even the single situation differs over time” (p.124) (Lincoln & Guba, 1985).  This study 
recognizes the uniqueness of the actual incident as well as the unique context in which 
all of the actions occurred.  A strong effort was made to enhance the “thick description” 
of the event, particularly with regard to process and context, throughout the study so as 
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to improve the transferability and fittingness of the research so that it might possibly be 
applicable to future situations. 
 The possibility of causal linkages is the focus of the fourth axiom which states 
”All entities are in a state of mutual simultaneous shaping so that it is impossible to 
distinguish cause and effect”(p.38) (Lincoln & Guba, 1985).  True linear causality is a 
difficult phenomenon to conclusively prove in human behavior (Lincoln & Guba, 1985).   
There are so many variables, each potentially impacting one another, and this is a major 
factor in naturalistic inquiry which focuses on the human experience.  Through the 
course of the study, the researcher was aware of this fact, particularly with regards to the 
necessary interactions with participants, and considered this axiom heavily during the 
data analysis phase of the study. 
 Lastly axiom number five defines the role of values in inquiry.  Lincoln and 
Guba (1985) explain this through a series of five corollaries: 
1. Inquiries are influenced by inquirer values as expressed by the choice of the 
problem. 
2. Inquiry is influenced by the choice of the paradigm that guides the 
investigation into the problem. 
3. Inquiry is influenced by the choice of the substantive theory utilized to guide 
the collection and analysis of data and in the interpretation of findings. 
4. Inquiry is influenced by the values that are inherent within the context 
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5. With respect to the corollaries 1 through 4 above, inquiry is either value 
resonant or value dissonant.  Problem, paradigm, theory, and context must 
exhibit congruence if the inquiry is to produce meaningful results (p.38). 
In effect, values play a significant part in inquiry, and this study was impacted by the 
researcher’s values, the values of the theoretical framework, the values of the 
participants, and the context of the situation. 
 Once these axioms are understood and adopted, they provide a framework of 
operational characteristics of natural inquiry.  These characteristics outlined by Lincoln 
and Guba (1985) provide a coherence and interdependence to an inquiry that informs the 
research process.  These fourteen characteristics include: 
1. Natural setting – the research is carried out in the natural setting of context of 
the entity for which the study is proposed. 
2. Human instrument – the researcher is the primary instrument of data collection 
and analysis. 
3. Utilization of tacit knowledge – the researcher uses intuitive and tacit 
knowledge as well as spoken knowledge so as to better understand the nuances of 
the multiple realities.  
4. Qualitative methods – qualitative methods are more adaptable to multiple 
realities and mutually shaping influences occurring in human behavior. 
5. Purposive sampling – With purposive sampling, the researcher increases the 
likelihood that the full array of multiple realities, local conditions influencing the 
grounded theory, mutual shapings, and local values 
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6. Inductive data analysis – While better to expose multiple realities, this process 
also is more likely to describe fully the setting and to make transferability to 
other settings more possible. 
7. Grounded theory – the guiding theory should be grounded in the data and as 
such be more responsive to contextual values. 
8. Emergent design – allows the research design to emerge rather than pre- 
construct it preordinately to pursue the multiple realities that may exist. 
9. Negotiated outcomes – Work with the participants to negotiate meanings and 
interpretations to better understand and reconstruct their constructions of reality, 
10. Case study reporting mode – the case study is more adapted to a description 
of multiple realities encountered at a given site. 
11. Idiographic interpretations – the research interprets data in terms of the 
particulars of this case rather than in terms of generalizations. 
12. Tentative application – the researcher is cautious in making broad application 
of the findings due to the realities being multiple and different in an 
individualized context 
13. Focus-determined boundaries – the researcher is likely to set boundaries to 
the inquiry in an emergent process so as to permit the multiple realities define the 
focus, rather than inquirer preconceptions. 
14. Special criteria for trustworthiness – The researcher will seek other criteria 
for trustworthiness such as credibility, transferability, dependability, and 
confirmability.  
 62 
 
These characteristics informed the study and guided the researcher in developing a 
cohesive, naturalistic approach to the problem being studied.  
 
The Case Study Research Design 
 Once it was determined to utilize a qualitative inquiry, there was a need 
to further clarify the specific research design.  “Scholars use the phrase qualitative 
inquiry as a blanket designation for all forms of social inquiry that rely primarily on 
qualitative data including ethnography, case study research, naturalistic inquiry, 
ethnomethodology, life history methodology, and narrative inquiry” (p. 213) (Schwandt, 
2001). The case study design is employed “to gain an in-depth understanding of the 
situation and meaning for those involved.  The interest is in process rather than 
outcomes, in context rather than a specific variable, in discovery rather than 
confirmation. Insights gleaned from case studies can directly influence policy, practice 
and future research” (p.19) (Merriam, 1998).  Furthermore, case studies differ from the 
other forms of qualitative inquiry in that they are in-depth descriptions and analyses of a 
single unit or bounded system (Smith, 1978).  In fact, case studies by definition “get as 
close to the subject of interest as they possibly can, partly by means of direct observation 
in natural settings, partly by access to subjective factors (thoughts, feelings, and 
desires)” (p.23) (Bromley, 1986) 
Merriam (1998) argues that the case study can be further defined by its special 
features, specifically its particularistic, heuristic, and descriptive nature.  There are a 
number of benefits that are derived from these features.  For instance by being 
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particularistic, a case study is very specific in focusing on a particular event, 
phenomenon or situation.  Through this singular focus on a particular instance, the case 
study can give insight to a general problem. In addition, it can suggest to the reader what 
to do, or not to do, in similar situations.  Depending on the case study, it may or may not 
be influenced by the researcher’s bias.  The heuristic nature of the case study can often 
explain the multiple reasons for a problem, detailing exactly what happened and why.  
The case study method is extremely effective at explaining why an innovation worked or 
did not work as well as discuss and evaluate alternatives not chosen.  It is through this 
heuristic ability to evaluate, summarize and conclude, that allows a case study to 
increase its potential applicability (Merriam, 1998). 
The descriptive nature of a case study may be its most significant feature.  
Merriam (1998) provides a list of the many descriptive benefits of the case study when 
she states a case study can: 
 Illustrate the complexities of a situation – the fact that not one but many 
factors contributed to it. 
 Have the advantage of hindsight yet can be relevant in the present. 
 Show the influence of personalities on the issue. 
 Show the influence of the passage of time on the issue- deadlines, change 
of legislators, cessation of funding, and so on. 
 Include vivid material – quotations, interviews, newspaper articles, and so 
on. 
 Obtain information from a wide variety of sources. 
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 Cover many years and describe how the preceding decades led to a 
situation. 
 Spell out differences of opinion on the issue and suggest how these 
differences have influenced the result 
 Present information in a wide variety of ways…and from the viewpoint of 
different groups (p.31) 
These particularistic, heuristic, and descriptive aspects of the case study made 
this research design ideally suited for this study.  Specifically a qualitative case study 
approach was used to study how the crisis management team at Texas A&M University 
at Galveston responded to the impact of Hurricane Ike.  The use of a descriptive case 
study was utilized to develop a thick rich description of the processes and decisions 
surrounding the crisis management and recovery.  The study was focused on discovery 
and exploration with an emergent design being employed to consider the multiple 
realities for the various members of the crisis management team members.   
 
Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical framework that will guide the study came from the Baldrige 
Criteria and the Quality Texas Foundation.  The Quality Texas Foundation has 
established the Texas Award for Performance Excellence which identifies specific 
criteria for educational performance excellence.  These criteria are generated from the 
National Malcolm Baldrige Criteria for Performance Excellence.  The seven criteria are 
subdivided into 18 examination items (two for each of the first six criteria and six for 
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criteria 7) that focus on major requirements. Each item consists of one or more Areas to 
Address. There are 35 Areas to Address. Each Area to Address has a set of questions. In 
all there are over 200 questions that cover every phase of organizational life.  Both face 
and content validity for these questions have been established through numerous studies 
(Jayamaha, Grigg, & Mann, 2008; Winn & Cameron, 1998).  Furthermore the criteria 
make up only one part of a two-part diagnostic or assessment system. The Criteria are a 
set of 19 performance-oriented requirements. The Scoring Guidelines, as the second 
part, articulate the assessment dimensions for Processes and Results.   
 From the national Malcolm Baldrige Quality Award’s scientifically tested 
criteria, the Quality Texas Foundation, a state level organization committed to quality 
performance management, has developed a four stage progressive assessment and 
application process.  The four stages include an Engagement Level for those 
organizations that are utilizing the Baldrige Criteria for the first time, a Commitment 
Level for organizations that have committed to utilizing the Baldrige Criteria, a Progress 
Level for those who have begun reaping the benefits of the Baldrige Criteria and are 
preparing to apply for the Baldrige Award, and finally a fourth level where applicants 
are actually applying for the Baldrige Award.  The length and depth of application and 
assessment increase as the organization progresses through the stages.  Furthermore, 
each organization, regardless of level, must compile an organizational profile that offers 
a snapshot into the key influences, goals and challenges of the organization.  This study 
will utilize only the initial Engagement Level as TAMUG has not implemented the 
Baldrige Quality process as an organization.  As such, even though the same seven basic 
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criteria of the Baldrige Criteria are utilized, the number of corresponding questions and 
depth of inquiry are necessarily reduced as an organization that is new to the criteria may 
not have adopted and previously utilized the process and therefore not been intentional 
in addressing some of the criteria items.  The Engagement Level Criteria framework that 
was used includes: 
 Leadership- how the Strategic Operations Team established and communicated 
the vision and decisions leading to the recovery from the crisis caused by 
Hurricane Ike. 
 Strategic Planning – how the Strategic Operations Team developed the short term 
and long term objectives and created the action plans to fully recover from the 
crisis. 
 Customer Focus – how the students and other stakeholders’ needs were assessed 
and met. 
 Measurement, Analysis and Knowledge Management – how data was collected 
and utilized to inform decision making and tracking overall organizational 
success. 
 Workforce Focus – how the needs of the workforce, many of them facing 
personal crisis themselves, were assessed and met.  The category also considered 
the overall effectiveness of the organization in promoting the workforce’s 
cooperation and commitment to the management of the crisis. 
 Process Management – how the work systems were implemented to deliver 
student and stakeholder value that contributed to the recovery from the crisis. 
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 Business Results – what results were achieved to demonstrate student learning, 
student satisfaction, budgetary performance, workforce engagement, process 
effectiveness, ethical behavior and regulatory compliance as a result of the 
management of the crisis? (The Quality Texas Foundation, 2009). 
Under these seven major categories, there are questions covering four to eight 
subcategories for a grand total of thirty seven questions covering the various approach 
and deployment processes, as well as results, of the organization.  These questions 
provided the introductory framework of the initial interview session and are listed in 
Appendix I. 
   
Institutional Characteristics and Participant Selection 
Texas A&M University at Galveston is a small satellite campus of Texas A&M 
University.  Made up of three small campuses in Galveston, the main campus consists of 
eleven buildings situated on 100 acres of a dredge spoil island adjacent to the main 
island of Galveston. The campus has been in operation since 1962 when the Texas 
Maritime Academy was established and merged with the Texas A&M Marine 
Laboratory (Curley, 2005).  This unusual combination of maritime cadets with marine 
research continued to evolve from the original twenty three cadets in the Texas Maritime 
Academy and six graduate students at the Marine Lab into the over 1778 students at 
Texas A&M University at Galveston shortly before the hurricane (Curley, 2005).  
Although there is still a strong presence of cadets and graduate students, undergraduate 
students not participating in the corps represent the largest percentage of enrollment, and 
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despite the fact that the academic focus still centers on the ocean, the majors have 
broadened considerably from a maritime licensing and graduate degrees. The majority of 
students study undergraduate marine biology, marine sciences, one of the maritime 
business degrees, or various types of ocean-based engineering.  They are a very 
traditional looking student body at a specialized college campus. 
Due to a drastic increase in out of state tuition rates in the 90’s, the number of out 
of state students has declined from a time where over a third of the student body 
originated from out of state to the point just before the storm where 1507 of the 1778 
students are residents of Texas.  These students are typically high academic achievers 
with over 70% graduating in the top quarter of their high school class, and as such most 
of the freshmen TAMUG students had high school classmates who eventually chose 
TAMU- College Station. Furthermore there is a process in place at the Galveston 
campus that enables over 120 students a year who are no longer interested in the marine 
and maritime degrees of TAMUG to transition to the TAMU- College Station campus 
after their first year.  As a result of these programs, there is a strong linkage between the 
two student bodies of the campuses, a linkage that became more important in the days 
following Hurricane Ike. 
The culture also contributes to a sense of familiarity.  TAMU- College Station is 
strongly rooted in its military tradition, and as a satellite campus that also started with a 
history of cadets, TAMUG has endeavored to adopt many of those traditions.  Many of 
the traditions center on leadership, service and working together, all qualities that are 
critical in crisis situations.  Through these traditions, football games, various leadership 
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conferences and other activities, many TAMUG students are frequent visitors to the 
TAMU- College Station campus.  Academically, demographically, and socially, the Sea 
Aggies of Texas A&M University at Galveston are extremely similar to, and familiar 
with, their counterparts at the main campus in TAMU- College Station. 
The same is true in many ways of the staff and faculty.  With 89 faculty and 285 
staff, many of the faculty and staff have worked or studied at the main campus.  In fact 
some have dual reporting responsibilities and numerous meetings with counterparts at 
TAMU- College Station.  Many of the processes have been aligned for the smaller 
campus to reap the benefits of the deeper resources of the main campus.  The end result 
is one student information management system, one diploma for graduates, one tenure 
track process, and a number of other parallel or similar processes to tie the campuses 
together. 
Yet there is one major difference between the two campuses – size.  The small 
size of the institution is a critical factor that must be understood to properly understand 
the context of the management processes and decision making.   The small size of 
TAMUG as well as longevity of its administration contributed greatly to the level of 
familiarity, trust and support among the faculty and staff.  In fact the average time of 
service of the twelve crisis management team members at the time of Hurricane Ike was 
fourteen years.  It is through this lens that we must examine the crisis management 
processes of Texas A&M University at Galveston. 
The study concerns management processes and decisions made during the crisis 
of Hurricane Ike.  This study used purposive sampling to define the population and 
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selected the administrators, faculty, and staff who were identified as members of the 
crisis management team.  Additional subjects who were added to the team during the 
crisis management process and had any role in making management decisions with 
regards to the crisis management of Hurricane Ike and the return to normal operations 
were interviewed as well. For example, the previous Executive Associate Vice President 
who was instrumental in developing the campus emergency response plan and who had 
retired shortly before the crisis and was brought back on shortly after the crisis was also 
interviewed. Furthermore, the Vice President and CEO, although not identified as a 
formal member of the crisis management team, was also included in the interview 
process due to his extensive role in managing the Hurricane Ike crisis.   
Two original members of the crisis management team were not interviewed as 
they had little involvement in the actual crisis management.  One had already accepted 
another job at another institution prior to the hurricane and left very shortly after the 
hurricane struck.  The other was out of state at the time of the crisis and continued 
personal issues prevented him from participating in the crisis management.  In addition, 
one individual who was present and observed many of the decisions was originally 
identified as a possible subject for interview, but was eventually eliminated from 
consideration by the Institutional Review Board due to the fact that he is currently 
employed by the researcher as a subordinate, a position that generated concerns as to his 
freedom to choose to participate in this study.  As he was not in a decision making role, 
nor an official member of the crisis management team, this decision did not affect the 
study.   
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With the exception of the researcher, all eleven individuals who were active 
participants of the crisis management team were interviewed.  The participants included: 
 Vice President and CEO of the campus, who was the top executive for the 
campus.   
 Associate Vice President for Research 
 Associate Vice President for Enrollment Management  
 Associate Executive Associate Vice President 
 Assistant Vice President for Finance  
 Assistant Vice President for Administration 
 Assistant Vice President for Student Affairs and Auxiliary Services 
 Executive Director of Admission and Records 
 Director of Communications 
 Director of Information Services 
 Previous Executive Associate Vice President 
 
Data Collection and Recording 
 Instrumentation 
 As with all naturalistic inquiry, the researcher served as the primary instrument 
of inquiry.  As stated by Guba and Lincoln (1985), “Moreover, the advantage of 
beginning with a fund not only of propositional knowledge but also of tacit knowledge 
and the ability to be infinitely adaptable make the human investigator ideal in situations 
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in which the design is emergent; the human can sense out salient factors, think of ways 
to follow up on them, and make continuous changes, all while actively engaged in the 
inquiry itself” (p. 107).  This role was critical to exploring and evaluating the numerous 
contexts and multiple realities that developed during the course of the study. 
 Furthermore, the researcher was extremely well qualified for this specific role.  
After seventeen years at the institution, long-term professional interaction with most of 
the interviewees, and as a member of the crisis management team during Hurricane Ike, 
the researchers was extremely qualified to understand the individual participant’s 
experiences and communicate them as an instrument.  The researcher was able to discern 
the participants’ values and beliefs, while remaining very aware of the mutual 
simultaneous shaping that was occurring between the various respondents and the 
researcher, to develop a thoroughly negotiated outcome.  
Interview Protocol and Data Collection 
Permission was granted from the TAMUG campus executive team to interview 
all members of the crisis management team.  Once the theoretical framework was 
identified as the Engagement Level process from the Quality Texas Foundation, the 
interview protocol was determined and application was made to the Texas A&M 
University’s Research Office’s Institutional Review Board (IRB) to ensure the process 
was performed in accordance with IRB protocol.  Once approval was granted to proceed, 
each member of the crisis management team was contacted via email to inform them of 
the study and request an interview.  All purposively selected participants agreed to be 
interviewed in their respective offices.  As the process questions set forth by the Quality 
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Texas Foundation were quite complex with a great amount of detail required, the 
researcher sent the participants the initial list of questions a week prior to the interview 
so the participants could ruminate on them as well as collect any additional data such as 
meeting minutes, after action reports, enrollment data, and other artifacts.   
The interviews were semi-structured in that an initial introductory statement was 
read to each interviewee (Appendix B) before progressing into the Quality Texas 
Foundation- Engagement Level questions.  Each question was read verbatim to all 
participants, but the interview overall followed an emergent design which also allowed 
the participants to focus on the issues they found of most importance under each of the 
seven categories.  Interviews typically lasted approximately two hours with the longest 
lasting nearly four hours.  Interviews were recorded and transcribed, and the 
transcriptions were provided to each participant for “member checks”, that is to review 
for accuracy and/or clarification. All participants were asked to re-confirm the use of the 
transcripts for the study which all eventually did.  Follow up meetings occurred to 
discuss conflicting information or to follow up on offered artifacts not available at the 
initial meeting.  Many participants offered substantial documentation in the form of 
emails, reports and other data to further support the study.  All documentation was 
logged with the date received as well as who provided it. 
Researcher Reflexive Journal 
 A technique for enhancing the credibility, transferability, dependability, and 
confirmability of an inquiry as well to assess the level at which the inquirers bias 
influenced the outcome is called the reflexive journal (Lincoln & Guba, 1985).  This 
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process involves the investigator recording various information about self and method, 
providing information about methodological decisions and the reasons for making them.  
Journal entries were made prior to interactions with the participants, immediately after 
interviews and at other frequent times during the course of the study.  Information in the 
journal entries included basic information such as dates, locations and times of 
interviews, but also provided an outlet for ideas and various thoughts and concerns 
throughout the course of the study.  The reflexive journal provided a running 
commentary on the researcher’s state of mind as the study unfolded, with potential 
hypotheses and follow up questions, questions about perceptions and potential bias 
within the researcher’s own mind.  The reflexive journal was kept from slightly before 
the first interview in June, 2011 until present. 
  
Data Analysis    
The process of conducting qualitative research entails reviewing large amounts 
of information and identifying certain patterns or themes.  Full transcripts of the 
interviews were created to be analyzed for these patterns.  The transcripts were reviewed 
using the techniques of content analysis.  Content analysis refers to the search for 
recurring words or themes, pattern recognition, core consistencies and meanings derived 
from the information obtained (Patton, 2002).  The various data generated for the study 
from interviews, observations, documents, and records were analyzed by means of a 
constant comparative method (Lincoln & Guba, 1985).  This process utilizes unitizing, 
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categorizing, and developing/identifying themes and patterns to develop descriptive and 
exploratory categories (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). 
Unitizing data   
One of the most critical steps in the process of data analysis is the unitizing of 
data.  This process entails reducing all forms of data to the very most basic units or 
chunks of meaning.  Lincoln & Guba (1985) define a unit of data as possessing the 
following characteristics: 
First, it should be heuristic; that is, aimed at some understanding or some action 
that the inquirer needs to have or take.  Unless it is heuristic, it is useless, 
however intrinsically interesting.  Second, it must be the smallest piece of 
information about something that can stand by itself, that is, it must be 
interpretable in the absence of any additional information other than a broad 
understanding of the context in which the inquiry is carried out.  Such a unit may 
be a sentence… It may be as much as a paragraph…These units are found within 
observational and interview notes, documents and records, notations about 
unobtrusive informational residues or non-verbal cues, and the like (p345-345). 
 
To assist in the management of the thousands of chunks of data, the researcher 
utilized a knowledge management software system named MAXQDA.  This software 
allowed the researchers to load the various forms of data, including transcribed 
interviews, documents and records onto the computer and then break each document into 
its most basic units of data.  Furthermore, the program allowed the researcher to denote 
each chunk of data with a researcher assigned code, color and comment.  This process 
allowed for a much more effective management of data while still allowing for content 
analysis and grounded theory to develop.  As the data was being unitized, themes and 
patterns were further assessed and such tools as text analysis were utilized to further 
explore trends and identify key learnings.  Particular attention was focused upon those 
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themes relating to the approaches utilized in their crisis management process, the 
strategies deployed in applying their approach consistently and ensuring the approach 
was utilized by all appropriate work units, the learning occurred as a result of refining 
the approach through cycles of evaluation and improvement, and the extent to which the 
approach utilized by Texas A&M University at Galveston aligned with its organizational 
needs so that their measures, information, and improvement systems were 
complementary across processes and work units.  
 
Evaluation of the Quality of the Study  
Trustworthiness 
As a naturalistic inquiry, certain techniques were utilized within the investigation 
process to establish the trustworthiness of the inquiry’s findings.  The subject matter of 
this study does not lend itself to the conventional experiment that permits the 
manipulation of variables to demonstrate validity, soundness and significance.  Instead, 
the four components of trustworthiness- credibility, transferability, dependability, and 
confirmability – were addressed to make this qualitative study’s findings “worth paying 
attention to” (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). 
The first of these, Credibility, refers to the manner in which the inquiry is 
performed in such a way that the probability that the findings will be credible is 
enhanced, and second, to demonstrate the credibility of the findings by having them 
approved by the constructors of the multiple realities being studied (Lincoln & Guba, 
1985).  Several strategies are suggested for enhancing the credibility of a study.  
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Prolonged engagement, which allows for building trust and learning the culture, was in 
place as the researcher worked with many of the respondents for years prior to, during 
and after the crisis.  As the researcher was involved throughout much of the decision 
making, the additional technique of persistent observation added further salience to the 
observations.  By targeting all members of the Crisis Management Team as well as other 
involved individuals, triangulation of the differing responses from the different subjects 
further added credibility to the study.  To bolster the credibility of the findings, member 
checks, whereby data analytic categories, interpretations, and conclusions were tested 
with members of the stake holding groups from whom the data was originally collected, 
was utilized (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). 
Transferability refers to the extent to which the findings of the study can be 
transferred, or applied, to situations beyond the study.  Although every crisis is unique in 
how it affects an organization, there are certain parallels in the management and 
assessment of the decision making.  Through purposeful sampling of all involved 
decision makers and relying on proper “thick description,” the researcher provided the 
widest range possible of information to enhance the transferability of the study and to 
determine the effectiveness of the use of the Engagement Level Criteria as a set of 
standards for “best practice” management in a crisis environment. 
To address the issues of Dependability and Confirmability, the researcher relied 
on an independent review of the research methods by a competent peer group (Lincoln 
& Guba, 1985).  The review was performed by a group of researchers at Texas A&M 
University who served as the researcher’s dissertation committee and reviewed all 
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aspects of the research methodology.  This review included the process as well as the 
product to ensure their accuracy. 
 
Summary of the Methodology 
 This chapter explains the basis for the specific methodology utilized for this 
study.  A qualitative case study conducted through the extensive interviews of those who 
made the critical decisions and the thorough review of documents, records, and other 
artifacts provide a thick, rich description of the actions surrounding the Hurricane Ike 
crisis of Texas A&M University at Galveston.  Chapter IV provides this rich description 
in the context of the event through detailed observations, interview notes, and 
documentation. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE CASE STUDY 
 
The Context of the Study 
The Origins of a Plan 
The city of Galveston, Texas has been associated with hurricanes since 
September 8, 1900 when the Great Storm pummeled the island city.  That storm, thought 
to have been a category 4 hurricane with estimated winds of 145 mph, killed between 
6,000 and 12,000 residents and still ranks today as the deadliest natural disaster to ever 
strike the United States (Weems, J. E., 1980).  Besides the tremendous loss of life and 
devastation to the booming city, the storm is credited with forever changing the path of 
the once beautiful and prestigious city, frequently called the “Ellis Island of the West” 
and “Wall Street of the Southwest” due to its booming immigration and industry 
(Galveston.com & Company, retrieved August 29, 2012).  After the storm, development 
shifted inland to the city of Houston which soon supplanted Galveston as the major city 
and port of Texas.   
 When Texas A&M University at Galveston (TAMUG) was established as the 
Texas Maritime Academy in 1962, the administration was very cognizant of the 
incredible power of hurricanes, and their power to change history. The first classes were 
taught in a large underutilized building at Fort Crockett, a former army barracks that also 
housed the Texas A&M Marine Lab and was situated on one of the highest points on the 
island (Curley, 2005).  The entire city of Galveston, over 2100 buildings and including 
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the 3,000 ton St. Patrick’s Church, had been raised as much as 17.2 feet after the Great 
Storm using a series of jacks and sand dredged from the bay.  This massive engineering 
feat was only rivaled at the time by the construction of the Galveston Seawall, which 
further protected the citizens of Galveston and the new campus of Texas A&M 
University at Galveston (Larson, 2000). Even as the campus migrated from Fort 
Crockett onto the Mitchell campus, the 100 acre campus that currently houses the 
majority of university operations, the tenets of strong bunker style buildings situated 
well above sea level continued to guide the evolving campus as it grew in enrollment 
and number of buildings. Numerous storms threatened and some even struck the city, but 
evacuated faculty and students would return to campus and resume their studies rapidly 
(Curley, 2005).   
 The possible impact of a hurricane decidedly and forever changing the future of 
an institution was not fully realized until August 17, 1983.  The campus had enjoyed 
explosive growth over the previous decade.  Dr. Steve Curley (2005), Regents Professor 
in General Academics and unofficial historian of TAMUG stated:  
During those ten formative years (1971-1981) the operating budget had risen 
from approximately $1.3 million to $6.5 million. Curricula had expanded from 
two to seven degree programs; buildings had multiplied from three to nine; 
undergraduate enrollment had more than quintupled from 91 to 575 (580 in some 
reports); faculty had more than doubled from 22 to 51; and the library book 
collection had increased almost tenfold from 3500 to 31,500 (p. 116). 
 
A new residence hall, C-Dorm, was finalized and opened in 1982 that increased the 
number of campus beds from roughly 200 to over 600 to accommodate the growth in the 
student body, and the state legislature appropriated $4.5 million for a library building 
which would provide 26,667 square feet to house a hundred thousand volumes (Curley, 
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2005).  The concern around campus was whether these two new buildings added enough 
capacity to contain the incredible growth trajectory that TAMUG was experiencing. 
 Hurricane Alicia, a category 3 hurricane with incredibly destructive winds, 
passed over Galveston on August 17 – 18, 1983.  The slow moving storm dropped 
almost eight inches of rain on Galveston, and the flooding and wind gusts caused an 
estimated $3 billion in damage to the Houston-Galveston area.  (Hurricane Alicia 
Preliminary Report, 1983).  The campus was devastated.   
High winds, horizontal rain, and flying objects shattered windows, collapsed 
roofs, and soaked carpets, sheet rock and furniture.  In C-dorm, the rain soaked 
all floors on the west side of the building.  Fifteen rooms in A- and B-dorms were 
torn up by shattered patio-door glass.  Hallways, classrooms, and laboratories 
were damaged.  Because the campus had been evacuated, no one was hurt…The 
paperback collection in the campus library, still located in the engineering 
building, was ruined by wind-driven water leaking through a few spots in the 
roof.  Carpeting in the library’s reading lounge loft wrinkled and shrank from 
leaking water and had to be replaced.  Luckily the hardbound book and journal 
collection suffered no losses. Because the library space was so small, about 
several thousand volumes were safely in storage, most of them at Fort Crockett.  
The C-dorm roof suffered the most expensive damage, allowing water to seep 
into walls, which led to chronic mildew problems.  New guttering was installed 
after the storm.  It took a year and half and $550,000 to repair roofs, sheet metal, 
and structural damage to buildings on campus (Curley, 2005). 
 
With classes scheduled to start only a week later and extensive damage to the residence 
halls rendering them mostly inhabitable, the campus was forced to seek housing for the 
students in the community with many staff and faculty taking students into their homes. 
The State Guard was manning the front gates immediately after the storm and turned 
many students away.  The administration had to wait to get someone onto campus to get 
the message out that class was going to continue (Interviewee#9, 8-18-11).  The growth 
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trend that had powered so much growth and excitement rapidly flattened out, and it took 
TAMUG years to recover (Interviewee#11, 9-9-11). 
 Hurricane Alicia was a critical moment in time not only for its physical impact 
on TAMUG, but also for its role as the catalyst for the campus’ crisis management plan. 
As one of the longtime  TAMUG Crisis Management Team members stated: 
I’m pretty sure we didn’t have the residence halls for a year but as far as student 
affairs was concerned, a great deal of the embryonic planning and stuff, it goes 
all the way back to that because that’s when - right after that I’m pretty certain 
when - I first started developing the checklist of how to evacuate the dorms 
before we learned a lot because when we returned…well, you know, that’s when 
the Student Affairs and HR group cleaned out all the refrigerators and we learned 
key lessons about what we could do to have students better prepare before they 
got out of there.  That was probably the first time we’d really made a 
conscientious effort to develop Emergency Data Sheets and started collecting 
data and stuff like that as the storm was approaching.  So all of that stuff that’s 
still part of what we do came about because of Hurricane Alicia in 1983.  I’m 
pretty certain that is what prompted us first to put in a section in the University 
Student life rules – student rules, you know, about evacuation and things.  So, 
that was key… (Interviewee#9, 8-18-11). 
 
In response to the massive damage caused by Hurricane Alicia, the administration 
initiated a much broader campus emergency plan that involved more stakeholders and 
was much more prescriptive.  The end result was a plan full of detailed lists with key 
individuals identified and series of checklists to accomplish as a hurricane neared the 
campus.  Its five sections outlined the Concept of Operations, Communications, Basic 
Action Plans, Action Plans- Physical Plant, and Action Plans- Site Specific (Hinojosa, 
1996).  This plan received slight modifications each year and became the blueprint for 
the university’s evacuation and hurricane preparation, a process in which they became 
quite adept through years of practice (Interviewee#9, personal communication, 8-18-11). 
Although the plan provided very detailed instructions on how to determine whether to 
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evacuate and how to prepare the campus for an approaching storm, the plan provided no 
guidance toward business continuity or what to do after the storm beyond the instruction 
to “Assess Damage”, the final step in each action plan (Hinojosa, personal 
communication, 6-7-96).  As luck would have it, this next step was not necessary for the 
next twenty five years. 
 With the arrival of Dr. Bowen Loftin as Vice President and CEO of TAMUG in 
May of 2005 only a few months before hurricane season, the crisis management plan, 
particularly the hurricane response, was revisited.  As the new CEO of the campus, Dr. 
Loftin asked long term Associate Vice President William Hearn to brief him on how the 
campus handled hurricanes.  He recalled: 
So he showed me the two basic documents.  One was an elaborate plan which 
really dealt with evacuation and primarily the plan dealt with when do you and 
how do you make the call.  So it really -- it dealt with the kinds of sources of 
models and the data you utilize, the communications with other entities like 
National Weather Service, places like that, that led up to giving the CEO the 
information required to make a decision.  And so that was well and, I think, well 
in use.  This is something I’ve done many, many times.  There’s lots of 
experience built into that plan.  It was clearly a very mature and well-oiled 
document basically to drive things and we used it several times during my time 
as the CEO there. 
 
The second piece was really a plan of how the campus was secured and so who 
does what and to be able to make sure that we get boats away if at all possible by 
trailering, what kind of things need to be boarded up, moved, relocated, and 
raised to a higher ground, you name it, and also included things like locations for 
the administration to be in, locations for police to be in and things like that.  So 
again, our plan had been used a number of times and was quite -- was quite, I 
think well thought through and obviously had been polished over many 
iterations.  But I asked him a question.  I said, “William, okay this is good and 
fine but what happens now when you have a hurricane hit you and you have to 
then come back to the campus and restore it some way necessary and resume 
operations?  And what if there is a lengthy gap between the time you evacuated 
and the time you come back again?”  Well, that wasn’t there (Loftin, 2011). 
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Loftin charged the campus executive team with developing what he termed the third 
piece of the plan – the business continuity piece (Interviewee#1, personal 
communication, 7-18-11; Interviewee#9, personal communication, 8-18-11; 
Interviewee#10, personal communication, 9-8-11).  The necessity of this phase of the 
plan became readily apparent only a few short months later as Hurricane Katrina 
slammed into Louisiana on August 29, 2005.  TAMUG administrators paid rapt attention 
to the numerous colleges and universities that were devastated by the storm.   
Less than a month later, Hurricane Rita approached Galveston as the first major 
storm to threaten TAMUG under Loftin’s tenure.  Following the campus plan, the 
students were evacuated and the campus was secured as the storm drew near.  The 
campus administration had relocated to College Station when the storm spun off and 
slammed into Beaumont.   One of the TAMUG Crisis Management Team reported: 
So we sat at College Station, and Rita eventually hits Beaumont.  It hit Lamar 
(University) and it damaged 60 of the 77 roofs.  They reopened six weeks later.  
They lost a lot but they did a very different thing that we did because it’s a very 
different situation.  And there is no storm surge overall and it was all fresh water 
flooding that was damaged, I guess you know.  But we sat there and Loftin says 
this thing isn’t going to happen again. (Interviewee#5, personal communication, 
7-29-11) 
 
The Rita evacuation was unprecedented in that millions fearing a Katrina-like situation 
hit the highways, creating gridlock.  TAMUG, following its well established protocol, 
had evacuated the students days before everyone else had called for evacuation, which 
enabled the students to get ahead of the traffic. Many staff were not so lucky with 
several spending up to twenty hours on the road to reach destinations like Austin or San 
Antonio (Interviewee#9, personal communication, 8-18-11).  Out of the evacuation from 
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Hurricane Rita, two significant things occurred.  For one, the traffic gridlock 
reemphasized the importance to the administration of making the decision to evacuate 
early enough to get the students out.  Secondly, while evacuated to College Station, Dr. 
Loftin had the opportunity to visit in depth with then-President of Texas A&M 
University, Dr. Robert Gates, who suggested that he would be very receptive to the idea 
of using TAMU- College Station as a base if TAMUG were unable to return to 
Galveston due to damage from a storm (Interviewee#11, personal communication, 9-9-
11).  This was the initial discussion that started the development of the business 
continuity plan as an extension to the crisis management plan.  As one participant stated: 
So that, Rita was the event, the cathartic event that caused us to create a business 
continuity plan because, prior to that, we did not have one.  Subsequent to that, 
there were some other events that it caused us to expand our business continuity 
plan beyond the hurricane.  The influenza pandemic fears caused a significant 
expansion, some other things after that.  But in some other entities, the triggering 
event for business continuity was 9/11.  A lot of other organizations saw 9/11 and 
said that could happen to us too.  In a scale of business damage occurred in 9/11 
that hadn’t occurred in other places before with the loss of the communications 
downtown in Manhattan, at least the evacuation of a big part of Manhattan.  So 
most of business continuity planning unfortunately triggered by some cathartic 
event to you or others.  In our case, it was clearly Rita.  Because prior to that, we 
didn’t have any significant business continuity planning.  Since then, we’ve 
grown our business continuity planning beyond hurricanes, like the bridge drill 
we just did.  But that was the first business continuity plan I ever saw on this 
campus.  I had disaster planning.  I had evacuation planning.  I had pre-
evacuation planning but I had no post-hit planning (Interviewee#5, personal 
communication, 7-29-11). 
 
The Evolution of a Plan 
 On October 21, 2005, a group was convened in College Station to develop the 
third phase of the TAMUG’s Hurricane Response and Crisis Management Plan.  This 
group, consisting of senior administrative leaders from both the Galveston and College 
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Station campuses, met to discuss the possibility of relocating the Galveston students and 
operations to TAMU- College Station in the case of a major storm or other catastrophe 
that rendered the campus unable to continue normal operations for an extended time.  
The initial meeting consisted of identifying key areas and assigning a TAMU- College 
Station lead as well as a TAMUG lead to work together to identify issues and designate 
lead officers for both campuses during emergency conditions.  The committee identified 
eleven primary areas that would need to be addressed.  These areas included student 
relocation, faculty/staff relocation, class schedules/room assignments, teaching 
assignments, grades/transcripting, research, billing/fees, financial aid, international 
faculty/staff/students, business services, and IT/communications (meeting agenda and 
notes, personal communication, 10-21-05).  Over the next month, the leaders under each 
area identified the key issues and potential obstacles to bring back to the group for 
further discussion on November 22, 2005.  Eventually a series of white papers were 
developed through these partnerships that provided additional detail, identified critical 
staff, and proposed processes for addressing each area of concern.  
 While the various administrators were working with their TAMU- College 
Station counterparts to develop the white papers that would ultimately provide the 
foundation for the business continuity plan, another team was reviewing and updating 
the current emergency response plan (Interviewee #3, personal communication, 7-20-
11).  In the months following hurricanes Katrina and Rita, a lot of information began to 
circulate concerning the many challenges faced by the various colleges and universities 
that were impacted by the storms.  This new information, coupled with the long and 
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detailed lists from the older plan, informed a new, broader plan that incorporated new 
social media and the campus website to further enhance communication (Interviewee #5, 
personal communication, 7-29-11).  It also implemented a deadline for the decision to 
relocate.  
First and foremost and for better or for worse, it set a drop dead time period 
about which if we can’t restart the campus in two weeks, we’ll pull the trigger 
and evacuate because that was pretty easy after Ike to determine that weren’t 
going to be back in two weeks.  Very difficult to determine when we would be 
back but it was clear as hell weren’t really going to be back in two weeks.  Yeah, 
that maybe in four weeks or maybe should’ve been three weeks, maybe should 
be a week, maybe should be two months, I won’t argue that but we had it.  We 
had a very objective deadline…” (Interviewee #5, personal communication, 7-
29-11). 
 
On March 1, 2007, an extensive table top exercise testing the hurricane 
preparedness and campus recovery plan was conducted.  The exercise focused heavily 
on developing a comprehensive response to extensive damage to the campus, and 
resulted in the development of a tiered response after a serious storm strike (Hurricane 
Preparedness/Campus Recovery Plan and Table Top Exercise and notes, personal 
communication, 8-3-11).  As one of the participants in the exercise stated: 
This was a table top exercise and it’s really phenomenal when you look at it.  It 
really has a lot of foresight in here that I never even thought about till I looked at 
the dang thing.  It has pictures of the campus and the coast and it has a picture for 
hurricane…have you seen this? But then it talks about campus recovery, return to 
the campus, campus business continuity, TAMUG/ TAMU integrated plan, 
hurricane emergency preparedness plan that was on the website at that time, and 
actually copied it too.  Tier 1, tier 2, tier 3, how you return, quality of return, so 
we had everything in this table top exercise which is pretty… this is a really 
strategic planning as far as I’m concerned.  And then if you look at questions that 
were asked on this table top exercise, this is how we came up with the ‘what 
happens if’, establish campus command, post Blackmon mooring out here 
immediately which we did do, coordinate with MARAD for use of ship which 
we did do.  Lodging-dining commitments, financial implications, identification 
of additional resources, long range - what if TAMU gets closed two months, six 
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months, one year.  So, we talked about that at this meeting, and that's how when 
we make a decision to relocate happened.  So, that’s kind of cool that this was 
done a few years before Ike (Interviewee #6, personal communication, 8-2-11). 
 
Information learned from the table top exercise was added to the updated emergency 
response plan and combined with the continuity plan to produce the Emergency Short-
Term and Long-Term Recovery and Business Continuity Plan (Emergency Short-Term 
and Long-Term Recovery and Business Continuity Plan, 2007).   
 One other significant aspect in the evolution of the plan was the changing of the 
top administrator of the plan.  The Executive Associate Vice President was historically 
charged with overseeing the crisis response for the campus.  William Hearn, the current 
Executive Associate Vice President, had served the university for 33 years and was well 
respected for his crisis management skills, strong leadership, and corporate knowledge 
when he decided to retire on January 31, 2008.  He retired with a capable staff and a 
strong crisis management plan in place.  Barely a month later, Dr. Rodney McClendon 
was named his successor and assumed the position of Executive Associate Vice 
President and Chief Operating Officer at TAMUG on March 1, 2008.  Dr. McClendon, 
the former Chief of Staff for the President of Texas A&M University, brought a wealth 
of strong relationships and connections with the TAMU- College Station campus to the 
Galveston campus.  His first task upon joining the Galveston campus was to familiarize 
himself with the new Campus Emergency plan so that he could advise Dr. Loftin in the 
case of a crisis (Interviewee #10, personal communication, 9-8-11) (Interviewee #11, 
personal communication, 9-9-11). 
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 On June 6, 2008, tragedy struck TAMUG.  The Cynthia Woods, a small sailboat 
carrying four students and two staff safety officers, capsized while competing in a 
regatta running from Galveston to Vera Cruz, Mexico.  One of the safety officers died in 
the accident, and the other safety officer and four students spent 26 hours in the Gulf 
waters before being rescued by the U.S. Coast Guard (Associated Press, 2008).  The 
national press swarmed to the campus.  Although the crisis management plan only 
provided limited guidance in such a scenario, the administration gained extensive 
experience in dealing with the media.  This was particularly true of the relatively new 
Director of Communications, Karen Bigley, who already had a background in crisis 
communications but was new to working in higher education.  The Cynthia Woods 
tragedy enabled her to become familiar with the administrators, build trust, and really 
distinguish herself as being effective in crisis (Interviewee #5, personal communication, 
7-29-11). 
The Storm Approaches 
 Hurricane Ike entered the Gulf of Mexico on Tuesday, September 9, 2008.  The 
TAMUG Crisis Management Team had met just a few weeks prior in response to 
Hurricane Gustav, a category two hurricane that had threatened Galveston before 
eventually making landfall in Louisiana on September 1, 2008.  As a result, even though 
the crisis management plan called for a convening of the TAMUG Crisis Management 
Team whenever a hurricane entered the Gulf, Dr. Brad McGonagle, Assistant Vice 
President for Administration, felt that another meeting was not necessary as the semester 
had just started, and everyone was extremely busy.  All of the key players had been 
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identified, the emergency communication had been tested, and key details of the crisis 
management plan had been discussed only two weeks prior at the Gustav meetings 
(Interviewee #3, personal communication, 7-20-11).  Furthermore, most projections had 
Hurricane Ike going northward into Florida. Instead Dr. McGonagle contacted the team 
through email and notified them that he was watching the storm and would contact them 
if a meeting was scheduled (Interviewee #3, personal communication, 7-20-11).   
 The next morning, Dr. McGonagle sent out another update indicating that 
Hurricane Ike had continued on a track toward Galveston overnight, but the projections 
had changed drastically.  Some projections still had the storm turning north into Florida 
while others projected the storm turning south and going into Mexico.  The entire Gulf 
Coast fell into the projected path, and it would be hours before the next hurricane plane 
reported back.  Still, Dr. McGonagle continued monitoring the storm’s progress and 
coordinating with the County Emergency Management Service and the City Emergency 
Management Office, dialing into the state teleconference through the emergency 
preparedness program on an hourly basis as the storm approached.  He also instructed 
the Facilities Services staff to begin preparations for securing the campus in case an 
evacuation is called for (Interviewee #3, personal communication, 7-20-11).  By noon, 
Dr. McGonagle felt it was time to call for the evacuation, but Dr. Loftin was not quite 
ready, preferring to wait until the latest hurricane report came out at 2:00 
p.m.(Interviewee #3, personal communication, 7-20-11) (Interviewee #11, personal 
communication, 9-9-11). 
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 That afternoon, many of the TAMUG Crisis Management Team were together at 
a Multicultural Reception welcoming students in the student center when the 2:00 pm 
hurricane report came out.  Dr. Loftin; Dr. Rodney McClendon; Dr. Brad McGonagle; 
Karen Bigley; Grant Shallenberger, Assistant Vice President of Student Affairs and 
Auxiliary Services; Dr. Donna Lang, Associate Vice President of Enrollment 
Management;  and Todd Sutherland, Director of Student Life were all gathered in the 
reception room when Shelly Fordyce, Assistant Director of Student Activities entered 
the room to notify the group that the latest update was posted.  The entire group excused 
themselves to Grant Shallenberger’s office, the closest office to the reception, only to 
find Galveston sitting directly in the new hurricane path projection (Interviewee #4, 
personal communication, 7-27-11). Dr. Loftin described the situation: 
That morning I was looking at data showing the largest enrollment of students on 
campus, 9% over the previous Fall, so I was feeling pretty good.  As the day 
went on, I was feeling less good as each model update was showing a progressive 
trend of the storm track toward Galveston.  We had a social event at 2:00 that 
afternoon.  At 2:30 pm, I gathered my senior staff who were at the event, and we 
talked about it, and at 2:30 we decided to close the campus as of 5:00 that day.  
Very serious event based on what we were seeing at that time, and so the right 
thing to do was get the students away, get the staff out, and kind of shut things 
down and get ourselves away as well.  So we closed campus at 1700, 5:00 pm. 
(Appendix C) 
 
 With Dr. Loftin and the Campus Executive Team closing the campus and calling 
for evacuation, the hurricane response plan was activated.  Communication via the 
website and text message alert system immediately went out to faculty, staff, and 
students stating that no classes would be held beyond 5:00 pm.  Although a few faculty 
in the midst of class continued on, most cancelled classes immediately.  The word spread 
rapidly as students contacted their friends and classmates.  Many students helped with 
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securing the campus before departing themselves.  Sailing and rowing team members 
were summoned to transport their competitive and practice boats to a warehouse and 
secured their facilities next to the slowly rising waterline.  Lifeguards sank pool furniture 
into the pool to prevent high winds from turning them into projectiles (Interviewee #2, 
personal communication, 7-22-11).  Community Leaders walked up and down hallways 
reiterating university instructions and helping students pack up when necessary.  On 
campus residents were directed to clean out their refrigerators, remove everything from 
their balconies, and complete an on-line registration form detailing where they planned 
to evacuate to, in what vehicle and with whom.  Anyone who did not have transportation 
was instructed to contact the Office of Residence life immediately.  By 7:30 pm, a bus 
from TAMU- College Station pulled out from the Galveston campus, transporting the 
last ten to fifteen students who had no transportation to College Station.  They were the 
last students to leave campus (Interviewee #2, personal communication, 7-22-11). 
 The faculty and staff had been busy as well.  As soon as the decision to evacuate 
was made, individual departments initiated the process they had used multiple times 
before to great success.  Karen Bigley as Director Communications immediately 
departed for TAMU- College Station to set up her base of communications (Interviewee 
#4, personal communication, 7-27-11).  Also for the purpose of communications, the 
website was transferred to a server located at TAMU- College Station while the 
Galveston servers were loaded into a vehicle and driven to College Station as well 
(Interviewee #5, personal communication, 7-29-11).  Residence Life contacted TAMU- 
College Station’s Transportation Services to summon the bus that transported those 
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students who had no transportation to College Station.  Food Service contacted their 
contracted food provider to send a freezer truck so all of the food in the freezer could be 
relocated to a safe location off of the island (Interviewee #2, personal communication, 7-
22-11).  Facilities Services began their process of collecting important files, documents, 
data, specimens, cash, and equipment from Human Resources, Financial Management 
Services, Admission and Records and other pre-identified locations for storage onto the 
Texas Clipper to safely ride out the storm (Interviewee #3, personal communication, 7-
20-11).  Researchers filled emergency generators with gas in case of power outages, and 
offices lifted computers off of floors in case of flooding.  The evacuation went smoothly 
as it had so many times before with many employees being veterans of over a dozen 
evacuations. In fact, post hurricane inspectors would later comment on the incredible job 
done by students, staff, and faculty in protecting all computer and other electronic 
equipment at the campus (Loftin, 2009). Once their on-campus responsibilities were 
complete, the employees also left campus to secure their own homes and evacuate their 
families. 
 The familiarity and experience did not work well for all.  After the horrendous 
evacuation and traffic for Hurricane Rita, many stated they were not going to evacuate 
(Interviewee #3, personal communication, 7-20-11).  The widely varying projected paths 
had also caused the call for evacuation to occur much later which made it more difficult 
to get personal homes secure, especially for those who had relatives nearby for whom 
they were responsible.  Others had evacuated so many times without an actual hurricane 
strike that they were reluctant to fully follow the plan: 
 94 
 
Interviewee:  Okay, well, for Ike normally when one is getting ready for a 
hurricane okay, we have a hurricane plan.  And our hurricane plan is written out.  
I can get you a copy of that. 
 
Interviewer:  Okay. 
 
Interviewee:  And we box up applicant documents.  We box up all our 
documents.  We take certain CPU’s and put them in cars to take home.   We do 
all these things.  So, it’s a whole plan written down.  When Hurricane Ike started 
coming, I didn’t think it was going to be bad.  So, anyways, we were staying and 
a day before we left, [Omitted] said, “No, we’re leaving.  You too, come on, I got 
you a room in College Station.” Because it always so hard then at the last minute.  
So, we got rooms in College Station.  So, at that time, right before we decided 
that the… TAMUG decided they were going to make the evacuation and all 
those things.  And for Ike surprisingly, I didn’t think it was going to be that bad 
and I decided to pack nothing.  We took CPU’s because that was the data that 
could never be recovered.   
 
Interviewer:  And those CPU’s and the other documents that you bring, that’s 
something that that was done historically on every evacuation?  
 
Interviewee:  Every evacuation until Ike.  With Ike, I decided this isn’t going to 
be bad and we’re going to leave them.  Okay, because it was coming at you, we 
had just packed for Rita and Katrina or whatever, there’s a million other ones and 
it’s a lot of work to pack this office up, okay.  And my team wanted to pack up, 
actually a lot of them did.  But it’s a work interruption of about a week to put 
everything up and pack it up.  Plus our documents are gone from here until we 
get them back.  It’s just really hard but doable.  So, we always take my CPU.  
[Omitted] is responsible for taking mine and his because we have – if we had to 
set up shop at another place, it would take our CPU’s to do it.  And [Omitted] 
takes hers along to, okay.  Normally, we don’t take hers but we did this time for 
Ike.  Everybody else took their CPU’s and we put them in the back room.  But 
aside from that as far as preparations for Ike, we walked away.  Normally, we do 
for all the plans and I’ll give you a copy of that plan.  I’ll have to find it.  And we 
can certainly, we get all the emergency numbers on that.  We did all that.  We 
just didn’t pack the office like we normally do (Interviewee #7, personal 
communication, 8-9-11). 
 
 By 6:30 am, Thursday, September 11, 2008 TAMUG had relocated its web 
services and electronic mail to TAMU- College Station, some 150 miles inland.  At 7:30 
am, the Texas Clipper II, a 523 foot vessel, was relocated from the campus dock across 
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the Galveston Ship channel to Pier 40.  This new location provided much greater 
protection from the impending storm.  The four crew members stayed with the ship 
throughout the storm.  At the same time, the campus powered down the physical plant 
leaving only overhead lights shining on the campus.  At 8:00 am, the Galveston 
Communications Center was opened in College Station.  At noon the sewer plant was 
shut down to prevent possible problems with salt water intake, and shortly thereafter the 
water lines were closed restricting all water from the campus (personal communication, 
September 10, 2008).  By 12:30 pm, the Galveston campuses were secure with all 
remaining faculty, staff and students evacuated.  Four police officers remained at the 
campus until the rising waters forced them to the City of Galveston Command Center 
(Loftin, 2009). 
Hurricane Ike Strikes Galveston 
   At 2:10 am, Saturday, September 13, Hurricane Ike slammed into Galveston.  
The velocity of the wind at its eye wall categorized it as a high Category 2 hurricane, but 
the sheer size of the storm pushed a storm surge of water typical of a much stronger 
storm. Only hours prior to the storm landing, the storm moved slightly northward in its 
path, resulting in the eye passing directly over the city of Galveston.  This last minute 
change in direction resulted in the Bolivar Peninsula, just north of Galveston, receiving 
the strongest of the storm’s winds as well as a reported surge of up to twenty feet high 
(Johnson, 2010).  The seawall in Galveston initially protected the city from the eleven 
foot surge preceding the eye wall, but as the bays and inlets around the city swelled with 
water from the Gulf, the city streets filled with water, flooding 75% of the city (Spinner, 
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2010).  Most off campus student, staff, and faculty housing on the island was damaged 
and rendered unlivable (Loftin, 2009).  In the December after action report, Loftin states: 
Ike was a rather odd storm.  We normally measure storm strength by wind 
velocities, and under those measurements, Ike was a Category II storm.  And 
there have been quite a few Category II storms that have passed over or very 
close to Galveston.  So at first people weren’t too worried about Ike, because it 
wasn’t much of a storm, but if you saw the picture I gave you earlier how big this 
storm was…it was a very, very large storm.  The extent was equal to what 
Category IV and V storms typically exhibit.  And that size contributed to a much 
larger than a Category II sized storm surge.  Actually we were very lucky in 
Galveston. The storm surge in Galveston was eleven feet, twelve feet max, but 
across Galveston Bay to the east of Boliver toward Gilchrist, it was well over 
fifteen feet.  Some recorded almost twenty feet.  So had the storm gone ashore in 
Freeport, not in Galveston itself, we would have had much more water damage 
than we did and we would have had major water intrusion almost certainly into 
our buildings on Pelican Island.  So again, it was a bad storm.  Galveston was 
hurt very badly, but it could have been much worse by a forty mile shift of the 
landfall of the storm (Appendix C).   
 
 Of the three campuses of TAMUG, the Fort Crockett campus, situated at one of 
the highest points on the island and well behind the seawall, fared the best.  The campus, 
which housed many faculty offices and was home for much of the campus research 
operations, was virtually untouched with only a few broken windows and vent stacks 
dislodged (Loftin, 2009).  The Teichman campus, housed on the waterfront campus on 
the other side of the island, suffered a much different result.  The Rowing Crew building 
and Texas Engineering Extension Service building suffered major damage from the 
storm surge with both buildings’ outer walls being breached by debris carried by the 
storm surge (Loftin, 2009).  The Benison Place Sailing Center also suffered major 
damage, and nearly all sailboats and rowing shells were destroyed or severely damaged 
(Loftin, 2009).  The campus was nearly a total loss. 
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 The Mitchell campus on Pelican Island also suffered mixed results.  Although the 
storm surge covered most of the campus grounds and destroyed any student vehicles left 
on the campus, the flooding did not penetrate any of the campus buildings.  Four major 
buildings on the Mitchell campus suffered damage to roofs and windows.  The sewer 
plant was damaged as well.  The most extensive damage to the campus was along the 
waterfront where significant damage was done to the Small Boat Basin and Texas 
Clipper Dock, which also suffered major silting.  The Wetlands Center suffered from 
extensive shoreline erosion, and huge piles of debris were strewn all over campus.  All 
of the teaching and training vessels that were unable to be relocated before the storm 
were lost, with many ending up on the Galveston Causeway several miles away (Loftin, 
2009).  The Texas Clipper II, in its more secure berthing across the ship channel safely 
rode out the storm, although on at least one occasion was nearly thrown onto the dock by 
the powerful winds and waves (Interviewee #4, personal communication, 7-27-11).  
Lastly, the sole entrance road leading to campus buckled under the storm’s assault 
allowing access only by foot (Interviewee #3, personal communication, 7-20-11).   
The Crisis Response Initial Meeting 
 By the next morning, many were anxious to assess the damage to the campus and 
city in general.  The governor had declared a no fly zone over the area, preventing an 
aerial surveillance of the island, and the main causeway leading onto the island was 
nearly completely blocked to traffic.   Despite the hurdles, by daylight reports began to 
filter in to the executive team (Interviewee #4, personal communication, 7-27-11).  The 
four employees who had ridden out the storm on the Texas Clipper II were able to see 
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the campus from their location across the ship channel, and even though many of the 
roads of Galveston were impassible due to large piles of debris, the campus police were 
able to navigate from the city’s storm headquarters to the buckled road to walk onto the 
campus (Interviewee #4, personal communication, 7-27-11).  Dr. Brad McGonagle, who 
had responsibility over the police and facilities service departments, had weathered the 
storm about forty miles inland, and with the assistance of the TAMUG chief of police, 
Sam Martinez, he was able to get back on campus and survey the damage to report to the 
rest of the executive team with the use of a campus-issued satellite phone (Interviewee 
#3, personal communication, 7-20-11). 
In College Station, President Loftin requested an emergency meeting for 4:00 pm 
with the senior leadership of Galveston and the TAMU- College Station campuses in the 
President’s Conference room in 1030 Rudder Tower (A AA Werlinger & Associates, 
2008).  With the exception of Brad McGonagle, who was at the Galveston campus, 
Rodney McClendon, who had evacuated to the East Coast for a funeral and was having 
difficulty getting a flight back to Texas, and Dr. Gil Rowe, Chief Academic Officer who 
had been in New Mexico for a week prior to the storm, all of TAMUG’s executive team 
were in attendance.  Both Drs. McGonagle and McClendon were able to teleconference 
into the meeting (Interviewee #3, personal communication, 7-20-11, Interviewee #10, 
personal communication, 9-8-11).  Dr. Elsa Murano, President of Texas A&M 
University, had assembled much of her senior staff as well including Dr. Russell Cross, 
Executive Vice President for Operations and Chief of Staff; General Joe Weber, Vice 
President of Student Affairs; Dr. Dave Parrott, Executive Vice President of Student 
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Affairs and Dean of Students; Dr. Martyn Gunn, Speaker of Faculty Senate; Mr. John 
Crawford, Associate Vice President and Controller; General Van Alstyne, Corps 
Commandant; and others (Interviewee #11, personal communication, 9-9-11).  In all 
there were perhaps 25 -30 people in the room, and many of the individuals in attendance 
had been directly involved in the development of the white papers outlining the TAMUG 
Business Continuity plan (Interviewee #1, personal communication, 7-18-11).     
The first order of business for the meeting was to review the damage reports 
from Dr. Brad McGonagle and others concerning the status of the campus as well as the 
city of Galveston.  Dr. McGonagle argued that although the damage to the campus was 
extensive, no major classroom buildings were significantly damaged, and with the 
assistance of Vaughn Construction, a construction group that already had heavy 
equipment on site for the construction of the new Ocean and Coastal Sciences building, 
he felt strongly that campus could be cleaned up enough for classes to resume within 
three weeks (Interviewee #3, personal communication, 7-20-11).  Furthermore, contracts 
signed well in advance of the disaster with Munters International for Disaster Recovery 
would provide generators and dehumidifiers for each of the buildings (although the 
university would later discover that Munters was unable to deliver on any of their 
contracted obligations) (Interviewee #3, personal communication, 7-20-11).  This 
recommendation conflicted with the two week deadline agreed upon in the TAMUG 
Business Continuity Plan put in place in the previous year (Emergency Short-Term and 
Long-Term Recovery and Business Continuity Plan, 2007).  Furthermore, reports 
coming in from the City of Galveston Emergency Center described a bleak situation 
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throughout the city.  Major flooding rendered much of the off campus student housing, 
including the two privatized entities located across the street from campus where nearly 
300 of the students lived, uninhabitable for an extended amount of time. Once the 
information from Galveston was in and fully discussed, each individual’s opinion was 
solicited.  Nearly unanimously by 4:30 pm, the decision was made to relocate the 
Galveston campus operations to TAMU- College Station and fully activate the TAMUG 
Business Continuity Plan (Appendix F). 
Once the decision was made, President Murano put her Chief of Staff, Dr. 
Russell Cross, in charge and instructed the team to do whatever was necessary to ensure 
that the Galveston campus survived and continued its semester (Interviewee #10, 
personal communication, 9-8-11).  A discussion of the TAMUG Business Continuity 
Plan commenced.  There was a great deal of conversation concerning how many 
students would relocate to TAMU- College Station as there was no previous data upon 
which to base an estimation.  Like many universities across the country, TAMU- College 
Station had welcomed evacuees from the schools affected from Katrina the year prior, 
but the number had been only around 100 students (Interviewee #1, personal 
communication, 7-18-11).  This crisis involved 1,777 students as well as staff and 
faculty who much more closely affiliated with the main campus and each other, and the 
anticipated number was a critical element is how so many issues would be addressed 
(Loftin, 2009).   The Galveston members of the meeting were asked to estimate how 
many students would relocate (Interviewee #1, personal communication, 7-18-11).  
Estimates from 40 to 65 percent were projected until eventually the committee settled on 
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using 60 percent of the 1777 students for planning purposes (Interviewee #1, personal 
communication, 7-18-11).  It wasn’t determined until much later that the actual number 
would be much higher – 1,1612 students of the 1,777 or 91% of the enrollment (Loftin, 
2009).    
As the group dove into the planning of the relocation, the plan called for a 
pairing of a Galveston staff counterpart with a TAMU- College Station staff counterpart.  
The meeting rapidly deteriorated into multiple discussions of the thousands of details 
needing to be addressed when General Van Alstyne of the TAMU- College Station 
campus suggested the development of a set of guiding principles to bring the discussion 
back to a strategic level.  As one participant explains: 
Because instead of this big thing you wanted to drill down and the “Oh my gosh 
how are we going to handle this” and it was just, it was all over but it was so 
obvious that this was just going to be an all out push on so many areas of 
problem solving that we are just going to take lots of people.  And I remember 
being in there for a good while maybe 45 minutes or an hour into that process 
and they started to develop – “This is our structure- There’s going to be a 
morning meeting at 8:00 A.M every morning that will be the higher level 
coordination group,” every kind of communication issues have to go to that table.  
You know the structure was important but General Van Alstyne was the 
commandant of the Corps at that time and I love General Van Alstyne, because 
he’s huge and his voice has this like power house impact to it. 
 
And I remember that General Alstyne stopped the whole meeting and it got really 
quiet and I thought this was one of the most significant things that happened and 
he stopped the meeting and he said, he goes “There’s too many different threats, 
there’s too many different issues,” he said “We have to stop right now and define 
our guiding principles” and I’ve put those in all of the handouts and the things 
I’ve used, because they really came down to the three guiding principles. 
 
But from watching the process enroll from that day through the next three or four 
months we went back to those guiding principles over and over and over again 
whenever there was conflict and there were multiple conflicts whether it was the 
-- how the parking tag worked and the thing or whether the students could get a 
shot in the health center.  It was that kind of thing that you kept going back, “No 
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that’s not what we agreed on.  These are the guiding principles”, … But still at 
the time that you are having to make decisions very fast, I know we made 
decisions based on that agreement that if you’re a staff member we said that can’t 
cost you more in this process in expense.  We want you to be working, and we 
need you to be doing these things so you can’t suddenly realize I have another set 
of costs but that time from General Van Alstyne I thought was just really pivotal.  
It strikes me over and over again…(Interviewee #1, personal communication, 7-
18-11). 
 
As discussion ensued, eventually three guiding principles were established.  The first 
and foremost would be a commitment to maintain the highest quality academic 
experience for TAMUG students.  Many schools after Katrina had cancelled their 
semesters much to their detriment, but if TAMUG was going to continue their semester, 
it was plainly stated that the school owed it to the students to deliver the education at as 
high a standard as academically possible under the circumstances (Interviewee #11, 
personal communication, 9-9-11). 
The second principle recommended maintaining the integrity of the TAMUG 
classes.  The semester had already started and students had progressed in their various 
classes.  Breaking them up and dispersing them into the various TAMU- College Station 
courses and expecting them to succeed would have been problematic.  The crisis and 
relocation already had great potential for negatively impacting the students, and the 
specialization of many of the Galveston courses did not facilitate an easy transition in to 
the TAMU- College Station courses.  This was a major decision as it contradicted the 
Business Continuity Plan which called for placing TAMUG students in as many TAMU- 
College Station classes as possible.  One participant stated, “Part of what we talked 
about very early on was the courses in Galveston—there’s a lot of the average everyday 
courses, but there are also a lot that are very specific.  And so we talked about how 
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important it was that those continue, because that’s obviously why students have chosen 
to go to Galveston.  That kind of drove the decision that we would keep our students 
together and not put them in an English class up here or a history class or whatever” 
(Interviewee #4, personal communication, 7-27-11).       
The third principle proposed a cost neutral experience.  The university would 
ideally make it financially seamless to the 1200 estimated students and undetermined 
number of faculty/staff to relocate for an undetermined-to-date time period.  The concept 
was founded on the principles of ethical behavior – the university did not want to re-
victimize students, many who had lost all of their belongings in the flooding- as well as 
an enticement to retain students at TAMUG.  As one participant said: 
It was driven by two things in my opinion, it was driven by two things.  One is 
the thought it was the right thing to do which I agree.  I’m not sure I would have 
the nerve to say it aloud okay.  I didn’t recommend it. I didn’t stick my head out 
that far.  I mean that was ballsy. He didn’t have the resources to pull it off, it was 
pure bluff.  But when you talk about guiding principles, our guiding principles, 
that was one of the critical guiding principles that you and I used as we went 
forward and it was a damn good one. 
 
I definitely would put it in plan again and the correlating part of that was because 
of limitations on refunds the decision to give the waiver to credit all those who 
would come back the next semester, My opinion is one, we came back in the 
spring and when we came back, with those numbers we came back because of 
that decision.  That 9% that didn’t move to College Station mostly came back in 
January because of that factor, I confess, and that was a corollary to the cost 
neutral piece.  It wasn’t really cost neutral because it really addressed the 
students that didn’t come but that made it cost neutral for them but that’s the 
ethical piece. We didn’t take half their money and run.  I mean legally we’re 
supposed to take half their money and run for the 9% of our students, but if we 
do, and most of them may not come back.  I never saw the final number 
personally.  My impression was that almost all of them came back in the spring, 
given our normal attrition from fall to spring is going to occur anyway of the 
ones that went up there…Not after that of course, but that was just the practical 
way to do it and besides we’ve been assholes to do that but I think we didn’t do 
stupid things but I think those two decisions around cost with the second one just 
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helped us when we returned.  But the first one was really a guiding principle that 
came up right in those first meetings.  The first time we met around the table with 
everybody that I sit there and I think I was in the if not the first day the second 
day that I was sitting in the back listening the cost neutral was on the table as a 
guiding principle and it drove so much of what we did. (Interviewee #5, personal 
communication, 7-29-11) 
 
This principle in particular had far-reaching implications.  It was determined at the 
meeting to give students one of three options.  The first option was to follow the 
university’s standard refund policy and refund 50% of their tuition and fees to any 
student who wanted to withdraw as dictated by the academic catalog based on the day 
the campus evacuated.  The second option was for the student to withdraw from the 
current semester and transfer all of their funds to be used in the following Spring 
semester.  This was a strategy that was utilized by some of the schools hit by hurricanes 
in the previous year that had demonstrated some effectiveness in retaining students 
(Interviewee #11, personal communication, 9-9-11). The third option for the student was 
relocate to TAMU- College Station and continue their classes with a commitment from 
the university to keep their expenses roughly the same.  “We wanted to make sure the 
students understood and the parents understood that even though it might be more 
expensive for housing, for example, here in College Station than it was in Galveston, 
there would be no new cost to the student” (Interviewee #11, personal communication, 
9-9-11). 
 Once the guiding principles were set, the structure for future meetings was 
formalized.  Using the TAMUG Business Continuity Plan as a roadmap, the operation 
was broken into seven major areas: Evacuation, Relocation of Students, Relocation of 
Faculty and Staff, Student Services, Providing TAMUG Students Classes in TAMU- 
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College Station, Billing and Fees at TAMU- College Station, and Financial Services for 
TAMU Galveston (Texas A&M University at Galveston Relocation to College Station 
Briefing Memo for President Murano, September 16, 2008).  Each major area had a 
Galveston lead and a TAMU- College Station lead as well as a series of major issues to 
address in their respective area. While addressing these major issues, other operational 
issues were identified and addressed as well while reporting back to the main group 
which initially met twice a day.   
I just remembered that Dr. Cross would convene these large meetings; that is the 
one thing I remember.  It was like-, because the plan called for pairs.  Somebody 
for Galveston and somebody from College Station and you work together on 
office space for faculty or classroom space, et cetera.  So you had these pairs of 
the people and it was a great plan so I commend all of those who created the 
plan.  So you had the person there who knew what Galveston’s needs would and 
should be in a situation like that, and then you had the person on this end who 
should be able to garner the resources and so we would have this large meetings 
and literally Dr. Cross is facilitating it and go around the room and just kind of 
go down the sub-committee or the people who are paired up; where are we with 
this, where are we with that and then of course all of these people who were the 
leads had a team of folks who were out getting it done and I mean literally- you 
talk about BlackBerrys, I don’t even know if the iPhones were really rolling 
there, but definitely BlackBerrys. 
 
I mean people would be getting updates continuously throughout the meeting, 
but pretty much those meetings were really updates then they would take place 
once or twice a day.  I think initially it was twice and then as we move further 
into the situation it became once.  A lot of times people were in and out, because 
we needed to be out in the field.  It was nice to sit here and give you an update, 
but we needed to get the work done.  So those were the meetings from almost 
like a policy group, but then we had operational meetings.  I mean my gosh- you, 
me, Cassandra, Grant, all of us.  Then we would have our own operational 
meetings as to what we needed to get done et cetera and who do we need to call 
upon to help us get it done from main campus or the community, because the 
community was definitely a critical part of this.  (Interviewee #10, personal 
communication, 9-8-11). 
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The meeting concluded with the assignment of a facilities assessment team to travel to 
Galveston to assess any structural damage to the TAMUG campus assets with a goal of 
presenting a cost analysis by close of business on Thursday, September 18th.  The 
Vaughn Construction representatives would assist the team on site (Texas A&M 
University at Galveston Relocation to College Station Briefing Memo for President 
Murano, September 16, 2008).  The last order of business was to determine when 
Galveston classes would restart in College Station.  After much discussion, the goal set 
forth in the TAMUG Business Continuity Plan of restarting classes within two weeks of 
the evacuation was upheld.  Classes were scheduled to begin in College Station on 
Wednesday, September 24th with TAMUG student registration and orientation to be held 
the two days prior (Texas A&M University at Galveston Relocation to College Station 
Briefing Memo for President Murano, September 16, 2008).  A campus of nearly 2,000 
students and 200 faculty and staff would be relocated, and classes resumed in just ten 
days. 
 That evening Dr. Loftin, Karen Bigley and Jason Cook, TAMU- College Station 
Vice President for Marketing and Communications, met to formulate the communication 
plan.  The website was updated to notify students that there is extensive damage to the 
campus and that the Campus Executive Team was meeting to determine the next course 
of action.  The webpage was stripped of graphics to allow easier loading and better 
access for mobile devices.  The E-2 text messaging system was used as well to 
communicate to those who were in the many areas of Texas who still did not have 
power.  The decision to relocate was not shared at that time to allow some of the 
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logistics to be determined in the following days. “That was the announcement that we’re 
going to be closed for a few days until we can reopen.  Once we know more, we’re 
going to get it out. We were at that point, we just wanted to be able to tell people that yes 
we are going to continue the semester.  We don’t know what that’s going to look like yet 
and to reassure people that campus was at least relatively okay” (Interviewee #4, 
personal communication, 7-27-11).   
The Next Eight Days 
 The days following the initial meeting were characterized by long hours and 
multi-level problem solving.  More Galveston employees began arriving in College 
Station with many still reeling from the loss of their homes and possessions.  Fran 
Vargas, a computer and information services employee who had been on the team that 
originally moved the Galveston servers to College Station, lost everything in the storm 
with the exception of what she had taken with her in one suitcase (Alexander & Rizvi, 
2008).  Dr. Donna Lang, who had come to College Station with her children and mother 
in the days before the storm, had six feet of water in her house.  “The only thing that was 
left in my house that was salvageable was whatever was in the tops of closets.  Think 
about what you have in the tops of your closets” (personal communication, November 1, 
2008).  Regardless of their personal loss, the employees dove into the problem at hand 
finding some therapy in the long hours working with close friends enduring similar 
circumstances.  The employees supported each other in many ways. 
We had a meeting, like where we actually said there was a meeting, every day.  
We had some problems with transportation and where people were housed.  So, I 
had an accountability meeting every day at around 8:30.  I expected people to try 
to get there about 8:30 because parking and traffic were a little different and 
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many times I have to go find people because they were in their car.  Like one 
time one day Audrey got hurt.  She didn’t know where she lived and that was an 
ordeal.  I mean, there are different things that happened.  Or somebody’s car 
didn’t start and they didn’t have a phone in their apartment and their cell phone 
wasn’t charged and so I go over there, banged their door, “Where are you?” 
“Why aren’t you at work?” just to keep track of each other.  But basically, we 
had to meet a lot and we stayed together.  Here, they don’t care where I am.  
There, they wanted to know where I was at every minute (Interviewee #7, 
personal communication, 8-9-11).  
 
 The various teams were diligently working on their assignments and identifying 
other issues in their domain. The evacuation team was focused on developing a method 
to best communicate with students collectively as well as to develop a survey for the 
students to assess their plans and needs.  Those students who did not complete the 
survey were contacted by phone.  A telephone hotline with multiple lines was set up to 
answer questions.  Questions and answers were added to the online Frequently Asked 
Question list.  Student leaders from the Student Government Association and 
Community Leaders from the Galveston residence halls were brought in to assist in 
contacting students and manning the phones.  Contact was made with every student 
(Interviewee #7, personal communication, 8-9-11).   All faculty members were contacted 
to confirm their safety and ability to continue to the semester.  The one faculty member 
who was not able to be reached was later found to have had a medical emergency during 
the storm and was medically evacuated to San Antonio.   
As we called the faculty, the commitment to continue was amazing. Remember 
the video of the house burning in the historic district surrounded by water that 
made it on all the news channels on the day after the storm? That house belonged 
to one of our adjunct professors who has a successful law practice and teaches 
two courses for us each semester.  What does that pay, like maybe a $1000 or so?  
How easy would it have been for him to say forget it, I have too much on my 
plate right now, I can’t do it.  But he didn’t.  With the exception of the one 
instructor who’s health prevented him from continuing, every other faculty 
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member continued on with their courses (Interviewee #1, personal 
communication, 7-18-11). 
 
The staff were more difficult to contact as many of the service employees lived in the 
areas most impacted by the flooding (Interviewee #3, personal communication, 7-20-11).  
However, through well-established phone trees updated prior to the storm season 
through the campus emergency plan, contact was successfully achieved with each 
employee, communicating that they each still had a job and that they needed to call in 
each day for instructions (Interviewee #2, personal communication, 7-22-11).  At the 
same time, plans were developed to relocate scientific equipment from the Fort Crocket 
campus and Human Resource records from their storage point on the ship (Texas A&M 
University at Galveston Relocation to College Station Briefing Memo for President 
Murano, September 19, 2008). As detailed in the TAMUG Business Continuity Plan, 
arrangements were quickly made to relocate the ship back to its dock on the Mitchell 
campus where it had the ability to generate power for much of the campus.  
Unfortunately, it was soon discovered that the storm had silted in the dock, preventing 
the ship from being returned to its dock (Loftin, 2009). 
 The team assigned to the relocation of the students were focused on a number of 
issues that were critical to the relocation of the students.  The team decided to adapt the 
orientation program that was used with the Katrina refugees to provide students a one 
stop shop to get all of the necessary information about the campus and transition.  As the 
Galveston student information was already readily available in the Texas A&M 
University Student Information Management System (SIMS), the ability to convert 
Galveston student identification cards, meal plans and parking permits to the appropriate 
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TAMU- College Station documents was fairly seamless.  A much greater challenge 
existed in providing housing.  At the time of the storm, slightly over 600 students of the 
nearly 1800 students lived in campus housing with an additional 100 freshman cadets 
living on board the ship in a living learning community. Another 350 students lived in 
privatized housing located across the street from the campus.  The remaining 700 
students lived in the Galveston community.  When the number of students coming to 
TAMU- College Station grew from an estimated 60-65% to nearly 90%, the challenge of 
providing housing grew as well.  Both TAMU- College Station and Blinn College had 
enjoyed record enrollments that Fall semester, resulting in less available housing for the 
transplanted Galveston students.  On campus housing at TAMU-  College Station had 
only 285 beds available, many of these were cots in study rooms.  An additional 178 
beds were available for cadets in the Quad, and 25 beds were available for International 
students in the University Apartments.  While the Galveston housing office pulled 
students from their on campus housing rosters to assign them to the TAMU- College 
Station on campus beds, the Off Campus Housing office and University Real Estate 
office scrambled to locate housing for those students for whom there was no space on 
campus.  Less than ten days was an extremely short time to identify available space in 
the community and develop contracts through the university under the cost neutral 
principle.  Luckily, Melrose Place, an apartment complex that was finished only a few 
weeks before the Fall semester started, was mostly vacant providing an additional189 
beds.  Shortly thereafter another 300 beds were secured in other various apartment 
complexes and rental properties in the community.   With almost 240 offers from 
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community residents willing to house a Galveston student for the semester resulting 
from an email plea from President Murano to the campus community, the university 
would make progress toward the goal, but the goal kept changing (Murano email, 
September 16, 2008).  With every step forward came a step back as the numbers of 
students indicating they were relocating to TAMU- College Station continued to grow.  
It did not appear the university would achieve their goal of housing all students who 
decided to relocate when on the day of the orientation, the owner of the Plaza hotel, a 
hotel that had been mostly off line but was still serviceable, offered to open to the 
Galveston students and provide an additional 300 beds.  In addition, the owner of the 
Plaza offered extra furniture to supplement the residential furniture that TAMU- College 
Station could provide to furnish the bedrooms of the newly rented properties.  In the end, 
the university did not have the 1572 furnished rooms that were hoped for but it was 
extremely close, and as it turned out, more than sufficient housing was identified.   
  The third team was focused on the relocation of faculty and staff.  The first step 
was the assessment of which faculty and staff would be relocating to TAMU- College 
Station.  Many of the faculty lived on the mainland and with the exception of a shortage 
of electricity following the storm, their houses were perfectly habitable.  The conversion 
of their current classes to 3 hour once a week courses or even distance only courses were 
explored and offered to interested faculty.  Faculty who would drive up for a day or 
perhaps two days were offered mileage and hotel room reimbursement rather than 
semester long accommodations.  For those faculty and staff that were needed throughout 
the week or had homes affected by the storm, the Real Estate office secured 92 rental 
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units for the semester.  As of September 19th, 65 of the faculty had indicated that they 
were able to teach the following Wednesday with 43 requiring office space in TAMU- 
College Station.  Nine TAMUG faculty members indicated a need for research space 
with an additional six others already securing support with collaborators in TAMU- 
College Station (Texas A&M University at Galveston Relocation to College Station 
Briefing Memo for President Murano, September 19, 2008).   International faculty with 
VISA implications were assessed and offered assistance in resolving any issues. A 
meeting was scheduled for Friday, September 20 at 11:00 am to further answer 
questions, identify issues, take care of parking and identification cards, and offer 
Employee Assistance Services (Texas A&M University at Galveston Relocation to 
College Station Briefing Memo for President Murano, September 17, 2008).  The 
Faculty and Lab Office space was much more difficult as described by one: 
The senior group at A&M jumped right in. The secondary group, the deans, were 
not helpful; they were counter helpful. So the administrative group was all on 
board but the deans have a, you know, had a much more territorial view of their 
facilities. They have no central classroom assignment capability up there. It’s just 
all little fiefdoms and many things were done by, you know, through friendships. 
So we had a perfectly great relationship with physics because I was a good 
friend- I went to college with the assistant department head so he and I figured 
things out.  Chemistry was a problem until it was declared to be a non-problem 
by the dean and that was a relationship that Bowen and to some extent myself 
had with John Hooton, who basically informed the staff member who was a long 
time staff member that was saying, “well if we do that then I’m going to quit.” 
John just said, “Bye bye. Go away.” And the guy didn’t quit and suddenly 
everything was wonderful. And after that, everything was not just tolerating, they 
were really enjoying the whole thing. So it was a fight over nothing as it turned 
out. The- what was you know, xeroxing was a ridiculous problem. They couldn’t 
seem to figure out anyway for us to xerox up there, you know. We were 
instructed to go to an off-campus Xerox place. That was bizarre. (Interviewee #8, 
personal communication, 8-10-11).   
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 The team responsible for student services for the Galveston students were 
focused on identifying necessary services for those students and eliminating obstacles to 
receiving them.  With student medical services, TAMU- College Station was able to 
provide 100% access to the A. P. Beutal Health Center and its services.  In the 
Counseling and Career services, Galveston relocated their Counseling and Career 
services staff to TAMU- College Station for three days of each week so a supportive role 
was determined to be most effective.  Due to the specialized nature of the Galveston 
majors, the Galveston career services staff was best equipped to advise students on 
career services issues, but the use of TAMU- College Station facilities and support for 
students seeking counseling in dealing with the stress and trauma of relocation was 
useful to the students.  In supporting students with disabilities, the difficulty in securing 
documentation for academic accommodations was overcome by the agreement to accept 
any student “on their word” that they had a disability and needed accommodations 
(Texas A&M University at Galveston Relocation to College Station Briefing Memo for 
President Murano, September 17, 2008).  Lastly, TAMU- College Station Financial Aid 
was prepared to handle all Galveston students, having access to TAMUG systems and 
loan providers.  The team also recommended that a pool of funds ($200,000) be 
established to provide direct assistance to TAMUG students, as needed, which similarly 
occurred for students who were evacuated for Hurricane Katrina (Texas A&M 
University at Galveston Relocation to College Station Briefing Memo for President 
Murano, September 17, 2008). 
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 Another team was working diligently to provide TAMUG students classes in 
College Station.  The decision was made to archive Galveston student enrollment as of 
the September 15th for reporting purposes to Austin for state funding.  Working through 
the TAMUG class schedule, the team did their best to keep TAMUG class sections and 
instructors together as well as to ensure that the 120 students scheduled to graduate in 
December were provided the proper courses necessary to successfully graduate on time 
(Texas A&M University at Galveston Relocation to College Station Briefing Memo for 
President Murano, September 19, 2008).  There were several challenges.  For one, the 
number of students that classes were being scheduled for kept increasing daily. 
Our estimate before that storm ever hit was that we could retain 60 percent of our 
students.  60 to 65 percent was we thought if we start the fall semester here and 
then we really went into a bad hit with all the students that have stuff going on 
and this and that and have to relocate, we’ll take more than half because our 
students are Aggies.  They are going to come with us and they’re going to be 
solid.  We’re going to go 60, so you know we can’t go into that 60, 65 maybe 
range or when you get up there, we took 92, there are a whole lot of things I 
would have done different with 92 percent than I did had in my head with 60.  
But you didn’t know any of that until much later and then once you are too far 
down you couldn’t change your model, because you had already started down 
that train track.  So the 60, 65 percent was way off.  
 
Well so if I go back on my end of the world as far as running the classes on the 
academic side, the white paper that I wrote two years earlier was; step 1 would 
be to contact all the faculty and see who I would have the College Station to 
teach.  And then, I would use those faculty members and I would build a new 
schedule for the fall semester that would overlap College Station in any places 
where we had overlap. 
 
So if you had an English with 10 seats that matched our English class or Physics 
class over here; or things that we were parallel on I’d use all of those to our 
advantage and then, I would use our faculty to recreate all the specialty courses 
that wouldn’t be taught in College Station and I would build a new schedule.  
And then, when the students were arriving in College Station we would then 
register them kind of what they have done with Katrina students with the New 
Orleans, but they only had a 100 of those people. 
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So that was a piece of cake to register and put them in but in my head I’m 
thinking I need a new schedule for 60 percent and I need to build it for about this 
number.  Well, wrong, you got 92 percent on that, so that was a very, very big 
change in what, how we implemented the system.  And then, like I said this, 
maintain the relationship between the faculty member and the student really 
changed things, because that meant I couldn’t re-attach this student from this 
English faculty member to this English section.  I had to keep them with the 
original faculty member. 
 
So that then, became a scheduling model that every student had to have the same 
classes, but also, the same faculty member as they started out with when they 
left.  So those two things were shifts that happened in that implementation 
process that our performance goals or our assumptions that we made before hand 
weren’t on target.  And now that we have done it once, I don’t know how many 
students will do it again.  
 
Well, what I ended up doing the model that I had developed during that white 
paper was I build a hurricane semester and so, I built a whole new semester and 
then, I started dropping the new classes and the faculty and people into the new 
semester and every time a student said “I’m coming.” I’d pick them up out of the 
Galveston semester and I drop them into the hurricane semester. That model I 
don’t know if I would have come up with in the speed if I didn’t have it had 
developed during the white paper.  So that was really huge for me in my area at 
least and that’s what drove financial aid, that’s what drove billing.  All the other 
things that then allowed me to give you like pre-census and post-census, in all 
those kinds of things I got through ahead of time. 
 
I think it was just the principles that were moving too fast and why I said you 
know the things that I went “Oh gosh! I would have done that different.” You 
know like I said if I had this Galveston semester and I expected 60 percent of the 
students to come over here, so not knowing which 60 I would need to register 
them on the new semester.  Well, if I was 92 percent I would have picked out the 
whole semester, drop them in there and then drop the ones that -- I would have 
rather dropped 8 percent, they’ve registered 92 percent; but I didn’t get that at the 
time -- you know in hindsight it would have been so much easier to drop than to 
register. (Interviewee #1, personal communication, 7-18-11).   
 
Further complicating the process was the discovery just days before students were 
scheduled to arrive of a computer glitch that coded TAMUG classes differently than 
 116 
 
TAMU classes in the report used to build the courses.  As it was described by team 
member:  
I was doing information management systems and some of those kinds of things, 
we didn’t know some things on a regular basis but like our one big scheduling 
failure going into one of the student assemblies was reporting resulted because of 
an error in the way a report was coded.  You’re like “Holy mackerel,” it set us 
back like three and a half days.  We lost three and a half days off of a computer 
report that had a bad coding error and that killed us and that’s why the lines were 
backed up on the scheduling pace or we would have had some of that solved 
(Interviewee #1, personal communication, 7-18-11).  
 
This glitch caused the team to ask for the start of classes to be pushed back at least one 
day and perhaps two, a request that Dr. Loftin eventually denied (Interviewee #5, 
personal communication, 7-29-11). This problem later created significant registration 
delays during the student orientations.   
Yet another difficulty experienced by the team charged with developing the 
Galveston classes in College Station was the assignment of a class to a location.  
TAMU- College Station was experiencing record enrollment so the classroom and 
laboratory use was already incredibly high before the arrival of the Galveston students.  
A variety of course delivery methods were explored including distance education, 
TTVN, videoconferencing at the University of Texas Medical Branch in Galveston or 
Prairie View, and various hybrids of classroom and distance education, TAMU- College 
Station was extremely limited in the availability of appropriate classrooms.  In addition, 
there was no central repository listing all of the classrooms available as classrooms and 
laboratories in most situations were generally managed through the various deans who 
were often reluctant to surrender classroom and laboratory space to classes outside of 
their college.  This resulted in the necessity to look off campus for solutions. 
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Interviewee: I think we got help from the community churches, community type 
classrooms.  We just got a lot of help from Texas A&M. 
 
Interviewer:  Particularly, one thing that jumps out is the strong organizational 
support we enjoyed from the community there.  When you went through and 
developed the class roster and suddenly everybody was coming and you realized, 
“Okay now I need to go and setup the schedule. Where are they going to be.” 
What was the process for reaching out to the community and identifying – did 
the churches just come forward on their own or was there solicitation that went 
up to them and some of the different spaces that you used... 
 
Interviewee:  Well, TAMU has used some of those places before.  So, they were 
aware that this is a possibility.  Quite honestly, it was hard because College 
Station has a different model than we do in classroom assignment.  And so, they 
were trying to help us.  So, they wanted to do it but they weren’t doing it at the 
speed that we wanted to do it.  So, we had to take different tactics and call a lot 
of places on our own.  But we were never turned away.  We did call some of the 
churches.  We don’t have anywhere for this classroom, we need a place that seats 
45 or 100 people for every Wednesday night with parking.  And people said, 
“Yes”. 
 
Interviewer:  Was there any place besides the churches that were used? 
 
Interviewee:  Well, we used weird places that TAMU doesn’t normally use like 
Sbisa Hall or whatever it is.  And we use different places that they don’t 
normally use – I don’t think we used the Bingo Hall but that was a consideration 
though at one time.  But we used every available space that we could find on that 
campus and then in the community really.  The problem was that they don’t use 
central ID for all of their classrooms, that everything is departmental and 
departments sometimes like to hide their classrooms.  Like biology, it worked a 
lot better when Dr. Loftin said, “This is craziness.  Let’s get Schwartz 
(Department Head of Marine Biology) up there to talk with their department 
head.” And once that happened, more classrooms opened up.  But had we not had 
to go through some of the politics of College Station, which we will again, I’m 
sure, if we ever had to do that again.  I really couldn’t handle them because we 
do it here and I don’t think it would have been an issue because when I would 
call around them, we were never refused.  Now, Donna called College Station 
and said, “Can Galveston use these two rooms or can they have these labs?” And 
they would say, “No, we’ve already got them set up for labs at that time so they 
can’t.” And then at 4 o’ clock that day Donna would say, “I’m sorry, you need to 
move this.  This has got to move.” I would just call myself and explain the 
situation and tell them that we would put the lab back the way they had originally 
had and they said, “Fine, no problem.” So, we got what we wanted but – it was a 
lot of work, the classroom schedule because this is a lot of problems. 
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Interviewer:  But you think that the faculty, department heads interacting with 
them helped facilitated that... 
 
Interviewee:  Huge – when they went to their peers and said, “You need to have 
your faculty stand down.  You’re going to have to share. You have to share with 
me, I’ve got people here.”  And sometimes there weren’t very comfortable 
meetings for our department heads.  I heard about some of them but all of them 
said, “We’re going to help.  We are supportive.” And facilities helped with that 
some too.  Facilities would go sometimes with the department head or whatever.  
We sat by the facilities people and they try to help us too.  They can be very 
territorial there (Interviewee #7, personal communication, 8-9-11).   
 
Eventually 563 new sections of TAMUG classes were taught in TAMU- College Station 
in the Fall of 2008 with 18 of those sections in the evenings or on Saturday mornings 
and an additional seven on Sundays.  Only TAMUG faculty taught TAMUG students.  
Classes were located not only in the lecture classrooms and laboratory classrooms on the 
campus teaching inventory, but also in conference rooms, seminar rooms, off campus 
rooms.  Non-traditional locations include A&M Methodist Church, St. Mary’s Catholic 
Church, Hillel Foundation, Weslyan Foundation, Traditions and Calloway House private 
residence halls, Sbisa Dining center, and Rudder Tower.  In addition 19 sections were 
taught by TTVN from remote locations to TAMU- College Station as a convenience to 
the faculty members involved, allowing the faculty members to live at home without 
commuting or relocating (Texas A&M University at Galveston Relocation to College 
Station Briefing Memo for President Murano, October 13, 2008). A final challenge 
identified by the team was the lack of textbooks.  Many students had evacuated the 
campus taking clothes, computers, and other valuables, but had left textbooks behind, 
reasoning they would not need them while away from campus.  As a result, a question 
was added to the student survey inquiring about the student’s textbook status, and 
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eventually a process was set up to allow the student the ability to borrow textbooks from 
the TAMUG Book store until the TAMUG residence halls could be re-opened to the 
students to retrieve their textbooks.  An additional fund was set up through the 
Association of Former Students Class of 1952 to purchase textbooks for any students 
whose books were lost or damaged during the storm. 
 Yet another team worked to identify issues in transferring billing and fees to 
TAMU- College Station.  This process was already mostly in place through the satellite 
campus status of Galveston, but very quickly another problem resulting from Hurricane 
Ike was identified.  TAMU- College Station’s 20th class day was September 22nd, only a 
few days away.  Unfortunately a large percentage of TAMU- College Station students’ 
family homes were in the Houston and Southeast Texas region of the state, which was 
still without electricity or mail service.  This meant many parents had no way to submit 
payment to the university.  This issue posed a significant threat to the formula funding in 
the next biennium for both TAMU- College Station and TAMUG as the Fall 2008 
semester was part of the base period used in the formula calculation.  (Texas A&M 
University at Galveston Relocation to College Station Briefing Memo for President 
Murano, September 17, 2008). An extension was requested, and eventually granted, 
through the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board. 
 The final team was charged with identifying issues concerning financial services.  
The major focus was in relocating the Financial Management Services to TAMU- 
College Station and assimilating their operations without interruption of important 
services like payroll and expense tracking.  The model used to track and document costs 
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incurred through the relocation effort was based off a similar model used during the 
Katrina student relocation.  Furthermore it was determined the university could track 
costs through support accounts.  This team also took on identifying campus mail issues 
for relocated faculty and students as well as textbook requirements for TAMUG students 
(Texas A&M University at Galveston Relocation to College Station Briefing Memo for 
President Murano, September 17, 2008). 
The Students Arrive 
 On Monday, September 22nd, TAMUG students were scheduled to begin 
arriving at the General Services Complex, a building on the perimeter of TAMU- 
College Station’s campus where the Galveston administration had been granted office 
space to use as a headquarters.  Graduate students and freshmen were instructed to arrive 
between noon and 4:30 pm.  The next day, Sophomores were scheduled to arrive from 
9:00 -11:00 am, Juniors from 11:00 am – 2:00 pm, and Seniors from 2:00 – 4:30 pm.  
They were told they would have the opportunity to pick up schedules, revise schedules 
as required (or desired), receive their TAMU ID card, housing assignments, parking 
permits, meal plans, and get any questions answered.  Financial aid and student 
counseling personnel were available as well (Texas A&M University at Galveston 
Relocation to College Station Briefing Memo for President Murano, September 19, 
2008). This information was posted to the webpage and sent as an E-2 campus text 
message to notify all students. 
 Students were in line as early as 9:00 am on Monday, and by noon, hundreds of 
students were in line.  Standing in long lines was counter to the culture of TAMUG 
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which prides itself on its small personalized attention to the students (Interviewee #2, 
personal communication, 7-22-11).  The lines slowed even further as the class 
registration team struggled to make changes necessary as a result of a computer 
reporting error discovered only days prior (Interviewee #1, personal communication, 7-
18-11).  The housing station caused more tension as students were assigned to the 
various contracted facilities or on campus housing.  Although the vast majority of 
students were pleased and appreciative of the university’s effort, many were unhappy 
with their assignment and wanted the ability to pick from the contracted assignments.  
Once word began to spread about the different amenities at the different properties, 
students began to switch with each other despite signed contracts or come back to the 
line to request changes.  Others were less than pleased to hear that cost neutral did not 
mean the university was going to house their significant others and multiple pets as that 
was what their housing situation entailed in Galveston.  Still others found that the 
assignment put them with someone considerably older or that was not a good match 
and/or not pleased that they were suddenly getting a roommate from Galveston.  Had 
any of the issues occurred independently, they could easily have been resolved, but the 
registration process had students in line by the hundreds, and it was extremely difficult 
to break those individuals who could address the problems away from the registration 
process (Interviewee #2, personal communication, 7-22-11). 
 The lack of a definition of cost neutral came into question in other areas as well.  
The university had viewed the term cost neutral as defined by if a student was still tied 
up in a lease in Galveston as many were, the university would assume the cost of a lease 
 122 
 
in College Station until the student could be released from their Galveston lease.  In 
addition, if a student was paying a certain amount in Galveston and was released from 
their lease, they would continue to pay that amount and the university would cover the 
difference, even if the cost was higher.  The same philosophy was held for things such as 
meal plans and parking permits.  Many students, however, understood cost neutral to 
refer to amenities as well.  Those students didn’t understand why if they had high speed 
internet and a cable tv package which they were still contracted to in Galveston, why 
weren’t they placed in apartment complexes that offered the same amenities in College 
Station.  Those students who were placed in the Plaza Hotel, and as a result didn’t have 
kitchens, didn’t understand how they were not given some sort of meal package to offset 
the higher cost of not being able to cook.  Lastly, there were some students who had read 
about the relocation and cost neutral commitment and came to College Station early to 
find their own apartments.  Several of these students became upset to learn that the 
university would not reimburse them if they made their own arrangements and were not 
in the housing contracted by the university, as they felt they were being punished for 
being proactive in securing their own housing (Interviewee #2, personal communication, 
7-22-11). 
 After securing their individualized class schedules, parking permits, student 
identification cards, housing assignments, financial aid, and counseling, the decision was 
made to discuss university services in a more generalized format to the entire student 
body.  On Tuesday evening, September 23, a student assembly was held.    This was 
originally scheduled in one of the large meeting rooms of the Memorial Student Center, 
 123 
 
but moved at the last minute to Kyle Field to handle the larger numbers.  A series of 
speakers addressed the crowd on issues considered critical to their success.  General 
Weber, Vice President of Student Affairs at Texas A&M University, welcomed the 
Galveston students to TAMU- College Station and introduced Dr. Loftin.  Dr. Loftin 
addressed the student crowd, gave a state of the university address, and invited questions 
from the students.  Following Dr. Loftin, a series of speakers outlined various services 
for the students, how they would work for Galveston students, and where they were 
located.  The speakers included: 
 Dr. Ric Montelongo, Director of Academic Enhancement at TAMUG 
discussed academic enhancement including supplemental instruction and 
tips for the new semester. 
 Adrian Truliollo Gonzalez, Assistant Professor and Instructional Service 
Librarian from TAMU- College Station and Steve Conway, Director of 
Computing and Informational Services at TAMUG discussed general 
information about the libraries on campus and how resources provided at 
TAMUG were to be delivered on the TAMU- College Station campus. 
 Miles Rucker, Lead Information Technology Consultant at TAMU- 
College Station Computing Information Services shared information 
about computing services and what students needed to know for access. 
 Ken Bailey, Assistant Director of Career Planning and Services at 
TAMUG discussed how their services would be provided. 
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 Dr. Martha Dannenbaum, Director of Student Health Services at TAMU- 
College Station discussed the services available through the student 
health center. 
 Stacey Rugh, Dining Services at TAMU- College Station shared 
additional information regarding the conversion of the meal plans. 
 Debbie Hoffman from Transportation Services at TAMU- College Station 
discussed parking permits, campus bus system, and parking locations.   
 Cassandra Boyd, Multicultural Services at TAMUG, discussed the office 
of student life and support activities for students. 
 Shelly Fordyce, Assistant Director Student Life at TAMUG, discussed 
student organizations, intramurals and continued involvement in student 
activities. 
 Mike Spiers, Student Body president at TAMUG and Mark Gold Student 
Body President at TAMU- College Station discussed student government 
and encouraged the student body (Galveston Student Assembly 
Informational Packet, September 23, 2008) 
At the conclusion of the assembly, an announcement was made that the city of Galveston 
would be opening the Galveston causeway for day visitation starting at 6 am the 
following Saturday, September 27th.  Students were encouraged, but not required, to 
return to the Galveston campus where university personnel would be present to allow 
access to the residence halls for any students who wanted to remove their belongings.  
Lastly a series of town halls would be conducted throughout the semester to keep 
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students informed of the progress in Galveston and information would be 
communication through the website and campus emails (Interviewee #2, personal 
communication, 7-22-11). 
The Semester Starts Again 
 On Wednesday, September 23, classes began anew.  Most of the TAMUG 
operations continued to operate out of the General Services Complex on the periphery of 
campus.  TAMUG was provided office space, and there was adequate parking for 
students who needed to resolve issues.  At the same time, many administrators in the 
TAMUG Student Affairs area voiced concern that the Galveston students needed an area 
to call their own more centrally located.  There was a lot of concern that with the size of 
TAMU- College Station that many TAMUG students would feel lost and with the added 
stress of the storm and unfamiliar campus surroundings, their chance of success would 
decline.  The issue was resolved when Ron Sasse, Director of Housing for TAMU 
offered the use of a recently vacated temporary building in the Grove.  The building 
offered multiple offices and a much more centralized location as well as an adjacent 
parking lot that would later prove to be an ideal spot for student activities, TAMUG yell 
practice before the TAMU- College Station Yell Practice, or even a meeting spot prior to 
the game. TAMUG Student Affairs and Student Government quickly moved in and hung 
the Texas A&M University at Galveston flag out front, a flag that caught many students’ 
eye as they walked to class.  Couches were installed and the building quickly became a 
meeting point for TAMUG students between classes or whenever they needed to see a 
familiar face (Interviewee #2, personal communication, 7-22-11). 
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As the students resumed their routine of attending class with their classmates and 
faculty, the various departments worked to develop their own identities under the 
umbrella of Texas A&M University.  For example, the Student Life Office that 
coordinates housing for the Galveston campus had worked extremely closely with their 
TAMU- College Station counterparts to assign students to on and off campus housing.  
However, once all of the students were assigned, they fell under the supervision of the 
very competent staff of Texas A&M University, and the TAMUG staff fell very much 
into a supportive role for the on campus students.  One of the professionals, Neil 
Golemo, took on a residence life position, living in one of the TAMU- College Station 
residence halls to be more readily available to on campus Galveston students that might 
be in distress, and five Galveston community leaders took the equivalent residence 
advisor positions in the TAMU- College Station residence halls.  The other housing staff 
looked to support the off campus students where TAMU- College Station did not 
oversee students to the same degree.  Community leaders were assigned to the off 
campus apartment complex, Melrose Place, where a large number of freshmen had been 
assigned to keep them together as a group.  The philosophy was even though the 
apartments were located off campus, they were contracted through TAMU- College 
Station and as such, university rules still applied and could be enforced through the 
community leader program.  Unfortunately with a limited mixture of College Station 
students who were not contracted under TAMU- College Station also present in the 
apartment complex, enforcement of drinking and parties by the underage was fairly 
ineffective.  Other issues arose with Galveston students inviting non-TAMUG friends 
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from Galveston, many of whom could still not get access to their apartments in 
Galveston, to come to College Station to stay on couches or floors, creating tension for 
their new TAMU- College Station roommates who understood taking on one roommate 
but not their friends as well.  These situations were fairly limited in number, but allowed 
the TAMUG staff the ability to continue to resolve housing issues, particularly off 
campus situations, in support of TAMU- College Station’s operations. 
 The same was true in a number of other areas of student affairs.  A memorandum 
of understanding between TAMU- College Station and TAMUG’s conduct offices 
provided a clear process for students who had violated University Student Rules to be 
co-adjudicated by a TAMU- College Station and a TAMUG hearing officer.  The same 
was true of Cadet violations, where the minor violations were handled within the 
TAMUG Cadet Corps, and major violations were co-adjudicated by representatives from 
both campuses.  In Student Activities, a meeting was held on September 30th with the 
TAMUG Student Activities and TAMU- College Station Student Activities departments.  
Besides introducing the two staffs to each other, issues concerning the specific needs, 
including their banking processes, of TAMUG student organizations, offers of resources, 
services, and support from TAMU- College Station, access to TAMU- College Station 
StuAct Online service for organizational training, and the identification of important 
processes and procedures for TAMUG student organizations were discussed in detail.  
The TAMU- College Station staff offered training and an orientation to the TAMUG 
student organizations and even offered partnerships in other campus program areas 
(TAMUG/TAMU Student Organization meeting agenda, September 30, 2008).  
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Intramural and Recreational Sports were handled a little differently as TAMU- College 
Station charged teams to participate, something that TAMUG did not do in their 
recreational sports program.  In discussing the issue in light of the cost neutral 
philosophy, the decision was made to continue to hold TAMUG exclusive intramurals 
with no charge to the students.  The TAMU recreational staff identified fields, 
equipment, and resources for the TAMUG program to run completely independently 
(Interviewee #2, personal communication, 7-22-11).  A final example was the TAMUG 
tutoring services that also ran independently on the TAMU- College Station campus that 
eventually ended up attracting a number of TAMU- College Station students to their 
services (Interviewee #1, personal communication, 7-18-11). 
 With the very effective support and administrative structure of TAMU- College 
Station already in place and very capable of managing the additional 1,500 Galveston 
students, many Galveston departments were able to focus their energy on issues that 
were unique to the hurricane situation.  Besides the thousands of emails and phone calls 
from students and parents that one would expect from a relocation of nearly 2,000 
students to a different campus, there were many special circumstances that arose from 
the relocation.  Much of the time was spent ensuring that the Galveston students kept 
their identity as a group on the TAMU- College Station campus.  Galveston Student 
Activities staff planned activities for the Galveston students often before or after major 
TAMU- College Station activities.  The Galveston Counseling staff implemented Taco 
Tuesdays where Galveston students would meet at the local Taco Cabana every Tuesday 
just to see familiar faces and reconnect with Galveston staff.  Several town hall meetings 
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were held where Dr. Loftin addressed the students via distance technology from 
Galveston with updates on the progress of the campus as well as the City of Galveston 
itself and provided the opportunity for the students to ask questions.  The town hall 
meetings were often very well attended but were also videotaped and put on line for 
those students who were unable to attend (Interviewee #8, personal communication, 8-
10-11).  Through the town halls and suggestions from the students, several trips to 
Galveston were coordinated where busloads of students provided volunteers to 
Galveston residents, including many TAMUG staff and faculty, to help clean up homes 
and property from the extensive flooding.  These volunteer efforts were exceptionally 
impactful to those faculty and staff most affected by the storm (Interviewee #2, personal 
communication, 7-22-11).   
There were also new responsibilities required as a result of the storm.  For one, 
TAMUG, concerned about the cost of the relocation, had asked all students to go to the 
FEMA webpage and apply for relocation assistance which would then be paid to 
reimburse TAMUG.  The reimbursement process through FEMA was a horribly 
confusing process as students and parents were unsure how to complete FEMA forms as 
it related to a university relocation process.  FEMA investigators wanted to view vacated 
residence halls rooms with students and proper accounting processes for receiving any 
reimbursements further complicated this process for the students who were trying to 
focus on their studies.  The TAMUG housing staff expended a considerable amount of 
time and energy working with students and FEMA to complete the necessary documents 
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before the administration determined they would change the process and apply for 
reimbursement of the relocation of the students as a group.   
At the same time, the Texas A&M University’s Association of Former Students 
donated $200,000 to support students who had been affected by the storm with a primary 
focus of alleviating student’s critical relocation needs, textbook replacement, and 
uniform replacement for cadets in the Texas Maritime Academy.  A small team chaired 
by TAMUG’s Director of Student Life with representation from TAMUG’s 
Communications department, TAMUG Student Government Association, and TAMU’s 
financial aid department determined a process for awarding the money.  An online 
application was developed to allow students to detail their losses, needs and request 
relief.  Wading through the numerous requests and awarding the money while observing 
limits mandated by the federal government, as the money fell under financial aid rules, 
took an extraordinary amount of time with students often required to adjust their 
financial aid paperwork as part of the process.  Eventually over 200 students received as 
much as $2,100 of financial support from this fund, and many indicated that this funding 
was what allowed them to continue their semester. While this process evolved, the 
extremely committed Aggie Mother’s clubs across the state had organized huge donation 
drives to benefit the faculty, staff and students affected by the storm.  Donations literally 
by the truckload were arriving in College Station with everything from furniture, plates, 
kitchen appliances to hundreds of gift cards.  TAMU- College Station had identified a 
warehouse to store the considerable number of donated items while faculty, staff, and 
students were asked to complete an online form itemizing items that had been lost in the 
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storm.  Staff from TAMUG’s book store and mailroom, along with considerable student 
volunteer assistance, were able to prioritize lists, with a great consideration given to 
income level of the recipient, and sort the donations into groupings according to the 
individual’s wish list.  Once sorted, many of the packaged groups of items were sent by 
U-Haul truck to Galveston where many of the staff who had been impacted the worst, 
were still working.  Items that were not grouped were available for any Faculty, staff or 
student affected by the storm to look through and take home.  As one participant 
described:  
The donation system you know, I don’t know who had the idea.  It might have 
been from Rodney who had the idea of going out into the community soliciting 
donations and then finding a way to transport what was donated down to 
Galveston, and I had it as just one more thing for Rita to do, but I’d asked Rita to 
coordinate with the gentleman that was in, I think it’s the old food service 
commissary, and just asked her to see, you know, to coordinate with him as far as 
space went. Then somehow the word got out that we were soliciting donations 
for whatever.  It could be beds, dressers, sofas, mattresses whatever and people 
just came and dropped their donations off at the commissary and it really just 
exploded.  And then obviously the next piece was we had to find a way to get it 
from College Station down to Galveston.  Ironically at about the same time we 
were initiating that donation drive in College Station, folks in Galveston had 
begun to do the exact same thing here in Galveston for people that had stuff that 
they wanted to donate. Long story short it turned out to be what I think was a 
fairly successful project. Basically we got the stuff from College Station down to 
Galveston by having somebody who was working in Galveston on the Galveston 
campus drive a truck and a trailer up a couple or three times and load it up and 
brought everything back into town and then they had a big donation store if you 
will in the gym and the folks were able to come through and take what they 
needed (Interviewee #2, personal communication, 7-22-11).   
  
Back in Galveston 
While the faculty, staff and students struggled for some sense of normalcy on the 
campus setting of TAMU- College Station, things were anything but normal in 
Galveston.  For the first few weeks after the storm, even the ability to get on and off the 
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island was limited as both the Galveston causeway was shut down to all but official 
traffic, and the small road and bridge, the Pelican Island Causeway, leading to campus 
was significantly damaged.  As most of the senior administration had been tasked with 
facilitating the relocation of operations to TAMU- College Station, Dr. Brad McGonagle 
was put in charge of securing the campus, coordinating repairs and debris cleanup, and 
returning the Galveston campus to its pre-storm condition (Interviewee #11, personal 
communication, 9-9-11).  
The first step was to secure the campus.  This was accomplished by parking one 
of the university police officers at the front gate to monitor anyone coming onto Pelican 
Island.  Other officers were positioned strategically around campus when not making 
rounds to prevent unauthorized individuals from accessing the campus.  When the 
facilities assessment team arrived from TAMU- College Station a few days after the 
storm, individuals from the Galveston campus’ facilities services as well team members 
from Vaughn Construction, a major construction company in the process of building a 
new campus building, were on hand to tour each building and identify damage as well as 
security breaches caused by the storm in the way of broken windows or doors.   
While the damage to the campus was being assessed, an assessment was also 
taking place with regards to the staff who had not been relocated to College Station.  
Physical well-being, location, status of their living situation and ability to return to work 
were all documented.  As the status of the campus was being determined and plans were 
made to initiate clean up and repair, there was a real emphasis put on the people that 
would eventually get the campus back up and running.  As one participant noted: 
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We have people who are fiercely loyal and dedicated to this campus and they go 
to book store and buy A&M t-shirts and A&M caps and they wear that when 
they’re not at work.  So they are very dedicated to this campus and that came 
through more than ever after Ike, because I’d say,  they were out here working 
when they could have been home building or repairing their houses.  So, I think 
folks were very focused on getting the campus back up and running but they also 
knew that we were there to help them (Interviewee #3, personal communication, 
7-20-11) 
 
During the two weeks that it took to start Galveston classes in College Station, 
progress was made on the Galveston campus.  The weather had been extremely pleasant 
following Hurricane Ike which allowed rudimentary repairs to be completed to the 
Pelican Island Causeway.  Once the road way was navigable, Vaughn Construction 
started rolling their heavy construction equipment across to assist with campus debris 
clean up.  Very shortly after that, the Galveston causeway began to open to Galveston 
residents for day trips to inspect and work on their property as long as they left the island 
before the 6:00 pm curfew. There was still no electricity, water or sewage working on 
the island.  As TAMUG employees returned to Galveston to find significant damage to 
their homes, they were offered places to stay, first on the ship and later in the campus 
residence halls.   
Our residence halls were totally functional and so we were able to move those 
people who didn’t have any place to live into the residence halls free of charge 
and we were able to keep them there as long as they needed to be. We had the 
world’s oldest dorm resident, in Dr. Sammy Ray, who came to me and said, “I’ve 
worked at this campus for 60 years and I’ve never asked for anything. I need a 
house. I need a place for my wife and I to stay.  Let’s see, we’ve got Sammy at 
90 and his wife, Charlotte at 89 and I told them “there is only one condition.” I 
said, “Doctor, you can’t drink in the dorms” and he said that, “Charlotte asked 
me about this - ‘I can’t drink my wine?’.”  It’s a University rule. But, yeah, I 
mean that was one of the things for me that, was rewarding to me personally is 
that I was able to help so many people who are having such a hard time and 
campus was almost, not secondary but once we got people stabilized, ‘cause we 
had people that have been working that lost everything. They’d come here and 
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put in an 8 hour day and then would leave and go home and put in another three 
or four, five hours on their houses (Interviewee #3, personal communication, 7-
20-11). 
 
Food was also a challenge in the initial weeks.  Without electricity and water in the city, 
the grocery stores were non-operational.  The ship, originally planned to be immediately 
relocated back to the campus dock after the storm, had the storage and cooking facilities 
to feed hundreds and had done so as a relief ship in New Orleans after Katrina 
(Interviewee #11, 9-9-11).  Unfortunately the silting of the dock prevented returning to 
the campus dock, so very early on the workers would stop for lunch and travel across the 
channel to where the ship was docked.  Eventually even the meal times became part of 
the daily process. 
I think the fact the meals were especially critical, because what happened with 
meals was we started more before we got the dining hall back up and running, 
when we were just a physical plant department working with our own staff. We 
had a barbecue pit and that’s one thing about Tammy Lobaugh, Director of the 
Physical Plant at the time. Her strengths are crisis management in terms of 
logistics as far as I know.  She had a barbecue pit going all the time.  She knew 
where to get the food, she had to talk a little on all that stuff you had Tammy 
cooking.  And, so, Tammy was excellent at doing that, we had, morning 
meetings and close of day meetings at the end of each day, where we could 
debrief everybody and find out where to set up for our next day’s work or we 
need to focus the next day.   
 
But once the dining hall was back up and running - because after the facility 
physical plant people came in and got everything stabilized then dining services 
was the next group to come back - So they started getting the dining hall back up 
and running and once they got it, where we could cook which, I don’t know if the 
health department came out and checked.  Actually I think they did. But they 
started cooking because we had gas, we had natural gas so,  I think by then the 
water was back on but then it became more of a true family atmosphere because 
everybody looked forward to going to lunch every day and it was very much a 
family lunch. We had a free lunch for everybody that was on campus for 
basically, from after Ike until the end of October.  Everybody who was on 
campus went to the dining hall and ate lunch for free. That was my call, I didn’t 
share with everybody, that was a command call that says and I guess because, we 
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know at least folks who would be getting one hot meal during that time. There’s 
a lot of people that, didn’t have anything and that was their only hot meal 
(Interviewee #3, personal communication, 7-20-11). 
 
 As a result of the assistance of the TAMU- College Station Damage Assessment 
Crew, several TAMU- College Station craftsman and technicians, Vaughn’s heavy 
machinery and expertise, and TAMUG’s staff working in small crews, the damage 
incurred by the campus was fixed, and the massive amounts of debris was removed in 
fairly short order.  Contractors were secured for the bigger projects like building roof 
damage and damage to the waterfront with plenty of time for completion before the 
Spring semester.  However, it wasn’t the damage to the campus that drove the decision 
to relocate to College Station as much as the damage to the city and lack of available 
housing for the students.  TAMUG only had 600 beds on campus with another 120 beds 
on the ship to house approximately 1800 students in the Spring.  The city of Galveston 
still had extensive damage to many of their apartment complexes and homes, and repair 
was going painstakingly slow as owners waited for insurance and permits to be 
processed.  Pelican Island Private Student Housing, one of the privatized facilities across 
the street that accounted for 180 student beds, had water intrusion into the building, and 
the owner had simply locked up the building and left for California.  Although possible 
to get renovated in time for the Spring semester, time was running short and the current 
owners showed no interest in investing the money necessary to make the repairs.  
University Apartments, the other privatized property across the street that accounted for 
another 250 student beds, had water intrusion into many of the downstairs apartments, 
but the second and third story apartments were still suitable for living with a small 
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amount of work to the property. All of the units could be ready for the Spring semester, 
but the owner was not willing to wait for the Spring and leave his units vacant for the 
two months until the students came back.  The availability of housing in Galveston had 
plummeted.  People were looking for places to stay while they worked on their 
uninhabitable homes jumped on any vacancies.  Rental prices sky-rocketed, pushing the 
costs of many of the apartments where students previously lived above the typical 
student price range.  
Within weeks of the storm, Dr. Loftin was out speaking to local civic groups, 
reiterating TAMUG’s commitment to the city and inquiring about potential housing for 
students to come back to in the Spring.  As the city became more and more stable, 
various civic groups were meeting again to discuss the future of the city, and Dr. Loftin 
made multiple appearances and re-connected with the city leaders, especially since he 
was the chairman of the island’s United Way campaign and had given the kick off 
speech to the campaign only a week before the storm hit (Interviewee #11, personal 
communication, 9-9-11).    Through these connections, Dr. Loftin constantly sought 
housing opportunities for the students, but also asked what TAMUG could do for the 
residents of Galveston which brought about two results.  The first developed into a 
process for identifying potential housing in which someone would identify housing that 
would be available in the Spring.  Then Dr. Loftin would pass the information onto the 
Director of Student Life, who would meet with the individual(s), explore the property 
and if appropriate add it to the database to share with students.  Through this process 
multiple properties were identified including new apartment complexes opening twenty 
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miles north of Galveston, Assisted Living facilities, privately owned homes, apartments 
in Texas City, and completely demolished apartment complexes in Galveston that 
developers promised to rebuild in time for the Spring semester if TAMUG was willing 
to enter a long-term contract to finance the build.  Eventually TAMUG did enter into just 
that type of agreement with the original builder of the Pelican Island Private Student 
Housing, who offered to buy back the building and renovate it by the Spring provided 
TAMUG would enter into a ten year lease to fill and manage the facilities.  Furthermore, 
the campus agreed to lease the available apartments in the other property across the 
street, the University Apartments, from November until May to prevent the owner from 
leasing the property to others, so it would instead be available to the students when they 
returned in the Spring.  By adding more beds to some of the more spacious apartments in 
these two facilities, the administration calculated approximately 1,200 beds for the ship, 
on campus residence halls, and two privatized facilities across the street.  Another 100 
beds were identified in the community as of mid-November.  With the typical attrition 
that occurred in student enrollment from Fall to Spring, that still left an estimated two 
hundred students without housing but more apartments were coming available every 
day.  As it turned out, even with the Coast Guard declaring the ship unfit for living only 
two weeks before the Spring semester started, returning students found more than 
enough housing in the community and half of the University apartments that had been 
reserved for them went unused. 
The other result that came of Dr. Loftin meeting with all of the Galveston 
community and civic groups was the extension of assistance from TAMUG into the 
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community.  Very rapidly people realized that not only was TAMUG in a position to 
assist, but was very willing.  There were many examples.  For one, while the students 
weren’t using the residence halls, they were offered to the University of Texas Medical 
Branch (UTMB) students who had also had their housing impacted by the storm.  
TAMUG students coordinated a weekend where they cleaned out their belongings to 
make room for the UTMB students to use the TAMUG residence halls until January.  
Although the original estimation was 300 UTMB students would utilize the TAMUG 
residence halls, only around 50 eventually ended up moving onto campus, since many 
found places in the community. Still, many of their classes were held at TAMUG.  
The other thing that we did was UTMB was back up and running class wise and 
some of the adjunct faculty, some of the faculty in UTMB had connections here 
in Galveston. So UTMB actually held classes here on our campus in our 
classrooms because it was a total swamp down there. I don’t know how many 
classes they held but they had several classes down here.  So we were able to 
throw a lot of our resources to help the community.   
 
Another one was the Sunshine Center which is a center for mentally challenged 
adults. It’s a kind of adult day care for mentally challenged adults.  Their facility 
was wiped out, and we were able to put them in our Sea Aggie center and they 
could still function and that was a tough one because a lot of the participants in 
that program had their families who had not planned for what they would do with 
these folks post Ike. So the sunshine center getting back up and running was 
critical and so… they came over to do their crafts and we loved having them on 
campus, they were absolutely phenomenal.  They loved being here, they had a 
good time.  I paid for their meals I think I paid for a meal once a week for them 
because they came and ate with us in the dining hall. We invited them over for 
that. We invited them over for Halloween and then Thanksgiving.  We brought 
them over because they were still here till Thanksgiving.  So we brought them 
over and fed them at Thanksgiving, so we were able to help.  That’s probably one 
of the biggest things and not many people knew about that. Anybody who really 
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needed help we were able to give it to them (Interviewee #3, personal 
communication, 7-20-11)      
 
Dr. Loftin also contacted the superintendent of the Galveston Independent School 
District to offer their teachers lodging in the University Apartments while the students 
weren’t using them prior to the spring semester starting.  When only a few accepted the 
offer, the rest were offered to the employees of Gulf Copper, whose headquarters are 
down the road from the campus.  Even the Office of the Governor inquired about 
positioning a large mobile kitchen on the campus, an idea that was later dropped due to 
the distance of TAMUG from the center of the island (Interviewee #3, 7-20-11).  
TAMUG demonstrated its commitment to the community throughout the evacuation. 
There were all kinds of ways things were going on there and I can’t say it was 
like a grand design.  It happened spontaneously many times because of 
individuals and people who recognized right away that TAMUG was there as a 
resource and they reached out to us once they understood they could and when 
we could help them, we did. (Interviewee #11, personal communication, 9-9-11).  
 
The Cost of the Storm    
Hurricane Ike was the third costliest hurricane in the nation’s history with 75% of 
all structures on Galveston Island receiving some type of damage (Henton, L., 2012).  
As the huge hurricane’s eye passed directly over the city, it was a foregone conclusion 
that there would be damage.  The questions were how much, was it recoverable, and 
how would this storm financially impact the future of TAMUG.  After all, when another 
hurricane struck the island in 1993, it had taken years to recover the university’s 
enrollment (Interviewee #11, personal communication, 9-9-11).  So in considering the 
damage from the storm, the university was not only concerned about the immediate 
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damage from the flooding and powerful winds, but also about the future implications of 
lost revenues from sacrificing a semester.  After considering the long years of smaller 
enrollment following the 1993 storm, the decision was made long before the storm hit 
that the University could not face a semester long shut down of operations.  
We could have lost the whole fall.  We would have lost that benefit to society we 
talked about.  Depending on the decision about refunding which, if we ended up 
at that point, we wouldn’t have made the decision to credit at all.  We would 
have had to keep their money.  We couldn’t survive to January without keeping 
their money.  So save for our January scenario.  That means we kept their money.  
That means they got no skin in the game to come for.  I think in January we 
would have seen 80 percent of our students return, or less. 
 
I'm not sure we would have survived as an institution if we tried to re-open in 
January, because if it was 70% for those other students and if somebody didn't do 
something heroic in December, we ran out of money.  I would have had to lay 
my staff off.  Don't have the money.  Because about half of my staff was funded 
on local funds, not state funds.  I couldn't have made it to January without 
somebody doing a heroic decision and with us not doing our work.  If we just 
sort of lollygagged around and opened in January, the odds of anybody coming, 
making a more heroic decision than we're making is really low (Interviewee #5, 
personal communication, 7-29-11).   
 
 Within twenty-four hours of the storm, the decision was made to relocate to 
College Station with guiding principles of cost neutrality to the faculty, staff, and 
students and a commitment to keep Galveston students with their Galveston faculty 
members.  As the implications of the guiding principles were discussed, it became 
obvious that both of these principles threatened to add significantly more cost to the 
already substantial storm damage costs.  One of the participants in the meeting recalled, 
“It was kind of scary because we had never dealt with FEMA.  I mean it was scary for 
me because I’m sitting there and going, ‘Oh my God he is making all these promises 
here.’ I'm thinking we are going to spend all of our fund balances to maintain the Sea 
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Aggie identity” (Interviewee #6, personal communication, 8-2-11).  By the end of the 
meeting, the leadership around the table determined that the financial commitment to the 
guiding principles was necessary and they moved forward with the TAMUG Business 
Continuity Plan despite not knowing what that cost would be.  As one participant 
recalled: 
Two things made that possible.  We had some reserves we could utilize.  We 
anticipated ultimately that between federal and state sources we might get much, 
not all of it, reimbursed but there was no guarantee of that and so we depleted all 
of our reserves basically before we had this kick in.  I also, of course, spoke to 
the president here, at that time Elsa Murano, and made sure that we had to have a 
line of credit, if you will, and we had that. I don’t recall having used that but we 
did burn up basically all of our reserves to get this thing done.  Fortunately, the 
state stepped in and did some things to really help us recover financially from 
that event and FEMA was also -- still is being worked on to reimburse us for 
some of the expenses that are allowable under their rules and regulations and so 
again, a very difficult task after the fact to try to go through all that and make it 
work and I have to give Susan Lee all the credit for what she did in terms of just 
tirelessly working through those particular issues for us.  But again, it was gutsy 
in a sense that it meant we were taking some risk but I thought I had a backup in 
terms of -- especially Texas A&M where I could draw necessary -- some dollars 
from them.  We repaid obviously ultimately.  They have this bridge if we had to.  
I don’t recall having to do that necessarily but we really went to the limits pretty 
much what we had or in reserves when we started by the time we got done with it 
(Interviewee #11, personal communication, 9-9-11). 
 
 The first step to assessing the cost was the assessment of the damage.  Within 
days of the storm, a damage assessment team made up from TAMU- College Station 
facilities personnel, TAMUG facilities personnel, and Vaughn Construction consultants 
toured and inspected the Galveston facilities.  Based on this visit and very preliminary 
estimations, an outline of estimated costs for Hurricane Ike damages was created and 
submitted to the Governor’s office through the Coordinating Board on September 18 
with the following amounts: 
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 Building costs related to Damages - $18,945,521 
 Aftermath Clean-up and Temporary service costs - $118,057 
 Housing - $3,082, 728 
 IT expenses - $6,792 
 Other expenses (security, research, extra Communication 203 sections, 
orientation, emergency leave) - $2,025,267 
 Lost revenue from cancellation of classes - $2,907,969 
 Lost revenue from auxiliary enterprises - $150,000 
 Contingency (% of error) (15%) - $4,085,450 
 TOTAL ESTIMATED COSTS - $31,321,784 
 Total without contingency - $27, 236,334  
(Texas A&M University at Galveston Relocation to College Station Briefing  
Memo for President Murano, October 13, 2008). 
For a university with annual budget of just over $39 million the total costs were 
very concerning, but the only choice available was to move forward.  Luckily as quotes 
and bids started to come in, the projections began to look much more reasonable.  The 
next step was to determine what was reimbursable through insurance and FEMA.   
We began early on assessing our cost then we had astronomical assessments 
because they weren’t accurate and people were using a construction industry-
folio for cost.  I didn’t start with that because I knew immediately, it was way too 
high; it was huge.  But we began immediately early on getting quotes, very early 
on.  So, I was able to put together for Dr. Loftin a kind of a summary of what 
costs we incurred and then what we expected to claim from FEMA, insurance 
proceeds and revenues that we have already collected.  Like for example, we had 
already collected revenues from students for housing.  So, we weren’t going to 
ask FEMA for that entire cost, we are only going ask FEMA for the differential 
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cost between what they have paid and what we have to put them in, either a 
house or a dorm, and if was larger we ask for that differential (Interviewee #6, 
personal communication, 8-2-11).    
 
To assist in this endeavor, a consultant, formerly employed by FEMA, was brought on to 
facilitate the reimbursement process.  The consultant had come highly recommended 
through work done after Hurricane Rita had struck Lamar University in Beaumont, 
Texas a few years prior (Interviewee #6, personal communication, 8-2-11).  His ability 
to clearly define the process, what was reimbursable, and insight as to how to categorize 
items in a manner which increased their chance for reimbursement were of great value to 
the university. For example, the securing of apartments and houses for students relocated 
to College Station was not unlike FEMA’s own rental assistance relocation program for 
victims displaced by the storm.  A memorandum from TAMUG’s Fiscal officer Susan 
Lee to Krieg Campbell of FEMA detailed not only these similarities but also the 
resultant savings to FEMA as a result of the university’s action.  This helped TAMUG to 
secure partial reimbursement for the program (personal communication, January 29, 
2009).  Furthermore clear processes were developed to provide substantial on going 
documentation of every expense incurred during the evacuation and relocation process.  
Employees were given one of three designations – commuter defined as those employees 
who travelled to College Station from home during the day with no overnight stay; 
overnight traveler who travelled to College Station and stayed at least one night; and 
Displaced worker who temporarily relocated to College Station for the semester using 
housing procured by TAMUG.  Each of these categories of employees had different 
reimbursement guidelines and documentation requirements which were submitted to the 
 144 
 
Financial Services office.  Forms were created by reimbursement of cell phone usage, 
meals, and other business necessities depending on employee status (Interviewee #6, 
personal communication, 8-2-11). Once Financial Services were able to review and 
approve the expenses, they were able to assess a realistic cost of ongoing operations to 
go with the damage incurred from the storm.  Table 3 demonstrates the total costs of 
recovery from hurricane Ike with total cost estimates as well as the FEMA 
reimbursement categories and other possible funding sources as of March 10, 2009.  
These numbers, based on more accurate estimates and bids, projected $17,260,690 in 
total cost of recovery, which were a little more than half of the initial estimate of 
$31,321,784.  With projected insurance, FEMA reimbursement, and student payments, 
the total impact was estimated at $10,809,828.   
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Table 3. Texas A&M University at Galveston Estimates of Total Cost of Recovery 
from Hurricane Ike Includes Total Cost Estimates as well as Possible Funding Sources 
 
Description 
 
Total  
Estimated 
Cost to 
Date1 
 
Actual to 
Date 
 
Encum-
brances/ 
Payables 
 
Possible 
Insurance 
 
Possible 
FEMA 
Expense 
 
Student 
Payments 
 
TAMUG 
Impact 
w/o FEMA 
Assist. 
 
TAMUG 
FY2009 
Impact 
with FEMA 
Assist. 
 
TAMUG 
Impact 
Beyond 
FY2009 
 
Infrastructure 
         
Category A 
(100% FEMA 
Eligible) 
         
General Site 
Restoration 
(debris) 
334,042 166,835 167,207  334,042  334,042  
 
Silt Removal 
at Texas 
Clipper Dock 
450,000 398,877 51,123  450,000  450,000  
 
Silt Removal 
at Small Boat 
Basin 
511,540 95,500 416,040  95,500  511,540 416,040 
 
Sub-total 1,295,582 661,212 634,370 
 
879,542 
 
1,295,582 416,040 
 
Category B 
(100% & 
75% FEMA 
Eligible) 
         
Emergency 
Protective 
Measures 
(Repairs ..etc) 
617,855 304,012 300,000 
 
617,855 
 
617,855 
  
Galveston 
Housing - 
Police 
7,790 
 
7,790 
 
7,790 
 
7,790 
  
Housing 
Contracts 2,561,605 
 
2,561,605 
 
1,497,682 423,522 2,138,083 640,401 
 
Commuter 
Employee 
Travel Costs 
334,299 318,876 15,423 
   
334,299 334,299 
 
Housing 
Secured for 
Spring - 
TAMUG 
151,603 151,603 
  
113,702 
 
151,603 37,901 
 
Sub-total 
3,673,152 774,491 2,884,818 
 
2,237,029 423,522 3,249,630 1,012,601 
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Table 3. Continued 
 
Description 
 
Total  
Estimated 
Cost to 
Date
1 
 
Actual to 
Date 
 
Encum-
brances/ 
Payables 
 
Possible 
Insurance 
 
Possible 
FEMA 
Expense 
 
Student 
Payments 
 
TAMUG 
Impact w/o 
FEMA 
Assist. 
 
TAMUG 
FY2009 
Impact 
with 
FEMA 
Assist. 
 
TAMUG 
Impact 
Beyond 
FY2009 
 
Category E 
(75% FEMA 
Eligible) 
         
General 
Building 
Damage 
1,431,429 473,785 957,644 
 
1,073,572 
 
1,431,429 357,857 
 
Sea Aggie 
Center 
Roof 
Design/ 
Replace 
298,977 
   
224,233 
 
298,977 74,744 
 
Mariner 
Hall Roof 
Replace 
358,257 
  
341,032 17,225 
 
17,225 
  
Boat Loss - 
Mitchell 
Campus 
268,300 
  
133,000 101,475 
 
135,300 33,825 
 
Boat Loss - 
Teichman 
Road 
Campus 
57,500 8,000 
  
43,125 
 
57,500 14,375 
 
Sub-total 2,414,463 481,785 957,644 474,032 1,459,630 
 
1,940,431 480,802 
 
Category F                   
   Pump and 
Equipment 55,490 55,490   
41,618 
 
55,490 13,873 
  
   
Laboratory 
Building 
30,000 
   
22,500 
 
30,000 7,500 
  
   Other(1) 100,000 29,850 
  
45,150 
 
100,000 54,850   
  Sub-total 185,490 85,340 
  
109,268 
 
185,490 76,223  
Category G 
(marine 
Work & 
Other) 
        
  
 Mitchell 
Campus 
Boat Basin 
300,000 1,505 300,000 
 
225,000 
 
300,000 75,000 
 
 Texas 
Clipper 
Dock 
148,247 62,710 84,537 
 
111,185 
 
148,247 37,062 
 
 Teichman 
Road Docks 150,000  
150,000 
 
112,500 
 
150,000 37,500 
 
  Wetlands 
Center 
$00,000 
 
100,000 
 
75,000 
 
100,000 25,000 
 
  Swimming 
Pool 
Repairs 
23,400 
 
23,400 
 
17,550 
 
23,400 5,850 
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Table 3. Continued  
Description 
 
Total  
Estimated 
Cost to 
Date1 
 
Actual 
to Date 
 
Encum-
brances/ 
Payables 
 
Possible 
Insurance 
 
Possible 
FEMA 
Expense 
 
Student 
Payments 
 
TAMUG 
Impact 
w/o FEMA 
Assist. 
 
TAMUG 
FY2009 
Impact 
with 
FEMA 
Assist. 
 
TAMUG 
Impact 
Beyond 
FY2009 
 
  TAMU 
Utilities 
Electical 
System 
Repair 
300,000 
 
300,000 
 
225,000 
 
300,000 75,000 
 
  Sub-total 1,021,647 64,215 957,937 
 
766,235 
 
1,021,647 255,412 
 
Texas 
Clipper Ship 
Relocation 
Costs 
         
 Ship moving 
& cleanup 170,000 75,126 75,000  
57,500 
 
170,000 112,500 
 
  Sub-total 170,000 75,126 75,000 
 
57,500 
 
170,000 112,500 
 
Other 
Expenses          
  Temporary 
Support at 
TAMU  
8,312 
 
8,312 
   
8,312 8,312 
 
   Copies, 
rental ..etc - 
Academic 
Expense 
16,200 
 
16,200 
   
16,200 16,200 
 
   Teaching 
addt'l classes 
- TAMU 
Salaries 
(grads 3 
Comm 
Classes) 
10,125 
 
10,125 
   
10,125 10,125 
 
   TAMU 
Services 
provided 
TAMUG 
Students Day 
one and Day 
two 
42,454 
 
42,454 
   
42,454 42,454 
 
   Employee 
Cell Phone 
Expense 
1,875 1,875 
    
1,875 1,875 
 
  Disaster 
response  -  
on-site 
meals  
8,841 - 8,841 
 
6,631 
 
8,841 2,210 
 
 Employee 
Vehicle 
Expense 
9,405 9,405 
  
7,054 
 
9,405 2,351 
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Table 3. Continued  
Description 
 
Total  
Estimated 
Cost to 
Date
1 
 
Actual to 
Date 
 
Encum-
brances/ 
Payables 
 
Possible 
Insurance 
 
Possible 
FEMA 
Expense 
 
Student 
Payments 
 
TAMUG 
Impact 
w/o FEMA 
Assist. 
 
TAMUG 
FY2009 
Impact 
with FEMA 
Assist. 
 
TAMUG 
Impact 
Beyond 
FY2009 
 
   Campus Security 
- Police Overtime 
27,310 27,310     20,483   27,310 6,828  
   Temporary IT 
person to assist at 
TAMU 
4,082 4,082           4,082 4,082  
   Temp 
Counseling at 
TAMUG 
13,250 13,250    9,938   13,250 3,313  
    IT expenses 6,792 6,767           6,792 6,792  
Other Expenses 148,646 62,689 85,932  44,105  148,646 104,542  
          
Mitigation of 
Coastal Erosion & 
Shore-side Dock 
Reinforcements 
5,000,000      5,000,000 5,000,000  
          
FY2009 Lost 
Revenue from 
Cancellation of 
Classes 
                  
     
Student/Academic 
                  
     Tuition/Fees of 
withdrawals 
497,700 497,700         497,700 497,700   
     Dorm, Meal 
Plans, Parking 
Refunds 
213,300 213,300         213,300 213,300   
 Sub-total 711,000 711,000            711,000 711,000  
Loss of Formula 
Funding for 2010-
2011  
                  
   Operations 
Support 
1,000,000 1,000,000             1,000,000 
   E&G Space 
Support 
                 
   Sub-total 1,000,000 1,000,000                     1,000,000 
          
Lost Revenue for 
auxiliary 
enterprises 
                  
 Food Services 808,981 808,981         808,981 808,981   
 Bookstore 354,929 354,929         354,929 354,929   
 Residence Halls 456,579 456,579         456,579 456,579   
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Table 3. Continued  
Description 
 
Total  
Estimated 
Cost to 
Date1 
 
Actual to 
Date 
 
Encum-
brances/ 
Payables 
 
Possible 
Insurance 
 
Possible 
FEMA 
Expense 
 
Student 
Payments 
 
TAMUG 
Impact w/o 
FEMA 
Assist. 
 
TAMUG 
FY2009 
Impact 
with FEMA 
Assist. 
 
TAMUG 
Impact 
Beyond 
FY2009 
 
 Residence 
Halls 
456,579 456,579         456,579 456,579   
 Lost 
Citation 
Revenue 
20,221 20,221               
   Sub-total 1,640,710 1,640,710              1,640,710 1,640,710  
                    
Grand 
Total 
Estimated 
Costs 
17,260,690 5,556,568 5,595,702 474,032 5,553,308 423,522 15,363,136 9,809,828 1,000,000 
          
          
Total to be 
requested 
      
10,809,828 
 
Estimated cost to date are best estimates from various sources such as building site assessments, ships needs, move of students to 
College Station calculations, contracts let for housing and others.  These may change as we continue to discover additional costs 
and fine tune estimates. 
 
 
 
The next step was to pursue Legislative support for this damage.  On February 3, 2009, 
the Texas Senate Finance Committee, chaired by Senator Steve Ogden held a meeting as 
part of the 81st Legislative Session to consider the overview of major emergency 
expenses with the damage from Hurricane Ike being the major discussion point.  
TAMUG was one of eight agencies experiencing significant damage and/or business 
interruption who were asked to brief the committee on the hurricane impact (Texas 
Senate Finance Committee Agenda, February 3, 2009).  Table 4 represents a summary of 
damage that was provided to Texas State Senator Craig Eiland and the Texas Senate 
Finance Committee for which the university sought state assistance (Interviewee #6, 
personal communication, 8-2-11).  Dr. Loftin presented the total cost of recovery while 
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comparing it to the projected losses that would have been suffered had TAMUG not 
pursued the Business Continuity Plan.  The difference based on the impact of refunds, 
loss of revenue, and loss in formula funding was projected to be $10,957,515.80 as 
compared to the $3,038,284 relocation expenses that had been claimed (Interviewee #6, 
personal communication, 8-2-11)  This pro-active approach was extremely well received 
by the committee as described by one witness: 
I think if you look at the questions that were asked at that legislative budget 
board.  I think it was pretty clear that the perception was that we had done the 
right thing and we had it for the right reasons. I happen to watch it all day; I was 
working on something in office and watched it all day.  Because I wanted to 
know - we've been working on what they were going to say and everything.  So I 
wanted to see Doctor Loftin and Susan present and I happen to get in when U of 
H (University of Houston) was up.  And they got hammered.  Because you hear 
their solution, you're shelling out all this money to pay for them not taking care 
of their buildings, buildings that wouldn't have the damage they had had they 
maintained them.  And so it was a very different discussion with U of H then it 
was with UTMB and with A&M at Galveston.  And honestly they were like good 
job, move along.  I mean that's kind of all that happened.  They asked questions, 
they asked good questions, but there was never any like, what were you thinking?  
[Laughter] The whole U of H conversation was like, you know, brutal 
(Interviewee #4, personal communication, 7-27-11).   
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Table 4. Texas A&M at Galveston Summary of Costs to Date 
 
Description   Total  Estimated Cost to Date  
Infrastructure   
 Debris Removal $1,295,582.00  
 Emergency Repairs $949,045.00  
 General Bldg Damage $1,616,919.00  
 Sea Aggie Center Roof Design/Replacement $298,977.00  
 Mariner Hall Roof Replacement $358,257.00  
 Boat Loss - Mitchell Campus $268,300.00  
 Boat Loss - Teichman Road Campus $57,500.00  
 Mitchell Campus Boat Basin $300,000.00  
Texas Clipper Dock $148,247.00  
Teichman Road Docks $150,000.00  
Wetlands Center $100,000.00  
 Ship moving & cleanup $170,000.00  
Mitigation of Coastal Erosion & Shore-side 
Dock Reinforcements $5,000,000.00  
Infrastructure & Mitigation Subtotal $10,712,827.00  
Less: FEMA Reimbursements  Claimed $3,897,819.25  
Infrastructure & Mitigation Net of 
Reimbursements Claimed 
$6,340,975.75  
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Table 4. Continued 
Description   Total  Estimated Cost to Date  
Relocation Expense/Emergency Sheltering $3,047,507.00  
Less: FEMA Reimbursements  Claimed $1,611,384.00  
Less: Revenues Collected to Offset this Expense $423,522.00  
Relocation Expense/Emergency Sheltering 
Net of Reimbursements Claimed & Revenue 
Collected 
$1,012,601.00  
    
Other  $148,646.00  
Less: FEMA Reimbursements  Claimed $44,104.50  
Other Expenses Net of Reimbursements 
Claimed 
$104,541.50  
    
Lost Revenues   
FY2009 Lost Revenue from Cancellation of 
Classes 
$711,000.00  
Lost of Formula Funding for 2010-2011  $1,000,000.00  
Lost Revenue for auxiliary enterprises $1,640,710.00  
Total Lost Revenue Current and Future $3,351,710.00  
Hurricane Relief Request- Grand Total 
Estimated Costs Net of all Proceeds 
$10,809,828.25  
Relocation Expense/Emergency Sheltering $3,047,507.00  
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The following week on February 9, 2009, the Texas Senate Finance Committee 
convened to discuss Article III of the General Appropriations Bill, which focused on the 
funding of the state institutions of higher education. All of the Texas A&M System 
Universities, as well as five other universities, presented on their financial needs for the 
upcoming biennium (Texas Senate Finance Committee Agenda, February 9, 2009).  Dr. 
Loftin presented once again on the impact of the Hurricane on enrollment as well as the 
critical need for legislative support in the coming funding period touting the $10,809,828 
impact (Interviewee #6, personal communication, 8-2-11).  In the meetings, he 
emphasized the long term impact of the storm to TAMUG as this was a counting year 
for the next two years funding and TAMUG was forced to use the 20th class day 
enrollment rather than the 5th day enrollment for their head count.  As a result, TAMUG 
stood to lose nearly a million dollars over the next two years (Interviewee #6, personal 
communication, 8-2-11). 
 At the same time as the senate finance committees were being held, the State 
Auditor’s Office was conducting an audit of the hurricane’s impact and the university’s 
expenditures as a result of the storm.  On March 27, 2009, the state auditors released 
their findings which projected a $5.7 million cost of recovery with the “majority of 
difference between the auditors and University’s estimates of total losses being primarily 
due to the $5 million in costs related to the mitigation of coastal erosion and shore side 
dock reinforcements.  The proposed mitigation and dock reinforcements project was 
previously included in the University’s fiscal year 2010-2011 Legislative Appropriations 
Request, which was prepared prior to Hurricane Ike.  Auditors did not include this $5 
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million in their total of estimated losses because the proposed mitigation and dock 
reinforcement project existed before the hurricane” (SAO Report No. 09-025, 2009).  
The auditors had confirmed the expenditures and processes of TAMUG in responding to 
the hurricane.  As a result of the recommendations from the audit, the university 
separated the $5 million in costs related to the mitigation and dock reinforcements to a 
separate request in House Bill 51, a bill requesting authorization for the sale of tuition 
revenue bonds to pay for the necessary mitigation.   TAMUG further reduced their 
requested amount by $100,000 to match the auditors’ findings, but added $500,000 to 
the amount to cover the debt service of the tuition revenue bonds that would result if 
House Bill 51 was appropriated.  This total of $6,209,828.25 was forwarded as part of 
House Bill 4586 (Interviewee #6, personal communication, 8-2-11). 
 In the end, both House bill 4586 and House Bill 51 were passed with over $11 
million of support flowing to TAMUG..  In addition, FEMA had approved TAMUG’s 
request for reimbursement of $6.9 million worth of expenditures at an 80% rate with 
another $770,000 project still likely to be approved.  In considering the financial 
recovery, one TAMUG Crisis Management Team member described it like this:  
So, when you look at, you know, did you perform well from a financial 
standpoint? Yes, we did.  Now, did we use reserves? Yes, we did.  Were we 
hurting? Yes, we were, but the fact is we recovered already 5.2 million out of 6.9 
million.  That’s not bad at all and we still believe we will be receiving, I would 
say, safe to say, 80% of that $770,000.  I don’t think we’ll get it all, because they 
are arguing and there are some things you’re not going to recover.  So, it was a 
team effort between our legislators, FEMA and presenting the information really 
well; and I think we learned a lot, I think the next time it will be smoother 
because we will know how to accumulate these costs in the categories that they 
want (Interviewee #6, personal communication, 8-2-11). 
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The Return Home 
 As the weeks after the evacuation turned to months and students fell into the 
routine of their semester, eventually talk began about the return to Galveston.  A series 
of town halls had been held throughout the semester with students and separately with 
faculty and staff that featured updates on the campus from Dr. Loftin via TTVN as well 
as procedural items like housing updates.  Quite often the town halls were used to direct 
individuals to the webpage for surveys.  One such survey was to assess the relocation 
process and its impact on the students so all students were asked to anonymously answer 
questions about their experience.  This survey was fairly comprehensive in seeking input 
from the student body.  The same was done with faculty with particular emphasis put on 
the academic experience of the semester.  Yet another polled the graduating seniors to 
see if they would like to graduate in College Station with their TAMU- College Station 
peers, hold a separate graduation in College Station for only Galveston graduates, or 
third, return to Galveston and graduate despite the fact that hotels and restaurants were 
still somewhat limited.  Overwhelmingly the graduating seniors voted to return to 
Galveston, and on Sunday, December 14, 2008 at 2:00 pm in the afternoon, 106 
undergraduate and six Master’s degrees were conferred in a ceremony well attended by 
city officials, Regents, Elsa Murano, President of Texas A&M and many other TAMU- 
College Station officials (Guidry News, December 12, 2008). The Sea Aggies had 
returned home. 
 The following Spring semester, classes would begin as scheduled on January 20th 
with a record enrollment for the Spring and an even larger enrollment the following Fall.  
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The enrollment had been 1,778 pre-Ike, dropped slightly to 1,563 for the Spring as 
enrollment always did, and reached a new record enrollment of 1804 in Fall of 2009.  
The administration was overjoyed to find the storm and relocation had not overly 
impacted enrollment (Interviewee #10, personal communication, 9-8-11).  Although the 
city of Galveston was still recovering, the campus itself was mostly repaired before the 
students returned in the Spring, and very quickly the students fell back into their usual 
schedules.  Faculty also fell back to their habits of teaching and research with many 
taking on research projects centered around Hurricane Ike’s impact.  While the students 
attended classes, the faculty and staff continued work on their homes.  Counseling and 
support was provided to the staff and faculty through Employee Assistance Programs, 
but slowly TAMUG slipped back into the new normal.  TAMUG had survived a 100 
year storm and was ready to move on. 
 
Restating the Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study was two-fold: (1) to examine the Texas A&M 
University at Galveston’s Crisis Management Team ’s approach, deployment, and 
learning as a consequence of Hurricane Ike in the effort to return the campus to Pre-Ike 
status; (2) to evaluate the Quality Texas Foundation- Engagement Level Criteria as a 
framework for assessing crisis management in higher education.   
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Research Questions 
1.  What approach did Texas A&M University at Galveston utilize in their crisis 
management process?  
2. What strategies did Texas A&M University at Galveston deploy in applying their 
approach consistently and ensuring the approach was utilized by all appropriate work 
units? 
3. What learning occurred as a result of refining the approach through cycles of 
evaluation and improvement? 
4. To what extent is the Quality Texas Foundation- Engagement Level Criteria an 
effective framework for assessing crisis management in higher education? 
 
The Findings 
Research Question 1 -Approach 
 Research Question One inquires as to the approach that TAMUG utilized in their 
crisis management process.  When considered through the Baldrige framework, 
approach refers specifically to the identification of the various methods used to 
accomplish the crisis management process as well as the appropriateness of these 
methods within the context of the organization’s operating environment as defined by 
the various Baldrige categories of leadership, strategic planning, customer focus, 
measurement, analysis, and knowledge management, workforce focus, and process 
management.  The approach also considers the effectiveness of these methods and the 
degree to which the approach is repeatable and based on reliable data and information 
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(i.e., systematic) (National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2011).  Lastly in this 
context of a crisis response, the approach refers to the planned process leading up to the 
crisis.  In reviewing the specific methods utilized in six of the seven categories of the 
Baldrige framework (the seventh – Business Results – would not occur in the Approach 
phase which is focused on the planning), a comprehensive view of the approach and 
planning of the TAMUG Crisis Management Team will be detailed.   
Leadership  
Creating and Sustaining an Environment for Excellence - The Leadership 
category examines how the organization’s senior leaders’ personal actions guide 
and sustain the organization.  Also examined are the organization’s governance 
system and how the organization fulfills its legal, ethical, and societal 
responsibilities and supports its key communities (The Quality Texas 
Foundation, 2009).  The following analysis and findings of leadership are derived 
from questions that are established by the Quality Texas Foundation- 
Engagement Level Criteria and outlined in Appendix I. 
 
 The TAMUG Crisis Management Team employed a number of strong leadership 
actions in its approach leading up to the Hurricane Ike crisis.  The first of these entailed 
the establishment of a clear leadership structure.  The use of crisis management teams is 
generally considered best practice in crisis management literature (Mitroff, Pearson, & 
Harrington, 1996), and TAMUG had relied heavily on their structure in the development 
of the crisis management plan and throughout the crisis response.  The Galveston team 
was extremely familiar with each other and worked closely with Dr. Loftin and their 
TAMU- College Station counterparts to develop a business contingency plan that would 
guide TAMUG through the crisis.  This development of this plan, even though it 
originated during the previous TAMU- College Station president, Dr. Robert Gates’ 
term, provided a strong enough framework to carry through into the new TAMU- 
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College Station leadership under the new president, Dr. Elsa Murano.  The plan clearly 
delineated Galveston leadership and responsibilities as well as established TAMU- 
College Station counterparts for each one of the identified areas of the plan.  In addition, 
the plan set and communicated the organizational vision, values, and performance 
expectations for the faculty, staff and students.  The unity of the leadership team and 
consistency of their organizational vision was critical.  As one participant noted: 
I think from the most senior level the fact that Dr. Murano and Dr. Loftin were 
on the same page and very early on said, “We’re going to make this happen.”  
They didn’t just share that with those of us sitting in that room on Sunday - they 
talked to the media about it, they sent it out in every message. That, I think, was 
huge, because had Dr. Loftin said it and not Dr. Murano, I think we would have 
been in a very different situation.  But the fact that they were very united in that 
and agreed on it was pretty key.  Once Dr. Murano had communicated her 
commitment, she kind of assigned the role of facilitation to Dr. Russell Cross.  
He made it clear to the people that he pulled in, which for the most part were 
those people that we had matched up in the plan.  All the key leaders and he 
made it pretty clear to them that this relocation was their priority so I really don’t 
think we could have done what we did without that commitment from him 
(Interviewee #4, personal communication, 7-27-11). 
 
 Besides identifying and empowering the leadership, the plan went further in 
developing the organizational vision to move the campus beyond the crisis.  Until only a 
short time prior to Hurricane Ike, the plan had been focused on simply weathering the 
storm , specifically securing the campus and evacuating the students.  Understanding the 
recent lessons of Hurricanes Rita and Katrina and their impact on the colleges and 
universities in their path, the TAMUG leadership became proactive in developing a 
recovery and business continuity plan.  Realizing the incredible value to the students and 
employees of TAMUG in being able to continue their semester regardless of the extent 
of the crisis, the leadership team developed a well-articulated plan that detailed an 
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organizational vision for the continuation of classes regardless of the damage to the 
campus.  As one team member recalled: 
So my role was always to go to College Station first and so, I was actually one 
of the first people to always leave campus as soon as the decision was made.  I 
packed my office; I did my things here and closed down, went home closed that 
up and I would go straight to College Station, because I would start the command 
post there.  And I’d done that for ten plus years. 
 
On Rita, we got up there, I was ahead of all of that Houston traffic mess, but 
certainly lots of coordination at the command post was different, because there 
was so much of a mess due to the traffic situation scattering everyone and 
preventing many from making it to the command post.  And we were -- after the 
initial crisis and we got everybody up there and in places to stay and everybody 
was safe and all of that was done, Dr. Loftin really was the first to ask well where 
is the continuity plan and we kind of went, “We don’t have one of those because 
it would be, I mean, there’s so many different parameters and so many different 
questions that how do you even start to look at this?” And he said “Oh, we need 
to look at this” 
 
And so he started some processes after Rita that he forced people to develop 
single page white papers and I have the forms covering the enrollment services 
standpoint that was agreement for the registrar, financial aid, SIMS, etc. on a 
model of how we would react to a storm.  Prior to the agreement, we wouldn’t 
have had that, so I actually think when I did get here, we did move faster with 
more agreement in places, because that had already been done.  We had the 
structure for the relocation plan in place, who the lead team members would be, 
and a  lot of that identified before the storm actually ever hit (Interviewee #1, 
personal communication, 7-18-11).  
 
 Another method that the leadership team employed was the established expectation 
of clearly principled and ethical behavior.  This expectation was not formalized with the 
actual plan but instead emphasized within the culture which they carried throughout the 
crisis.  As stated in Ellen Chaffee and William G. Tierney’s book “Collegiate Culture 
and Leadership Strategies,” 
Institutions are certainly influenced by powerful external factors, such as 
demographic, economic, and political conditions, yet they are also shaped by strong 
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forces that emanate from within.  This internal dynamic has its roots in the history 
of the organization and derives its force from the values, traditions, processes and 
goals held by those most intimately involved in the organization’s workings.  The 
most fundamental construct of an organization, as a society, is its culture.  An 
organization’s culture is reflected in what is done, how it is done, and who is 
involved in doing it.  It concerns decisions, actions, and communications both on an 
instrumental and symbolic level (pg. 7). 
 TAMUG already enjoyed an environment with high personal accountability and high 
standards of ethical behavior.  Nearly all of the TAMUG Crisis Management Team were 
long standing employees of the institution who were heavily invested in the university 
and each other.  The leadership team was committed to continuing this philosophy 
throughout the crisis and reinforced this philosophy on multiple occasions throughout 
the crisis.  In addition, the values and guiding principles established early on contributed 
further to an environment that fostered legal and ethical behavior. As one member 
stated: 
I think we all had worked together enough in whatever capacity that it was 
understood that we were going to do this right.  And I don’t know how to be even 
more clearer than that.  We were so focused on caring for our people, keeping the 
campus open, functional or getting it going in whatever form that would take, 
that we assumed that people are going to do things properly, to an extent.  We 
also told people to keep good documentation of any money spent, any whatever 
so we had the financial folks in there, we had HR folks in there.  Basically and 
most of those kinds of folks were people from the main campus working with 
Susan Lee… So those folks were talking, but we just told folks – keep great 
documentation, because we don’t know what would we’re going to have to 
provide to be able to be reimbursed, to be able to just justify what we did and 
then in cases where we did – so general counsel was a part of this conversation, 
so things that we did like contracts and as you mentioned leases, et cetera, so we 
made sure that we did, and so we had the people who knew those issues and 
potential pit falls who would raise a flag, but our primary objective was to get it 
done (Interviewee #10, personal communication, 9-8-11). 
 
 The TAMUG Crisis Management Team also worked diligently in their approach to 
create an environment for organizational performance improvement through a couple of 
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different processes in the development of the crisis management plan.  The first was an 
extensive after action review process after each previous crisis where the plans were 
reviewed and improved upon.  “The fact that we dissect every one of these crises, and do 
after action reviews of the past crises, greatly informs and improves the next crisis 
response.  After all from the Rita evacuation we learned a great deal.  So that process of 
review starts creating that organizational performance improvement” (Interviewee #9, 
personal communication, 8-18-11).  Secondly TAMUG Crisis Management Team 
conducted annual table top exercises to test university response to various crises such as 
active shooters, fires, and hurricanes.  The last table top exercise immediately preceding 
Hurricane Ike had been a hurricane scenario that incorporated many of the factors 
learned from Hurricanes Rita and Katrina, and resulted in a number of changes to the 
Crisis Management Plan (Interviewee #3, personal communication, 7-20-11).  Lastly, 
the leadership utilized a process of reviewing best practice in response to other 
university crisis responses.  One of the initiatives which was greatly credited with 
pushing the following Spring enrollment to a record high came from one of the 
Louisiana schools that had been struck by Hurricane Rita.  “The idea of we’ll hold your 
money and come back in the spring or a 50 percent refund or some level of refund.  That 
was an idea that somebody had heard that one of the Louisiana schools had done from 
Rita, and we found it to be attractive, obviously the idea we’re going to hold your money 
and come back in the spring was an idea to help students come back. (Interviewee #2, 
personal communication, 7-22-11). Although this particular initiative was not 
incorporated into the plan until after the Hurricane had struck TAMUG, it was the 
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process of reviewing other universities responses to crisis that had identified this 
initiative as a possibility. 
 Another important factor considered in the approach used by the TAMUG Crisis 
Management Team was the determination of the most critical of the university’s 
programs, offerings, services and operations to society, the assessment of how the crisis 
might affect them, and a commitment to push them through.  The most critical of these 
was quickly determined to be the graduating class not only of the Fall semester, but the 
following Spring as well.   
In December, we graduated seniors that went into the workforce.  If we needed to 
close down the campus and not relocate it, we wouldn’t have graduated seniors 
in December.  The December graduating class and the May graduating class is 
what we did for society in my opinion.  If we made mistakes, we missed 
opportunities but we graduated seniors in December.  I don’t think we would 
have done that had we not relocated.  I don’t think we would have graduated 
seniors in May if we hadn’t relocated.  So, those two groups graduated on time, 
or at least 90% in the fall and almost 100% in the spring.  That wouldn’t have 
and they wouldn’t have gotten to the workforce and they wouldn’t have done all 
the things they did for society.  We would have lost a year of their benefit to 
society, or at least a semester, a long semester that their benefit to society would 
have been lost. 
That’s probably the biggest thing that we did for society as a whole, which is of 
course our core mission.  We should do it.  But we could have failed to do it.  So 
in other words, fulfilling our core mission in spite of it was our biggest support 
for society in my opinion (Interviewee #5, personal communication, 7-29-11). 
 
It was largely based on this determination and the economics of losing a semester that 
resulted in the development of the business continuity plan as part of the approach to 
managing a crisis level storm.  The focus of the business continuity plan was to get the 
students up to College Station and keep them on the exact academic track as prior to the 
storm.   
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Leadership had not been perfect in their approach to the crisis response planning.  
A major shortcoming in leadership’s approach to preparing for the crisis was the 
predominately internally focused perspective of the plan.  Past experiences had always 
resulted in significant wind based damage to the campus, with the campus often 
sustaining more damage than the Galveston community.  As a result, TAMUG was often 
able to rely on the City of Galveston for support after a major storm, even housing nearly 
all of the students in the community after Hurricane Alicia (Interviewee #9, personal 
communication, 8-18-11).  As a result of Hurricane Ike, those roles were reversed in that 
there was some wind damage to a few buildings but most of the damage suffered 
through the Gulf Coast was a result of catastrophic flooding from the huge tidal surge. 
With the majority of campus at well over 17 feet above sea level, most of the buildings 
escaped significant damage.   Instead it was the city of Galveston where a majority of 
students lived and the roadway leading up to campus that suffered significant damage.  
This significant change meant that instead of TAMUG needing assistance from the 
Galveston community, the Galveston community would seek assistance from TAMUG.  
TAMUG’s approach never even considered this as a possibility, and there was no part of 
the plan that addressed such a contingency. 
The Leadership Team in the form of the Crisis Management Team and their 
College Station counterparts played a vital role in recognizing the evolving need for a 
Business Continuity component of the well-rehearsed crisis management plan.  Through 
the identification of critical people and a well thought out plan that detailed the strategic 
goals and needs to the institution, the most critical aspects of the university’s mission 
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were carried forward through the storm.  Although leadership’s approach to the plan was 
not perfect, the culture of ethical behavior and organizational improvement contributed 
to an overall effective approach to sustaining the university.   
Strategic Planning  
Developing Strategic Objectives and Action Plans for Competitive Advantage - 
The Strategic Planning category examines how the organization develops 
strategic objectives and action plans. Also examined are how the chosen 
strategic objectives and action plans are implemented and changed if 
circumstances require, and how progress is measured (The Texas Quality 
Foundation, 2009).  The following analysis and findings of strategic planning are 
derived from questions that are established by the Quality Texas Foundation- 
Engagement Level Criteria and outlined in Appendix I. 
 
An organization that is strategic in their planning and preparation for crisis is 
much more likely to be successful (Zdziarski, Dunkel, Rollo, & Assoc., 2007).  The 
TAMUG Crisis Management Team was committed to being strategic in their approach, 
and the team members reported several of their strategies during our interviews.  The 
first and most major of these was the continued development of the crisis management 
plan and specifically the development of the business continuity plan.  Prior to Hurricane 
Katrina striking New Orleans, the TAMUG crisis management plan simply addressed 
the securing of campus and evacuation (Hinojosa, 1996).  Once the devastation from 
Hurricane Katrina and even Rita was realized, strategic decisions were made to develop 
the business continuity plan that entailed the relocation of students to College Station 
(Interviewee #1, personal communication, 8-9-11). Counterpart meetings were held to 
further develop the broad strategic steps necessary for the plan, and tabletop exercises 
were conducted to test the plan well in advance of the actual crisis (Interviewee #3, 
personal communication, 7-20-11).  The crisis management plan was critical: 
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The biggest strategy was having a business continuity plan.  We could not have 
done this.  We wouldn’t have reopened to 13 days later without a plan in place in 
advance.  I don’t think anybody would have pulled the trigger to relocate to 
College Station without a thought about it a lot before the disaster.  If we started 
that discussion there, nobody would have the balls to do it, Loftin included, me 
included and I'm a risk-taker personally. 
But in the heat of the moment, it looked impossible.  Without having the naivety 
of talking about it in advance before the disaster, we wouldn’t have the nerve, I 
don’t think, to do that.  Because it looked so insurmountable and there’s only a 
few of us there trying to represent the whole institution.  Loftin, it’s one thing to 
have a plan and then say you didn’t execute.  It’s another thing to come up with a 
decision, a snap decision and make it in the face of that kind of challenge. 
So, I don’t think we would have done it as quickly without the plan of events and 
I really don’t think we would have pulled the trigger to relocate.  Without that 
plan of events, I think we would have said we’ll get back when we can.  We 
might have reopened the school by November 1st maybe.  We couldn’t have 
legally finished the semester as they're not enough days between the first of 
November and January 15th.  We were probably changing the spring semester to 
go into June (Interviewee #5, personal communication, 7-29-11). 
 
With the more strategic modification to the crisis management plan in place, 
individual managers of TAMUG worked extensively with their College Station 
counterparts to determine how to achieve those broader strategic goals through the 
development of one page white papers which detailed shorter and longer term objectives 
by department.  Although the white papers were not formally a part of the crisis 
management plan, the discussions that took place in developing them became a critical 
starting point as the team worked through the thousands of smaller details to achieve 
their strategic goals.  The starting framework for discussion created by the various white 
papers identified areas of concern and high priority so that team members could rapidly 
address the most significant issues before moving on to less critical issues. 
Through the use of the crisis management plan and white papers, the TAMUG 
Crisis Management Team had a good organizational vision for what they were working 
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to achieve.  The next step in the process was the identification of strategic objectives that 
were challenged by Hurricane Ike and developing processes to mitigate those challenges 
while striving to achieve balance for all stakeholders.  As stated previously, the ability to 
graduate TAMUG students on time and keep others on track academically was a major 
objective of the university.  “What we're talking about here is a business continuity plan 
that was strategic versus tactical versus a strategic plan for the institution, but our 
business continuity plan allowed us to continue toward our objectives and our strategic 
plan.  If we had closed the doors, that's clearly not consistent with our strategic plan.  If 
we don't graduate seniors in December, that's clearly not consistent with our strategic 
plan” (Interviewee #5, personal communication, 7-29-11).  Although not written 
prominently with the campus crisis management plan, the obvious goal for many of the 
faculty and staff was to get day to day operations back to as normal as possible with 
students attending class and studying even if the classroom was geographically different 
from their original classroom.  As such, the approach was to address those things 
interfering with the return to the “new normal” of student pursuing their studies in 
College Station- located classrooms (Interviewee #10, personal communication, 9-8-11).   
 Although the crisis management plan used a series of action plans to detail the 
preliminary steps to responding to a storm, particularly the tracking, evacuation, and 
locking down of the campus, the relocation and Business Continuity Plan carried too 
many variables to effectively outline action plans as part of the approach.  Instead the 
TAMUG Crisis Management Team utilized broad goals to leave managers the flexibility 
to react appropriately toward those goals depending on the conditions of the crisis. The 
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white papers certainly detailed some level of action and who was the lead in various 
areas, but there was not a significant amount of detail in those plans.  As one member 
described: 
I think we had our business continuity plan with strategic stuff that we filled in 
with tactical plans.  We had action plans throughout the thing and the biggest 
example of those occurring and the metamorphose of those are these documents 
right here, the white papers.  But considering those as the tactical plans?  That's 
it, right?  No there wasn’t much to it.  So, it details who the TAMU lead is and at 
that point, we were setting up the leads and so on, and as we went forward we 
discussed what to do.  But this structure was that these people would develop the 
tactical plans, right?  So, these were the players that took these pieces and then 
developed the tactical plans.  I developed tactical plans for example and there 
wasn’t much wasn’t done tactically in advance of the crisis (Interviewee #5, 
personal communication, 7-29-11). 
 
 The strategic nature of the crisis management team in developing a never before 
attempted relocation of students was effective.  The TAMUG Crisis Management Team, 
working together with their colleagues in College Station, was able to effectively 
identify the strategic objectives and priorities broken down by functional areas.  
Although extensive action plans supporting those strategic objectives were fairly short 
on detail, the level of detail was sufficient to provide guidance and allow flexibility in 
developing the first detailed steps of the relocation process. 
Customer/ Student Focus  
Understanding your Student and Stakeholders - The Customer/ Student Focus 
category examines how the organization engages its students AND stakeholders 
for long-term marketplace success. This engagement strategy includes how the 
organization listens to the voice of its customers, builds customer relationships, 
and uses customer information to improve and identify opportunities for 
innovation (The Quality Texas Foundation, 2009).  The following analysis and 
findings of customer/ student focus are derived from questions that are 
established by the Quality Texas Foundation- Engagement Level Criteria and 
outlined in Appendix I. 
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Despite the relocation, the TAMUG Crisis Management Team worked diligently 
to be consistent in delivering the programs and services to the students. In fact, the 
primary purpose of the relocation was to ensure the university could continue to deliver 
its programs and services to the students.  The university employed several different 
approaches that focused specifically on understanding the student needs during the 
crisis.  The first step was the initial outreach to the students through the webpage and 
text services.  Although the information communicated through these measures was 
important, the emphasis in the approach process was focused on developing various 
conduits to communicate with the students so they would be informed and could 
participate in the relocation process.  In developing the plan, the TAMUG Crisis 
Management Team knew the information processes were especially important in a crisis 
situation so establishing strong, multiple communication lines were a high priority of the 
plan, but the major focus of the plan was focused in one direction, pushing information 
out from the university through the webpage to its various constituents.  
Although this approach was somewhat effective in distributing the initial 
information, it was fairly one dimensional.  Such an approach had been sufficient in 
years past when the process for the students was simply to evacuate the campus with 
instructions to continually check the webpage for when to return. However with the 
implementation of the business continuity component of the TAMUG crisis management 
plan, a plan that had never been implemented previously, the need for two-way 
communication was necessary to permit the students to ask those important questions 
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that they found necessary to make the relocation decision for themselves.  The plan did 
not allow for this contingency. 
Another major tenet of the plan was the immersion of TAMUG students into the 
TAMU-College Station educational process.  The approach was such that TAMU-
College Station provided all of the necessary processes and services to allow their 
students success, and the infrastructure was such that even if the full enrollment of 
TAMUG decided to relocate, something that was considered a low probability in the 
plan, the existing infrastructure of TAMU-College Station could easily support the 
TAMUG student’s success (Interviewee #1, personal communication, 7-18-11). As such, 
the emphasis of the plan with regard to the student focus was to expend efforts on the 
actual relocation of the students such as identifying housing and identifying vacant spots 
in classrooms, rather than rebuilding student services that were already in place in 
College Station.   Furthermore, the plan detailed only the most basic processes for 
continuing the semester with little focus on the relationship between TAMUG and the 
students.  For example, the plan originally called for assigning students to as many 
vacant spaces as already existed in on-going College Station courses with additional 
courses constructed as necessary to complete the student schedule (Interviewee #1, 
personal communication, 7-18-11).    Although this approach would conceivably have 
allowed a student to continue with their semester, the difficulty of being inserted into all 
different, on-going courses with different faculty and different syllabi from what they 
started with would have placed an incredible burden on the students’ ability to succeed.  
In the approach, the TAMUG student was simply assimilated into the TAMU- College 
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Station educational process while using technology to continue to communicate and 
support them.  Very little consideration was given to how those specialty courses like the 
maritime coursework for cadets would be continued beyond the stated plan that any 
courses that were not offered in College Station would be reconstructed (Interviewee #1, 
personal communication, 7-18-11).  
The approach was also lacking with regards to the assessment of the students’ 
satisfaction of the process.  Assessment had always occurred at the campus after any 
major event, whether an after action meeting for staff or some sort of focus group or 
survey for students or other stakeholders.  In fact after each previous evacuation, the 
TAMUG Crisis Management team would reconvene to discuss the evacuation and 
whether the plan needed to be modified at all.  As such, it is likely that the intent to 
assess after the event was always present, but there was no formalized plan set for 
assessment prior to the storm hitting.  Furthermore, this event was the first time that the 
business continuity plan was utilized where assessments could have been conducted 
during the relocation to provide valuable input to campus administrators.  Unfortunately 
this was not considered in the plan leading up to the storm. 
A major focus of the development of the Business Continuity Plan was purported 
to be for the students to stay on track academically.  This focus meant ensuring that 
those who were on track to graduate would not be delayed in the case of a storm or other 
major crisis rendering the TAMUG campus untenable for any amount of time.  The 
approach was to relocate the students into the very successful environment of TAMU-
College Station where the students could reap the benefits of the multiple services and 
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offerings of the large campus while they continued in their academic schedule.  
Unfortunately this approach fell woefully short in consideration of the success of the 
students once relocated into College Station courses nor did it consider the continued 
relationship of these students with TAMUG or the special requirements of many of the 
course offerings necessary for the students majors.  Furthermore there was no 
assessment plan included in the approach to measure if the approach was working.  
Although the plan did outline the major goals for addressing major student needs, the 
student focus was lost in many of the missing details.  
Measurements, Analysis, and Knowledge Management  
Managing by Facts to Drive Performance Improvement - The Measurement, 
Analysis, and Knowledge Management category examines how the organization 
selects, gathers, analyzes, manages, and improves its data, information, and 
knowledge assets and how it manages its information technology. The category also 
examines how the organization uses review findings to improve its performance. 
(The Quality Texas Foundation, 2009).  The following analysis and findings of 
measurements, analysis, and knowledge management are derived from questions 
that are established by the Quality Texas Foundation- Engagement Level Criteria 
and outlined in Appendix I. 
 
 Information is important in day to day operations, but it is critical in crisis 
situations.  Whereas most organizations utilize data to track daily operations for 
organizational performance, organizations responding to crisis depend on timely 
information and data to survive.  The TAMUG Crisis Management Team realized this 
and utilized several methods to get information to the decision makers, processes which 
evolved with the crisis. One of the TAMUG Crisis Management Team members spoke 
about the wide variety of data that they had to deal with it. 
During the evacuation, you have continuous reports coming in. You know, 
you’ve got all of those actions that are taking place, and you do everything you 
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can to stay on top of all of it and – yeah, so you have people who are reporting 
that. All the way up and down at the local levels, you’ve got the same thing 
happening.  You’re having meetings. You’re pulling everybody together and 
saying okay, you, contractor, what do you need.  Physical plant director speaks 
up and says okay we’ll take care of that, we’ll get you the tape, we’ll get you 
this, we’ll get you that.  You’ve got an extensive communication network by all 
the multiple means that are now available, you know, so that’s going on and 
during the evacuation you’re basically communicating by mobile phone. I can’t 
tell you how many phone calls I got during Rita for 27 hours and nowadays, 
people text or are texting and doing all those other kinds of things plus at the unit 
level you’ve got phone trees. You’re checking within the unit - you’re checking 
on each other and things like that and that’s pretty formalized.  That’s happening 
pretty much all at the same time. 
  
During the actual storm you’re relying primarily on public media.  The use of our 
online resources which remember we’ve got - we’ve already setup computers up 
here in College Station - so we’re putting out messages; there’s an established 
schedule which you might modify if you need to, and you’re updating, you 
know, every two hours or you updating a lot on the information out there on the 
web because then you’ve instructed everyone to go to the web to get that 
information.  And that works, you know.  That’s a pretty solid system. 
 
Then there’s an awful lot of communication that’s going on between top 
management, just as I’m sure there is going on through students affairs.  You’re 
checking on your staff and you know, all the people, and immediately after the 
storm, you’re still using the public media. You use a lot of communication 
systems such as our e2Campus text system if you need to, you’re connecting 
with city officials back in with the city and then you may ask that city, how soon 
are they letting people come back or how soon are they, you know, what’s going 
on there.  So, communication occurs between the Galveston command post here 
and the Galveston folks who stay behind right off the bat.  We start talking to our 
police officers that are back in Galveston, and you know, what do you see, 
what’s it like, what’s going on and things like that.  It was interesting 
(Superintendent) Worley who was on the ship through the storm said we actually 
had cars floating around the campus down by the boat basin down there.  So we 
are asking him what kind of damage does he see, how does he come through it, 
how does he sustain stuff and things like that. 
   
So while all of those communications are going on the TAMUG evacuees here in 
College Station and other evacuees you know, where are they?  Phone lines are 
manned to take calls from constituents in the command post up here and if you’re 
calling, you actually set up a whole system.  During the College Station 
operations, again, you have communication by extensive means.  You have a lot 
of meetings.  You’ve got some written status reports that are usually submitted 
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electronically so you’ve got those pieces of information coming in.  You’re 
reviewing organizational performance and capabilities by considering all those 
above pieces of communication, all that above information that’s coming in to 
you is really review.  You guys, when your strategic operations team met, you’re 
busy reviewing action towards the key leaders.  You sought student feedback, 
you’ve got the students together and had forums and other informational things.  
You addressed parent and student concerns when they receive as well as you 
know, all those raised by all of the constituents.  I remember you had an issue 
about parking in a church parking lot, and you addressed that.  I mean, that – and 
so that was feedback, that was satisfaction, that was a constituent that you had to 
deal with. 
 
But those are – that goes directly to that question, you know, and the fact that 
you were there and available and open to doing it and you’ve got decision 
makers that end up taking action to get it solved.  The whole business around the 
lost textbooks and lost uniforms and things like that – I mean, that wasn’t so 
much anticipated ahead of time but as soon as it was identified as a problem 
because you were listening, you took action and handled it. I felt the whole 
decision of how we are going to administer this fund and we had constituents that 
we had to connect with, to be sure we didn’t step on toes went well because you 
were responsive to the constituents.  You collected information and distributed 
the fund equitably (Interviewee #9, personal communication, 8-18-11). 
 
Although the plan historically had always considered the information available before 
and during the evacuation, there was a much greater challenge with the implementation 
of the business continuity plan since it was truly a new proposed process with no 
previous baseline.  Without having any experience to base what measurement and 
analysis was needed, the approach was lacking in detail as to what should be acquired as 
well as how and when it should be.  
 The plan was successful in expediting those processes once the necessary data 
was identified.  The TAMUG Crisis Management Team was very intentional in the 
relocation being to College Station as so many of the processes were already aligned.  In 
working to develop a method to analyze data as it came through, the TAMUG Crisis 
Management Team realized very quickly that many processes did not need to be 
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reinvented.  Once the major aspect of relocating campuses was accomplished, many of 
the processes were the same processes used on the Galveston campus for years.  In fact, 
the student information management system, financial accounting systems, and other 
systems were the exact same which allowed the team members to exert their efforts on 
solving the problems, rather than determining how to gather the data.    
We identified a few key pieces of information that we needed to come up with 
like the percent showing up.  And it was a pretty modest number honestly.  And 
we didn’t try to do the impossible like measure if we hit cost neutral or not.  We 
could have spent an infinite amount of resources trying to do that unsuccessfully 
in my opinion.  So we were pretty pragmatic about how much information we 
collected, if anything we collected too little, probably in retrospect that’s almost 
always the case when you’re trying to set up new systems.  We mostly, as a 
strategy, used our existing data systems with new reporting as opposed to setting 
up new data systems. 
 
I didn’t build a bunch of new data systems.  We used existing data systems 
different ways, and we wrote new reports against the data to generate new pieces 
of information like the percent showing up.  But we didn’t implement technically 
new automated data systems and very few manual data systems in the process.  
We mostly utilized existing data systems to come up with new pieces of 
information and our traditional pieces of information.  So we didn’t bring in a 
whole new database to do this, that or the other thing that I can remember.  It 
may be the exception with real-estate stuff because it’s there we’re tracking, 
that’s sort of external to me at least and probably to you, really.  They may have 
done something new.  I don’t know, but TAMUG people didn’t write.  Now we 
built new reports on the local database to figure out stuff and so on.  So my 
premise is in the IT side with automated systems is we largely used existing data 
systems and existing normal data that we collected to generate new pieces of 
information along with our regular reports (Interviewee #5, personal 
communication, 7-29-11). 
 
 The TAMUG Crisis Management Team also did not focus much on the 
distribution of information through the levels of organization in their original plan.  
Although this aspect was touched upon in the early versions of the plan that only dealt 
with the evacuation and return and even then only on a very basic level, the development 
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of the information chain wasn’t developed in the latest plan.  At the time of the storm, 
the white papers really only provided the initial framework to the major steps of the 
Business Continuity Plan.  This was also true of the management of organizational 
knowledge of relevant information from workers, stakeholders, and students.  A well 
thought out process included in the plan to secure this base line information would be 
extremely helpful in modifying the plan for future relocations.  This was a gap in the 
approach. 
 The TAMUG Crisis Management Team realized the value of data in their 
approach to the crisis management plan.  Years of experience of dealing with vast 
quantities of data during previous crisis response had forged their approach moving 
forward.  Multiple, well-practiced systems of acquiring data immediately during the 
crisis event and then the intentional relocation to a campus with familiar systems to 
enable the easy acquisition of other data facilitated the knowledge management of the 
team.  The only shortfall was the lack of a detailed plan for distribution of the 
information throughout the workforce, a problem that resulted from the many unknowns 
of the never attempted before Business Continuity process. 
Workforce Focus  
Developing and Realizing the Full Potential of your Workforce - The Workforce 
Focus category examines the ability to assess workforce capability and capacity 
needs and build a workforce environment conducive to high performance.. The 
category also examines how the organization engages, manages, and develops 
your workforce to utilize its full potential in alignment with the organization’s 
overall mission, strategy, and action plans. (The Quality Texas Foundation, 
2009).  The following analysis and findings of workforce focus are derived from 
questions that are established by the Quality Texas Foundation- Engagement 
Level Criteria and outlined in Appendix I. 
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For years, the TAMUG Crisis Management plan addressed its workforce with 
very similar processes as the students in the case of a hurricane.  Of course, the crisis 
management plan’s primary purpose and emphasis was for the health, safety, and 
security of all of the faculty, staff, and students.  The very first step in releasing the 
students before the city of Galveston called for an evacuation was intended to get the 
students home and out of harm’s way before traffic could gridlock the evacuation routes.  
In addition, this was done as soon as possible so as to allow faculty and staff to lock 
down their offices and the campus in general allowing them to safely evacuate as well 
(Interviewee #9, personal communication, 8-18-11). The process of locking down the 
campus was a well organized process that had been honed over years of practice.  Once 
the actual call for evacuation was made, each representative of the TAMUG Crisis 
Management Team had a list of responsibilities in the plan to ensure the safety of the 
students and security of the campus.  Those responsibilities ranged widely.  From the 
coordination of the student community leaders in the residence halls going through each 
individual student room to ensure that all students had cleaned out their refrigerators and 
balconies and departed campus or the Facilities Service staff coordinating the pickup of 
important human resource and finance files and various safes from around campus for 
relocation to the ship, there were a number of things to be done.  The list of 
responsibilities covered all aspects of preparing the campus for the impending storm, and 
required participation from many in the workforce (Interviewee #9, personal 
communication, 8-18-11).    Fortunately these responsibilities were fairly well dispersed 
among the campus staff to ensure that no individuals were left with a disproportionate 
 178 
 
amount of work to complete before being able to leave campus with plenty of time to 
secure their own home and evacuate their families from the island.  Safety of the faculty, 
staff, and students was always paramount to the administration not only through the 
evacuation process but also through the entire crisis response.  As one TAMUG Crisis 
Management Team member remembered:  
I would say this of the senior leadership at the time, first and foremost and this is 
true from Dr. Loftin to Rodney, to other senior leadership.  And I would say that 
it was even true of Russell Cross who I was sitting in meetings with, and I would 
have to assume it was true of President Murano.  Their first and foremost concern 
was the welfare of the homes and the family and not how’s my employee doing 
or are you ready to work hard? It was how’s everybody doing? I think that was 
critical in helping all of us feel like… number one, we’re all in this together; 
number two, we’re all going to do what we need to do get it done and number 
three, nobody’s going to ask questions if somebody steps out for a little bit of 
time because of the stress.  And there were a lot of tears shed and slang used at 
different times, and it wasn’t ever seen in a bad way. I think it was all an 
understanding that we’re in this together and we’re here and as a campus we’re 
committed to making it work as long as you senior leaders understand that we 
have some real concerns of our own (Interviewee #2, personal communication, 7-
22-11). 
 
 The plan had also called for the continued use of the webpage by the faculty and 
staff, and this process was emphasized to all faculty and staff at the beginning of 
hurricane season and then again with any evacuation announcement.  The plan also 
established phone trees which were updated prior to each hurricane season for use in 
contacting every employee to ensure their safety and security in the case of a direct hit.  
This approach proved especially effective after Ike as many had evacuated to areas of 
the state without electricity for extended periods of time, rendering the campus webpage 
useless to many.  Through the phone tree, every single TAMUG employee was 
eventually accounted for including one faculty member who had been med-evacuated 
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out of Galveston just before the storm (Interviewee #7, personal communication, 8-9-
11). 
 As successful as the TAMUG Crisis Management Team’s approach was in 
ensuring the safe evacuation of all campus stakeholders, the plan was woefully deficient 
in its workforce focus beyond the evacuation.  The Business Continuity component of 
the plan had only been developed over the previous year and provided the framework for 
how the relocation of the students would occur, and certainly an element of the 
relocation was to continue the university’s business and prevent any of the workforce 
from losing their jobs as a result of being unable to continue.  However, the plan offered 
no detail as to what should occur with the faculty and staff beyond the very few who 
were identified as critical to the relocation effort or directly involved in the campus 
repair.  Although the Business Continuity Plan was to be implemented and utilized for 
several months until campus could be repaired, no part of the plan detailed what would 
occur with the 90% of the employees that were not identified as critical to the relocation 
effort – how TAMUG would continue to keep them engaged, assess their satisfaction 
with the crisis response, or even utilize their abilities to benefit the campus in the 
restoration process.  In its most recent form prior to Hurricane Ike striking Galveston, 
the approach of TAMUG was purely toward developing a plan to keep the students’ 
semester going in College Station with minimal to no attention dedicated to what that 
process meant to all of the faculty and staff that were not directly needed in the 
relocation process. 
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 The TAMUG Crisis Management Team were extremely strategic in developing 
the Business Continuity component of the crisis management plan after realizing the 
destruction that other storms, particularly Katrina and Rita, had wreaked upon the 
colleges and universities in their path.  Devastated enrollments coupled with soaring 
costs of repair often resulted in massive layoffs to the workforce resulting in a secondary 
crisis for many of the workers who had also been personally impacted by the storm.  As 
a result, the approach of the TAMUG Crisis Management Team was to develop a plan 
that focused on keeping the faculty, staff, and students safe while also developing a plan 
to preserve the university and with it the jobs of its workforce.  Unfortunately the 
approach did not provide the detail as to what to do for 90% of its workforce between 
the storm strike and the return to normal operations.  
Process Management  
Designing Work Systems to Deliver Value to Students and Stakeholders - The 
Process Management category examines how your organization designs its work 
systems, and how it designs, manages, and improves its key processes for 
implementing  those work systems to deliver student and stakeholder value and 
achieve organizational success and sustainability. Also examined is an 
organization’s readiness for emergencies. (The Quality Texas Foundation, 
2009).  The following analysis and findings of process management are derived 
from questions that are established by the Quality Texas Foundation- 
Engagement Level Criteria and outlined in Appendix I. 
 
As the business continuity plan was developed and added to the crisis response 
plan, one of the key considerations was the uniformity of processes.  As a satellite 
campus of Texas A&M University, TAMUG utilized the same student database system, 
financial aid systems, financial management systems, procurement and purchasing 
systems, and many systems.  Although there was understanding that all of the processes 
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would not be identical and seamless in transition, the early counterpart sessions spent 
quite a bit of time looking at what the major issues were in each functional area and how 
each functional process would work to assimilate the TAMUG students.  TAMUG was 
committed to transplanting as many of its processes within the TAMU-College Station 
systems as possible so that new processes would not have to be developed and learned 
during the crisis.  To a great extent, they were successful, but not all processes were 
easily transferable to TAMU- College Station. 
We tried to move systems with us.  Luckily, because we're part of this campus 
here in College Station, you see the records, employee records, payroll, all those 
things were basically the same, and there was no problem at all making that 
continue. 
 
What was difficult was taking processes which you needed but were unique to 
Galveston, and relocating them here or adapting them to a changed circumstance 
right here, and we gave immense power to the lowest level of supervisors to be 
able to do that sort of thing.  There was no way that I, or my deputy could 
micromanage how you handled a residence life issue for example.  In the 
maritime area, we really had a problem with the maritime work.  We could do 
only so many laboratories here. We had to get them down there again to access 
some functions there, and that was very difficult.  We used stuff from the Port of 
Houston for example which was very difficult with security and transportation 
processes, but we had a willing faculty and staff who just dug in and made sure 
that we could get people to what they had to do.  And so by the end of the 
semester, the students got what they had to have to stay on track to get their 
license requirements (Interviewee #11, personal communication, 9-9-11).   
  
The plan assumed once the students were relocated to College Station and 
provided housing and a course schedule, normal college processes would take over – 
attending class, studying, attending extracurricular activities, and other typical college 
activities.  TAMU-College Station was of a size where its current infrastructure of 
parking, dining centers, bus systems, libraries, and recreational facilities could easily 
assimilate an additional 2000 students if all students decided to relocate.  As such, the 
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plan did not provide much detail beyond the framework of how the major processes 
would work. As one team member described it: 
I think in that case the key was the plan that we already had.  We knew that if we 
were gone for X number of days that these were the things that we needed to 
worry about.  Like housing, dining, parking, so I think we had a rough idea of 
what we expected to do with all of those.  You know the scheduling thing I think 
turned out a little differently than we expected, but it goes back to us making that 
decision to keep them together.   
 
I don't mean to over emphasize that, but that was pretty key decision it shaped a 
whole lot of what we did.  I don't know that we were aware that it was such a key 
decision when made it.  And I certainly don't know that we would have made that 
decision had we known how many students we were bringing up.  I'm glad we 
did.  I don't know that I would change it, but that decision probably ended up 
having more importance than we would have initially expected (Interviewee #4, 
personal communication, 7-27-11). 
 
Since the discussions did not go into great detail concerning each process, one of the 
greatest benefits to the development of the framework was the discussion on how things 
might work and the relationships that developed as a result of those discussions.  There 
were certainly tentative agreements made, but with so much unknown about the crisis 
might unfold and how many students might relocate, several crisis team members felt 
the broad framework, detailed discussions, and resulting relationships were as beneficial 
as any detailed prescriptions of work processes. 
One, we used our existing systems where we could.  That’s the biggest thing and 
we had planned for having continuity of systems like email for faculty and staff 
that we run here.  We had setup the website which we’re running.  We had it 
setup up there already.  The other thing is that we had already built- pretty 
successfully with one department exception- good relationships between 
departments such that we were able to move in with them.  You guys have good 
relations with student services.  I have good relations with CIS.  The one failure 
was in the area of academics in that regard. 
 
So I don’t think you can ever underestimate the relationship building we had 
already done before this.  The trips you and I and Grant all took to College 
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Station, Donna and Loftin meeting with the president, all of us, all of that stuff 
that we do.  Some of them consciously just to touch base.  That stuff was 
invaluable.  The committees we’ve all been on up there so we know people 
because we’ve worked with them on committees up there even though we had 
TTVN and a drive up and all that stuff.  That stuff was invaluable when we 
relocated.  So, previous relationships that we had built were a key factor in how 
we eventually ended up doing many of our processes (Interviewee #5, personal 
communication, 7-29-11). 
 
 Simply put, the goal of the plan was to utilize the similarity and current 
alignment of various processes between the campuses, develop a rough framework and 
understanding as to how further problems could be addressed, and then deal with any 
unusual circumstances through the strong relationships that were developed while 
creating the framework.  This plan allowed enough infrastructure and guidelines but also 
enough flexibility to be able to appropriately respond to the unexpected issues that often 
arise in a crisis response, especially in one that had never been attempted previously.  
The one area where this plan suffered is the lack of forethought toward developing key 
performance measures to indicate success of the development of appropriate work 
processes.  By integrating the students into College Station’s processes so completely, 
there was not a plan for assessing performance beyond what College Station already did.  
Ultimately these processes for assessment were developed, but having them as part of 
the plan would have increased their effectiveness. 
Summary 
A number of factors influenced TAMUG-Crisis Management Team’s approach 
in the development of the TAMUG Crisis Management Plan.  For one, evacuation, 
return, and recover portion of the plan had been exercised repeatedly in past storms with 
continued assessment and process improvement implemented to further increase its 
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effectiveness.  Secondly, the impact of recent storms, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, had 
informed the team as to the devastating possibilities if a similar storm were to strike 
TAMUG.  This realization lead to the development of a Business Continuity component 
to the plan that involved the relocation of the students and business operations to College 
Station while the TAMUG campus was repaired.  This approach had never been 
attempted as far as the TAMUG Crisis Management Team was aware which created 
some difficulties in determining base lines or a model to follow in the development of 
their plan.  There were many unknowns that required assumptions being made in the 
development of the plan, but a foundation was eventually established upon which 
TAMUG-Crisis Team Members and their TAMU-College Station counterparts could 
build. 
The foundation upon which much of the approach centered was that TAMU-
College Station with its 50,000 students had the infrastructure to assimilate the entire 
2000 student body enrollment of TAMUG if necessary, and that the emphasis of the 
Business Continuity Plan should center upon those issues arising from the actual 
relocation.  As students would be placed in vacancies in current College Station 
classrooms, the primary issues needing to be resolved would be identifying housing for 
relocating students, transferring over the parking, dining, and others services from 
Galveston to College Station, and creating those specialized classes of TAMUG that 
were not found in College Station.  The alignment of many of the processes between the 
two campuses would further ease the transition with functional area counterparts 
working together to identify priorities and challenges in the assimilation process. 
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This approach was effective in many ways as it established a framework to guide 
discussion in the case of a crisis, but also strengthened the relationships between those 
counterparts who would need to work closely in the case of a relocation.  These 
relationships and agreements would prove critical during the rapid fire environment of a 
crisis.  In contrast, there was not significant consideration given to most of the other 
needs of the students or the workforce. Lastly, no assessment plan was included in the 
approach as much of the plan was formulated as more of a framework to guide later 
operations. 
Key Findings 
 1.  The TAMUG Crisis Management Team had effectively developed, exercised, 
and improved upon their crisis management plan over multiple years to where the 
processes in place were well communicated and executed by faculty, staff, and students.  
The highest priority of any crisis management plan is the safety and wellbeing of the 
faculty, staff, and students, and the TAMUG Crisis Management Plan reflected this.  The  
campus was efficiently secured against the storm and all faculty, staff and student were 
evacuated well before the storm struck. 
 2.  As part of the continuous improvement process, the TAMUG Crisis 
Management Team looked external from themselves to identify problems at other 
campuses resulting from storm strikes.  It was this realization that lead to the 
development of Business Continuity component of the plan less than a year before 
Hurricane Ike was to hit the campus, possibly saving the campus. 
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3.  The approach was very intentional in relocating specifically to College Station 
where the alignment of systems and processes would save much needed time in the 
event of a crisis event.  Furthermore, the infrastructure of TAMU-College Station would 
be able to support all of the needs to the TAMUG students once the relocation was 
accomplished. 
4.  The relationships and framework of agreements were critical in the 
development of the approach.  Many of the two campus’ counterparts already enjoyed 
collegial relationships that were reinforced by the TAMUG Crisis Management team 
approach. The ability to work together effectively during a crisis often has a great impact 
on the success of the crisis response. 
5.  Beyond the safe evacuation of the workforce and the preservation of 
employment that would hopefully be achieved as a result of the Business Continuity 
Plan, the workforce were not adequately addressed in the approach with no detail given 
as to what would happen with the 90% not involved in the relocation of the students or 
repair of the campus. 
  
Research Question 2  
Research Question Two inquires as to what strategies did Texas A&M University 
at Galveston deploy in applying their approach consistently and ensuring the approach 
was utilized by all appropriate work units? When considered through the Baldrige 
framework, deployment refers specifically to the extent to which the approach is applied 
in addressing areas of importance that are relevant to TAMUG, is applied consistently, 
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and is used (executed) by all appropriate work units (National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, 2011).  In the approach to crisis response, the TAMUG Crisis Management 
Team had to make a number of assumptions as the relocation of a university student 
body in mass had never been attempted before.  As a result, no one was sure of the 
thousands of variables that would exist in this particular crisis further affecting the 
implementation of the plan.  The strategies used in the deployment of the plan reflect the 
intentions of the plan when faced with the environmental realities of the crisis. 
Leadership  
Creating and Sustaining an Environment for Excellence - The Leadership 
category examines how the organization’s senior leaders’ personal actions guide 
and sustain the organization.  Also examined are the organization’s governance 
system and how the organization fulfills its legal, ethical, and societal 
responsibilities and supports its key communities (The Quality Texas 
Foundation, 2009).  The following analysis and findings of leadership are derived 
from questions that are established by the Baldrige Criteria (Quality Texas 
Foundation - Engagement Level Criteria) and outlined in Appendix I. 
 
 The TAMUG Crisis Management plan clearly identified and empowered the 
leadership structure to manage the crisis well before Hurricane Ike landed.  This 
structure was not only important in identifying the critical personnel to initially respond 
to the crisis, but also in building and formalizing the relationships with their TAMU-
College Station counterparts who would greatly facilitate the relocation process.  The 
initial plans and agreements detailed in the white papers provided a valuable framework 
to the initial discussions in the relocation process, but there were problems in the actual 
deployment.  For one, the white papers were theoretical in nature as neither campus had 
ever attempted something of this scale before.  Many of the initial suppositions such as 
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number of students willing to relocate were drastically wrong, leading to problems in the 
implementation of the plan.  As one member recalls: 
The white papers beforehand set our performance expectations but they were 
wrong. They were very, very wrong and that became part of the issue too.  As far 
as in hindsight you can see things and even today with the parameters constantly 
changing, if it were to happen again today, I am not sure that I could guess again 
and be correct. I think setting performance measures in some ways was…well, I 
don’t know whether it was a good or a bad thing. 
 
Our estimate before that storm ever hit was that we could retain sixty percent of 
our students.  Sixty to sixty-five percent was what we thought if we start the fall 
semester here and then we really went into a bad hit.  With all the students that 
have stuff going on and this and that and have to relocate, we’ll take more than 
half because our students are Aggies. They are going to come with us. They’re 
going to be solid.  We’re going to go sixty, so you know we can’t go into that 
sixty, sixty-five maybe range and when you get up there, we took ninety-two!  
There are a whole lot of things I would have done differently with ninety-two 
percent than I did when I had in my head sixty percent.  But you didn’t know any 
of that until much later and then once you are too far down you couldn’t change 
your model, because you had already started down that train track.  So the sixty, 
sixty-five percent was way off (Interviewee #1, personal communication, 7-18-
11). 
 
 The structure that had been so successful in identifying the key players in the planning 
process also needed modification.  Within a few weeks of the decision being made to 
relocate, the Galveston staff augmented the TAMUG Crisis Management team with the 
development of the Strategic Operations Team to better identify and respond to the 
myriad of issues and decisions that occurred on a daily basis.  Different from the 
TAMUG Crisis Management Team in that it included many administrative department 
heads and front line individuals and dealt with more day to day operational issues, the 
organization brought together a team who could more readily respond to issues facing 
the staff and students in College Station.  Originally meeting daily each morning to 
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address issues, eventually the group reduced the schedule to twice a week and then later 
to once a week. Due to its effectiveness in bringing people around the table to make 
operational decisions for the campus, the Strategic Operations Team currently still meets 
at TAMUG twice a month. 
 The plan itself also needed additional enhancements in its deployment to further 
communicate the organizational vision.  The original plan, through the various 
departmental white papers, provided a framework of agreements and understandings as 
to how the relocation would work.  Without having any past experience in conducting 
such a relocation, the goal was to provide general guidance without getting too mired in 
the details, so as to provide the staff the flexibility to appropriately respond to the unique 
dilemma they faced in the relocation.  As the crisis unfolded, further guidance was 
needed by the various staff operating under the very broad crisis response plan. The 
solution came in the form of a set of guiding principles to undergird the crisis response 
plan. 
 Within the few first meetings of the deployment of the plan, a set of guiding 
principles were developed that clearly established the values and to a certain level, the 
performance expectations for the staff and faculty.  The commitment to continue the 
semester without additional costs to the faculty, staff, and students or allow students to 
take their funds and apply them to the following Spring semester, to keep faculty and 
students together, and to maintain the highest quality of academic experience were not 
easily accomplished, but these principles became a major component of the 
organizational vision. Although challenging at times, the members of the TAMUG Crisis 
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Management Team frequently referred back to the principles to guide them, and the 
values set forth by the principles were considered at every moment in their day-to-day 
decision making.   
So, what we did was we had these guiding principles that really pretty much 
allowed us to make decisions.  If it didn’t fit in here, we didn’t make that 
decision.  And that was pervasive.  I mean from travel reimbursements to cell 
phones overage usage, whether or not they could be reimbursed for that, well, we 
said yes because it depended upon the principles… and I have examples of that.  
Just some things we want to say, from the financial point, these kinds of things 
were looked at as well.  For example, Brad McGonagle he was on his phone 
99.9% of the 24-hour day and it’s his personal cell phone and he gets a cell 
phone allowance.  We didn’t cover it.  So we allowed anyone who felt that they 
had incurred that kind of expense to turn in a form with backup documentation 
and then we made the decision as to whether they would get that overage or not.  
In fact, for the most part everybody was very honest, and you could tell those 
were the kinds of people that were using their phone.  So, it was not a problem.  
So it was that sort of thing.  We did not want even our staff to incur any 
additional personal expense associated with the storm other than losing their 
dang house or whatever else they lost (Interviewee #6, personal communication, 
8-2-11). 
 
These guiding principles were also important reinforcement to the environment 
for legal and ethical behavior called for by the leadership.  Although not formally 
outlined in the plan, the leadership was very aware of the many opportunities for illegal 
and unethical behavior during crisis situations, and on multiple occasions stressed that 
employees should be as transparent as possible, document all decision making,  and not 
engage in any behavior that could even be perceived as being illegal or unethical.  The 
guiding principles, which were based on the good ethics of continuing to offer high 
quality classes with the faculty they had been promised for no additional cost, further 
reinforced TAMUG’s effort to do the right thing in all areas.  These directions and 
principles, based on a solid culture of ethical behavior resulted in no instances of illegal 
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or unethical behavior by any TAMUG employee during the course of the crisis.  One 
member stated the importance of the culture of ethical behavior: 
And that was a big deal… I think that goes back to personal values because it 
also comes from being in the school of (Former Vice President of Student Affairs 
Bill) Hearn, I mean you know that. Because there was ample opportunity every 
second of the day during that time to engage in activities that were illegal, 
unethical, or immoral because at the beginning, there was no oversight at all. I 
mean it was very much open society in terms of we were our own entity out here.  
But as everybody knows in events like this- there are a lot of unscrupulous 
people who trying to take advantage of the situation, and we were approached by 
several contractors that wanted to come work with incredible offers -what they 
could do for us and all those kinds of things.  And I think a solid leader who has 
solid values and is committed to the task at hand does not have time for other 
stuff.  I know we had several opportunities where we could have cut corners on 
things but we just didn’t do it.  In terms of expenditures, when you have someone 
like Kathy Mull managing your account, you have to account for every penny.  
In post- Ike when the state auditors came in to look at the money we spent, we 
could account for every nickel we spent.  And I knew that, and I was very 
comfortable with the auditors coming in because I knew we were totally clean.  
Now, did some of the decisions I made cost us money? Well yes, but having a 
construction firm like Vaughn in here, who is also a high level, highly ethical, 
high character value company and they’re known for that.  They weren’t going to 
cut corners, but the people they had on the ground down here were the same 
people who built our Ocean and Coastal Sciences building, and I knew we were 
going into a long term relationship with them.  But, yeah there is all kind of 
opportunities to engage in unethical and illegal activities.  I mean absolutely, but 
I don’t believe anyone ever did anything unethical.  Even when we did the right 
thing in allowing our people who needed shelter to live in the residence halls, we 
looked at the tax implications and made sure everything was legal. Sometimes, 
the time it took to verify was kind of a challenge because I would much rather 
make sure someone has something to eat and worry about having to pay taxes 
later but it was always the right thing to do... (Interviewee #3, personal 
communication, 7-20-11). 
 
 In carrying their culture of ethics with them in the relocation, a broader discussion 
developed concerning the importance of preserving the Sea Aggie culture and identity.  
Chaffee and Tierney (1988) state, “An organization with a coherent identity …has a 
strong sense of what it stands for – so strong that it is apparent to observers, newcomers, 
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and old-timers alike.  The identity is structurally consistent (p. 27), and that institutional 
identity and culture result through the intersection of three dimensions - structure, 
environment, and values.  Hurricane Ike had already seriously impacted the university 
removing it from its home campus and forcibly changing many of the structural and 
environmental factors that distinguished the university.  As a satellite campus of TAMU-
College Station, many of the Aggie values ran deep through TAMUG’s students, faculty, 
and staff, but the leadership had to seek out strategies to preserve the Sea Aggie culture 
and identity.  For one, the leadership abandoned the original concept developed in the 
original approach of integrating the TAMUG students into the TAMU-College Station 
courses.  The structure of coursework and environment of TAMUG faculty and 
classmates emphasized that TAMUG was still in operation despite being located 150 
miles inland.  This connection was invaluable.  The same was true of housing the 
students together and utilizing TAMUG community leaders to provide oversight.  The 
TAMUG Student Life Office also pushed TAMUG Intramurals, TAMUG student 
activities, and for multiple trips to Galveston to further structure the students time and 
emphasize the feeling that the current situation was temporary, and that “they were all in 
this together” (Interviewee #1, personal communication, 7-18-11).  The Sea Aggie 
culture was also emphasized through extensive and systemic communication discussing 
the values of the relocation effort.  It was extremely effective.  As a student, Betsy 
Bremer stated in the After Action Review (located in Appendix C), “I think we 
definitely kept our identity as Sea Aggies, because we did keep the same classes and we 
 193 
 
were living with people in groups. I don’t think there was any time that you had to really 
mix with College Station people.”  
 Along with a commitment to preserve the culture, the university was also 
committed to assessment and organizational improvement.  In deploying the crisis 
management plan, the campus benefited greatly from the campus leadership’s prior 
commitment to organizational performance improvement where every prior crisis had 
been dissected through debriefings and after action reports.  Although each crisis is 
unique in a sense, there were enough similarities between hurricane preparations and 
evacuations that the campus responded quickly and effectively to evacuating the campus 
prior to Hurricane Ike’s landing.  Campus leadership ensured personnel knew what their 
job was and that they were trained effectively in accomplishing those jobs based on the 
past experiences of the campus.  Unfortunately in the Hurricane Ike crisis, whole new 
aspects of the plan that had never been attempted were put in place.  Although table top 
and other simulations had been coordinated prior to the crisis, many of the plans had 
been attempted in theory only and prevented greater challenges to deployment.  In those 
situations and particularly with the business continuity/ relocation aspect of the plan 
which had not been attempted previously, new organizational structures were put in 
place to facilitate efficient and effective decision-making.  First, the daily meeting of 
Galveston and TAMU- College Station counterparts brought an incredible amount of 
broad and varied expertise together for frequent meetings to address problems 
holistically.  One of the participants explains the critical nature of the meetings: 
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Communication, team building, and this was a classic case where we built a team 
on the fly, a team that didn’t exist before, that those afternoon meetings were a 
key team, and it was a conglomerate team that’s never met before or since.  That 
team was the key to making it happen from an operational perspective, I think, 
because after that, they had the marching orders, there was coordination which 
they don’t normally have up there…  So up there it is very unusual when you 
have this level of coordination.  That’s not the way they normally work.  Their 
normal mode of operation is turf…We got to understand that, and they stood up 
in a way that they did--it's counter cultural for them, which shows a lot about 
Cross, a lot about the people in those positions that stood up and did it and none 
of them had much to gain from what they did.  I mean, and they don’t gain much 
from what they--we gained a lot but you know I don’t think you can argue that 
they did…Even though the big Aggie culture and social norm is clearly there on 
a service level and like their response to helping out with Katrina and helping out 
with the other people and stuff, that’s very consistent with the Aggie culture.  
They stepped up much more than other institutions did, honestly, and I respect 
that.   
 
But yeah, that’s my observation that there were some things that happened that 
were different than the day-to-day business in the course of this.  When you do 
stuff different from your normal business, somebody has got to make it happen.  
That doesn’t just happen.  Had Cross not taken a strong control of those 
meetings, listened to what Loftin asked for and made it happen, it wouldn’t have 
happened.  What happened up there is what’s supposed to happen with a FEMA 
command center.  That’s how incident commands supposed to work. 
 
But doing it right involved not just doing what you normally do the same way, it 
involved doing some things differently than they normally did, and I guess that’s 
my real point there.  That’s what the leaders did.  They shifted gears.  They said, 
“This is a different situation.  We can't do this with business as usual.”  Then 
they created an effective team and process, both team and process.  We met 
every day at 4:00 until we didn’t need to anymore.  Big deal, a lot of people 
stayed past 5:00, which is a cultural issue too.  A lot of people have dropped a lot 
of other stuff at 4:00 to come to those meetings, big deal up there.  These were 
important people, the players on campus.  We got the key leadership for ten 
percent of the day, fifteen percent of the day, every day for two weeks.  That’s a 
massive amount of capital from a leadership perspective.  That’s what made it 
work in my opinion.  I don’t think it would have happened without that level of 
commitment and leadership, not in the timeframe that it happened (Interviewee 
#5, personal communication, 7-29-11). 
 
Furthermore although the crisis environment was not very conducive to organizational 
improvement, the campus leadership realized that collection of data describing the event 
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and response was critical to later being able to document the decisions made for future 
improvement.  As a result, a number of assessment devices and after action reviews were 
implemented to capture the information for processing and incorporation into the crisis 
plan to address future relocations.  One such example is included in Appendix V which 
contains the transcribed discussion from the largest of the After Action reviews.  
 Although plans were in place to collect and review the data for future crises, the 
current crisis management plan had identified the primary initiative as keeping the 
students on track academically with particularly those seniors on track for graduation in 
the Fall and Spring.  During the deployment of the plan, the TAMUG Crisis 
Management Team rapidly realized that the employees were just as valuable of a 
constituency.  Although the plan did not explicitly call for their consideration, very 
quickly a team had to be assembled to arrange for housing for those faculty and staff 
relocating to College Station with the student population as well as make arrangements 
for those employees remaining behind in Galveston, many of whom were critical to the 
campus’ recovery yet now had no place to live.  Many of the TAMUG Crisis 
Management Team members refer to the role of TAMUG as one of the larger employers 
in the Galveston community as one greatest impacts on society, and yet it was not 
included in the plan leading up to the hurricane.  Once the storm had hit, the leadership 
team committed to keeping its employees employed and returning operations back to 
Galveston as soon as possible.   
Here is where I think the city of Galveston could’ve seen how we helped, what 
we did and how it impacted the city of Galveston.  We did it.  We lost one 
employee as a result of the storm, and if I remember correctly, that was a 
voluntary separation due to that employee having a family, having a mother or a 
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father who was ill, and they needed to take care of their family.  So, that 
wasn’t… that certainly could have happened to anybody.  We got the campus 
back up to speed during the fall semester, we were back here in Spring and 
through all of that we lost one employee, and we both know there is a larger 
institution on the island that had to let people go.  And I think...  I still to this day 
wish the city would see what we were able to pull off.  And not being critical of 
UTMB, but understanding that we did a lot with very little.  And we came back 
and we began contributing back into the local economy as quick as we could.  
So, for an impact on society I’d say that’s a local and that’s not society, but a 
local society impact.  I think that’s huge. I mean, we kept ticking along when the 
rest of the island was still in serious straights and trying to get back on its feet 
(Interviewee #2, personal communication, 7-22-11).  
 
A final leadership approach that was pursued by the TAMUG Crisis 
Management Team was the identification of key communities for organizational 
involvement and support.   Once the relocation process was initiated, the TAMUG Crisis 
Management Team quickly realized that the dynamic had changed from previous storms.  
The main campus of TAMUG would be restored much sooner than many of the 
organizations of Galveston.  The team looked very quickly toward various constituencies 
in Galveston to assist in whatever ways possible.  Assistance to others in the Galveston 
community included providing classroom and residence halls for the University of Texas 
Medical Branch, classroom space for the Sunshine Center, lodging for Galveston 
Independent School District teachers, and employing local contractors and workers to 
work on the campus (Interviewee #3, personal communication, 7-20-11).   Furthermore 
an initiative was introduced that brought Texas A&M students to Galveston to view the 
destruction and help out the citizens in any way possible.  Huge donation drives were 
developed and managed with assistance from TAMU- College Station and multiple day 
long trips to help the citizens of Galveston were organized to great success.  As one 
participant recalls: 
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Well, clearly the big event that Spring was an opportunity for our campus to give 
back to the city of Galveston and maybe even more than just the city of 
Galveston.  Obviously you know, the big event is the biggest one day community 
service event in the nation, and clearly a lot of folks in the city of Galveston still 
needed tremendous amounts of service.  And so we had as I recall - and actually 
we did a lot of this in the Fall - I know in the Fall we had a combined project 
where College Station and Galveston students came down and contributed to the 
island on a few occasions and then again at the big event in the Spring. I don’t 
remember, but I know we certainly had our regular group of students go out, but 
whether we had folks come down from College Station in the Spring to support 
that activity or not I don’t recall, but going out and clearing furniture out of 
homes or cleaning up yards or rebuilding fences or tearing out sheet rock or 
whatever the case would be so there was an impact there (Interviewee #2, 
personal communication, 7-22-11).  
 
The Crisis Management Team demonstrated strong leadership in a number of 
ways in the deployment of the crisis management plan.  Realizing that the plan was 
fairly broad in its approach, a stronger organizational vision with guiding principles was 
provided to assist the frontline managers in the decisions.  Secondly, they realized the 
lack of emphasis on the student’s success as well as workforce engagement and made 
significant decisions to address those issues.  The same was true of the Galveston 
community where the leadership reached out to offer assistance. 
Strategic Planning  
Developing Strategic Objectives and Action Plans for Competitive Advantage - 
The Strategic Planning category examines how the organization develops 
strategic objectives and action plans. Also examined are how the chosen 
strategic objectives and action plans are implemented and changed if 
circumstances require, and how progress is measured (The Texas Quality 
Foundation, 2009).  The following analysis and findings of strategic planning are 
derived from questions that are established by the Baldrige Criteria (Quality 
Texas Foundation - Engagement Level Criteria) and outlined in Appendix I. 
 
 The TAMUG Crisis Management Team had been extremely strategic in 
developing their crisis management plan.  Although the plan had been fairly responsive 
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and based on campus experiences with crisis for many years, the devastation caused by 
Hurricane’s Rita and Katrina to other institutions caused the TAMUG Crisis 
Management Team to revisit their own plan through a much more long-term, strategic 
lens. The end result had goals that were aligned with the university’s own strategic goals 
concerning enrollment and service to the students.  The deployment of the plan was also 
fairly successful in that the plan set many of the broad goals and identified many of the 
key participants to initiate a rapid response from the campus. As one team member 
states:   
I think you have to say that our whole strategic planning if you step back – step 
back from crisis, all the things that we do with reference to strategic planning are 
pretty relevant.  I mean, they go back to that whole business of your mission and 
your expectations and your strategic objectives and things like that; during the 
crisis what you’re trying to do is to maintain that continuity and to be able to 
continue your mission.  So yes I think our whole hurricane plan is then an off 
shoot of strategic planning, so I would say definitely yes, we’ve got that plan. 
We’ve got a written evacuation plan that has existed for years, a written business 
continuity plan has now been developed and like I said, I think that came about 
pretty much after Katrina and Rita.  We’ve got the plans, they are annually 
reviewed, if not more often than that.  I mean, if you think about even the 
meetings that you’ve been in on and how often we go over those things, the key 
players start with the executive teams at both campuses…and believe me I heard 
a lot of discussions about hurricane planning up here when I was attending both 
Bob Gates and you know, later Dr. Loftin’s executive groups up here.  Planning 
involves a campus leadership all the way down to the unit level and then it also 
involves all the things we do as far as our orientations and our training.  You 
always have some leadership and hurricane planning and training for your 
Community Leaders and for the Corps of Cadets leadership and account 
managers. The outreach counselors get briefed on it, and all of those you know, 
it’s pretty strategically built into pretty much every operational aspect of our 
campus (Interviewee #9, personal communication, 8-18-11).   
 
Once deployed, the crisis management plan provided the long term broad goals to work 
toward with the white papers providing much of the detail as well as longer and shorter 
term objectives to accomplish.  The white papers were critical in identifying many of the 
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key issues to be addressed initially and were incredibly important is outlining a plan of 
attack for the various departments to coordinate their work.  As helpful as they were, 
several shortcomings to the plan were also identified in their deployment.  For instance, 
the TAMUG Crisis Management Team had no way to determine how many students 
would relocate with them once the decision was announced.  All planning was based on 
somewhere in the 60% range, and the plan was developed accordingly.  When actually 
deploying the plan and discovering that the number was approximately 90%, the team 
discovered that many of the plans could have been significantly different.  As one 
member stated, “It would have been much easier to copy the Galveston schedule of 
classes to College Station and drop those few students that weren’t coming, rather than 
rebuild an entirely new schedule based on 60% showing and then keep adding and 
modifying the class schedule and class locations.  We lost a lot of time reworking that 
schedule multiple times before it was all said and done” (Interviewee #7, personal 
communication, 8-9-11). 
As the TAMUG Crisis Management Team deployed the plan, the large 
leadership group of TAMU- College Station and Galveston counterparts could work 
from that operating document to develop other broad strategic policy like the guiding 
principles.  One example is the quick turnaround in starting classes in College Station so 
as to preserve students’ ability to stay on track for the semester.  One of the very first 
strategic goals was to graduate those students in December who were originally 
scheduled to graduate in December (Interviewee #7, personal communication, 8-9-11).  
Once the broader long-term goals were determined, the larger group which had been so 
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critical at the outset of the crisis, became more cumbersome to developing the numerous 
shorter term priorities.  At that point, functional groups begin to work in their different 
areas of focus to determine the action plans necessary to accomplish their more 
immediate goals like developing the course schedule, securing classrooms, or securing 
housing for the relocated faculty, staff, and students.  In many ways, these counterpart 
teams became very focused and operated in functional silos as they made the many rapid 
decisions and identified the longer and shorter term goal that were necessary for their 
respective areas.  Eventually the interim Strategic Operations Team was developed to 
further focus on the short term action plans and possibly reduce some of the silo 
decision-making.   
And so I think that the emergency plan was the foundation, you know in the 
beginning stages of our strategic plan in a crisis situation in this case weather.  
And then SOT (Strategic Operations Team) was, if you’re going to be strategic, 
because you know while we had that big group that Dr. Cross convened that 
group was concerned with policy.  The focus of that group was “give us a 
report,” so we had to recognize that yeah, we are here and you’re treating us well 
and all of that, but we know how to run Galveston.  We know what our students 
need. So we developed a new group and each one of us participating in that 
group, I believe the first group was called Interim SOT, because we pulled 
people in who would not be there a long term when we got back the Galveston, 
but who needed to be in that room during the crisis to get things done 
(Interviewee #10, personal communication, 9-8-11).   
 
 The interim SOT, and even the groups before them, realized that after the initial 
evacuation and relocation, much of the strategic objectives at this point was directed at 
making things as normal as possible for the students so they could get back to the 
business of being a student.  The team worked diligently to get the logistics resolved so 
classes could begin less than two weeks after the initial evacuation.  As the cost of 
relocating, especially after losing possessions in a natural disaster, could further preclude 
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students from continuing the semester, the cost neutral solution was determined, and 
additional funding was secured from places other than the students.  Donations were 
disbursed to allow students to replace books, uniforms, and belongings lost during the 
storm.  Keeping the students with the faculty with whom they had registered as well as 
their classmates was another strategic objective that was achieved. This strategic 
objective of returning to the “new normal”, a term frequently used by the TAMUG 
Crisis Management Team, as soon as possible was pervasive through all of the activities 
and goals of the Galveston staff.  At the same time, the workforce in Galveston were 
pushed to bring the campus up to speed and identify additional housing so that the 
students could truly return to normal by attending classes once again in Galveston 
(Interviewee #3, personal communication, 7-20-11).  The efforts of the staff during this 
process was not altogether different from what many did on a day to day basis prior to 
the crisis. 
 In the effort to accomplish many of the strategic objectives of getting the students 
back into their daily routines, one of the areas that the TAMUG Crisis Management 
Team struggled with was the development of shorter term action plans that could be 
codified and measured.  Certainly action items got accomplished, but the number of 
items necessary to accomplish during the time of a crisis was often prohibitive to 
planning and evaluation.  When an action item was identified by the strategic operations 
team and assigned to an individual, short discussion ensued and then the individual 
worked with their team to complete it as soon as possible so the next item on the ever 
growing list could be addressed.  Each strategic operations team meeting after the item 
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was assigned, the item and name would move up the list and be addressed at the 
beginning of each meeting until it was completed, creating an incentive for each team 
member not to have their name on the top of the list next to too many action items 
(Interviewee #10, personal communication, 9-8-11).  In the rapid fire decision making 
environment of a crisis, it was necessary to take action as rapidly as possibly to best 
resolve the issue so that other important items could be taken care of as needed.  As one 
participant described it: 
You know I think in terms of action plans, they were probably less action plans 
than action items.  And what I mean by that is I think under ideal circumstances, 
we would have said, "Okay this needs to happen, then this needs to happen and 
then we need to do this."  Those things couldn't happen sequentially; they just 
had to happen and so a lot of things were happening on top of each other which 
meant a lot of the stuff was fluid.  You know it goes back to you talking to Texas 
City one day and finding out this was going to work, but this wouldn't work.  
You know you had to--there were less action plans than action items I think and I 
think really that's what we were using SOT for.  And again under ideal situations, 
we would have had probably more formal measures.  But I don't think we could 
have done that with the size staff that we had.  I just don't think it's possible.  We 
were pretty well pushing the limits, especially for that first three weeks.  I think if 
that first three weeks had stretched out into six weeks, we would have needed 
serious help.  I don't think that the group of people that we had doing all of that 
could have sustained for much longer than that (Interviewee #4, personal 
communication, 7-27-11). 
 
Those decisions were not always the right ones, but the crisis environment often 
required the team to move on to the next challenge instead of stopping to reflect. As a 
result, the team relied greatly on the good decision making ability of the staff.  “ We had 
a plan, we executed it to the best that we could, but sitting down asking are we being 
strategic, are we doing whatever – I remember our conversation with Grant where I just 
said “Just tell everybody make their decisions and if we mess up we’ll fix it, but just 
make good decisions.” (Interviewee #10, personal communication, 9-8-11).  One 
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strategy the team utilized was to document everything so at a later time, once the crisis 
subsided, an after action report and more reflection could occur. 
Things were too hectic in those initial weeks, but longer term we consciously 
decided that there had to be an after action review.  So it’s like those documents 
that we created both in that tracking system that you just made reference to, I 
know Karen and Taryn from the communications perspective kept up all the web 
pages with the updates and I mean we literally, a lot was just kept in a binder of 
all that so we can kind of follow, okay what did we say we were going to do et 
cetera and monitoring those kinds of things. 
 
I think we got a lot of information on actions that we needed to take when we 
would have those forums of just the Galveston family coming together and then 
having folks come in to do those other deals.  But we committed to an after 
action review.  And I think that was critical to kind of talk about not only what 
are we doing on a day to day basis, but what the heck did we learn after this 
traumatic experience that we’ve been through and we pulled together as you will 
remember the folks from Galveston as well as A&M and had a facilitator come 
in and then we went back and then we tweaked our plan based on things that we 
learned from the experience (Interviewee #10, personal communication, 9-8-11).  
  
 The use of performance measures in reviewing these day to day action plans was 
also an approach that although, recommended by best practice, often falls to the wayside 
during crisis response (The Quality Texas Foundation, 2009).  The process was just 
different.  “I think it was more of a checklist; if you could go back through that original 
document, and say did each one of these pieces get resolved.  Did parking get resolved?  
Did health services get resolved?  Did counseling get resolved?” (Interviewee #1, 
personal communication, 7-18-11).  Others described the use of performance measures 
differently: 
I can't say that was formally done.  I mean I don't recall filling out a form every 
day.  All of us had a couple--again, we had the principles.  We made sure the 
principles were always there behind us to check off on.  We came back to those 
all the time I think and remind ourselves, this is how I make decisions, I mean 
that's-- the real key was, every decision had to be traced back to those principles 
and that's not common. I think in many operations like that when you have a 
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small set of principles that are used to drive every decision you make and that 
was very effective, so everyone in leadership role knew those principles and 
employed them probably daily, hourly sometimes, to be able to make appropriate 
decisions and to me that was the strength what we did here. 
 
The measure of performance there at best was done after the fact in terms of 
measuring things like number of students who didn't make it up here.  We 
tracked their performance academically very carefully.  We were concerned 
about again the emotional impact having a negative effect on that.  It was true.  It 
did happen, I believe.  And so we tracked their academic standing very carefully. 
 
We then again looked at the financials to try to track those very carefully, make 
sure we knew where the money was going.  In fact, we had a state audit done 
right after it happened.  I think it was going on while we were still recovering in 
fact, which was kind of inconvenient but we did.  And so, we had sort of a 
professional objective viewers from outside coming in and asking hard questions 
about why or how or how much and I'm not saying I appreciated that a lot 
because it was very disruptive of our processes here, but it probably helped us 
pay attention to things like that and we did do better tracking as time went on 
because of that.  Not so much in College Station whereas in Galveston, we were 
making decisions there very much real time and not doing appropriate 
documentation of some plans which was really a great necessary for recovery of 
resources after the fact especially with FEMA. 
 
And so once the audit was done to us as I was saying, it was pointed out very 
quickly to us, we had to do a better job with that, so we had some real short 
change of philosophy about this.  We weren't just calling the shots at the hip 
every day and calling in contractors and telling them to get this job done without 
going through more of a formal process to award contracts, to track the actual 
processes going on.  We obviously waived a lot of the normal procurement 
processes that we had to, but we went too far probably at the beginning of this in 
the effort to try to get things back on the right track quickly and we paid a price 
for that in terms of having to go back and recreate a lot of stuff after the fact.  We 
probably lost out on some reimbursements because of that, too, ultimately 
(Interviewee #11, personal communication, 9-9-11). 
 
 The approach that the TAMUG Crisis Management Team had pursued in the 
original Business Continuity Plan was extremely strategic in nature outlining a broad 
framework in the various functional areas with the intent to let counterparts from the two 
campuses continue to work out the details.  Very quickly after the crisis, the team 
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realized that there were a number of other decisions that had to be made that were not 
covered through the white papers and so a set of guiding principles were developed to 
provide for consistency across decision making as well as guidance for front line 
managers. 
 With the white papers and guiding principles as well as the large committee of 
College Station and Galveston leadership further directing policy, a truly strategic plan 
for addressing the crisis was developed.  Very quickly the interim strategic operations 
team was formed to begin developing the action items necessary to accomplish the 
strategic goals set forth by the larger group.  Although the available time often prevented 
the establishment of formalized action plans, the group was able to identify key issues, 
address them, and document many of the actions for consideration later on.  Auditors 
and after action reviews later reviewed this documentation for performance and future 
improvement.  
Customer/ Student Focus  
Understanding your Student and Stakeholders - The Customer/ Student Focus 
category examines how the organization engages its students AND stakeholders 
for long-term marketplace success. This engagement strategy includes how the 
organization listens to the voice of its customers, builds customer relationships, 
and uses customer information to improve and identify opportunities for 
innovation (The Quality Texas Foundation, 2009).  The following analysis and 
findings of customer/ student focus are derived from questions that are 
established by the Baldrige Criteria (Quality Texas Foundation - Engagement 
Level Criteria) and outlined in Appendix I. 
 
TAMUG’s approach to assessing the students’ needs and communicating with 
them through the web initially worked very well.  The students had been told as early as 
their first college orientation that in the case of emergency or crisis, the webpage would 
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be the official means of communication for the university, and it had been reinforced 
many times, including during the call for evacuation for Hurricane Ike.  Even with 
power disabled through much of the Houston-Galveston area as an on-going result of the 
storm, students used their smart phones and other resources to communicate with each 
other and with the campus, often using car chargers to recharge them (Interviewee #4, 
personal communication, 7-27-11).  Unfortunately the plan did not provide the detail as 
to how to augment the communication with the students once the decision to relocate 
was made.  The TAMUG Crisis Management Team knew there would be an incredible 
amount of confusion and uncertainty once the information concerning the relocation was 
released through the webpage and text service.  As a result, a telephone hotline was 
made available for all student questions and concerns and manned by Galveston faculty, 
staff, and student leaders.  Multiple lines running late into the evening allowed TAMUG 
faculty, staff and students to respond to the myriad of questions, recording each with an 
appropriate response into a frequently asked question list that was placed on the 
webpage and updated once a day (Interviewee #4, personal communication, 7-27-11).   
In addition, a web-based form was developed that allowed students to provide 
information about their intentions and needs to TAMUG.  In seeking guidance on 
orienting Galveston students to the College Station campus and services, the TAMUG 
Crisis Emergency Team deferred the process to the College Station staff who had 
conducted a similar process on a much smaller scale with the Katrina refugees a year 
earlier.  Once the students arrived on campus, a student wide orientation was held in 
Kyle field to orient the students to the new campus and processes as well as provide 
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another opportunity for feedback.  One participant speaks about the process of assessing 
the student needs: 
So I think having really strong professionals is a huge component to that but we 
did do a lot of things like that website framework was one, taking down the 
normal home page and putting up the emergency structure or whatever that was. 
Then another part of it was we set up the 24 hour hotline and we rolled the 800 
numbers from this campus in Galveston to College Station so there were the free 
phone calls coming in and out on that line, and we manned it.  That helps and it 
was amazing what came in on that line.  I mean the people that were answering 
those phones were God sends, because they had to answer all kinds of crazy 
stuff, even stuff not related to the campus trying to get people solutions when 
they didn’t know where else to call. 
 
The other thing they did was they kept the log of all of those phone calls that 
were coming in and kept generating frequently asked questions and posting them 
on the web as fast as we could.  I think that was tremendously helpful.  And then 
once we were in College Station, when we were opening up we had the 
orientation in Kyle field, but that was really significant for me to see the students 
there after that first week of crisis that they came in.   It was kind of that 
overwhelming in nature and then they are suddenly sitting in Kyle field and all of 
those kind of things (Interviewee #1, personal communication, 7-18-11). 
   
Once the semester was under way, efforts were continued to seek student feedback and 
information.  Emails were sent out with new information, and the webpage was 
continually updated with newer information.  Student forums were held on a number of 
occasions, videotaped and put on the internet for students who couldn’t attend.   
During the fall semester, we held at least two, maybe three town hall meetings in 
College Station for students to come to.  It gave us an opportunity - they weren’t 
well attended - but it gave us the opportunity to share information with the 
students, and it also gave students the opportunity to ask questions of us in 
particular areas about how things were going to be handled.  And as you can 
imagine, the first town hall meeting was probably the best attended which I don’t 
remember might have been 100 students.  And we got a lot of questions in some 
sense there was probably a lot, understandable, but there was a lot more anger at 
that meeting, because of some of the chaos they were running into when they got 
to College Station.  As we held more town halls, fewer students would show up, 
and we kept things going as far as Aggnews and keeping websites updated and 
trying to do the best we could and using text messages as best we could to keep 
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students in the loop. I think of the bigger challenges we had being in College 
Station was you now had students spread out amongst however many acres that 
campus is whereas in Galveston where we’re used to much smaller confined 
space (Interviewee #2, personal communication, 7-22-11). 
 
Two locations on the TAMU-College Station campus, the General Services Complex 
and the Grove, were identified as locations where students with any issues could come to 
get assistance.  Student affairs and counseling staff were on hand in the Grove to address 
non-academically focused issues and academic enhancement and admissions and records 
worked to resolve academic issues.  As one team member described it: 
We clearly rely upon student affairs to do a lot of work in terms of listening to 
students here and filtering that.  We made all decisions about housing in 
particular.  Basically, you've did a lot of that yourself like at the Plaza Hotel, for 
example and things like that, so, we were trying to utilize directional input into 
us and then go back out at a higher level to provide services and say, you've got 
to fix this problem, so there was a feedback loop established right away about 
that. 
 
It was more complicated for the academics because they were more dispersed 
and it's harder anyway, but with there again and the combination of Bill Seitz, 
who really ran that program fairly effectively, and Donna Lang, who handled 
some of the underpinnings of it, was very good and so, we sort of knew from the 
faculty and staff that were happy academically, what was working and not 
working day by day and we really shuffled the decks several times about issues 
about classrooms and laboratories and off campus facilities we were making use 
of for the academic enterprise here. 
 
Ultimately, the student was coming first.  We want to make sure, again our 
principles were there.  We want to keep them on track academically.  We want 
them to be successful academically, so that was paramount (Interviewee #11, 
personal communication, 9-9-11). 
 
The TAMUG Crisis Management Team realized very quickly that another threat 
was looming.  TAMUG had already had a history on losing students to College Station 
after their first year.  Whether students who were intentional in taking their first year in 
the smaller classes of TAMUG or students who had become disillusioned with a marine 
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or maritime-based major, there were years where well over a hundred students changed 
their curriculum to a College Station major and transitioned campuses.  Now with the 
entire freshmen class located in College Station, the concern was whether that number 
would surge even higher.  The threat of saving the semester for these students only to 
lose them to College Station permanently was very real.  Although the upperclassmen 
had bought into the culture of TAMUG, the storm had struck very early in the semester, 
quite possibly before the freshmen had been able to fully experience the TAMUG 
academic culture.  As David Dill (1982) states in his article, “The Management of 
Academic Culture: Notes on the Management of Meaning and Social Integration:”   
The intensity of an academic culture is determined not only by the richness and 
relevance of its symbolism for the maintenance of the professional craft, but by 
the bonds of social organization…For this mechanism to operate the institution 
needs to take specific steps to socialize the individual to the belief system of the 
organization, and promote joint activities between colleagues from throughout 
the enterprise.  The decline of academic culture is thus partially traceable to the 
rapid growth of academic communities, the isolation of specialties, and the 
inattention given to the process of social organization necessary to nurture 
academic culture.  The management of academic culture therefore involves both 
the management of meaning and the management of social integration (p 317). 
 
Although the Galveston freshmen had some limited class time with their faculty 
in Galveston prior to the storm and many had some exposure to the TAMUG culture 
through New Student Conferences and SALT camp pre-orientation programs, the plan 
leading up to the storm was to disperse the students among College Station courses and 
throughout the community.  Very quickly the TAMUG Crisis Management Team 
realized the folly in this plan not only from the standpoint of retaining the academic 
identity of TAMUG but also from an emotional support standpoint.  The result was the 
development of a new plan to emphasize the Galveston culture and connections to these 
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students and further enhance the relationship between TAMUG and its student body, 
even as they existed with the culture of the College Station campus.  In his article, 
Organizational Culture in Higher Education: Defining the Essentials, William G. 
Tierney (1988) identified six essential areas to establishing and maintaining academic 
culture – environment, mission, socialization, information, strategy, and leadership.  
TAMUG implemented initiatives in each of these areas with the intention of 
strengthening the ties between the students and institution.  With regards to environment, 
the determination to keep every Galveston class together with the same faculty and 
classmates gave each course a truly Galveston flavor regardless of being located in a 
church, dining hall or other location.  The housing assignments had also been intentional 
in trying to keep roommates and suitemates together as well as trying to keep the corps 
together as much as possible.  In apartment complexes where a number of students were 
assigned, upper class student leaders were assigned as well with the task of interacting 
with the younger students to connect and role model for them.  Community leaders who 
no longer had residence halls to oversee were kept on payroll and charged with 
contacting their former residents to check up on them and give updates and new 
information.  The mission of TAMUG’s relocation was communicated on numerous 
occasions and reinforced by organizing trips to help clean up Galveston.  These trips 
served to reinforce the need for the relocation as well as the commitment to return.  
Socialization was reinforced by all of the activities above as well as other activities 
specifically designed to engage with the students as much as possible, building 
relationships with them and assist the students in building relationships with each other 
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through different types of programming.  Intramural sports were set up exclusively for 
TAMUG students as well as numerous student activities throughout the Fall semester.  
Furthermore, the location at the Grove was outfitted with couches and lounge space 
among the office to give Galveston students a place to socialize. 
From my perspective I think one of the things that worked well as I alluded to 
much earlier was the fact that we were in a trailer over in the Grove and so we 
were able to announce… Back up just for a second.  When the students all got 
back I want to say the first full day back we held essentially an orientation in 
Kyle field and so we were able to share a lot of information and we were able to 
share during that orientation that the Grove is kind of a maybe a home base for 
people.  And so a lot of students I think used that as a resource.  Again we had 
counseling, we had career services, we had activities, we had Rec Sports, Joe 
Hoff working with the folks in College Station for intramural sports and spaces 
and I seem to recall they were well attended and good participation.  So that was 
important, but having that temporary building be our home away from home I 
think gave students a place to congregate.  I don’t want to make it sound like that 
was the only place, I think certainly students have connections to different places 
and I wouldn’t be surprised if the writings might have been a home base for folks 
that might have worked with Vic Penuel or if the tutors might have found some 
home with Academic Enhancement.  But just a place to go and know if I go there 
I’d know I’m going to see Galveston people... (Interviewee #2, personal 
communication, 7-22-11). 
 
 Information, strategy and leadership came through the thousands of phone calls 
that were received and responded to not only from students, but from their parents as 
well (Interviewee #4, personal communication, 7-27-11).  This information was 
augmented by student forums where President Loftin addressed the students, outlined 
the progress and strategy moving forward.  These forums were recorded and put on the 
internet for students to view if they could not attend the forums.  Besides recording the 
student forums, TAMUG developed podcasts so the information could be downloaded to 
their mobile devices.  The message was clear and communicated in a number of 
technological mediums by President Loftin himself to emphasize that the situation was 
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well under control, and there was a solid plan to return TAMUG and its students back to 
Galveston. 
 Technology actually played a major role in supporting the students’ continued 
use of the educational programs and offerings.  As planned in the approach, the primary 
mechanism was the use of technology to communicate with the students.  The webpage 
was the critical first piece, but the initial orientation and mass emailing and texts further 
augmented the spread of information and support of the students. As described by one 
team member: 
Yeah.  So, basically various communication channels were established to ensure 
trust among the students. And there was website communication.  It was constant 
and consistent.  You will see that.  When changes were required they were 
communicated as quickly as possible.  A phone bank was set up at the command 
post and College Station to address questions from both parents and students.  
The phone bank had available both TAMUG and TAMU phone numbers for 
areas of expertise on specific questions, because TAMU has students services 
group, TAMU has business services group, but TAMUG also has representative 
there.  So, Bob Piwonka might be called on to the specifics, but if the student was 
really up in arms, they would talk to someone from Student Business Services 
that knew Galveston.  Town hall meetings were held regularly to communicate 
latest on current academic issues and concerns as well as prognosis and plan for 
returning to Galveston.  So, all those communications were done (Interviewee 
#6, personal communication, 8-2-11).  
 
Student leaders and student organizations were also used a great deal to support the 
students.  The TAMUG Student Government Association and Community Leaders 
became valuable conduits of information to the rest of the student body, and the team 
used various organizational structures such as the Corps of Cadet structure and tutoring 
labs to distribute information and provide support to those students struggling in the 
relocation (Interviewee #9, personal communication, 8-18-11).  The other TAMUG 
student organizations were also called upon to continue operating and thereby provide 
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additional socialization and support.  TAMUG student activities worked with their 
TAMU- College Station counterparts and student officers to get the TAMUG student 
organizations access to the StuACT website, an interactive website hosted by TAMU- 
College Station student activities which provided valuable information concerning 
critical processes and forms directly to the student organization officers who were trying 
to keep their clubs active during the College Station relocation.  This new technology 
proved to be a valuable asset to the officers struggling to keep their organizations active 
under the difficult circumstances. 
 Unfortunately as much as technology greatly enhanced student access to the 
programs and vital information, the students reportedly suffered from the overuse of 
technology as well.  Distance education strategies were utilized by many faculty to 
facilitate the teaching process, allowing many faculty members to commute less as well 
as provide opportunities for those students who did not relocate full time to access class 
from other locations such as north Houston or the Prairie View campus.  Many students 
reported that some faculty were not qualified to teach distance type courses or that 
certain subject matter such as calculus was not appropriate for distance teaching.  This 
result was particularly evident in some of the freshmen level courses who were already 
adjusting to college level instruction.  This adjustment was already extremely difficult 
for many freshmen, but when compounded by the interruption of the crisis and followed 
by the adjustment to a new teaching style, it proved to be a recipe for disaster for many 
students.  This was a key learning point in the crisis that really resonated with one 
TAMUG Crisis Management Team member: 
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And the same thing goes for evaluation of research. I mean, that was no hiccup. 
If you’re talking about the academic programs, there was no metric applied to my 
knowledge with respect to the quality of the programs as they were delivered. 
There’s no doubt in my mind that the move to College Station was only 
marginally better educationally than a shut down for the semester. 
Institutionally? Yeah, we kept our enrollment. We kept everything going but with 
regard to the education of the individual, they’d been, in my opinion, almost as 
well served by just taking a semester off and coming back fresh to a functioning 
campus.   So a lot of that is driven by money…I don’t know. I just, I do believe 
that the quality of what was done academically was very subpar. And you know, 
it was all about keeping the family alive and not about the family learning very 
much (Interviewee #8, personal communication, 8-10-11). 
 
Although much of the academic difficulty information did not become apparent 
until after the semester was concluded, TAMUG did develop a number of methods to 
assess student satisfaction, engagement and dissatisfaction so that the information could 
be used for improvement outside of the classroom.  Initially there was a high level of 
engagement as every student was contacted so that housing, parking, university 
identification cards, and the like could be distributed.  Those moments often gave the 
staff members time to question students about their well-being as well as the student 
time to share concerns.  The forums and web also provided input.  “The process of the 
FAQs, which was really more of a back and forth than it sounds like, was certainly part 
of it, then a lot of informal communications occurred like you talked about, talking about 
until 10:00 o’clock at night with students.  And we continue to, because -- even though 
we moved out to our purest areas physically, we still continued to function as TAMUG 
in College Station as a campus.  And so we continued to meet and share these things 
we’re all learning with each other and that was critical” (Interviewee #5, personal 
communication, 7-29-11).  TAMUG enjoyed a high level of personal interaction with its 
student body before the storm and that tradition continued throughout the crisis, 
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providing valuable information as to the performance of the university throughout the 
crisis.  One TAMUG Crisis Management Team member described the ongoing 
assessment like this: 
I would say it was mostly anecdotal.  We did some formal stuff.  We made a 
decision that was, I'm not sure it was the right one, but we worried about the 
normal course evaluation process that was discontinued after that one semester, 
so we did not do it, but there were other informal ways and a few formal ones 
done to capture student input for example and especially after we got done.  
There was always stuff done to capture information about how things worked 
with people and so that was all used as part of the After Action Report again to 
do refinements of the long range plan we had utilized during this effort to make 
sure it was better, given the fact.  But again, I think all of us knew there was a lot 
of communication. 
 
I got so many E-mails.  You did.  We were--I always replying E-mails basically 
24 hours a day; you were, too.  We had all these phone calls, so there was no lack 
of input there.  I can't say it was structured necessarily, that's the downside.  It 
wasn't structured, but the volume was huge and a lot of those were redundant.  I 
mean you heard the same story over and over again, but that gives you a 
measure, too.  If you hear the same story, you know the magnitude of the 
problem and I think it was probably not efficient in an objective way because it 
was all sort of one of one-on-one kind of conversation and such, but in my case, I 
would create E-mail responses to common kinds of E-mails.  I could almost just 
copy and paste replies, but I made sure every E-mail I got was answered.  I think 
every phone call was answered. 
 
We had our principles again.  We will respond to people and not let them hang 
out there, and that was very effective.  There was a lot of utilization again of 
College Station staff to help on some other areas like financials.  Bob's office was 
very involved here.  Bob Piwonka was involved here in terms of handling that 
part of it.  Student IDs, all of the things you've got to have here, meal cards, 
things like that, we had utilized College Station staff to augment the Galveston 
staff as well.  And again, the way we got input or evaluations done was usually 
not formal but informal, but I think in a case like this, it's very difficult to think 
about how you would do formal evaluations that are meaningful because every 
crisis is different, something like that.  There're are probably some common 
elements you could always look at, but I think there's too many things that are 
just unique in each crisis that makes it hard for you upfront to say, here's my 
standard evaluation mechanism.  But again at the After Action Report level, we 
did sort of form, we did have questionnaires, we did go back and ask questions 
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about specifically what went right and wrong about this and try to document 
those (Interviewee #11, personal communication, 9-9-11).  
 
 The TAMUG Crisis Management Team deployed a number of strategies to 
enhance the student focus from the original plan.  The biggest strategy was to change the 
plan to reconstitute the TAMUG classes on the College Station campus for a variety of 
reasons.  This strategy facilitated a stronger connection between the students and 
university which then created more opportunities for assessment and feedback.  Many 
other strategies for feedback and interaction were developed as well included the 
extensive use of technology and planned activities.  Still, most feedback was anecdotal 
in nature, but through high levels of student interaction provided valuable insight as to 
the engagement and satisfaction of the student body.  
Measurements, Analysis, and Knowledge Management  
 Managing by Facts to Drive Performance Improvement  - The Measurement, 
Analysis, and Knowledge Management category examines how the organization 
selects, gathers, analyzes, manages, and improves its data, information, and 
knowledge assets and how it manages its information technology. The category also 
examines how the organization uses review findings to improve its performance. 
(The Quality Texas Foundation, 2009).  The following analysis and findings of 
measurements, analysis, and knowledge management are derived from questions 
that are established by the Quality Texas Foundation- Engagement Level Criteria 
and outlined in Appendix I. 
 
 Without a formal plan identifying what the needs for data would be, the TAMUG 
Crisis Management team operated during the initial phases of the relocation in a 
reactionary mode.  The initial plan had laid out the basic framework for the initial steps 
of the relocation, but very quickly the team was operating in new territory, attempting to 
merge the Galveston semester into College Station’s semester in a very short time frame.  
As initiatives were attempted, calls for data were made to determine the success or 
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failure of each initiative, and regular routine meetings were called to analyze and discuss 
next steps based on the data. 
Again, daily meetings occurred at both intermediate and senior levels to review 
what was going right and wrong.  We were tuning things day by day.  The first 
month at least, maybe more than a half, every day was a new day and we were 
learning stuff and then adjusting our operations accordingly.  I think by the time 
we got to mid-October, things became pretty routine by then, but that mid-
September through mid-October timeframe, that first month was very intense and 
it was very, very much again everyday people getting together, maybe multiple 
times a day and we were facilitated particularly in the GSC area there where you 
were housed, we had people get together, you could easily go to a conference 
room.  I was having meetings over there at least one a day for a while. 
 
When I left, Rodney continued that whole process, multiple times a day 
sometimes, so there was a lot of ways for us to again monitor the circumstances 
and adjust day by day.  For a longer term, clearly, just the whole idea of doing 
After Action Reports is formal and having an external person.  Bryan came and 
did that job for us.  He was very helpful.  He asked the right questions.  He 
wasn't biased by having imparted the process as much and so we came out of that 
with a pretty thick binder full of information that we gathered through that 
process that's a permanent way to help you in forming your future planning 
(Interviewee #11, personal communication, 9-9-11). 
 
The data came in a wide variety of formats.  Some were standard reports that would have 
occurred in any semester of Galveston prior to the storm.  Reports concerning 
enrollment, attendance, financial aid, and other university information were generated to 
guide discussions based on what would have been expected without the storm.  Others 
were more unique to the crisis such as students who were facing severe financial 
circumstances as a result of the storm and students who had lost uniforms and textbooks.  
As one team member described the need for the variety of reports: 
Well, we are data people, Loftin is a data person.  We made a lot of reports.  You 
don’t want to know- how many people had called us, how many people didn’t 
call, how many people have emailed, and how many people didn’t email.  There 
is student channel.  How many students? Can we estimate? Okay now send them 
emails and see how many emailed back.  Now we do a lot of that.  Even if we did 
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one method, sometimes you tried two.  So, we try a lot of different ways and we 
try a lot of different data.  It was kind of hard too because we didn’t have that 
kind of data before.  How many people are here that were on financial aid before 
because how many can they plan on upstairs (in the President’s office).  It’s data 
that we didn’t normally have before that we have now to make the decisions with 
(Interviewee #7, personal communication, 8-9-11). 
 
 The data was fairly accessible due to the alignment of the systems.  With 
Galveston utilizing nearly all the same systems as College Station, not only was it is 
easy to pull reports from the various databases, but the Galveston staff were very 
familiar with many of the information technology people in College Station who assisted 
in pulling larger, more complicated reports.  This also meant nearly all of the data was 
preserved in College Station, well away from the impact of the storm.  There were some 
challenges however.  There were some nuances between some systems that caused major 
problems at times when programmers were not aware of the differences.  At one of the 
most critical junctures of the crisis response when the new class schedule was being 
built, it was discovered that one of the reports was wrong resulting in two long days of 
lost work at a time when they were under a deadline to have the class schedule complete 
(Interviewee #1, personal communication, 7-18-11).  There were also other minor 
differences in databases like different meal plans available on each campus that further 
complicated some of the transition on the cost neutral principle (Interviewee #2, personal 
communication, 7-22-11). Lastly some of the smaller databases likely the housing 
databases were completely separate and so required a lot more manual manipulation to 
be able to access the necessary data.  Unfortunately some of the most critical data, that 
of the teaching and classroom performance, would not be available until the end of the 
semester when the campus was transitioning back to Galveston.   
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There was also a conscious effort to distribute valuable data and information to 
the workforce, students and other stakeholders.  In fact, numerous methods were used.  
During the height of the crisis, direct meetings were called where information could be 
directly disseminated to the involved parties who could then distribute to their teams for 
action.  These meetings were heavy on time and manpower but deemed critical during 
the rapid pace occurring early in the crisis (Interviewee #11, personal communication, 9-
9-11).  As the crisis somewhat subsided, more traditional forms of communication were 
used to distribute the information.  The TAMUG Crisis Management Team members 
emphasized the benefit of utilizing the same systems in many, but not all, of the 
departments. 
Data flowed through the normal mechanisms and that’s only possible because 
we’ve already used College Station systems.  In another situation, if this was – 
okay, Tulane’s people at A&M for Katrina, it wouldn’t have worked because 
they didn’t have access to the data systems, they didn’t know the data systems, 
etcetera.  In this case, because of the branch campus relationship and we already 
use those data systems, they just keep old staff and students, the portal and at that 
point we were still on SIMS but we had myRecord, so they still use myRecord to 
find out when our schedule was and so on.  So they still use -- because we were 
on a shared common system, they still used their normal data systems, I think.  
We didn’t do a lot whiteboard checkmark kind of stuff.  We didn’t setup a lot of 
new automated systems.  I think we pretty much used all our existing systems 
because of the commonality (Interviewee #5, personal communication, 7-29-11). 
   
At the same time, much of the data involved in the crisis was not purely 
numerical in nature.  In making decisions rapidly, it became difficult to operate purely 
on anecdotal information, but the TAMUG Crisis Management Team members worked 
through it. 
We're all data driven and the difference here was it wasn't all numeric data.  A lot 
of anecdotal data was given to me every day, so what made it a little more 
complicated at this time was, and I'm data driven myself, that's how I make 
 220 
 
decisions but we had to rely at this time on not just numbers because we don't 
always have them. 
 
We relied a lot of just this informal communication that was coming in to various 
parties and we try to aggregate that the right way, so we could examine it from a 
standpoint not of this person speaking about this, but that we had these 15 or 
these 150 different comments that had very similar things here and that was a 
very big driver making decisions day by day.  So again, data yes, but data in a 
broad sense of the word, not data that's purely numerical. 
 
Once we got into the semester, we began to get grade data things like that, so 
we'd be monitoring more differently but that wasn't true the first month.  We 
were doing it again day by day based on any anecdotal information flowing 
through all of us up to the top levels (Interviewee #11, personal communication, 
9-9-11). 
  
 Yet another piece of the knowledge management aspect of the crisis response 
was the collection and transfer of workforce knowledge in how the crisis was responded 
to.  The TAMUG Crisis Management Team took a very intentional approach to 
preserving the organizational knowledge that resulted as a result of the crisis response.  
For one, all students were surveyed as to their experience with 366 students returning 
valuable data about what worked and didn’t work for them during the semester.  In 
addition, a student forum was hosted by the TAMUG Student Government Association 
upon returning to Galveston to facilitate a dialogue between the students and 
administration that provided valuable data.  All faculty were surveyed as well, providing 
valuable data as to their perceptions of the classroom experience and overall semester.  
A broad After Action Report was conducted by an outside consulting firm that collected 
valuable data from many of the TAMUG Crisis Management Team, Strategic 
Operations Team, and TAMU- College Station participants and is included as Appendix 
V.  The information was collected and reviewed by the TAMUG campus executive 
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team.  It has also been used in various presentations across the nation by administrators 
and faculty, but at this point has not been developed into a format that is readily 
transferable to the workforce, something that may become an issue as attrition occurs.  
As one member stated,  
We had the same team, we had the same process.  What I worry about is that 
students clearly graduate.  There are no students already left right now in 
Galveston who lived through it and so that's totally new and we always have staff 
and faculty turnover, so what I don't know we're doing as well is how well we're 
trying to refresh this.  I mean people like yourself and others.  Donna who has 
been there through it all, in fact going back many times before and that's 
extraordinarily useful corporate knowledge, but Bill Hearn is gone.  And that's a 
problem because he was a very wise and a very, very helpful individual at this 
whole process there and helped tremendously by taking care of some of the 
issues we had.  Nonetheless, there should be a team effort to do that (Interviewee 
#11, personal communication, 9-9-11).   
 
 The management of knowledge immediately after the storm was difficult but 
effective.  The TAMUG Crisis Management Team was familiar with the multiple 
systems and had access to additional support through College Station for the more 
complex or time sensitive projects.  Data was used extensively to drive the decisions, but 
unfortunately the data was not always in an easily analyzed format.  Anecdotal data and 
trends were interpreted to the best of the team’s ability.  In addition, a huge amount of 
data was collected at the conclusion of the crisis – assessment of faculty, students, 
critical staff- for later review and incorporation into the Crisis Management plan.  
Workforce Focus  
 
Developing and Realizing the Full Potential of your Workforce - The Workforce 
Focus category examines the ability to assess workforce capability and capacity 
needs and build a workforce environment conducive to high performance. The 
category also examines how the organization engages, manages, and develops 
your workforce to utilize its full potential in alignment with the organization’s 
overall mission, strategy, and action plans. (The Quality Texas Foundation, 
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2009).  The following analysis and findings of workforce focus are derived from 
questions that are established by the Baldrige Criteria (Quality Texas Foundation 
- Engagement Level Criteria) and outlined in Appendix I. 
 
Without a lot of detail in the plan as to how the university would utilize its 
workforce, a number of important decisions had to be made at great speed.  There were 
many different aspects that the TAMUG Crisis Management Team had to address 
immediately including the assessment and repair of the campus, the administrative 
aspects of the relocation, and the teaching of the students.  As such the handling of the 
university’s workforce of faculty and staff became a critical component in the response 
to the crisis, even though it was for the most part missing from the crisis management 
plan.  Different methods were implemented to address these incredibly different 
functions while managing the work processes in a way that would be most effective.  
The recurring theme communicated to the employees by the leadership of TAMUG 
throughout this effort was that the university was in this together and would work 
together to come out of this crisis as a team. 
You know, I think the biggest statement earlier on was, and it goes back to Loftin 
being willing to take risks, is we paid everybody.  We gave everybody a few days 
away, because we were in all in different states of different places when it 
actually hit.  I mean some of us were already working even before the storm ever 
hit and we just kept working into the storm response mode.  And then others 
called back and the speed of how fast somebody had to report in after the storm 
was asked.  It was questionable at times on different things and something we 
have to probably tighten up, but we said everybody that comes back to work is 
going to work.  And we found something for you to do to stay being paid and in 
that kind of a crisis where other wage earners are being cut off and don’t have 
any income, our staff always had their income.  And I think that was huge for 
them to stay motivated and loyal to the larger picture of the organization. I think 
people that weren’t as hurt personally, some of the people on the mainland, were 
directly told “Hey, we have to have you step up; I know this is above and 
beyond, but so and so down here has got to have some flexibility, because this is 
where they’re at.  I need you to do their job.” 
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So it was about refitting and being constantly dynamic, and there’s a couple of 
things if it matters in this particular process that make huge differences to us in 
this campus and I think part of that is Aggie culture.  I think that kind of ‘can do, 
we’re going to stick together no matter what’ mentality, permeates our staff too 
and so that was done and our size mattered. 
 
If we were much bigger than we were, this wouldn’t have been as doable because 
it’s still personal here.  I still know you as a person or this person and I knew 
exactly, what they were going through and so the longer term about stabilizing 
the institutional health was as important to me as what happened on that 
Tuesday.  We didn’t RIF (reduction in force) anybody.  No other organization in 
Galveston can say that. GISD, Galveston College, UTMB did really harsh things 
to their people, that Texas A&M at Galveston never did, and I value that in a 
huge way.  They let people go to rehire them back, and I know they were in a 
crisis too, but we didn’t do it.  And I think that’s the biggest part of our work 
force development. (Interviewee #1, personal communication, 7-18-11). 
 
There were some difficult decisions to be made as the work decision involved not just 
the workers, but their families as well.  After all, the TAMUG Crisis Management Team 
knew immediately that this event would not be a short-term work assignment of a week 
or two but rather a semester long relocation away from their households, many of which 
had been devastated by the hurricane.   
Well, a big deal in this crisis was really who stayed there and who came here and 
who could stay here and could come here and so we tried to sift through all the 
people we had, which is in the lot number.  We have under 400 faculty staff total, 
so it wasn't a lot of people. But we had to really figure what skills and such were 
required. 
 
It was tough.  I mean in some cases you had one spouse here and one spouse 
there.  I mean you were one exactly in particular and that was very, very tough 
on that particular family.  They had to move part of the family here and a part of 
the family there and so those were just very, very hard problems for you to adapt 
to.  I think it worked out okay ultimately, but it wasn’t easy. 
 
A big deal for us was the issue of faculty and staff with families that relocated 
here.  What about the kids so we went to school districts here, Bryan and College 
Station ISD, and we talked about that. We got kids in school again.  I think it 
wasn't ideal, but it worked and so those are problems you get into. 
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So, you have work forces not just a matter of matching skills, it's matching also 
the reality of a person’s life and their families just as well.  You can’t ask too 
much particularly for many months at the time.  I would pick at a person without 
recognizing what’s going on there.  So, I think it was two levels.  We looked at 
one level which was really just work force skills.  What skills would we have 
here, which one is down there?  That’s pretty straight forward. But then you had 
to do a second cut and say, “Okay, given that, who can really do this?  Who can 
really be here?”  So, in some cases, we had people who had to stay in Galveston, 
who really should be here and we had to work out ways to help them get their 
jobs done in spite of that problem.  There weren't a lot of these situations, but 
there was some of them, a few people particularly in some of the operational 
areas there that families just could not relocate.  And so, we ended up having 
them stay in Galveston, but they had to actually work here in a virtual sense, but 
that was almost done on a case by case basis. 
 
The skill set, you can almost do at a higher level and say we need this kind of 
skill here and that one here there.  That’s straight forward, but you can’t ignore 
the human dimension and recognize you have to be sensitive to the person’s 
ability to do the job because of who they are and who they live with basically 
(Interviewee #11, personal communication, 9-9-11).   
 
For the staff that would remain in Galveston, many worked for the service component of 
the campus – custodial, facilities services, food services- and could get back to work at 
their old jobs once the campus had some minimal work done to ensure safety.  The 
ability to stay local for this group was especially important as it was many of these 
employees whose homes suffered the most extensive damage.  Many had to relocate 
with their families from their devastated homes to the residence halls on campus or 
apartments across the street that the university had leased.  Abbreviated work schedules 
were developed to allow workers to do their jobs on campus but still have time to return 
to work on their homes in daylight before returning to the campus once again before the 
city curfew to sleep (Interviewee #3, personal communication, 7-20-11).   For those 
admission and student relations professionals, they were sent out on the road to visit 
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more high schools across the state as well as coordinate admissions receptions in home 
cities rather than inviting new prospective students to the hurricane ravaged city 
(Interviewee #7, personal communication, 8-9-11).   
 For those deemed essential for the relocation of the students, houses were leased 
for those who were needed fulltime, and flexible work schedules were developed for 
those who could commute for certain days of the week.  The student activities, 
counseling and career services rotated their staff to have staff present in College Station 
during the work days of the week, and a three bedroom house was leased, furnished with 
air mattresses and furniture from the Galveston campus, and deemed “Hotel Student 
Life” where whomever from student affairs was in town for the night could spend the 
night (Interviewee #2, personal communication, 7-22-11).  Generally the hours in 
College Station were long, particularly early in the semester, as professionals struggled 
to answer the many phone calls and emails late into the evening each night (Interviewee 
#5, personal communication, 7-29-11).   
 The teaching aspect was also a challenge.  Originally the plan had called for 
distributing the relocating students throughout the available College Station courses, and 
then reconstitute those courses that were unique to TAMUG.  After considering the 
impact on the students of being forced into a course in progress with a different 
instructor and syllabus coupled with the high percentage of students willing to relocate, 
the plan was changed to bring the entire TAMUG course inventory to College Station.   
The TAMUG Crisis Management Team worked to develop a process that worked for the 
instructors, many of whom did not live on the island and so whose homes were 
 226 
 
unaffected by the storm, and the students, some of whom also had not relocated fully due 
to family and households off of the island.  Classes were changed to three hour blocks 
once a week to ease the travel requirements of faculty and student commuters.  In 
addition, faculty were given the option to utilize distance education techniques to further 
reduce the commuting requirements.  The faculty were kept together in their academic 
departments, and many of the faculty were given lab and office space with a respective 
academic department in College Station.  At first, there was some resistance by some 
TAMU- College Station departments, but most eventually gave way to collegial respect 
and even friendship.  
In the research area in many ways and probably in most ways, the storm was a 
super positive event from the stand point of our relationship with the departments 
in College Station. You know, they suddenly saw a bunch of people from down 
here that were serious about their science, and I think that kind of surprised 
people. They got to know each other. You know, all that takes a lot of time, and 
that’s why they’ve had to ask for extra time for that. But it built relationships that 
are really solid. All of my relationships with the research office at College 
Station began with the storm. And now I’m good friends with them all. You 
know, I can walk back in there and talk to anybody. People who you couldn’t 
talk to are now friends and that’s a total turnaround. And 100% due to the storm. 
That was all due to the storm (Interviewee #8, personal communication, 8-10-
11).  
As a result of the required flexibility of many of the schedules, one of the 
methods many of the supervisors pursued was the cross training of their employees.  
There really was no time during the initial phase of the crisis for formalized training so 
employees often learned on the job from each other and their TAMU- College Station 
counterparts.  In fact just operating within the processes of TAMU- College Station 
often offered a different perspective to many of the Galveston processes resulting in 
many processes being adapted for use in Galveston and vice versa.   
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There were a lot of things that they (Galveston employees) learned how to do.  
And they can do them now and they still do.  That’s very true.  But lot of other 
things that they look forward to, things that they consider to be professional 
development, that they didn’t get to do. But they did learn a lot.  They learned a 
lot.  They learned a lot from their friends in College Station and from each other.  
And they learned both work processes and efficiencies.  So, they increased 
efficiencies in a lot of our processes.  And they also learned business and 
personal skills that assisted them when we got back here (Interviewee #7, 
personal communication, 8-9-11).  
In addition, several consultants were brought in to provide more formalized training in 
more specialized areas.  The FEMA reimbursement process was an incredibly difficult 
but important process, and two different consultants were brought in to assist and better 
train staff as to the reimbursement processes (Interviewee #6, personal communication, 
8-2-11).   The same was true for the distance education process that affected so many of 
the students. 
We took resources, and we provided for faculty development around distance 
stuff, because there were more challenges and more need for it than we had 
before.  So that’s probably the biggest professional development thing that I did 
beyond my normal professional development stuff.  Even in my own staff, I 
don’t think I did anything outside my norm.  We did take advantage of going to 
stuff up in College Station - training and stuff, the forums and stuff they hold 
because we were physically there, for the people there. 
 
But probably the faculty thing is the biggest thing I was involved in where we did 
additional professional development training.  I didn’t help set something up.  I 
don’t know -- FEMA forms, there were some additional training about how to do 
FEMA training.  Certainly, Susan had lots of professional development 
opportunities, and we brought in a consultant to help us.  So that consultant did 
some of the work but more importantly probably trained our people how to 
continue to do the work.  So that’s another area where we brought in an external 
resource, the consultant, the FEMA consultant to help us learn how to do FEMA 
claims (Interviewee #5, personal communication, 7-29-11). 
 
Even with the realignment, relocation and cross training of the workforce, there 
was a continued emphasis on their health, safety and security. Once the immediate 
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decision to relocate was determined, specialized teams were sent to the Galveston 
campus to inspect for dangers from electrical or fire hazards before allowing employees 
back onto the campus.  Once the campus was secured, employees who did not have safe 
housing were allowed to move onto the campus and provided with food, donated 
household items, and security for themselves and their immediate families. Security 
included a police officer posted at the front gate of campus immediately after the storm 
and a 24 hour police presence after the immediate crisis had subsided (Interviewee #3, 
personal communication, 7-20-11).  Faculty, staff and students who were relocated were 
given leased properties throughout the Bryan/College Station community, and when a 
few were found to be in less than safe areas, alternative accommodations were quickly 
identified and made available.  Counseling through employee assistance programs was 
available to any staff and faculty as well as personal counseling for the students through 
the counseling office.  Perhaps most importantly, not a single TAMUG employee lost 
their job as the result of the crisis. 
Yeah, of course, TAMUG did a great job of helping everyone.  Everybody was 
safe and had a place to live and food to eat and that was wonderful.  I’m just so 
amazed we still did that.  We did take care of our people.  We had illnesses, we 
had hurt… people get hurt with all those things and we dealt with it up there.  It 
was a little more challenging, but we did it.  We didn’t know the services of 
TAMU, so we used city services more.  But I think that we cared a lot about 
safety.  We didn’t let people stay too long in places that we didn’t know.  We 
always went together – so, those kinds of things.  I think that we really looked 
out for each other more there because we were together – many of us were  
literally living together (Interviewee #7, personal communication, 8-9-11). 
 
As part of this healing process, supervisors were especially alert as to the 
engagement and satisfaction of the workforce through the crisis.  Constant reminders 
were provided to gauge the workforce’s well-being and recommend Human Resource 
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assistance or Employee Assistance Programs as necessary to help employees deal with 
the crisis.  There was a lot of management by walking around where the new working 
environment resulted in supervisors and employees interacting at a much more frequent 
level ((Interviewee #5, personal communication, 7-29-11).  One TAMUG Crisis 
Management Team member recalled how they assessed employee engagement with the 
crisis response process: 
Well, initially purely anecdotally.  Many people, especially supervisors were 
cautioned, we had a lot of--again, College Station’s HR got involved very 
quickly from here.  They're a big team here.  They got involved to help the 
supervisor understand what questions to ask, how to listen to people and so we 
are trying to be able to gather data from individuals here. Those who initially 
couldn’t come back again were especially the problem and we -- we had to 
ultimately set deadlines about when they were coming back and regarding their 
ability to be on leave.  I have rules to follow after all.   
 
So we -- we pushed as far as we could and not all, but well plus 95% of our staff 
came back ultimately. There were a handful who just couldn’t do it for a variety 
of reasons here.  We gave all we could in terms of help and support as transition.  
Well, we couldn't do it ultimately for everybody. 
 
So again, it was a matter of HR being very effective largely here because we had 
three people in Galveston and we had a whole team here. They were very 
engaged in helping us make calls, talk to every person and make sure we knew 
where they were, their circumstances, encouraging them to take care of 
problems, but also getting back to work when they could and keeping them on 
the payrolls as long as we could legally do so (Interviewee #11, personal 
communication, 9-9-11).    
  
For many the crisis response was very personal.  A professional counselor was 
brought in from outside of the campus and assigned to the Galveston campus for some 
time to offer assistance to many of the employees who remained in Galveston.  The 
counselor remained available for a period even after the return to TAMUG, and group 
debriefings were held to encourage those more reluctant to participate (Interviewee #2, 
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personal communication, 7-22-11).  More formalized assessments were sought by the 
TAMUG Crisis Management Team including broad staff and faculty forums and 
updates, and afterwards several after action review exercises and surveys were 
completed to better provide insight as to the satisfaction of the faculty, staff, and 
students (Interviewee #10, personal communication, 9-8-11). 
 Through these broader assessment forums, the TAMUG Crisis Management 
Team really benefited from the diverse ideas, cultures, and thinking of the workforce in 
a number of ways.  For one, the challenge that was presented with the relocation of 
students was a brand new experience where there were no experts.  As a result, every 
idea and suggestion was considered as the territory was largely unexplored.  This created 
a wonderfully dynamic discussion that attacked a problem from multiple perspectives.  
As one team member described:  
Absolutely, I mean that, having large groups of people very focused on an 
outcome was fabulously interesting.  I think that does go back to that culture that 
we have on campus that we are pretty good at working as a team, we are pretty 
good in crisis and we can come together; and that diversity made us so much 
better because in that big room or whatever there were a lot of times when you’d 
start down one path and someone would smack you in the head because you 
hadn’t thought about something.  You go “no wait come back on that” and that 
stemmed from different people were always thinking about all different things 
and that was very powerful (Interviewee #1, personal communication, 7-18-11). 
 
Another described the inclusiveness that was felt even in the larger groups and how the 
crisis environment encouraged participation from all participants. 
First of all, because I'm not generally shy about expressing my opinion, but I 
think it was probably pretty freeing to some of the people who are shy about 
expressing their opinion.  You just, there was no reason to hold back in this 
situation, you had to speak up if you had an idea or felt strongly about something 
or oppose something.   
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You really did not have the luxury of staying out of it, you had to be engaged and 
so I think that probably more than anything encouraged that and I think we 
probably used all those ideas.  Because we were desperate for good ideas, I mean 
without specifying who, but one member of our team was never really open to 
new ideas until we were in this situation.  And then I saw a complete reversal and 
they were very open to new ideas in so far as seeking other ideas.  And so that 
was kind of a turn around there (Interviewee #4, personal communication, 7-27-
11). 
 
Yet another benefit came from the merging of two different entities.  Certainly 
TAMUG is a satellite campus of Texas A&M University, but the processes of serving a 
campus of 2000 vs. 50,000 were different in many ways.  The ability to learn from the 
different processes and adapt them to create a newer, more improved process occurred 
on a regular basis. 
We got a lot more input from College Station in the things we were doing and 
ways we could do stuff.  Had we gone up there and we rented out facilities and 
stuff, we wouldn’t have done as good a job as we got from having them engaged 
and helping us rent it out.  We could have gone up and tried to procure it 
ourselves rather than go through them.  So there is a case where we did a better 
job by engaging and having the partnership with the people in College Station to 
do it.  I think there was cross fertilization and a partnership.  You can do all kinds 
of studies to show group decisions are better than individual decisions, but in this 
case, I think we saw was that two groups make better decisions than one group.  
And it was sort of the next step up from group versus individual. You know, 
you’ve seen all the studies on that and have done the exercises for the student 
leaders about how a group makes better decisions.  But this was the case where 
you really brought together multiple groups to do major, real time decisions 
(Interviewee #5, personal communication, 7-29-11). 
 
 The lack of much of a workforce focus in the crisis management plan became a 
significant issue when the TAMUG Crisis Management Team began deploying the plan.  
Suddenly the reallocation of work force resources was urgent in determining what skills 
were needed in College Station versus Galveston, who could relocate, and how to cross 
train and professional develop those who would be taking on new roles.  The same was 
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true of the faculty who moved from a supportive role in teaching courses that were not 
offered in College Station to a situation where every faculty member was needed to 
commute or relocate to continue their courses.  The rapid fire decisions and 
repercussions from those decisions were extensive.  Still, every member of the 
workforce continued to be employed and although their circumstances, whether location 
or responsibilities, might have been different for a few months, the commitment to the 
workforce was proved to be unwavering. 
Process Management  
Designing Work Systems to Deliver Value to Students and Stakeholders - The 
Process Management category examines how your organization designs its work 
systems, and how it designs, manages, and improves its key processes for 
implementing those work systems to deliver student and stakeholder value and 
achieve organizational success and sustainability. Also examined is an 
organization’s readiness for emergencies. (The Quality Texas Foundation, 
2009).  The following analysis and findings of process management are derived 
from questions that are established by the Quality Texas Foundation- 
Engagement Level Criteria and outlined in Appendix I. 
 
In managing the processes to successfully deliver value to the students, the 
TAMUG Crisis Management Team had been very deliberative in relocating to an 
institution which already shared many of the processes and technical infrastructure to 
immediately support the TAMUG students.  Once the relocation has been announced 
and the team began to review what processes needed to be in place to effect the move, 
the team quickly realized that most of the processes would remain the same after the 
“big three” were taken care of – developing a schedule and classrooms, housing, and 
meal plans (Interviewee #5, personal communication, 7-29-11).  Part of the “big three” 
also included the housing for faculty and staff and the schedule for determining which 
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faculty would be commuting versus relocating.  An incredible amount of effort was 
expended in solving the three major issues, but once everyone was housed with the 
understanding of when and where their classes would be, many of the old processes 
began to fall into place and still worked toward accomplishing the core competencies of 
teaching and research.  Of course there were a few processes that were unique to the 
crisis like managing the donation drives and donated funds (Interviewee #2, personal 
communication, 7-22-11).  Others had to be adjusted to fit in the crisis environment such 
as the allowance to use Q-drops until the day of the final (Interviewee #1, personal 
communication, 7-18-11).  Quite a few of the new processes were developed to facilitate 
a transitory workforce as many of the faculty were relocated or commuting several days 
a week to teach.  Processes to provide appropriate documentation for reimbursement 
were quickly developed to ensure that employees met all state and system requirements 
(Interviewee #6, personal communication, 8-2-11).  With a little time, processes were 
developed that for the most part kept the student experience fairly consistent with the 
exception of one very important area - the classroom experience. 
In working to develop processes that kept to the core competencies of TAMUG 
and also met the key requirements of students and faculty, several processes concerning 
the classroom experience were altered, some only slightly modified but others 
completely changed or eliminated.  After determining that the students and university 
would be better served by keeping the students and faculty together in the courses they 
had signed up for prior to Hurricane Ike, the TAMUG Registrar’s office faced the 
difficult task of developing a schedule that kept students with their respective faculty but 
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also was convenient for those students and faculty who were commuting from the 
Galveston area.  The shift to courses that would be held once a week for a three hour 
period was very conducive to the travel plans of those commuting.  Unfortunately the 
long hours of lecture were not the best format for many undergraduate classes, many of 
whom struggled to pay attention for the extended time.  A second concession to the 
faculty, the changing of the approval process of distance courses, also proved to be 
detrimental to the quality of instruction for many of the undergraduate courses, Calculus 
being just one example. 
The learning is a hugely important question to the institution in a long term 
environment.  How do you know students are learning? What are your learning 
outcomes? Can you point to them and continue this improvement? That is not 
where you’re at in this process; that’s why I said I don’t know that we were 
successful in some of the student learning outcomes especially when you come to 
like – well, we had a huge problem in math. Math was terrible; it was probably 
one of our weakest areas because they tried to do some things that just didn’t 
work at all.  So I don’t know that the students are competent in calculus, but I 
think overall the students had learning gains, I mean as far as the development in 
that person (Interviewee #1, personal communication, 7-18-11).   
 
In both of these cases, the processes that were changed to facilitate the course schedule 
and travel arrangements worked against the core competency of quality instruction in the 
classroom.  This was a lesson that was learned too late in the semester to make 
appropriate changes but was documented as an area to be adjusted in future relocations, 
specifically to reinstate the approval process for any distance education class 
(Interviewee #5, personal communication, 7-29-11).    
Compounding this issue for the TAMUG Crisis Management Team was the 
management of the work processes while under a crisis situation.  Due to the hectic 
nature of the first month of the crisis, TAMUG Crisis Management Team members had 
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to develop a process rapidly and then move on to the next emergency often without 
serious follow-up.  Sometimes by the time the solution was realized to have fallen short 
of expectations, it was too late to make adjustments as the return to the more 
standardized processes of TAMUG was occurring at the end of the semester.  Some of 
the student experiences with the distance education courses fell into this category as the 
team didn’t realize how bad students were struggling until the end of the semester.  In 
these situations, accommodations were made for the students and notes were taken to 
add to the business continuity plan for future crises (Interviewee #2, personal 
communication, 7-22-11).   
 The TAMUG Crisis Management Team relied heavily on the process 
management in place at the TAMU-College Station campus, but had to develop and 
manage several of their own processes to get to that point.  Working closely with 
College Station counterparts and through the campus website FAQ system, TAMUG 
faculty, staff, and students educated on the TAMU-College Station processes and 
assimilated into the TAMU- College Station systems.  In those situations where 
processes were developed, data was obtained as to the effectiveness of the process for 
future crisis situations as the timing often did not allow modifications during the ongoing 
crisis.  The greatest failure in the process management was the elimination of the 
approval process for distance education which allowed unsuitable coursework and 
untrained faculty to teach students at a subpar standard that ultimately reduced the value 
of the course to the students.  This failure to properly manage this process is routinely 
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cited by many of the crisis team members as the greatest failure in the crisis response 
(Interviewee #5, personal communication, 7-29-11). 
Business Results  
Tracking and Using Key Results - The Business Results category examines the 
organization’s performance and improvement in all KEY areas—student 
learning outcomes, customer-focused outcomes, budgetary, financial and market 
outcomes, workforce-focused outcomes, process effectiveness outcomes, and 
leadership outcomes.   Performance levels are examined relative to those of 
competitors and other organizations with similar educational program and 
service offerings.(The Texas Quality Foundation, 2009).  The following analysis 
and findings of business results are derived from questions that are established by 
the Quality Texas Foundation- Engagement Level Criteria and outlined in 
Appendix I. 
 
 As one of the challenges the TAMUG Crisis Management Team faced was the 
ability to get results to shape future decisions, the TAMUG Crisis Management Team 
developed several approaches for securing results of the policy and process decisions 
that were made.  There were efforts to get results in a number of different areas.  The 
first and arguably most important was student learning.  Assessing student learning is 
always a challenge and typically left to the instructor to determine what successful 
learning looks like.  When the review of the final semester came back, overall the 
students did not decline in performance in a significant way. As one of the team 
members stated: 
Well, again, I can’t claim we improved learning here a lot.  We tracked it very 
carefully. There was a dip in terms of student performance academically for that 
semester which is not unexpected given the loss of time and the emotional and 
physical transitions that occurred here, but long-term, it appears -- I’ve seen this 
only vaguely, but it appears there was no permanent damage done there.  The 
people recovered. 
 
In the spring semester, they got back to the campus and they were right on track 
to continue their studies and get well.  So, that part, I think worked very well for 
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us there.  The formalization here can be measured by the fact that people take 
licensing exams, certain things like that, certain kind of tests and they graduate, 
so then we had a graduation in December there probably maybe 20 or 30 less 
than normal, but we got a pretty good size regardless at the summer here, which 
was good for them and the following May was good too (Interviewee #11, 
personal communication, 9-9-11). 
 
One team member described the classroom success and student learning experience on a 
more personal level as a faculty instructor at the time of the relocation: 
They graduated.  It is impossible in my opinion to measure learning adequately – 
let me be careful - adequately assess learning in order to see a difference in this 
case.  The difference, if there was a difference was in the noise level, and my 
ability to measure it.  But my ability to measure learning is really, really poor.  I 
don’t trust most of the ways we commonly use to assess learning.  Assessment in 
general is very, very difficult and very expensive to do well.  And in this case, we 
had neither the time nor the money to do it well.  That is my gut instinct as a 
faculty member, not as staff, for my class, the [deleted] course. 
 
I had four students who went fully online that didn’t move up there.  I had about 
three or four students drop out of the thirty-three or so I had in my class, and the 
rest showed up in College Station.  So I actually had less than 91% of my 
students show up in College Station, but 91% of my students successfully 
completed the course because I was able to move them to distance.  And in 
MARA (Maritime Administration), we tended to have more students in the 
MARA department that stayed behind because of internships and so, I think.  
That’s my gut feel from talking to other faculty.  But I was able to accommodate 
at least at my course. 
 
The first question is if my course objectives, what percent do the students learn?  
I like to think I’m at 80%, that my students typically achieve 80% or so of my 
course objectives.  That’s what I like to think.  Now, that could be 60, that could 
be a 100 but I don’t know.  I’ll argue with you.  I don’t think it’s less than 60% 
of my course objectives.  I don’t think it’s over 100.  I honestly don’t think it’s 
over 90, but we could optimistic.  So if my noise level is 40 and my guess is 80, I 
think the students at the end of this semester who showed up in class there hit 
75% of my course objectives. So my gut -- I think the students who went fully 
online hit 70% of my course objectives, because there are a few things I didn’t do 
and now I would do if I had time I would have done which is do some video 
recording pieces and some short clips of some of the key lecture things that I did 
in class that I would have shared with them better.  I just gave my PowerPoint.  I 
would have done at least a voice over which would have been better. 
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So if 80% is my normal success of hitting 100% of the course objectives, I think 
I ended up at 75% for about 80% of the students and 70% for about 10% of the 
students and of course a 50% loss.  So that’s my gut as an instructor.  I think one 
of the math courses in particular probably went from 50% to 60% down to about 
a 25%.  That’s probably the worst case.  I suspect, I don’t know of anybody that I 
would argue a lot didn’t lose at least 5% of the learning objectives.  Retain the 
academic experience and quality.  I mean, we have it on there.  That was part of 
the discussion.  We weren’t going to just pass people.  We’re going to make sure 
they learn the material.  I think there was a strong commitment to maintaining 
academic quality along with -- I think that’s brilliant academic experience.  I 
think that’s a very worthy goal for both the experience and the quality of 
experience. 
 
Assuming that, I think we lost a little bit.  Probably very much in the noise level 
of how well we can assess learning, because I think the noise level is at least 20% 
both of sides or 10% both sides by 80%. I want to get on. There’s no way in hell 
I would argue that I can better -- my students are probably between 70% and 
90% of my course objectives, that’s as close as I could ever argue.  I could never 
say it’s 80, my gut says 80.  The 5% is in the noise level there.  
  
Certainly, within the class, you have students who are zero, because they never 
come to class.  The students who pick maybe 90%, I don’t think very many 
students succeed 90% of the course objectives in the sense of truly mastering the 
depth of stuff.  I have all my objectives - But the ultimate thing came down the 
art of the doable.  It was either zero - we didn’t go back in the classes - or we 
compromised and we got what we could.  My net result in my one section and 
they’re not freshmen typically because it’s a 200-level course, mostly who had 
juniors and seniors in this case.  My class, that section was mostly juniors and 
seniors so there’s a clearly different population.  I think I lost about 5%.  That’s 
well within an acceptable tolerance in my opinion compared to zero if we didn’t 
continue the semester (Interviewee #5, personal communication, 7-29-11). 
 
In the end, no students were academically suspended as a result of grades received from 
the semester.  The university felt the circumstances surrounding the hurricane and 
resulting relocation precluded such a decision (Interviewee #1, personal communication, 
7-18-11). 
 There were other areas where results were acquired.  Stakeholder 
satisfaction/dissatisfaction was a major concern.  After action reports, faculty surveys, 
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and student surveys and forums all provided valuable data to be considered in case of 
another crisis.  Figure 1 demonstrates the faculty opinions of TAMUG administrative 
and student academic responses to Hurricane Ike.  Although the amount of respondents 
was limited to only thirteen, eleven of the faculty thought the administration did 
excellent or good versus the two whom indicated poor.  That number doubles to four 
who thought the students did poorly academically in response to Hurricane Ike.    
Individual surveys on a host of other issues including housing, staff support, parking, 
research support and other factors captured valuable insight on areas to improve upon.  
The student satisfaction with the academic quality was also surveyed with much more 
mixed results.  
Figure 1.  Faculty Opinions of TAMUG Administrative and Student 
Academics Responses to Hurricane Ike  
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Figure 2 includes a number of graphs reflecting the perception of the students with 
regard to the academic quality of the College Station experience.   
Of particular note is only a little over 50% felt the academic quality of the courses were 
maintained in the relocation to College Station.  Furthermore, many perceived the on-
line courses as being subpar to the classroom-based coursework to which they were 
accustomed.  
Figure 2. Student Assessment of Academic Quality of Relocation
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Figure 2. Continued 
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Figure 3 demonstrates the student perceptions of the academic support services.  
Additional survey questions provided an opportunity to suggest improvements as well as 
the biggest positives and negatives of the experience.  
 
 
Figure 3.  The Academic Support Services were Satisfactory 
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and following Fall and the strong financial showing, many TAMUG Crisis Management 
Team members felt fairly positive about the crisis response.  As one stated: 
I think we do but only in a very, very general sense and those were the things that 
we looked about as far as how many students did we take to College Station 
successfully and maintain during that semester?  How many students did we 
bring back in the spring? Did our retention rates drop off? We were very 
successful, I mean it floored me what we were able to maintain going into the 
spring semester, because I thought after -- the students were sort of bound to us 
in the Fall, they didn’t have a lot of choices at that point, but certainly, they’ll 
leave, they won’t come back in the spring and Galveston looked like crud, 
bringing them back here, it was a terrible environment coming back and they 
survived that and then they graduated at the same rates over time. 
 
So those student performance indicators were all in place.  And then, you can 
look at us financially and what do the numbers look like as far as the losses- were 
we able to get reimbursed- and we’re pretty made whole at this point based on 
FEMA.  I think one of the things that happened on both sides, both financially 
and students for example was when as soon as the storm hit we made the 
decision, the students could come to College Station have all the tuition and fees 
and everything applied to be cost neutral to stay in the semester or you could 
withdraw and use it for the following spring semester and we’d move your 
tuition and fees to the spring or you could cash out 50 percent; those were kind of 
your three options. 
 
That saved spring is what the students that did have to leave said, “Okay, I’ll 
withdraw. I'll move it to spring.”  If we would have lost those students then we 
would have lost that revenue and we wouldn’t have been able to put back Spring. 
We would have much more serious financial consequences than we did.  Did we 
have the authority to do that by policy? That was one of those big “we are out on 
a limb” things that Loftin said, and we were fuzzy with the Texas Higher 
Education Coordinating Board and payment guidelines everything was in order, 
just do it, this makes sense and we were in it, it was a good thing to do on 
hindsight.  If it would have blown up… I don’t know, we would have to figure 
something else out. 
 
So financially, I think we are pretty made whole and then you could look at us 
too from a sense of facilities or some other things where we’re better now, 
because we’ve rebuilt.  It’s newer.  It’s stronger than it was before the storm, but 
I don’t know if we got down to like really tactical level of performance measures, 
it was just the bigger picture stuff (Interviewee #1, personal communication, 7-
18-11). 
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 Although the TAMUG Crisis Management Team developed several initiatives to 
increase workforce engagement, they did not have clear measures of workforce 
engagement.  The surveying that was performed for the students and faculty was not 
performed for the staff.  The staff were engaged in the after action reports and provided 
professional counseling, but the only measure that was attained was the retention of the 
staff after the crisis was over. 
Well, not many quit.  [Laughs]  People again felt very committed to the cause.  
We were in this together.  No one--everybody worked themselves silly from me 
on down and there was nobody, I think feeling like they were being treated 
different than anybody else.  With a few exceptions of staff who just couldn’t 
make it work for a few different reasons. 
Everyone got back into the mix very quickly and gave everything they had to it 
and beyond I think, working very long hours, taking on different kinds of jobs 
they hadn’t done before and so it was learning curves and areas of unfamiliarity 
here, but again, this sense that we had a purpose -- the principles were out there 
in front of our body.  In fact, we were trying to get this job done and take care of 
the students both here and get them back to Galveston in January were clear 
drivers just like Apollo Program -  Get to the moon in a decade, okay?  It was 
very clear. 
So we had to get them to College Station, into the semester, and then get them 
back again.  We had a very clear simply stated mission to accomplish here and 
everyone knew they have a role to play in it and they did.  And that motivated 
them in ways if you seldom get motivation I think done through other means 
(Interviewee #11, personal communication, 9-9-11). 
 
 That was not the case for operational measures where the TAMUG Crisis 
Management Team had a number of key measures for their key operations.  Their 
primary operational goal of keeping students on track academically was demonstrated by 
the number of students who graduated in December and the following Spring being 
consistent with the number that were anticipated prior to the storm. (Interviewee #11, 
personal communication, 9-9-11). Secondly, the fact that all classes and labs were 
reconstituted and assigned to compatible classrooms and labs in College Station was 
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key.  No courses had to be eliminated, and all critical equipment was available 
(Interviewee #5, personal communication, 7-29-11).  Furthermore academic 
performance declined somewhat overall but was still very much within the range of a 
successful semester especially considering the crisis and trauma many of the students 
had experienced (Interviewee #10, personal communication, 9-8-11).  Third, every 
student who needed housing was assigned to a safe, furnished property. Fourth, the 
information process was successful in that every faculty, staff, and student was 
accounted for and contacted allowing the relocation process to move forward 
(Interviewee #4, personal communication, 7-27-11).  Lastly the financial analysis that 
eventually assessed the operational plan found that the TAMUG Crisis Management 
Team had actually saved TAMUG financially by taking the actions that they did 
(Interviewee #6, personal communication, 8-2-11).   One team member referenced some 
of the measures: 
The percentage of people that showed up in College Station, people graduating in 
December, those kinds of things I think are the biggest.  Secondarily, the housing 
and classes - we got them housed however adequately.  None were grossly 
inadequate. Classrooms, none of the classrooms we put people in were bad 
enough that they weren’t at least adequately successful in their stuff.  I don’t 
think -- if my sort of 80% stuff, I don’t think anybody lost over 5% over the 
norm because of the classroom.  There may have been people who lost 10%, 
more than 5% because the classroom was that I was assigned in.  But we got labs 
into labs, we got my class that needed a computer in the computer rooms.  We 
were at least -- I don’t know of any classrooms that at the end of the semester 
that were inadequate for teaching their subject.  I know there were ones that were 
marginal – SBISA Dining center - because of some of the sound stuff.  No matter 
what we did, it was just a big awkward room and there was a lot of noise next 
door.  So there may be one but I mean the labs, as far as I can tell from talking to 
people, they all got into a lab that let them do their dedicated lab courses at least 
adequately.  Some of them took field trips and so on. So, that was a big measure 
in my mind (Interviewee #5, personal communication, 7-29-11).   
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 A much larger measure that was heavily considered by the TAMUG Crisis 
Management Team was the overall accomplishment of the organizational strategy and 
action plans.  Obviously the relocation was the first time the TAMUG, and perhaps any 
other institution, had attempted the business continuity plan component of the crisis 
management plan.  Nearly all other institutions had responded by simply closing down 
for a semester or two until the campus could recover with often huge impacts in their 
ensuing enrollment.  TAMUG itself utilized this strategy to some extent immediately 
after Hurricane Alicia and suffered a resulting enrollment setback that took nearly a 
decade to recover from.  The question for the TAMUG Crisis Management Team was 
would the stress and difficulties of the relocation process cause a similar decline in 
students.  The measure of enrollment in the following Spring and Fall found absolutely 
no drop off in enrollment with the Spring immediately following showing a record 
enrollment 1563 students for the university (Interviewee #7, personal communication, 8-
9-11).   Figure 4 demonstrates the TAMUG enrollment figures prior to the storm and the 
eventual enrollment for the following years.  
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Figure 4. Texas A&M University at Galveston Fall Enrollment Figures  
 
 
 
Preserving this enrollment trend while delivering on the rest of the mission of the 
university was a fairly solid measurement in the eyes of many of the TAMUG Crisis 
Management Team members: 
Well I mean, we graduated students that were intended to graduate in December, 
and students continued their education for the most part - I’m assuming some 
chose to take a break in their course work, because they didn’t want to go to 
College Station - but for the most part, what we as a campus have as a mission, 
we were able to fulfill, and I think we did it across the board.  I mean it wasn’t 
just that they went to class - they had their activities, they had their intramural 
sports, they had access to tutoring, they had access to the writing center.  It was a 
little maybe unorthodox, but I think they had access to all of the kinds of things 
that they would have access to had they been in Galveston. So on a very broad 
sense I think we as a campus were able to fulfill that broad mission, little 
unorthodox, but we did it.  And were able to continue on as a viable institution 
back in Galveston the following Spring (Interviewee #2, personal 
communication, 7-22-11).   
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Other key business results of interest to the TAMUG Crisis Management Team 
included key measures of ethical behavior as well as regulatory and legal compliance. 
When asked about the key measure of ethical behavior, several TAMUG Crisis 
Management Team members identified the fact that TAMUG did not terminate a single 
e
mployee as a result of the crisis despite most business on the island doing so.  “But that 
was huge; it was huge for me personally.  I gave more because I knew A&M was 
standing behind us and that I was and being so much a part of this community I had 
very, very dear friends that were so hurt, because they lost everything and then they were 
left without jobs and sometimes both jobs, and there’ll be health issues and there’ll be --.  
It 
was terrible and I am thankful that I think A&M did a really good job. Its the best that 
we could do” (Interviewee #1, personal communication, 7-18-11).  The fact that 
TAMUG delivered upon its promise of education to the students at no additional cost to 
the student was another often cited example of ethical behavior.  
Probably the biggest measure of ethical behavior is the net neutral --the no net 
loss. I mean it was a big ethical statement for us to make as an institution.  I think 
it was ethical and I think we did get, you know, reasonably close. The other big 
ethical statement was letting our students that didn’t come back credit everything 
to the Spring.  I think that was the ethically correct thing to do, very difficult 
choice to make and to carry up.  And -- in retrospect we got people to believe it 
was legal.  Whether it was or not, who knows?  The intent was consistent with 
law, clearly.  I mean the intent was let the students pay for school and get school, 
but have them not pay if they don’t get something.  Well, in this case they didn’t 
get something, so we gave it to them. You could argue that I suspect.  I don’t 
think the legislature anticipated that event and would have -- it wasn’t written 
into the law to allow, let's put it that way, but it was the ethical thing to do 
(Interviewee #5, personal communication, 7-29-11).  
 
Furthermore there were a number of measures of regulatory and legal compliance.  The 
state already had a number of processes in place to ensure compliance and TAMUG 
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worked closely with such agencies as FEMA and the Texas Higher Education 
Coordinating Board throughout the crisis.  In addition, an audit was performed that 
further confirmed compliance with state regulations and rules. 
We had a formal state audit done, right in the middle of all these.  Inconvenient, 
but again vital in a sense it documented very thoroughly what was going on in 
there and that's a public record.  That's available to us right now if anybody wants 
to see it basically. 
 
We also have our actual reviews.  We did a formal review after the fact to what 
we did.  So, we have all those things which I think measured what happened and 
documented and formalized all of that, so that part was done pretty well.  We did 
some specific things here in terms of I’m looking at certain areas where we felt 
we didn’t do well and those are available to us as well for down the road to 
utilize.  It's had to have been used, I’m sure, in terms of the plan revisions and 
that sort of thing (Interviewee #11, personal communication, 9-9-11).   
 
 A final measurement that could be obtained was the organization’s fulfillment of 
its societal responsibilities.  Many TAMUG Crisis Management Team members refer 
back to the graduation numbers and keeping students on track academically.  These 
things were confirmed by the Legislative Budget Board of the state legislature that made 
it apparent that Texas A&M University had done the right things for the right reasons 
(Interviewee #4, personal communication, 7-27-11).  But many thought there was more.  
“We graduated students and we've supported our local community in effective ways 
even though they weren't part of our central mission” (Interviewee #11, personal 
communication, 9-9-11).  TAMUG took care of its people and the people in the 
Galveston community.  
Our societal obligation was to take care of our own and as many people as we 
could, and we did that.  We put them in residence halls, fed them, gave them 
financial support, mental health support, you know a lot of stuff we talked about.  
In terms of commitment to the community, I’ve tried to use as many local 
vendors to help us out if I could… In the commitment to the community with 
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UTMB, we were prepared to bring them on campus and we did in some regard 
(Interviewee #3, personal communication, 7-20-11).  
 
Others speak more to some of the intangible measures of meeting the societal 
obligations: 
Well, I think that you can see in our key measures that we not only stabilized 
enrollment in the short term but we were actually growing by the following Fall 
is an amazing measure of performance that the key measures that we track for the 
state the retention graduation rates don’t reflect a hurricane, it’s huge.  And then 
the intangible, the one that and I’m sure will decrease over time with the loss of 
historical memory but the goodwill that we have for what we did was huge.  Not 
only in the Galveston community, because people recognize we didn’t RIF 
people and we didn’t do things; and we did what we had to do, but even at the 
state level… I mean, I was at one of the debriefings when Loftin was briefing 
and the Chancellor stood up to do a commendation of the people in Galveston, 
and he literally choked up and teared up, about what we had done and showing 
this.  Also, like at the coordinating board, we are known as being very high 
quality institution now.  We sail through with graduate programs and things that I 
don’t know if we would have the same reputation, because they know we are 
going to push it out there and get it done.  So there are some intangibles that have 
been kind of like yeah.  I don’t think Loftin would be the president of Texas 
A&M University right now, without this hurricane.  I think that was the visibility 
and that sense of leadership that put him in that position to do this. (Interviewee 
#1, personal communication, 7-18-11).   
 
 The TAMUG Crisis Response Team had a series of significant business results 
as a result of their deployment of the Crisis Response Plan.  Not all of the results 
demonstrated remarkable performance but many did.  There were some challenges in 
learning and improvement to student learning, but the results demonstrated that over 
time, the impact of the Hurricane on the learning process was recoverable.  At the same 
time, TAMUG demonstrated remarkable results in many other measures specified by the 
Baldrige-based criteria.   
 Ensuring Consistency of Approach 
 After  discussing  in  detail  the  numerous   strategies  that  the  TAMUG  Crisis
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Management Team deployed in its approach, the second part of research question two 
considered the strategies that the team used to ensure a consistency of approach.  In the 
rapid fire environment of crisis response, consistency in approach is always a challenge.  
Too often during crisis, various departments feel the need to respond immediately to 
their immediate situations, resulting in a fragmented response that is not systemic in 
nature.  Although TAMUG utilized a number of intentional strategies, there were a 
number of structural realities that were in place before the crisis or came about as a 
direct result of the crisis that facilitated a more systemic approach to the crisis.  For one, 
the very size of the campus and staff contributed greatly to unified decision-making.  
Although there certainly were challenges in accomplishing everything that needed to be 
done with a smaller staff, one of the benefits of the smaller staff was the culture of 
working together with other components of the university to accomplish goals.  This 
already relatively small number was further reduced when the campus staff was split into 
those who would relocate with the students and those who would stay in Galveston to 
rehabilitate the campus.  With each of these groups having different personnel and 
focused on different missions, the university in many ways acted as two completely 
separated and thus smaller systems rather than one large system.  Additionally, the small 
group that was operating in College Station was compressed mostly into two working 
areas, the Grove and General Services Building with many sharing offices and work 
spaces.  The long hours that were necessary in these close-knit working environments 
already contributed greatly to strong communication and awareness of each other’s 
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operations, but this situation was even further augmented by the fact that the workers 
were located in a new community away from their friends and for some their family.  As 
a result, even the typical social occasions like meals were often spent with co-workers 
where conversation often drifted to the day’s challenges and accomplishments 
(Interviewee #2, personal communication, 7-22-11). 
Still the TAMUG Crisis Management Team employed a number of strategies to 
ensure a consistency in deploying approach.  The first was through the selection of 
leadership for the crisis management team.  The team was very operational in nature, 
and the university was very intentional in assigning all of the major operational decision 
makers to the team.  The result of this decision was a crisis management team that was 
fairly broad in the expanse of their campus responsibilities so when a decision was made 
within the group, it was immediately communicated to that broad constituency who 
could then communicate the message to their direct reports.  With there not being a lot of 
depth in the organization chart, communication moved at a fairly rapid and direct line 
through the College Station-based component of the organization.  In the early days of 
the Crisis Management Team meeting daily and then members immediately meeting 
with their direct reports, communication was immediate, direct, and pervasive.  As needs 
evolved, so did the group which eventually evolved to the Strategic Operations Team, 
where new members were brought into the group to continue the participatory decision 
making and lines of communication.  The same was true of the Galveston based staff, 
many of whom were living and eating every day on the campus together.  The team in 
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Galveston relied on daily meetings to communicate priorities and gather feedback from 
the staff.  
But I think the fact the meals are especially, because what happened with meals 
was we started more before we got the dining hall back up and running, when we 
were just a physical plant department working with our own staff. We had a 
barbecue pit and that’s one thing about Tammy Lobaugh, director at the time, her 
strengths are crisis management in terms of logistics as far as I know.  She had 
the barbecue pit going, and she knew where to get the food.  She had to talk a 
little.  On all that stuff you had Tammy cooking.  And, so, Tammy was excellent 
at doing that.  We had morning meetings and close up meetings at the end of the 
day where we could debrief everybody and find out where to set up for our next 
day’s work would be or we need to focus the next day (Interviewee #3, personal 
communication, 7-20-11). 
 
 Another strategy that was deployed to ensure the approach was applied 
consistently throughout the work units was the communication of a clear organizational 
vision and more specific guiding principles.  The TAMUG Crisis Management Team 
worked closely together on many of the key decisions, but eventually individual work 
units had to focus on their individual areas.  The guiding principles established a 
framework that allowed individuals to make necessary decisions while being consistent 
in their approach.  As one participant recalls:  
But from watching the process unfold from that day through the next three or 
four months we went back to those guiding principles over and over and over 
again whenever there was conflict and there were multiple conflicts whether it 
was the -- how the parking tag worked and the thing or whether the students 
could get a shot in the health center.  It was that kind of thing that you kept going 
back, “No that’s not what we agreed on.  These are the guiding principles”, and I 
put those in here just for my notes.  I’m not even sure that they were fully 
articulated, but those guiding principles were that we would maintain the 
academic continuity of all classes because the classes were already in progress 
and maintain the relationship between the faculty member and the student.  That 
was huge, because that changed the model that I had built before hand and that 
was a significant paradigm shift that happened that had some interesting 
consequences, but it absolutely made sense in hindsight - They would need to 
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stay together and anyway that was important (Interviewee #1, personal 
communication, 7-18-11). 
 
One of the main approaches that was clearly defined through the organizational 
vision and guiding principles was the approach of keeping the Sea Aggie identity as 
much as possible.  With less than 2000 students on a campus of 45,000, this was not an 
easy task and required a heavy emphasis in the first few weeks.  Rebuilding the course 
schedule with students remaining with their TAMUG faculty and housing TAMUG 
students together as much as possible were two massive undertakings of many that 
involved a large percentage of the workforce available to the team.  With such a high 
percentage of available staff allocated to working on this challenge in the very early days 
of the crisis response, the approach was deployed by being clearly reinforced in the 
minds of all involved.  Furthermore, those initial efforts of building the course schedule 
and housing students together resulted in other priorities that were highlighted (locating 
classrooms, furnishing apartments, etc.) that kept employees focused on the approach for 
some time.  With this heavy emphasis and large amount of manpower devoted to this 
approach for an extended amount of time, the entire system was dedicated toward 
consistently deploying this approach.  One of the participants speaks about the approach:  
One model we looked at for a while - we would just plug in the students in the 
courses here but since we are already into the semester, it seemed to be very 
inappropriate especially for freshmen students, freshmen students who were 
really unacquainted with anything else.  To take them from one place to the other 
and almost guarantee perhaps a lower success rate on the part our students 
academically by doing that and so I thought it was a harder thing to do than just 
plugging students into specific holes and just in classes here in College Station.  
Given the relative sizes, that would have been very practical actually to do but 
we made that decision which drove several decisions beyond that.  We had to 
then locate real classrooms that were empty.  We had to locate laboratories that 
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were empty and we ended up going into odd hours, weekends, and even going 
off campus for the number of those activities. 
 
Ultimately those principles we actually selected there but again the idea was to 
make it -- make it easy as we could for the students to be here and I think that 
was proven by 92% of the students persisted here and those that didn’t had very 
specific reasons, typically family connected, perhaps job connected they were 
working because of -- to inhibit their relocation here (Interviewee #11, personal 
communication, 9-9-11). 
 
After the initial leadership structure, organizational vision, and guiding principles 
were deployed to guide employees, one of the next immediate concerns was the 
distribution of information to the students and parents who would be considering 
relocating with the campus.  Ensuring that information was delivered and questions were 
answered in a clear and consistent manner was another challenge for the TAMUG Crisis 
Management Team.  Once again they fell back to a systemic process to address this 
challenge.  Students and parents had been directed to the webpage for information 
throughout the process and the webpage continued to be the central hub for information.  
For individuals who had questions that were not addressed on the webpage, several 
phone numbers were provided that rang into a room lined with paper.  Working the 
phones were various staff members who had lists of the frequently asked question who 
would try and answer any question from that list.  If the caller asked a question that was 
not on the list, the answer was written on the paper on the wall, the TAMUG Crisis 
Management Team members would answer it, and then it would be added to the web 
posting of the most frequently asked questions.  This process was exhaustive to many of 
the employees as many of the questions were asked repeatedly even though the answers 
were posted online. As one participant remembered:  
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The only thing that I would say about that is we really--at every stage, the first 
few days of that mad housing rush; we said the same thing over and over and 
over and over again into this, you know at every opportunity we said it.  I think 
we kind of did the same thing with "Right, this is how your class is going to 
work.  Here's how your finals going to work.  Here's how the holiday's going to 
work."  You know we just had to say everything over and over and over again 
which is fair, I mean it was a lot for people to take in (Interviewee #4, personal 
communication, 7-27-11). 
 
As this process evolved, eventually an expansive list of questions and responses were 
developed, and as many of the staff worked the hotline for several days, a 
comprehensive understanding for how the university was going to respond to the crisis 
was developed and understood.  Although the experts in each area were often called in to 
address questions, the sheer numbers of calls necessitated workers frequently handing 
calls that would typically fall out of their area of expertise.  This resulted in the 
employees who worked the hotlines having a broad base of knowledge to draw from and 
further facilitated a certain level of consistency in approach. 
I mean certainly the website and updating it regularly and timely and on a 
schedule was critical because it built an expectation that they would be told when 
things happened.  And an assurance that they had been told everything we could 
tell them and the Frequently Asked Questions - posting and constantly adding the 
Frequently Asked Questions were a huge -- I mean, when you really think about 
it, maybe in retrospect I miss the significant piece of just that, that FAQs were a 
big piece of that.  Because those were questions we got from one person, that we 
said other people had this question too, and we regurgitated. 
 
Well, No; first we formulated an answer. In many of those cases, we couldn’t 
answer the question when the first person called because we didn’t know the 
answer.  And in a number of those cases like we alluded to earlier, we made up 
the answer.  And then we all swore to secrecy and said, you lie and I’ll swear 
we’re sticking to it.  “It’s got to be cost neutral.”  “We’re going to start on 
Wednesday morning.”  We all just sort of made this big lie and made it happen 
then and so we made it truth but it was self-fulfilling prophecy.  We just had to 
wing it. 
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Now at least running FAQs helped us all as it made us consistently wing it.  And 
we at least thought about the answer rather than flipping coins on the phone.  So 
the FAQ process was a critical part of the dialog that occurred in retrospect, I 
think because they grew regularly and you and I attended a lot of meetings where 
somebody -- Karen walked in and said a student asked this. We said, ‘what did 
you tell them?’  I don’t know, I’ll get back with you.  Okay, good answer.  And 
then we made up an answer. 
 
And continue to build that knowledge base because what it became was a 
knowledge base and our only knowledge base because a bunch of the stuff was 
made up and it was new to us.  It was FEMA rules and stuff that we’d never been 
exposed to before that we had to go research or get somebody to research and 
come back and present it in an understandable format, which was always hard 
with the federal government.  And so, yeah, that was something in retrospect.  It 
certainly worked up quite effectively up through about the first week of classes, 
after that I’m not sure we updated it.  But I remember a lot of discussions around 
trying to come up with an answer to those questions.  We occasionally 
rescrubbed them, changed some of the answers on the Frequently Asked 
Questions when we found out we couldn’t do that or it was a really 
phenomenally bad idea (Interviewee #5, personal communication, 7-29-11). 
 
Once the initial part of the crisis passed, the students began working within the 
routine of attending class, a process they were familiar with even if it fell within the 
system of the TAMU- College Station campus.  Unfortunately this was one area where 
the university’s system of ensuring consistency faltered.  Prior to the hurricane, the 
university had required any faculty seeking the ability to conduct their class through 
distance education technology would have to secure approval through a distance 
education committee.  Through this process, syllabi could be reviewed as well as 
appropriate training and support identified for the faculty member, and quality of 
academic quality could be preserved.  Unfortunately in the process of facilitating faculty 
in the relocation process, the approval requirement was waived and a number of faculty 
opted for distance education courses without prior training or course approval.  This 
resulted in courses that were already fairly inappropriate for distance based teaching like 
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Calculus for freshmen being taught by instructors who were not qualified to use this 
medium, resulting in wildly inconsistent quality and performance in many courses.  As 
one of the team members described it: 
We have a policy that says, if a class is going to be a distance course, over 51% 
of its contents presented online versus face to face, it has to have department 
head and VP for academics approval.  We waived that.  We wouldn’t waive that 
next time, not if I have a jolt and Seitz has appointed me as the distance 
coordinator for, as our official distance coordinator right now.  And I’ve talked 
about it and that would be the thing I wouldn’t change, the math.  We start so far 
in the hole with those particular faculty; their face-to-face classes are marginal.  
In fact, in some cases they are below marginal.  Look at the failure rates.  So do 
we screw them a little bit or we screw them a lot?  I mean, in the other courses 
where the faculty were performing already at a more acceptable level, we had 
little much less issues.  The place we had the issues were with faculty who were 
the weakest to start with which is predictable, but we’re probably not performing 
very well in the first place.  And during the situation, when I was here talking to 
a couple of those faculty and trying to advise them on how to improve what they 
were doing, they didn’t listen. 
 
The difference was, I had taught my course fully online already, so I developed a 
hybrid course.  I’d had a couple of cases where students needed to graduate, and I 
had taught my course fully online already.  Here, but fully online.  I never met 
them face to face and in one case I met them once face to face or no, I proctored 
test three times; once first day of class, midterm, final.  The only time I saw the 
students all time was during tests and the rest was fully online, so I’ve done that 
twice; two semesters with two different groups of students for their personal 
reasons. 
 
And we’ve gotten approval that the distance sections need to follow our rules and 
I was trying to talk to at least one of the faculty, who is one of our weakest 
faculty, in my opinion.  They did the distance and it kind of worked but that’s 
why she’s weak in the first place.  They never listened in the first place about 
how she ought to teach.  And she’s too weak, I had just an opportunity to see and 
experience that syllabus for her course.  And I thought besides not meeting the 
spirit of the law, it didn’t meet the letter of the law either.  Her course objectives 
that we’re supposed to put in her syllabus was the sentence out of the catalogue 
which was horribly written -  describing the course as a series of sentence 
fragments with no verbs, no adjectives.  Vectors, period, Angles, period.  It’s the 
worst syllabus I’ve even seen in my whole life.  Now that person wasn’t 
succeeding before this distance.  Certainly I could have told them how to succeed 
with this and they didn’t listen when I tried to help.  I physically drove down 
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there and talked to her.  So there will be failures.  There are failures with various 
departments all the time.  The faculty, just as the students... I assessed accurately 
that they didn’t know what they were doing to put it in proper terms, the 
politically correct terms. 
 
So yeah, there was a failure there.  The prevention would have been - we might 
have mitigated it happening by making it be approved.  The odds are Gil would 
have approved anyway.  But we waived our approval process.  We shouldn’t in 
the future way but we should be very -- we should learn from this experience and 
be very careful (Interviewee #5, personal communication, 7-29-11). 
 
Summary 
 TAMUG used a number of strategies in deployment of the approach.  The plan 
had been very strategic in nature and did not provide much in the way of detail for the 
Business Continuity component of the plan.   In fact, very little guidance was provided 
about the students or workforce beyond their safety and security.  In fact the preservation 
of the campus Sea Aggie culture and identity became a major strategy during the course 
of the deployment, yet the plan actually worked against that strategy to a large extent.  
Still, the original plan of relocating to TAMU-CS where many of the processes were 
familiar and could be adequately managed proved to be critical in the deployment and 
contributed a great deal to the success of the crisis management.  The business results 
that came out as a result of the deployment greatly support this notion of success. 
 In addition, TAMUG did not deploy too many strategies to ensure consistency in 
its approach, because there were already a number of aspects that naturally contributed 
to a well-coordinated approach.  For one, the smallness of the campus staff was further 
reduced due to the relocation that left part of the staff in Galveston and part in College 
Station, each with its own fairly distinct mission.  The group in College Station was 
further consolidated in two main locations which further facilitated coordination and 
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communication.  The strategies that were deployed utilized a broad operational 
composition in leadership that shared decision making and utilized direct 
communication to staff to ensure clear messaging.  Frequent meetings of this group and 
subgroups ensured rapid and consistent messages that aligned with the organizational 
vision and guiding principles of the crisis response.  The very implementation of the 
initial steps of the guiding principles required large effort and staffing to further bring 
focus to the goals of the crisis response.  In addition, the first steps of the response in 
refining the communication and instructions to the students further honed the 
organizational vision for a large number of staff.  The greatest failure is ensuring 
consistency across the work units was dropping the standard of approval for distance 
education which allowed great disparity among the different distance education courses. 
Key Findings 
 1. The TAMUG Crisis Management Team had the authority necessary to make 
any decision necessary to progress through the crisis.  The representation of the team 
covered most operations of the university and due to the longevity and familiarity 
between many of the crisis team members, there was a high level of trust between team 
members as well as from the staff and faculty of the university to the members of the 
team.  The fact that the employees of the university trusted the leadership team and that 
the university retained all of its workers further contributed to employee morale and 
commitment to the relocation effort. 
 2. The crisis management plan was critical in guiding the team members through 
the initial stages of the crisis.  Not only did the advance development of the plan provide 
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for thoughtful reflection and planning on appropriate processes and response, it 
facilitated collaboration and familiarity between colleagues from different campuses to 
critically consider potential solutions.  These collegial relationships could not have 
occurred in the urgency directly following the crisis when the stress and trauma of losing 
a home further complicated the decision making of many of the participants.  Instead a 
plan that was not without faults provided a solid pathway and guidance to crisis team 
members during a time of great unknown.  
 3.  The organizational vision of the relocation and specifically the guiding 
principles proved to be extremely critical through the relocation.  The crisis management 
plan could only be expected to provide broad guidance through the initial parts of the 
crisis, not the more specific issues that arose that were unique to the situation.  The 
guiding principles provided the framework to guide employees in making appropriate 
decisions in line with the leadership team’s message.  There were some challenges in 
better defining some of the principles, in particular the principle of cost neutral and what 
exactly that meant to students, staff, and faculty.    
 4.  Process is incredibly important in crisis situations.  There was a real effort to 
keep processes as simple and familiar as possible for students, staff, and faculty as they 
dealt with the crisis.  Efforts were made to employ step by step processes to eliminate 
confusion as students began the relocation process by surveying the students, then 
registering them for classes and housing and orienting them all within a series of lines 
over two days.  Although class location was different, familiar classmates, material and 
instructors provided a similar process to what was experienced in Galveston.  In fact, the 
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greatest criticisms of the crisis response came from those situations where processes 
were significantly changed such as allowing faculty who had never taught distance 
courses to convert their class to a distance education course.  For the most part, faculty 
and staff were able to utilize familiar processes due to the satellite campus relationship 
between Texas A&M University and its Galveston satellite campus.  The familiarity of 
these processes balanced the challenges of new processes such as organizing donation 
drives and coordination of events on a less familiar campus. 
5.  Preserving the Sea Aggie Culture and Identity became a major concern in the 
deployment of the plan.  Seeking opportunities to communicate the values of the 
institution, working to develop familiar structure for the students through course 
scheduling and housing and emphasizing socialization through activities and interaction 
were continuous themes as the Crisis Management Team developed strategies to keep 
the students, and to some extent the faculty and staff, engaged.  The relocation was an 
effort to keep TAMUG viable, and the TAMUG Crisis Management Team did not want 
all of the freshmen students to bond to the TAMU- College Station campus and transfer 
to TAMU- College Station at the end of the semester.  Keeping the classes together, 
housing them together as much as possible, various intramural/ student activities, and 
many other activities were purposefully coordinated to facilitate the bond between 
students, staff and faculty in hopes of returning the entire student body to Galveston, an 
effort that was largely successful. 
6. Communication during crises is critical, and the Hurricane Ike crisis was no 
exception.  Communication was often difficult after the storm with people relocated 
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across the state, electricity out for most of Houston and surrounding areas, and cell 
phone coverage poor or unavailable. From the constant communication to the students 
immediately after the hurricane’s landfall to the numerous student forums and emails 
throughout the semester, TAMUG worked diligently to communicate with the student 
body and assess their progress and keep them connected to the university and each other.  
Communication was equally critical in confirming the safety of the university employees 
as well as confirming their ability to continue after the storm.  Staff members were 
located, provided instructions, and immediately went to work on their phase of the plan 
whether than entailed working back on the campus or driving to College Station to assist 
in the relocation.  Communication was key to mobilizing the plan. 
7. Course scheduling was one of the most complex and difficult processes of the 
relocation plan.  Locating and communicating with teaching assistants, adjunct faculty 
whose day jobs may be relocating them, and full faculty that have research obligations, 
confirming their intention to continue the semester, locating classrooms on and off the 
campus that are appropriate for teaching, developing a schedule and registering students 
is already a complex issue.  Performing this action in a matter of days with a limited 
number of trained staff is especially trying.  This process was further complicated by a 
report with bad data and the fact that many of the courses are specialized to an extent 
where they were not easily replicated in TAMU- College Station.  This was especially 
true of many of the maritime classes where special trips to the Houston ship channel had 
to be coordinated.  Further complicating the process was the ever changing number of 
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students who would relocate, a number that initially was estimated at 60% but grew to 
90% by the day before registration. 
8. Securing housing for faculty, staff, and students was another complex issue for 
the university.  Housing was one of the first issues that needed to be addressed, and it 
was a challenge that the Texas A&M system waded into without much legal certainty.  
While working with the off campus housing office to identify available housing, the 
system real estate office was developing leases for faculty, staff and students without a 
precedent.  The university hoped for and eventually received FEMA reimbursement, but 
the identification, furnishing, and payment for the housing was an incredibly difficult 
operation, yet was critical to the relocation’s success.  
9.  In focusing on their workforce commitment, the TAMUG Crisis Management 
Team understood the difficulty and trauma faced by many of the workforce and possibly 
even compounded by the relocation of the students.  Families were split which would 
already be difficult, but after a hurricane had devastated the family home, compassion 
and flexibility were emphasized.  Housing in the residence halls and leased apartments 
was provided for those in Galveston who did not have a safe home in which to live, and 
flexibility of work schedule was encouraged as much as possible to allow employees to 
work on their homes and see their families.   
10.  Although the size of the staff was a challenge in many ways, the smallness 
greatly enhanced the coordination of the approach.  TAMUG’s small staff was further 
divided with many remaining in Galveston, and those in College Station handling 
multiple responsibilities.  This resulted in a fairly flat organizational chart which meant 
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operational meetings being fairly small in number but extremely inclusive in terms of 
areas of responsibility.  This streamlined organization allowed for the rapid 
dissemination of information and directives as well as more rapid collection and 
response to valuable feedback. 
 11.  Immediately following the decision to relocate, days were filled with long 
lists of things to accomplish and very little time in which to accomplish them.  The daily 
meetings were often difficult interruptions from the hectic work day but proved to be 
critical to ensuring a consistent approach and deployment.  Often just one hour a day, the 
ability to get everyone in the same room, collect information from a broad perspective 
and make decisions as a group ensured that at least once a day everyone was on the same 
page.  This consistent message and response went a long way to calming students, staff, 
and faculty who were often recovering from a traumatic situation. 
 12.  Eliminating the standard of approval for the distance education requirements 
for the coursework eased the initial process of faculty being able to teach their courses 
but eventually undercut one of the main guiding principles of preserving the academic 
quality of the courses.  
 
Research Question 3 -Learning 
Research Question Three inquires as to what learning occurred as a result of 
refining the approach through cycles of evaluation and improvement?  Learning as 
defined by the Baldrige organization refers to the refining of the approach through cycles 
of evaluation and improvement, encouraging breakthrough change to your approach 
 266 
 
through innovation, and sharing refinements and innovations with other relevant work 
units and processes in your organization (National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, 2011).  Crises are important opportunities for learning (Kovoor-Misra & 
Nathan, 2000).  Unfortunately the timing of crisis and required crisis response does not 
always allow for learning mid-crisis, with most learning occurring post crisis during the 
debriefing process.  Even then, post-crises learning is time sensitive with the opportunity 
for learning transitioning through three processes: first defensiveness then openness to 
learning, and finally followed by forgetfulness (Kovoor-Misra & Nathan, 2000).  As 
such, organizations must be deliberate with regards to their learning and intentional with 
codifying and implementing their learning into future crisis response. 
The data shows that learning occurred throughout TAMUG’s crisis response 
process with a steady process of evaluation and improvement for future crisis response.  
Numerous interviewees discussed the four step process of prevention, response, 
recovery, and learning throughout the crisis response process leading up to Hurricane 
Ike.  It was common practice after each evacuation for a brief after action meeting to be 
held to discuss any issues or damage, discuss viable alternatives to mitigate the damage 
and then adjust the plan appropriately (Interviewee #9, personal communication, 8-18-
11).  The modifications were typically fairly minor over the past twenty years as they 
focused only on the evacuation and campus preparation as no major strike on the campus 
or Galveston had occurred in some time.  Although TAMUG ‘s response to threat of 
crisis and after action reviews demonstrated learning, TAMUG also incorporated other 
learning processes through identification of best practices and observation of other 
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universities’ experiences.    The most apparent learning in this prevention phase of their 
crisis management planning took place after Hurricane Katrina devastated New Orleans, 
causing massive damage to a number of the colleges and universities located there.  The 
potential for a major crisis as a result of a hurricane was further emphasized with 
Hurricane Rita striking nearby Lamar University in Beaumont, Texas just a short time 
later.  Although TAMUG was certainly already very cognizant of their vulnerability to a 
hurricane strike, these two major disasters further emphasized the effect that such a 
disaster could have on the area surrounding the university and what a significant impact 
that could play in the response following the storm.  These storms also demonstrated the 
long-term effects of such a strike could have on the enrollment and survival of a 
university.   
Through these universities’ experiences, valuable lessons were learned by 
TAMUG’s Crisis Management Team.  These three storms clearly demonstrated that 
even if TAMUG was successful in weathering the storm, damage to the surrounding area 
could seriously impact the university moving forward (Interviewee #11, personal 
communication, 9-9-11).  Administrators at universities impacted by Katrina and Rita 
were contacted to glean valuable information about the impact of the storms and the 
respective crisis response to provide valuable information for the development of 
TAMUG’s crisis management plan.  In reviewing the continuing impact to enrollment 
after the storm has long past, this data reinforced the notion that simply closing down for 
a semester as did many of the Katrina-affected universities was not an option for 
TAMUG.  The attrition of students after a cancelled semester was significant in every 
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situation, and it was concluded TAMUG simply did not have the enrollment to sustain 
such a plan.   
Lamar University was growing at 10% a year when Rita hit.  The next three 
years they were flat.  So, the IT guys there, and I talked to him a lot about it, and 
listened to his presentations on Rita, and asked a lot of pointed questions, and 
fortunately - more fortunately than I hoped at the time – learned a lot.  So, they 
figured in the three year period after Rita, it cost them 30% of their student body.  
 
Tulane, like Xavier…in New Orleans.  Xavier is still not back. Tulane --
University of New Orleans. UNO, where is its enrollment right now?  50% I 
think.  Right, UNO?  In contrast, we had a record number in spring and the next 
fall I think and actually every semester since then.  So, we not only didn’t lose 
the growth like -- I mean, one we didn’t lose half our students like in New 
Orleans even though the island was 20% of this population.  Not the whole area 
but the island.  They once lost 60%.  Lamar lost over three years 30% in the loss 
growth. That's where they looked at it as they lost their growth and it took them- 
it was three years where they started back up again in a growth pattern.  We had 
record growth for the next… for the record, not necessarily record growth but 
record enrollment and pretty much high end to our record growth for the next 
few semesters.  So, those are big measures.  They're very aggregated but those 
are very big measures of our success that -- because we could have not had that 
happen.  That's why I mentioned Lamar and New Orleans even though like -- 
Tulane even, Xavier -- it's not automatic (Interviewee #5, personal 
communication, 7-29-11).   
 
While learning of strategies that would not work, the TAMUG Crisis 
Management Team discovered many strategies that offered great potential.  For one, the 
evacuation and continued operation of several of Tulane University’s athletic teams to 
TAMU- College Station offered precedent for the relocation and continued identity 
within TAMU- College Station’s operations.  In fact, the floor plan and orientation 
model that was implemented for the TAMUG students was based on the plan originally 
developed for the Katrina refugees. Although the number of students coming from 
TAMUG turned out to be much greater, the early identification of important departments 
to include in the orientation and traffic flow saved quite a bit of time in planning and 
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reconstituting the process so rapidly after Hurricane Ike.   Other information was learned 
from these universities as well.  The caveat to the cost neutral guiding principle that 
allowed students the option to transfer all of their tuition and defer enrollment to the 
Spring semester was a strategy employed by one of the Louisiana schools to great effect 
and incorporated into TAMUG’s response (Interviewee #7, personal communication, 7-
18-11).  Even some of the details of the Hurricane Rita’s impact on Lamar University 
were assimilated into a table top exercise for training purposes.  The scenario that was 
developed from this information proved to be an effective learning opportunity that 
turned out to be surprisingly prophetic when Hurricane Ike struck TAMUG the 
following year (Interviewee #6, personal communication, 8-2-11). 
Although a great deal of learning and implementation occurred during the 
preparation phase, the greatest amount of learning occurred during the actual crisis.  
Although extensive planning had occurred based off of TAMUG’s experiences as well 
as experiences of other universities facing similar situations, the actual relocation of all 
of the students was a new experience that had never been attempted before.  This rapid 
response environment required in the crisis response coupled with the business 
continuity plan that had never been attempted before resulted in a lot of learning on the 
run.  Even in the initial information dissemination, learning occurred as they determined 
solutions to the challenges as they presented themselves.  As one of the team members 
recalls: 
But the process of developing the FAQs, which was really more of a back and 
forth than it sounds like, was certainly part of the on-going learning process. A 
lot of informal communications occurred like you talked about, talking until 
10:00 o’clock at night every night with students.  And we continued to check in 
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and update each other, because even though we moved out to our purest areas 
physically, we still continued to function as TAMUG in College Station as a 
campus.  And so we continued to meet and share these things we’re all learning 
daily with each other and that was critical.  I mean, we neither moved up there in 
our own little corner of the campus because it wasn’t feasible, there wasn’t a big 
enough corner to put us in all at one place.  And it wouldn’t have worked very 
well either honestly. 
 
Nor did we just go become part of the College Station CIS department College 
Station student services and our students go to College Station classes.  We did 
something in between, which was the essence of the answer to that question, you 
know, by maintaining our identity and maintaining our communication streams 
that we already have.  Feedback to faculty, feedback to student services staff, 
student leaders attending SALT kind of things.  All of those things continued 
through our normal feedback process even though we’re in a very abnormal 
situation. That constant feedback was critical to our learning how we would 
operate in this new environment (Interviewee #5, personal communication, 7-29-
11). 
 
 Although new strategies were learned every day, many of the interviewees spoke 
to the difficulty in trying to apply these strategies across the organization due to the rapid 
response necessary.  Instead, the process seemed to address the many challenges using 
the business continuity plan and guiding principles as much as possible, learn from those 
that worked or didn’t work, and then move onto the next challenge.  As one of the 
interviewees stated about organizational learning: 
I think we did over time but it goes back to only just those big parameters, 
because in the trenches in the crisis you don’t have time and we didn’t have 
enough depth in staff or anything else to be analyzing performance other than is 
it getting done until more of the reflective part, where you stopped and you 
looked back at it, I think.  It’s a lot about speed.  The crisis element puts so much 
speed on there (Interviewee #1, personal communication, 7-18-11). 
 
As things slowed down as the semester progressed, more opportunity for looking once 
again at other institutions and best practice became more practical.  For instance, the 
reimbursement process, which began long after the students were relocated to College 
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Station and classes had resumed, allowed the administration to look to Lamar University 
and explore their response to Hurricane Rita.  Several strategies Lamar University had 
employed successfully in their reimbursement process were implemented at TAMUG.   
The hiring of a FEMA consultant to assist in maximizing the reimbursement revenue 
was one strategy that proved particularly successful to TAMUG’s recovery. 
We fired our first consultant.  Yes, the second consultant we got was actually a 
FEMA guy, and he was very good. And he worked with me personally. We 
finally understood the categories.  You have to understand the categories of 
damage.  You have to understand how they’re going to pay you because some of 
75% pay out, they don’t even pay you 100%.  Some is 100%, some is 80%, and 
some is 90%.  So, we had to argue a bunch of those things.  We finally argued it 
all but the reality is we were very close, so weird, of our original estimates.  I 
picked an 80% pay outright, ends up… So, anyway, basically this is just the 
differential auxiliaries.  Dr. Loftin said to me, “What’s the impact on the book 
store?” I said, “It’s something like $1.5 million,” because we still have to pay the 
people, we’re not getting revenue in for food, we’re not getting revenue in for the 
book store.  Residence hall was a little less of an impact because they collected 
some but they still had a lot of stuff that they haven’t had an outlay for.  So, he 
said, “Find me a precedent,” and I went, “What?” He said, “Find me a precedent 
where the state gave us money for an auxiliary.” That’s unheard of.  I mean, 
come on, think about it.  You can’t even spend auxiliary money on E&G because 
they don’t support auxiliaries.  Well, I’ll be damned, he heard somewhere that 
somebody got some money during Rita.  So, I by hook and crook just called 
anybody I knew, and finally I called the auditors, the state auditors that were 
working on the preliminary estimates, and I said, “Do you know about anything 
about Rita in East Texas, maybe the auxiliaries…?” They go, ‘Yeah. Lamar 
University.’ So, Lamar University got it.  So, we already went to Craig Eiland 
and he put it in the bill.  We got lost revenue for it.  Now what the auditors said 
was, it really wasn’t lost revenue, it was expenses incurred that were spent which 
you didn’t have revenue cover, the same thing. So, but we got it (Interviewee #6, 
personal communication, 8-2-11). 
 
 Just as the slowing of the crisis allowed for learning from others outside the 
organization, it also allowed the staff and administration to start reflecting upon their 
own experiences and determine what had been successful over the semester in case 
relocation was required in the future.  Many of the failed processes were identified and 
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understood while underway like the necessity of keeping daily histories of what was 
published on the webpage (Interviewee #4, personal communication, 7-27-11).  Other 
decisions had to be left to run their course with an understanding that changes would be 
made for future relocations.  The process for approval of distance courses, one of the 
biggest areas of complaint, was one such example.  The following quote, although 
previously cited, best exemplifies one of the key learnings that took place as part of the 
learning process. 
We have a policy that says, if a class is going to be a distance course, over 51% 
of its contents presented online versus face to face, it has to have department 
head and VP for academics approval.  We waived that.  We wouldn’t waive that 
next time, not if I have a jolt and Seitz has appointed me as the distance 
coordinator for, as our official distance coordinator right now.  And I’ve talked 
about it and that would be the thing I wouldn’t change, the math.  We start so far 
in the hole with those particular faculty; their face-to-face classes are marginal.  
In fact, in some cases they are below marginal.  Look at the failure rates.   
 
So do we screw them a little bit or we screw them a lot?  I mean, in the other 
courses where the faculty were more, performing already at a more acceptable 
level, we had little much less issues.  The place we had the issues were with 
faculty who were the weakest to start with which is predictable, but were 
probably not performing very well in the first place.  And during the situation, 
when I was here talking to a couple of those faculty and trying to advise them on 
how to improve what they were doing, they didn’t listen… 
 
So yeah, there was a failure there.  The prevention would have, we might have 
mitigated it happening by have it, made it be approved.  The odds are Gil would 
have approved anyway.  But we waived our thing.  We shouldn’t in the future 
way but we should be very -- we should learn from this experience and be very 
careful.  Now, the other thing we’re doing in prevention is I’m doing everything I 
can to get all our faculties teaching hybrid courses; because a hybrid course is 
fairly trivial to turn into a distance course.  A face-to-face course is very hard to 
learn into a distance course.  And more importantly, all the studies show no 
significant difference between distance and face-to-face (Interviewee #5, 
personal communication, 7-29-11). 
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The reality was that as the pace of the crisis slowed down, the TAMUG Crisis 
Management Team finally had more time to serious contemplate what the successes and 
failures of the previous months had been.  Using the Deming cycle of Plan-Do-Check-
Act, the team was able to review the processes dating all the way back to the planning 
stages to consider the effectiveness of those plans once actually deployed.  Often the 
most learning occurred when there was a gap from the approach to deployment of the 
plan.  The following details the learning that occurred from the gaps in approach to 
deployment in the areas defined by the Quality Texas Foundation- Engagement Level 
Criteria.  
Leadership 
There were several things learned about the leadership as the crisis management 
team deployed the crisis management plan after Hurricane Ike had struck TAMUG.  For 
one, the team that had been carefully selected to develop and hone the plan over the 
years was not the same team to effectively manage the business continuity aspect of the 
plan.  Not only did the distance between the two campuses geographically divide many 
of the staff members from each other, but the issues that each of the teams on the two 
campuses were just as distant in nature.  In many ways, the divided team was dealing 
with two very distinct crises.  In Galveston, the focus was on repairing the campus, 
supporting employees and community neighbors, and seeking additional support and 
housing for the students upon their return.  At the same time in College Station, the 
focus was much more on the students, identifying and equipping classrooms and living 
arrangements for the 1700 students and later the myriad of other issues like lost books 
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and uniforms, donation drives and preserving the Galveston identity and culture among 
the students.  This difference in location and focus resulted in the formation of two 
separate teams, an informal facilities response team under Dr. Brad McGonagle in 
Galveston and the more formalized Strategic Operations Team under Dr. Rodney 
McClendon in College Station. Although these teams were not identified in the crisis 
management plan, they played a critical role in the crisis response, operating almost as 
two subsets of the crisis management team addressing issues at each one of their 
respective campuses with little intersection.  Unfortunately, the independence of these 
teams as each dealt with their own crises became at times problematic as the team in 
Galveston often felt forgotten and left behind when it came to the amount of donations 
and very publicized outreach to the relocated students in College Station. (Interviewee 
#3, personal communication, 7-20-11).  This growing divide was eventually realized 
through employees moving between the two campuses, and efforts were made by Dr. 
Loftin and others to better inform each campus what was occurring with their 
counterpart in an effort to bring the campuses together in spirit. 
In addition, the organizational vision that had been established by the crisis 
management plan, and especially through the white papers developed by the team of 
College Station and Galveston counterparts, established a broad vision to achieve the 
business continuity of TAMUG.  Following best practice of not being too specific in 
their crisis management plan so as to provide managers the flexibility to adapt to the 
unique characteristics of a particular crisis, the plan proved to be in many ways too 
broad in not providing enough guidance.  The guiding principles provided a structure for 
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making decisions rather than what each decision should be and filled in many of the gaps 
left by the plan.  As a result, the development of the guiding principles proved to be a 
key learning in the crisis management response.   
In leadership’s effort to create an environment that fostered and required legal 
and ethical behavior, the issue was not specifically addressed in the approach as the 
leadership team really counted on the highly ethical culture and identity of TAMUG to 
continue through the crisis, and the philosophy worked.  As Chaffee and Tierney state: 
Several important organizational benefits arise when culture, strategy and 
leadership overlap.  When identity is clear and coherent, all who are involved 
with the organization have a star to navigate by in their efforts to contribute to 
the group.  They see what the organization is and, with consistent strategic 
leadership, they see where the organization is headed.  People generally will 
choose to leave an organization that they do not find comfortable and to 
contribute actively to those they believe in.  The organization with clear identity 
and direction attracts those with similar aims and encourages them to find ways 
to help (Chaffee & Tierney, 1988). 
 
TAMUG had enjoyed long term consistent leadership that emphasized ethical behavior 
and as a result had incorporated ethical behavior as part of its identity (Interviewee #3, 
personal communication, 7-20-11). The crisis did not change that expectation in any 
way.  The guiding principles further encouraged ethical behavior.  Instead with much of 
the culture reinforcing ethical and legal behavior, the leadership focused on 
communicating the ethical behavior in a transparent manner.   
Well, I would say that the most important single thing comes down to 
communication.  We tried to be very transparent.  I think we can talk about 
creating ethical environments but when it comes down to it, what does that really 
mean?  You can talk theoretically about it.  We just did it by being transparent.  
So the idea was being very open and above board.  Everybody, here are the 
problems, and here are the solutions we have, and we want you all to work with 
us. 
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It was effective, and so I am not aware of any cases.  There might have been a 
few cases where we had some issues of unethical behavior here but I don’t recall 
any of them.  We certainly had a lot of people who sacrificed a great deal to be 
here with the students and had to pull up stakes and oftentimes had little with 
them.  They left almost with nothing but the clothes on our backs and in some 
cases almost everything they had.  There was a tremendous outpouring of support 
in the campus obviously from Aggie Moms and groups like that but in terms of 
the environment I would say the most important single thing is that we were 
transparent.  We had many, many meetings and lots of communication via our 
website in particular so no one was in the dark about what we were doing and 
why we were doing it.  And that created a feeling of trust among everyone who is 
a part of the team, not just the administration but also the other faculty and staff 
were involved as well as the students themselves.  They thought they were truly a 
part of a family and we were embraced so well by the Aggie Family here that 
that was reinforced in a way too. (Interviewee #11, personal communication, 9-9-
11). 
 
 The TAMUG leadership’s commitment to ethical and legal behavior was 
matched by a commitment to learning and organizational improvement.  Although its 
review of previous crisis situations had been helpful in the Hurricane Ike close down and 
evacuation stages, the crisis management team could not review things that had never 
been attempted before like a campus relocation.  Table top exercises and simulations 
proved to be effective in many ways in the planning, but TAMUG learned that they 
would have to employ a leadership structure that not only had the ability to get all 
necessary data to review performance, but also the power to make broad strategic 
decisions quickly.  This structure enabled the university to be responsive and decisive in 
meeting the constantly evolving challenges of the crisis.  
 Another critical learning point discovered about the leadership in the gap 
between the approach and deployment of the plan was the crisis management team’s 
major emphasis on the students, to the detriment of the staff.  Although the continuation 
of the students’ academic endeavors was critical to the university, the staff also played a 
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key role in the continued success of the university.  There had been some minor 
discussion concerning the housing of critical staff who would travel with the relocated 
students, but no consideration was given to those staff who would remain behind in 
Galveston.  These staff members were critical to the rebuilding of the campus yet many 
were left homeless by the same storm that had forced the students off the island. In 
addition, if the plan was deployed successfully and the relocated students brought back 
to Galveston as soon as possible, these staff would be critical to the university’s 
operation.  Obviously more attention needed to be focused on the employee situation as 
one of TAMUG’s key impacts upon society.  
 The TAMUG Crisis Management Team also learned that the manner in which 
the surrounding community was affected would have a drastic impact on the campuses 
recovery.  Historically most of the storm damage that had been inflicted upon TAMUG 
had been from high winds.  Although the surrounding community had also been 
impacted by those same winds, the surrounding community had never been devastated as 
it had with the significant flooding that had accompanied Hurricane Ike.  In such a 
situation, TAMUG could not seek assistance from the community but instead was in a 
position to offer assistance to many in the community.  Dr. Loftin’s strong connections 
to the community proved to be invaluable during this time in reaching out to offer 
support, but there really was no premeditated plan to offering the assistance. 
We were aware of the problems that both GISD had as well as UTMB in other 
groups.  For example, the Sunshine Group, we gave them space on campus for a 
while.  They had total destruction in the place there so we reached out to various 
groups and said, “Look, we were hurt but not as badly as you.  How can we 
help?”  We took them in and so we let them kind of define how they wanted to 
do it.  We weren’t -- we weren’t strict about exactly what model to follow there 
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and so we had -- we had a number of UTMB students come over, not a lot there.  
A few of them lived on campus but most -- we had some classes there for a 
while. 
 
We had the Sunshine group there for long which is a group of people with 
disabilities who have real challenges and mobility challenges and other things 
and they were handled very well for several weeks until they had usable quarters 
to go back into.  GISD, we had less direct on campus effects for them but I was 
personally involved, the meetings involved working with GISD in their own 
recovery, helping them understand that.  I also was on the board of a chartered 
school which got devastated in the process there, the Odyssey Academy.  So I 
was very directly involved with Odyssey Academy’s recovery too and relocation.  
They went to the Methodist Church there.  It was an interesting process to go 
through all that.  So I saw this in many dimensions.  I saw it with our own 
campus but we were able to, given our, if you will, prior thinking of people 
before me about design and that sort of thing too and just in a way of luck as well 
in terms of how we were relocating compared to other places on the island there.  
We came through very well.   
 
A little side note here of course was the -- was the whole issue of the research 
community and how they could help too and not only with the research that they 
were currently doing.  We tried to continue that research but they also try to 
reach out and help research the recovery.  For example, Dr. Sam Brody was very 
involved in trying to get back into the recovery research area again and he was 
known among the faculty in Galveston but he was working here in College 
Station.  But he was down there right away.  We had grad assistants come from 
our -- one of our programs, master’s programs at Galveston working this problem 
and so we had a lot of people from the faculty and the student side of equation 
going into the community studying what was going on and to prepare research 
studies that would be able to guide recovery and guide future preparations in a 
way that might make this less likely to happen down the road. 
 
So there were all kinds of ways things were going on there and I can’t say it was 
like a grand design.  It happened spontaneously many times because of 
individuals but people who recognized right away that TAMUG was there as a 
resource and they reached out to us once they understood they could and when 
we could help them, we did (Interviewee #11, personal communication, 9-9-11). 
 
Strategic Planning 
When considering the learning that took place as part of the strategic planning for 
the crisis, the most significant realization was how critical the strategic outlook of the 
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plan was.  For years, the approach was simply to weather the storm and then deal with its 
consequences.  After Hurricane Alicia devastated the campus, it took years to recover 
the lost enrollment.  With the experiences of dozens of institutions who suffered greatly 
from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita reinforcing that point, President Loftin adapted a much 
more strategic perspective in requesting the development of the Business Continuity 
component of the crisis management plan that provided for the relocation of the students 
to College Station.  The end result of this strategic view of the problem is a campus that 
was shut down for most of a semester without the loss of any significant enrollment or 
employment. 
As critical as the crisis management plan was for establishing the primary goals, 
the white papers were also found to be incredibly useful for outlining many of the 
shorter term goals and objectives which fell more into functional areas than the broad 
strategic goals of the plan.  The framework these documents established as well as the 
relationships built between counterparts at the two campuses while developing the 
framework was critical to moving the crisis response forward.  Even the large team of 
College Station and Galveston counterparts that had been so important in adapting the 
plan, eventually became too large of an organization to efficiently identify the lesser 
priorities for each of the functional groups, so the next stage of response was greatly 
deferred to these functional groups. These functional groups played a decisive role in 
outlining the next stage of objectives for accomplishing the larger goals of the crisis 
management plan.  Eventually a comprehensive group from all aspects of Galveston, the 
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interim Strategic Operations Team stepped back in and took on the role of coordinating 
the plan for the Galveston students. 
As the Interim SOT worked toward the goal of the crisis management plan in 
keeping students on track academically, they very quickly learned that the major 
objective was to make things as normal for the college students as possible.  Even 
though the students were studying on a campus 150 miles away from their own, many of 
the day to day operations of being a student was the same – going to class, studying, 
socializing and so forth. So, even though this objective was not written out in the 
approach, the team learned through the deployment of the plan to look for those things 
that could disrupt the typical college student schedule.  These items became the strategic 
objectives of the committee.  Funding for books, housing issues, classroom problems, 
social activities were all issues that were identified and addressed by the Interim SOT.  
Regular discussions and email with students, group meetings and student forums all 
provided valuable information concerning problems for the students. 
In hindsight, the strategic planning process all the way down to the level of 
developing action plans was prohibitive.  The Business Continuity component of the 
plan had never been attempted so there was no base line data to use to make assumptions 
at the level required for action plans.  Now with the relocation complete, much was 
learned at a strategic level which could afford more detail in the plan, but the reality is 
that at the action plan level, most crisis response is fluid and reactive so it is difficult to 
plan in advance at any level of detail.  As one team member explains: 
I mean we had a good overarching strategic plan.  I thought we really did and we 
kind of just kind of rode the wave of that plan.  We had to make decisions on the 
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fly because even the ones that we planned out, well… some just didn’t work.  
Now, we know better because we did it.  But you still can’t just go out there and 
say, “Okay, what are all the rooms you have open?” But you can’t go up there 
and say, “Hey, we need an office space,” and expect everything to be the same as 
it was back then.  All those things will be a bit different next time and you can’t 
plan for all of that.  But I do think that we have a better plan now (Interviewee 
#7, personal communication, 8-9-11). 
 
Customer Focus 
 In the process of communicating to the student population, TAMUG was 
consistent in declaring their webpage as the primary source of information during a 
crisis.  This approach was communicated during new student conferences, floor 
meetings, and before any evacuation, and was effective in directing students to the right 
source of information.  As the crisis evolved from yet another evacuation and return into 
a full relocation exercise, feedback from students and the ability for students to ask 
questions became extremely important.  Although not addressed in the approach, the 
need for a phone bank to answer questions, constantly update FAQ lists to keep students 
and their families informed, web-based forms to collect data from students, and a more 
detailed on campus orientation program was just the start of an extensive communication 
process geared toward identifying and responding to the ongoing needs of the students..  
As the semester continued, these and other sources of communication became a priority 
to assessing the student experience and critical to the deployment of the crisis response.  
As one team member described it: 
We brought in some of the student leaders early, alright, if I remember correctly, 
the student government leaders came in and you talked to them; Loftin talked to 
them, Donna talked to them.  Certainly, after the students group showed up, we 
had the Kyle Field event, we had a number of minor events.  You guys make 
yourselves very visible.  We all listened to what we were told – I mean when 
students told us they had third grade desks in one of the Sunday school rooms.  
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We got them to move them out of the room.  Yeah, we made some missteps but 
we listened and changed it just as quick as we could.  I went out to the store with 
my personal credit card and bought stuff and brought them in the classroom 
when we were short.  We tried to be responsive to their needs and listened to 
them and engage them in discussions where it was appropriate and where we 
could engage them (Interviewee #5, personal communication, 7-29-11). 
 
 Another gap between the planning phase and the deployment phase that was 
realized was the focus on the immediate relocation without any focus on the retention of 
students once in College Station.  College Station had already been an attractive 
destination for those students who changed their major from the ocean-oriented majors 
of TAMUG.  TAMUG realized shortly after the relocation that the preservation of the 
TAMUG culture and retention of students needed to be considered in all aspects of the 
relocation process.  The small close knit feel of the campus as well as the unifying effect 
of going through the relocation certainly contributed to some extent, but multiple 
initiatives were developed during the deployment phase to further strengthen the 
socialization of the students, particularly the first year students, through housing, social 
activities, community areas, and communication.  With communication, TAMUG 
rapidly transitioned from using only their website as a means to convey information to a 
broad system of web based forms, recorded forums with President Loftin, phone banks, 
and other methods that allowed for two way discourse so that staff could better connect, 
identify and resolve the student body’s most pressing needs.  Maintaining the Sea Aggie 
culture with the students became a significant goal in the deployment of the plan, but 
was not even referenced in the original plan. 
 The TAMUG Crisis Management Team also learned significant information 
concerning the limits and even negative aspects of technology when it came to 
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supporting the key programs of the university. The approach had not provided much 
depth beyond how the initial relocation would take place which resulted in the team 
developing new processes and conduits to gauge student progress and satisfaction.  In 
addition, the use of technology in the classroom to better facilitate Galveston faculty 
staying connected to their students actually contributed to the problem, rather than 
solving it.  Faculty who were not properly trained or prepared to teach distance courses 
were allowed to teach distance courses, many of whose subjects were not particularly 
suited for distance teaching.  The result was students struggling even more in already 
difficult circumstances. 
 The TAMUG Crisis Management Team also realized that the addition of the 
business continuity plan to the emergency response plan added a much different 
complexity to the assessment requirements.  In the past, the event would occur and all of 
the major players would come together in the following days to reflect on how the 
campus could better prepare to the next event.  With the business continuity plan 
activated, the campus did not immediately return back to some aspect of normalcy for 
quite some time.  Instead there were continuous challenges as the event response 
stretched on for months and the ability to assess student satisfaction, engagement, and 
dissatisfaction as on ongoing process was critical.  Unfortunately the team had little time 
to stop and develop assessment procedures.  Instead, informal measures were deployed 
in the absence of a true assessment plan, and at the conclusion of the relocation, more 
formalized surveying and assessment processes were conducted as well. 
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Measurements, Analysis, and Knowledge Management 
 The TAMUG Crisis Management team learned a great deal when it came to the 
use of data and knowledge management during the crisis response.  With the Business 
Continuity portion of the crisis response never having been attempted before, the team 
really had a difficult time trying to determine what measurements would be crucial to the 
relocation in developing the initial plan.  As such, little attention was given to this aspect 
to the plan prior to the storm.  Once the storm had struck and the determination to 
relocate made, the team in many ways had to operate in a reactive mode in identifying 
all of the challenges with relocating such a high percentage of their students to College 
Station.  Data to drive decisions had to be captured rapidly especially in those early 
weeks, and the team met on a daily basis at least to analyze the wide array data that 
would be brought into the meetings.  Many of the older, more standard types of reports 
were still attainable to provide some information of the university’s deviation from 
normal operations, but most data provided a strong base line for future relocations, 
something the team was forced too often to operate without during the initial relocation. 
 Although at the time of the plan the team did not know what data would be 
needed, the plan for accessing available data to support organizational decision making 
was fairly effective.  The alignment of many of the database systems in Galveston and 
College Station proved to be extremely important as precious time could be spent 
actually analyzing data rather than determining how to secure the data. Some of the 
databases like the TAMUG housing lists were not accessible or as aligned as they might 
be, but the majority of the information held in the databases was readily accessible to the 
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team.  Still, a lot of other data was purely anecdotal.  The TAMUG crisis response team 
used the contacts among the student body, social media, and the numerous phone calls to 
identify new issues that could be responded to as quickly as possible.  This type of 
information proved critical to identifying and resolving issues that directly impacted the 
students before they became too widespread.  
You know measurement is kind of a fuzzy thing in that situation.  Some stuff we 
were able to measure.  You know when you talk about the registrations and how 
many students you have in these living quarters and whatever.  I think most of 
the satisfaction stuff that we weren't--again it was more anecdotal, it wasn't really 
quantitative.  You know we've had 47 calls about this so we need to get this 
addressed; we just didn't always have the manpower to manage that (Interviewee 
#4, personal communication, 7-27-11). 
 
 Information is critical in any crisis situation, yet the approach taken by the 
TAMUG Crisis Management Team toward knowledge management was minimal.  The 
plan hardly addressed the measurement and analysis in any significant manner with the 
exception of the relocation of several servers and the alignment of many of the 
universities’ data management processes.  These initiatives proved to be extremely 
important as it gave the crisis team members the ability to secure valuable data during 
the crisis,  In fact, a great amount of time throughout the first few weeks of the crisis was 
spent analyzing the data in daily meetings.  Furthermore in the actual response to the 
crisis, a great deal of effort was expended in making sure valuable information was 
distributed throughout the workforce and other stakeholders as well collecting 
organizational knowledge from those who had gone through the storm.  Although not in 
the original plan, the TAMUG Crisis Management Team realized the value of this 
information in further developing the plan for future crisis.  
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Workforce Focus 
The implementation of the Business Continuity component of the Crisis 
Management Response plan created a number of opportunities for learning for the 
TAMUG Crisis Management Team.  A sharp deviation from the old plan that specified a 
well-orchestrated evacuation followed by a return and repair of the campus, the Business 
Continuity Plan proposed the relocation of students to College Station for an extended 
amount of time.  Although the framework that had been developed prior to Hurricane Ike 
provided some level of detail as to how various processes would occur to ensure the 
students’ semester continued, very little detail as to what to do with the vast majority of 
TAMUG’s workforce was included in the plan.  The TAMUG crisis management Team 
very quickly realized the critical role that the workforce would need to play if the 
Business Continuity Plan was to succeed, so numerous decisions were made during the 
deployment to best utilize the TAMUG workforce, and a great deal was learned in the 
process. 
One of the most important things that was learned through this process was the 
need for a detailed plan identifying those who would actually commute versus those who 
would relocate to College Station versus those remaining in Galveston.  The TAMUG 
Crisis Management Team had to spend time they really couldn’t afford to spend during 
the early stages of the crisis determining this information.  Developing this policy took 
time away from other critical needs.  So many factors– how many properties to rent, how 
to contract those properties, how to reimburse for overnight stays for commuters and 
numerous others- depended on that decision which then had to be vetted against 
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university rules, system policies and state law slowing the process even further.  
Developing policies as to which roles specific employees would play in the case of an 
implementation of the Business Continuity Plan would go a long way to eliminating the 
early confusion.  These decisions could even be incorporated into job descriptions prior 
to an employee’s hire so that expectations during a relocation would be established and 
well known.   
Another thing not specified in the plan that proved to be important was the 
preservation of the TAMUG culture and the critical role of the faculty and staff in 
preserving that culture, not only among the students but the employees of TAMUG as 
well.  The closeness and family feeling of TAMUG had served the campus well over the 
years and even though the faculty, staff, and students prided themselves in fully 
embracing the “Aggie culture” of Texas A&M University, it was critically important to 
preserve the “Sea Aggie” identity of TAMUG within that culture.  The familiarity of 
faculty in the classroom and staff at various events reinforced that identity and the 
connectedness to TAMUG, so the faculty and staff quickly learned to seek out 
opportunities to interact with students.  As described by one team member: 
I also engaged cadets whenever I possibly could, I mean the business of just 
walking around through the residence hall area where they were living and -- 
they were anxious to greet you and holler out to you if you were on campus so 
that gave you lots of opportunity to connect with people.  I attended the 
formations of the corps activities period and I used most of those corps activity 
periods not only to issue instructions and things to them but also, to take their 
questions and answer their questions.  I met with individual cadets and their 
parents and then I did everything I could to integrate the cadet administration into 
the activities of things up here you know, where it was appropriate (Interviewee 
#9, personal communication, 8-18-11). 
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 Another valuable lesson learned through the relocation was the incredible value 
and opportunities for cross training and additional partnering with College Station 
colleagues. On the small campus of TAMUG, there was already an opportunity for 
employees to enjoy a broad area of responsibility versus the more specialized nature of 
employment on a larger campus.  The relocation required supervisors to further evaluate 
the personal situations of employees to determine who could move to College Station 
and then ensure they had the appropriate knowledge and training to do the job required 
of them in their new environment (Interviewee #5, personal communication, 7-29-11).  
Once in College Station, the specialized knowledge of the employees provided even 
more insight into new training and processes that could be adapted and brought back to 
Galveston.  Once the initial surge of the crisis slowed a bit, supervisors learned to 
actively seek out these types of opportunities to further develop and cross train their 
employees (Interviewee #7, personal communication, 8-9-11). 
Another key learning centered upon the health, safety and security of the 
relocation process.  The health, safety, and security were the primary focus of the 
evacuation, but it continued to play a major role even during the relocation to College 
Station.  TAMU-College Station and the local community college, Blinn College, were 
experiencing record enrollments, so when TAMUG began working to identify suitable 
locations for the Faculty, staff, and students to live, many of the identified properties 
were in less than desirable locales.  The plan had really only focused on the initial 
evacuation, but the supervisors rapidly learned that if the faculty, staff, student or their 
families were not safe and secure, their work would suffer and the relocation was for 
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naught.  As such, continued focus was placed on the safety of the employees and 
students throughout the relocation, and needed to be further incorporated into the plan.  
As one team member described: 
This is so corny but I have to go back and say, Maslow’s hierarchy fits so well. I 
mean, you know, what’s the most important thing to do first? Food, shelter and 
the basics.  The first thing you guys were doing was hustling places for people to 
live and accounting for everyone and things like that.  You know, it amazed me 
how glad we were to see the Red Cross coming around with meals when we were 
still trying to clean our home up and stuff like that, but you know, safety and 
security, the individual’s family, then the whole business affiliation when you 
reach that step.  You think about how important the campus was to each other 
and so I think you know that’s a motivation question, if there was one, and 
Maslow’s still a good motivation theory. So, temporary housing being provided 
in College Station and also in Galveston, I mean you guys put up (former 
President) Sammy and Charlotte up in the residence halls. You found the place 
for me to live over in the private apartments. Things that we did like keeping all 
of the food service people on payroll and I mean, not every university would’ve 
done that.  I think those steps were critical to take care of before focusing on the 
work at hand (Interviewee #9, personal communication, 8-18-11). 
 
The same was true of the emotional toll of employees being separated from their 
families.  The TAMU-Crisis Management team was well aware of the emotional stress 
caused by being away from their homes and families so they quickly learned to make 
allowances to mitigate these issues.   
There’s a lot to say about the informal, everybody going out to eat all the time.  
We were already very close but became even closer.  And when people started 
getting, ‘Oh my God, I haven’t seen my daughter in two weeks.’ I knew about it 
before morning fell from one or the other in the groups.  And immediately when 
I went to work, I was like, ‘Okay, you’re going home this weekend.  You go 
home this weekend, come back Tuesday.’ So, it was easier to keep the pulse 
because we lived with them (Interviewee #7, personal communication, 8-9-11). 
 
 Yet another need that was learned was the importance of having a formalized 
assessment process to ascertain the continued engagement and satisfaction of the 
workforce.  So much emphasis was placed on the student relocation, that the plan had no 
 290 
 
formalized process to access or even communicate with the employees.  This was 
problematic, but was made even worse by the divided nature of those employees still in 
Galveston versus those who had relocated with the students to College Station.  With the 
wealth of donation drives and activities for the students in College station, the 
employees in Galveston, many facing difficult personal situations with destroyed homes 
and dependent family members, often felt forgotten, and morale at times plummeted 
(Interviewee #3, personal communication, 7-20-11).  The plan did not identify these 
needs, but the assessments were important in identifying where counseling and 
additional support was needed.  Valuable insight was gleaned from many of the 
assessments that could prove valuable in future relocations (Interviewee #11, personal 
communication, 9-9-11).  
Process Management 
 The TAMUG Crisis Management Team learned several valuable lessons through 
their system of process management.  The team’s approach centered on developing a 
series of white papers that provided general guidelines and priorities in the actual 
relocation of the students and classrooms.  The idea behind this plan was that if the 
major issues surrounding the actual relocation – locating classrooms and building a 
course schedule, housing for the faculty, staff, and students, and transition of the local 
databases for meal plans and parking into the College Station systems - could be 
resolved quickly, then the TAMUG faculty and students could get back to the business 
of education using the well-established work processes already in place in College 
Station.  Their strategy of relocating to College Station was very purposeful as many of 
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the database systems and key work processes of the two campuses were already aligned 
reducing the need to create new processes and databases.  As one team member 
described: 
Housing and classes.  Everything else, we can fall back to the norm because most 
everything else we could still supply the way we always supplied it.  Neo email 
still worked.  This is coming from my side but you can compare it with others.  
In my area, we had emails still working.  We had the website still working.  We 
had e2Campus still working.  And that wasn’t an accident.  We worked real hard 
to be ready to do those things but those things still worked.  MyRecord still 
worked.  The learning management system still worked because they’re all run 
by College Station and we partnered with them.  Its part of the reason we 
partnered with them but in a serendipity, mostly.  But those weren’t a challenge.  
It would have been a challenge, but they weren’t a challenge because we already 
had planned for them and could plan for them. 
 
We could not plan for where people are going to live because we didn’t know 
who’s going to show up.  We could not plan for where classes were going to be.  
Those two things were the biggies in my experience.  Now maybe there are some 
student services things that were an issue- Food service is one.  So room, board 
and classroom, for faculty, staff and students. 
 
Now one of those, we weren’t 100% efficient in rooms because we had empty 
rooms.  But we were mostly effective I think.  They had a pillow to sleep on.  
Nobody was homeless and nobody was, in spite of what they say, in substandard 
housing after the first couple of weeks.  It’s getting better.  Food, I never get any 
feedback on that.  I just assume they got fed and nobody starved legally.  
Classrooms were probably our biggest failure in that we left some really good 
classrooms on the table and held other classes in places that were really marginal.  
Mostly because of the lack of cooperation on the academic department side there.  
For instance rural health, we could have held down a quarter of our classes in 
those classrooms.  I don’t mean to dwell on that but those are the nicest 
classrooms I have ever seen, 200 grand in equipment per room for just a regular 
classroom. 
 
I mean just three projectors for 45-person classroom.  They got three projectors 
and going over there and finding these damn things empty all night long and 
then, going into the Sunday school rooms where we’re teaching.  That was 
probably the things we could have done better with better data, better 
cooperation, better system process, more time.  Donna was right; with more time, 
she could have done a better job with that but, most of those things we didn’t find 
them out until a week or two later, when it was too late even to move. 
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But that was probably those three -- the worst done, I think.  We succeeded but 
we left a lot of – it was a lot of opportunity cost or a lot of opportunity cost on 
the table to do it better (Interviewee #5, personal communication, 7-29-11). 
 
During the crisis, this strategy of being able to use College Station’s processes would 
prove invaluable in saving scarce time and resources allowing the team to focus on other 
important issues as they arose, like the organization of donations drives and allocation of 
donated funds.  Furthermore use of the familiar work systems provided a sense of 
comfort to faculty, staff, and students at a time when it was drastically needed 
(Interviewee #5, personal communication, 7-29-11).  The TAMUG Crisis Management 
Team quickly learned that this process had worked extremely well, especially for the 
first time the Business Continuity Plan was ever implemented. 
 The TAMUG Crisis Management Team learned the only area that the plan did 
not work extremely well was when they failed to focus on their core competencies.  
Several of the processes were adapted to ease travelling for commuters, both faculty and 
students, at the expense of a quality teaching environment.  The approval process for 
distance teaching was lifted and the class time was changed to three hour, once a week 
schedules, and both reduced the teaching experience for many of the undergraduate 
students.  Through this experience, the TAMUG Crisis Management Team realized that 
the quality of the teaching experience must be paramount in the decision making process 
(Interviewee #1, personal communication, 7-18-11).   
 Another lesson that was valuable to the TAMUG Crisis Management Team was 
the effectiveness of merging their system into the system of College Station.  Although 
preserving the identity of the TAMUG students was important, the ability to fairly 
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seamlessly insert the near 2000 students into the well-established and -supported work 
process of College Station was a huge asset.  The work processed had been tested by 
tens of thousands of students, and also provided a depth of support through additional 
staffing in human resources, student affairs, general counsel and other areas that 
TAMUG could not have mustered on its own. These staff members’ experience and 
commitment to the relocation process multiplied the effectiveness of the TAMUG staff 
by a huge margin. 
 A final lesson learned through the process management process would be to be 
very intentional in developing performance measures as well as an assessment schedule 
to determine the performance.  The team realized early on that is a crisis situation, there 
were so many issues occurring and needing resolution that it was difficult to be strategic 
in the approach to process management.  Too often a rapid solution for a problem as 
determined and then the next problem identified without coming back to the original 
problem to measure its performance.  This was further exacerbated by the fact that this 
evacuation was the first attempt at the Business Continuity plan so there was no previous 
base line relocation plan to measure against when determining what might be an 
appropriate performance measure.  The TAMUG Crisis Management Team took careful 
assessment of the implementation of the Business Continuity Plan to incorporate the 
learning into the new plan with more formalized assessment procedures for many of the 
processes (Interviewee #5, personal communication, 7-29-11).     
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Business Results 
Although much of the learning occurred through the experience of actually 
deploying the plan, a great deal of information was also acquired through reviewing the 
final results of the crisis management plan, often obtained through various audits, 
reports, surveys, and other assessment processes.    In an effort to capture the 
perspectives of those involved in the crisis response, several debriefings and after action 
meetings were held at the end of the Fall semester and into the Spring.  The largest of 
these was a comprehensive after action meeting facilitated by Dr. Richard Cummins on 
December 10, 2008 and transcribed by an outside agency, A AA Werlinger and 
Associates, for distribution to the crisis management teams and others. It is included as 
Appendix C.  Nearly every major decision maker involved in the crisis from TAMUG 
and TAMU- College Station was present to provide valuable insight to be recorded and 
implemented into future response.  Separate on line surveys were also developed and 
distributed to all faculty and students to assess their experiences with the crisis response.  
Follow up forums were held in the Spring semester to seek further meanings from the 
survey results.  Through these processes, an incredible amount of valuable learning was 
documented and made available for review for the TAMUG Crisis Management Team to 
use in future crisis management planning (Interviewee #2, personal communication, 7-
22-11). 
 Once the data was consolidated, assessed and reflected upon, a series of actions 
took place.  One of the earliest actions was the reconvening of the Strategic Operations 
Team to review the numerous lessons learned and incorporate them into the new crisis 
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response plan.  The first meeting was held May 12, 2009, and identified areas for future 
improvements.  The major issues that came out of this review included the following 
concerns in four distinct areas, Academics, Evacuation, Relocation, and Crisis Plan.: 
Academics 
1. Concerns over the 3 hour class blocks for undergraduate students 
2. Approval process for online courses 
3. The time available for developing an appropriate course schedule after the 
decision to relocate has been made 
4. TAMU room availability 
5. Increasing the roles of academic department heads immediately after the crisis 
starts 
6. Continuing and even strengthening the relationships with academic peers in 
TAMU- College Station 
7. Technological needs in available classrooms 
8. Consideration of process for Faculty/Adjuncts/TA’s not reporting 
Evacuation 
1.  Possible development of a code system to improve communication on campus 
as to hurricane preparation status 
2. Update check out lists for students to include books, computers, and uniforms 
and faculty to take PC and teaching materials 
Relocation 
1. The early identification of off campus properties 
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2, Better communication of expectations to students 
3. Website worked well in student communication 
4. Review and keep current lease agreements for future use. 
5. Enhance initial student survey to better collect data and communicate 
information 
6.  Better coordinate with TAMU residence life for housing of students 
7. Provide for accommodation for first wave of staff to include housing and 
possibly child care 
Crisis Plan 
1. Reconsider process for implementation of Business Continuity Plan depending 
on timing during academic year. 
2. Refine crisis plan with new information  
3. Coordinate table top exercises to retain information and practice response. 
Once the major issues were identified, responsible crisis team members were assigned to 
develop a list of potential issues and solutions to bring back to the table for further 
discussion until solutions were accepted and incorporated into the crisis response plan.  
This process occurred over a series of meetings and resulted in a memorandum on 
November 5, 2009 from the Acting Vice President and CEO of TAMUG, Dr. Rodney 
McClendon to the Interim  President Of Texas A&M University, Dr. R. Bowen Loftin 
detailing the modifications to the current plan (Appendix D).  One of the major changes 
resulting from the experience of Hurricane Ike was the change of the decision point of 
the implementation of the Business Continuity Plan from the campus being closed for 
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two to a matrix that considered a number of other factors, severity of storm and timing of 
strike being the most critical (Appendix E).  Most of the other learning that occurred 
from the crisis occurred at the departmental level and the various departments were 
tasked with reviewing the information, improving their response, and adjusting their 
participation in the Business Continuity Plan.       
Also as a result of the learning that took place, key findings were identified and 
several administrators and faculty members took the consolidated review and developed 
educational presentations to be presented across the country.  Some of the key findings 
included the identification of those things that were done right, that needed further 
consideration, or that needed to be handled differently in future crisis management 
response.  The things that were done correctly in the relocation process included the 
removal of the main website for its sole use as a hurricane communication tool; the use 
of one command post; the clarification and documentation of drop processes, 
withdrawals, financial aid, fulltime status, suspensions, course evaluations, etc.; the 
critical role of the physical plant and IT teams; the faculty orientation preceding the 
student orientation; and the town hall informational meetings.  Things that needed 
further assessment were the three hour block classes, how to deal with pets, partners, 
children and spouses, and online courses particularly math.  Finally the areas that were 
identified that definitely needed to be addressed were consistent policies for staff, 
transition to 2nd semester courses; EIS security issues; streamlining of check-in 
processes; clarification of academic chain of command to validate course functions; and 
better identification of lab resources through planned weekend use.  These were the 
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major findings of the crisis response review team.  They also developed a list of top ten 
professional and institutional lessons learned: 
1. Taking time to set up your guiding principles and big priorities FIRST will pay 
off big time before you get into the details. 
2. You need to have about 50% of your annual budget in cash reserves or a good 
line of credit to get it.  FEMA, insurance and external resources will not be 
available in time. 
3. People need (and truly want) leadership.  Someone has to stand tall, provide 
direction, and take the risk to make decisions. 
4. People find comfort in structure and clear policies during crisis/chaos. 
5. Recovery will take much longer than you anticipate. 
6. Plan for a post-crisis intermediate period.  Things do not return to normal for a 
very long time (if ever). 
7. People respond to crisis very differently.  Pay attention to the needs of others. 
8. Those that are complaining the loudest did not help generate any of the 
solutions. 
9.  Stay the course with your culture and your mission.  How you respond to the 
crisis will define you for a very long time. 
10. Nothing is more important than people (your staff, peers, customers, 
suppliers, neighbors, etc.) 
 299 
 
Through the long process of review and discussion of personal issues, many of which 
affected professional performance, a companion list of top ten personal lessons learned 
was added as well: 
1. Leave your elderly parents, in-laws, or any others that may live with you with 
other relatives.  You will have enough to deal with on your own. 
2. Your personal recovery is going to take at least three to four times longer than 
you think it is going to take. 
3. Cash flow is a major issue.  If you do not own your home out right, your 
insurance check is going to be mailed to your mortgage company, not you. 
4. Trust your gut instincts.  You will be fine.  Push forward. 
5. You need to find some private time to cry once in a while. 
6. People will say “it’s just stuff.”  When it is your stuff laid out on the curb, it 
has a ton of memories and it hurts. 
7. Once you get over your shock of your stuff laid out on the curb, you will come 
to realize it is not the most important or valuable things in your life. 
8. You only need about a quarter of what you own. 
9. Get to know your neighbors - you are going to lean on each other while you 
will rebuild. 
10. It’s a new experience to learn how to “take” but it is okay to let others help 
you. 
One final review of the lessons learned by two TAMUG faculty members, Dr. 
William McMullen and Dr. Joan Mileski, resulted in the development and presentation 
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of twenty “governing principles” that should be considered in the event of another 
serious hurricane strike.  These principles are: 
1. Continuing the semester is essential.  Canceling the semester would be 
devastating to the students and the university. The recovery period for all involved 
would be protracted and harmful.  Loss of present and future revenue would take years 
to replace.  The entire strategy was driven by this governing principle. 
2. Students, staff, and faculty are universally affected in disasters and share 
common problems of stabilizing and rebuilding their lives.  Reestablishing the campus 
community quickly must be balanced against the reality that all members of that 
community are members of other communities as well and all involved persons have 
multiple sets of responsibilities that are sometimes in conflict with each other.  
Furthermore, emotional trauma is an overlay in all relevant processes. 
3. Complex protocols are required in advance of a disaster response.  
Traumatized students, staff, and faculty, cannot develop these after the event occurs.  
They can only be amended to fit the reality of the moment. 
4. Different segments of the student population have a greater or lesser sense of 
attachment and loyalty to the campus and this must be considered in developing plans 
and programs for the student body’s return.  New students, both freshmen and transfers, 
have the least sense of attachment and are the most vulnerable to being lost. 
5. Students need to be supplied with a list of things that need to be taken with 
them when they evacuate.  Only students whose families live in the region have grown 
up with a “hurricane mentality” will have any concept of what the outcome of a storm 
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will be and what they need to take with them.  Their functionality will be related to what 
they have taken with them. 
6. Communications are an essential element of the relocation process and one of 
the most difficult issues to manage.  Faculty and staff already at the new campus 
location are feeling increasingly overwhelmed with calls from other members of the 
campus community and solid information is hard to come by in a dynamic and highly 
fluid situation.  It is hard to separate “I think…” from “I know…”  Information should 
not be released until it is solid.  The university website was the most valuable means of 
communications it was the most widely accessible to those off campus.  There also 
needs to be a “glossary of terms” that everyone uses in talking to members of the 
university community and to the parents/families of students.  TAMUG had told the 
students that their experience would be “cost neutral” but this lead to a great deal of 
misunderstanding with parents and students, especially when it came to housing issues  
This term meant different things to different people in different contexts. 
7. Doing as much as possible in one place while processing students keeps 
people together and is efficient.  Staff can move from one area to another as the load 
dictates.  From a student and family standpoint, the “community” starts to re-establish 
itself through seeing familiar faces.  Dislocated people need community.  This system 
results in crowding but that is fair trade for re-establishing community.  Crowding in this 
case was good. 
8.  Be prepared to issue “temporary” meal tickets, parking permits and so forth in 
case there are problems of computer system integration or system breakdowns.  
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Removing problems from people’s plate reduces their stress levels.  Everyone is under 
tremendous stress. 
9. A philosophy of priority makes assignment of the most at-risk students (e.g. 
freshmen) easier.  Doing this in advance takes a significant amount of pressure off of 
those persons responsible for identifying student housing in future evacuations.  Placing 
staff with students off campus can be problematic.  At least additional resident advisor- 
type persons are needed. 
10.  As hurricane season approaches, it is worthwhile for housing officials to 
enter into contingency agreements with property owners/managers so that if there is an 
evacuation, there is already a set of plans that can be activated.  This should be backed-
up with a needs assessment form completed in Galveston by students, staff, and faculty 
that details special needs such as handicapped dependents, students who do not drive, 
and so forth.  Parents and families need to be informed that the university will only pay 
for housing that it has contracted for. 
11.  International students need to be handled in specific ways according to the 
different visa classifications that govern their stay in the United States.  A specific 
international student advisor is needed to assure informed and consistent advice and 
assistance to these students. A pre-printed card with the name and contact information 
for this designated person should be given to all international students. 
12. All academic departments have communications chains based on land lines 
and cell phones and Department heads should have this information available in their 
computers and on paper.  Fragmented communication links will cause the system to 
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break down.  Time is needed for the academic management to establish contact with 
faculty and academic staff.  It is not possible for the academic programs to be re-
established faster than the communications system will allow. 
13. A housing allowance can be explored as an alternative to University arranged 
housing, or a choice can be given to faculty.  In some situations, this may be a better 
arrangement.  It needs to be made clear in advance to staff and faculty that what may be 
available and provided is substantially different from what they are accustomed to “at 
home.” 
14.  International faculty and scholars operate in a legally defined and complex 
environment and require specific guidance according to their visa type.  They need a 
specific point of contact and need to be directed to make contact with that individual to 
assure all of their reporting requirements are met.  A pre-printed card should be given to 
these persons with the name and contact information for their specific point of contact. 
15. Distance learning techniques are an essential ingredient in situations like this 
but they involve a totally different methodology of teaching and enormous investments 
in time to establish.  Faculty will have to become accustomed to the technology and 
methodology of teaching.  Some sort of instructor contact via email, chat rooms, etc. is 
necessary and this adds to the time commitment on the part of faculty.  Integrating 
distance technology into all courses as a routine matter will reduce the trauma associated 
with the immediate shift from the traditional classroom to the remote location approach. 
16. A level-specific plan must be adopted by both campuses such that the campus 
that is escalating their “code level” is being complemented by the campus that will 
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potentially be receiving the programs.  Both locations have to move up the scale at the 
same pace and implement corresponding plans and programs in sync with each other. 
17. There needs to be a clear pre-definition as to where employees will be needed 
after the storm as it affects personal decisions that they need to make and decisions that 
their department might make regarding housing.  Communications links may be down 
and pre-identification is the only way that most of the people will be in the right place at 
the right time. 
18.  The need for counseling support is not limited to students. Employees will 
be traumatized as well and need to be supported if they are to remain contributing 
members of the campus community and the processes associated with program 
relocation.  Their spouse and children need to be covered by the program as well.  Some 
individuals will be completely paralyzed by events. 
19. Natural disasters cause financial systems to collapse.  Banks cannot process 
ATM withdrawals, fund transfers, wire deposits, and the like.  Students who work find 
that their places of employment have been devastated and their cash flow is immediately 
and adversely affected. Arrangements must be made to bridge the absence of normal 
banking operations and to support the students and employees who are suddenly without 
income or access to funds. 
20.  The class scheduling process is the most intricate of the many facets of 
moving an academic program and assumptions made in advance, or as the process 
moves along, either constrain or increase flexibility.  Too many constraints can cause the 
solution set to be the empty set.  Be clear as to the assumptions that will guide the 
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process. Have as few as possible but have as many as needed to retain quality.  
Recognize that some classes are very difficult to teach on line while others may be 
relatively easy to teach on line (personal communication, July 26, 2011). 
These governing principles, coupled with the organizational and personal lists of 
“lessons learned” developed by the TAMUG Crisis Management Team, demonstrate a 
long list of valuable information learned for the Hurricane Ike crisis event.  These mostly 
strategic items were gleaned from surveys, after action reports, and extensive meetings 
with a wide array of people using different perspectives to reflect on the process.  
Further adding to the list of information learned would be the long list of lower level, 
more specific operational changes that were codified for future crisis events by 
individual managers within their own departmental crisis response plans.  Although the 
necessity of speedy response often prevented the implementation of this learning during 
this crisis, a long and detailed process for integrating the learning into future crisis 
response was implemented shortly after the return to the Galveston campus.  The vast 
majority of this strategic learning and improvement will not be able to truly be assessed 
until the next crisis requiring evacuation, but based on much of the early assessment 
through surveys, forums, detailed meetings, and after action reviews, significant 
improvements will occur based on the learning from this crisis experience. 
Summary 
 An incredible amount of learning occurred throughout the crisis response to 
Hurricane Ike.  Even before the storm materialized the TAMUG Crisis Management 
Team incorporated a process of evaluation and improvement as a major component of 
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the crisis management process.  After each previous storm that had affected the campus, 
an after action review team evaluated the response and resulting damage and made 
recommendations to improve the process for future storms.  Even a storm that severely 
impacted TAMUG decades ago, Hurricane Alicia was brought back onto the table for 
assessment and re-evaluation after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita devastated other 
universities in the Gulf region.  What TAMUG learned from their experiences greatly 
affected TAMUG’s planning.  They learned how closing down for a semester could 
devastate enrollment.  They learned strategies to mitigate the enrollment impact by 
allowing students to transfer funds to the Spring, keeping the students tied to the 
university.  They learned the success of the Tulane athletics teams in relocating to and 
operating within Texas A&M University, keeping their identity and culture intact.  
Valuable information was also gleaned from the relocation and orientation of Katrina 
refugees to TAMU- College Station.  Lamar’s experiences from Hurricane Rita also 
provided valuable insight that would help prepare TAMUG’s preparation through Table 
Top exercises as well as recovery.  As a result of these experiences, TAMUG worked 
with their TAMU- College Station counterparts to develop the Business Continuity Plan 
that would play a major role once Hurricane Ike struck. 
 Once the Business Continuity Plan was initiated, many challenges were 
discovered during the deployment.  These gaps were valuable opportunities for learning 
so that adjustments could be made in the plan for the future.  Formalized assessment 
often had to wait until months after the initial call for relocation as the necessary speed 
in responding often inhibited the evaluation and improvement of different initiatives.  
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That being said, learning still occurred as responses to situations were developed on the 
spot and implemented with often immediate feedback.  Unfortunately the impending 
next issue often prevented the ability to reflect upon the learning.  It was only after the 
immediacy of the crisis had passed that the TAMUG Crisis Management Team could 
take the necessary time to once again learn from and reflect upon their experiences and 
incorporate best practice into their own practice. 
 As the semester subsided, TAMUG was very intentional in implementing an 
assessment process.  Much of the eventual learning occurred as a result of this 
assessment phase.  Surveys of students revealed a number of problems, specifically with 
distance courses and three hour blocks for undergraduate courses.  Surveys of faculty, 
broad student forums, and after action reviews identified more detailed areas for possible 
improvement in the area of academics, evacuation, relocation, and the actual crisis plan.  
The TAMUG Crisis Management Team met several times to further flesh these 
problems out as well as develop possible solutions.  From these extensive discussions, 
lists of what worked well were developed.  The team was careful to also list those 
processes that had more limited success as well as what needed to be changed in future 
relocations.  The TAMUG Crisis Management Team learned from these and 
incorporated the decisions into the current Business Continuity Plan.  These discussions 
further generated a top ten list of organization and personal lessons learned and twenty 
guiding principles that will be valuable for guiding the organization through a future 
relocation. Much of the strategic learning that occurred as a result of the relocation is 
represented on these lists with many smaller organizational changes incorporated into 
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departmental crisis response plans.  Even today, the TAMUG Crisis Management Team 
continues to review information from the storm and other institutions to enhance the 
campus emergency response plan.  The latest version is included in Appendix F. 
Key Findings  
1.  Learning in crisis response certainly does not only need to be internally focused.  
Although the crisis often seems to be unique to an organization’s situation, other 
organizations have similar situations and can provide great information in preparing a 
crisis response.  The response to Hurricane Katrina and Rita provided extremely 
valuable information to the TAMUG Crisis Management Team. 
2.  Learning takes place continually through the crisis management response, but true 
evaluation and implementation will often not be able to occur due to the rapid response 
necessary in the immediate days and weeks after the crisis.  The objective at that time is 
surviving the crisis rather than preparing for the next crisis.  This timing can also be 
helpful in that during the immediacy of the crisis, everything seems to be critical. 
3. Having a formalized process to assess the response is critical.  TAMUG used multiple 
surveys, forums, and after action reviews to secure the data.  Since everything is so 
rushed during the actual time of the response, using different formats and processes to 
draw out information that may have occurred months earlier is important. 
4. TAMUG developed a long list of specific lessons learned and guiding principles that 
were incorporated into their crisis management plan.  Most of these were at the strategic 
level with more operational changes left to the departmental manager to consider for 
future crises.  This follows the philosophy that each crisis will be somewhat different, 
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and you can get too detailed in your crisis management response where it becomes 
constraining for the manager to deviate from the plan, even when necessary.  It is better 
to inform the people who will be working at that level (departmental managers) so they 
are informed but still have the flexibility to respond appropriately. 
  
Research Question 4  
Research Question Four seeks to determine to what extent is the Quality Texas 
Foundation- Engagement Level Criteria an effective framework for assessing crisis 
management in higher education.  Leonard and McGuire (2007) stated that the purpose of 
the Criteria is threefold: (a) to improve an organization’s processes, procedures, potential, 
and outcomes; (b) to enhance and encourage sharing of best practices between 
organizations; and (c) to provide management with a framework for planning and running 
the business and to create intentional opportunities for organizational learning (pp. 4-5). In 
addition, the Baldrige Criteria provide several levels of self-assessment tools that are 
responsive to a college or university’s unique situation, a critical component when 
considering the individualized learning that comes out of a crisis incident (Quality 
Texas, 2003).  Even with the reduced scope of assessment utilized in the Engagement 
Level of the Texas Quality Foundation versus the full Baldrige Criteria, the broad 
categories of leadership; strategic planning; customer focus; measurement, analysis, and 
knowledge management; workforce focus; process management; and business results are 
extremely comprehensive in their consideration of an organization’s performance.  
Furthermore, these measures have been used for decades to assess the systemic 
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performance of an organization to great success.  The question then is whether there are 
unique aspects to a crisis that would fall outside the typical parameters of organizational 
measurement. 
 In reviewing the data provided by the interviewees, the profile of the 
organizational response to the crisis was fairly comprehensive in nature.  There were 
multiple elements in this crisis response including operations of different campuses, 
reconstruction, financial reimbursements, service to the community, relocation of 
students, leasing of properties, distance education challenges and many others.  Many of 
these were atypical of standard educational operations, but the Quality Texas 
Foundation- Engagement Level Criteria are able to handle a wide variety of elements 
due to its focus on process.  As a result, even with the wide array of challenges that may 
arise in the process of responding to a crisis, the Baldrige Criteria (Quality Texas 
Foundation - Engagement Level Criteria) would be effective in identifying necessary 
processes for evaluation of effectiveness.  The evaluation attribute actually is the greatest 
benefit from the use of the Baldrige framework - the systemic assessment and learning to 
better coordinate a systemic approach for the prevention of future crises. 
Furthermore, the Baldrige Criteria (Quality Texas Foundation - Engagement 
Level Criteria) actually specifically addresses work system and work place preparedness 
of disasters and emergencies under Category 6 Process Management.  In many ways, 
this entire study is in response to this specific question.  Although this one question 
alone would probably not generate all of the information and nuances of a crisis 
response plan by itself, the existence of the question does demonstrate that the criteria 
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does recognize the significance of a crisis and its potential impact on an organization.  
Even with only the single question focused on disaster prevention, the rest of the criteria 
would provide a very compelling description of an organization and its ability to respond 
to a given crisis.  In addition, the questions that were used in this study were a more 
generalized, introductory set of questions developed by the Quality Texas Foundation 
and based on the Baldrige criteria.  The full set of Baldrige criteria in this specific area 
could offer more in depth and probing detail with regards to preparedness of disasters if 
that were required.  However in this exercise where the entire Quality Texas Foundation 
Introductory criteria were used to discuss the preparedness and response to a disaster, the 
question became somewhat redundant.   
One of the other difficulties in gaining the comprehensive information necessary 
to develop the organizational profile and response to the crisis would be the 
determination of the necessary people to provide the data.  In any crisis, unusual 
circumstances may occur that require people to operate outside their usual area of 
responsibility and take on challenges outside their normal areas of responsibility.  
However, Crisis Management Teams are not only operational in nature, but in most 
organizations, membership on the Crisis Management Team is determined by position 
and area of responsibility/functional area (Coombs, 2012).  This means in most 
organizations no matter what unusual circumstance may arise, the crisis management 
team will typically be made aware.  Although the specific makeup of a crisis 
management team will primarily depend upon the culture and dynamics of an 
organization (Harper, Paterson, & Zdziarski, 2006), the successful organization will 
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always have the major issues of a crisis being addressed by its team.  TAMUG certainly 
followed this philosophy, and every major decision and activity was vetted through their 
crisis management team.  As a result, the crisis management team would be able to 
provide an extremely comprehensive description of all major crisis management 
activities. 
A second issue would be the shift in perspective of continuous assessment and 
evaluation that is encouraged through the Baldrige process.  The urgency of response 
necessary after most crises often prevents the systemic evaluation that the Baldrige 
advocates.  That does not mean it does not occur.  Crises should occur infrequently at 
best and not on a standard cycle.  The learning that occurs as a result of gaps that occur 
in the deployment of a crisis approach can be further assessed and evaluated after the 
crisis subsides and improve the next crisis response.  As the next crisis will hopefully be 
infrequent and not routine, so will the learning as a result of the crisis.  In effect, the 
process will still occur but not on the regular schedule that would occur when assessing 
normal organizational processes.   
 The last area of concern in the use of the Quality Texas Foundation- Engagement 
Level Criteria for assessing crisis management would be if there was some area of focus 
that is not included in the Baldrige Criteria (Quality Texas Foundation - Engagement 
Level Criteria) as its existence does not occur in normal organization processes.  
Certainly there are questions that are ill suited for use on crisis response assessment like 
questions about employee development which typically doesn’t occur during a crisis for 
example, but most of the participants were able to stretch the questions in that situation 
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to make them relevant to the discussion.  Instead the concern was for some major area 
that is critical to assessing a crisis that may not be apparent in typical organizational 
operations and thus would not be included in the Baldrige Criteria (Quality Texas 
Foundation- Engagement Level Criteria.)  In looking at the data provided by the 
interviewees, two major areas were identified as needing more emphasis in assessing a 
crisis response.  The first of these was communications. During crisis, communications 
become a much more significant issue to the extent that there are numerous books and 
consultants focusing on crisis communication.  Standard communication processes 
which may have been effective in normal operations become problematic in a crisis 
situation.  In the eyes of several participants, this meant that communications should 
have been more prominently discussed due to the critical nature of crisis 
communications.  As one member states: 
Yeah, the big thing you missed and it’s absolutely the thing that is the most 
essential in crisis is communications. No, there is no question in there about 
communication.  You know, if you can communicate and you need a good, solid 
communications plan. We didn’t have one. We still don’t have one. Closest thing 
we have is Conway with the website up there and we go to the website. But when 
you have to talk about housing, when you have to talk about class scheduling, 
when you have to talk about all that stuff, you need to have a communications 
plan and you need to execute it very seriously. You need plans of the day. You 
need this kind of thing that everybody sees and we didn’t do that. We relied on 
our usual techniques and in times of crisis, the usual techniques fall apart. That’s 
my opinion (Interviewee #5, personal communication, 7-29-11). 
Still several other respondents found something in the framework that spurred them to 
discuss communication.  One directly spoke to the critical nature of communication: 
Well, communication was…I learned my first evacuation was very critical and 
we had a method.  Basically every student and every staff member upon 
evacuation provided as with a piece of paper that time which indicated how to 
contact them later on and so that was utilized in evacuations to mostly the other 
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student and some staff questions and we had a website available previous to our 
evacuation here where people can go to the website and get frequent updates on 
the status of what was going on here.  We also had a telephone line, available 
line and multiple lines available and manned those lines during long hours to 
make sure people can call in and get help as well. 
 
So that had been tried before and clearly it was a key, a part of this success with 
Ike.  We could communicate effectively with almost all of our students and all of 
our faculty and staff one way or the other and that was essential to being able to 
make things happen here and so we not only were able to know where they were, 
we were able to tell them on almost hourly basis what was going on and get them 
prepared for what might happen and once we made a decision to relocate, then 
we began to develop communication strategies to really reach out and touch that. 
 
Karen Bigley, who, as you know, was our communications person at the time 
was central for that, making that happen.  We utilized again resources here in 
College Station for that purpose and we had great IT support with folks here.  We 
actually relocated servers from Galveston to College Station, housed them within 
the IT community here in College Station for support and we were able to again 
maintain email continuity for everybody without any changes at all and maintain 
an active website presence from the beginning of the process and that was 
probably the single most useful thing we had going on, that communication 
technique where everyone was able to tap into it one way or the other. 
 
We also augmented that with telephones and you yourselves spent time with the 
telephone a lot are trying to deal with specific issues and questions that were 
perhaps not unique people felt they were.  They wanted attention from us and we 
had a number of people working telephones all the time and helping with that 
process (Interviewee #11, personal communication, 9-9-11). 
 
Perhaps this conflict of opinion best characterizes the use of the Quality Texas 
Foundation- Engagement Level Criteria in that it only provides a targeted framework 
that covers the major systems of an organization.  At some level, it still is necessary for 
those who would use the framework to identify those important systems for discussion 
and review.  The organizational demographics of which people participate in answering 
the criteria will determine whether all of the major and most important systems end up 
being discussed.   
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 A second issue that was mentioned by several of the interviewees was the impact 
of the crisis upon the employees.  Certainly Workforce Focus is one of the major 
categories and questions are posed about workforce engagement, health, safety and 
security.  However, several participants did not feel this line of questioning covered, or 
even provided the opportunity to introduce, the very real issue of balancing the 
employees’ needs versus the organizations. As one TAMUG Crisis Management Team 
member described it: 
So I'm looking at the area, strategic planning, customer focus, measurement, 
leadership, etcetera.  So I guess when it started talking about the workforce focus 
and the customer focus, they’ve kind of hit on it pretty good.  But since you’re 
talking about a crisis situation in this case, you and I just had a significant 
conversation right there about people’s personal lives.  So, to some extent I think 
these 7 areas kind of hit that, but I don’t know that have hit, maybe it deserves a 
category on its own, if you were kind of tweaking it for the study, what is the 
leadership’s role in understanding and balancing the personal and business needs 
of its employees, etcetera, etcetera.  Maybe it’s there, but again, this wasn’t 
written for a crisis per se.  So there’s that personal side and what's the role and 
the ethical and I guess the ethical responsibility or compassionate responsibility 
of institutional leaders in a crisis for the personal needs of their employees. 
 
Because again, there were times when Dr. Loftin would push us and I will tell 
him this, he would push us and I'm like, dude, mentally our folks are strapped 
and I know we may need to get the campus up and that people are depending on 
us, but pull up and that’s to give people a chance to breathe.  I think somewhere 
in there it’s embedded, but we as the customer workforce, I don’t know that it 
automatically takes me to home life, personal life, and the like (Interviewee #10, 
personal communication, 9-8-11). 
 
Another described this issue more in terms of the ethics of ensuring work/ life balance, 
often an impossible feat to accomplish during crisis response. 
You’ve obviously talked to people.  So, a lot of times the discussion led us there 
before the question.  But the questions you didn’t ask about are the emotional 
piece and the people piece.  It talks about systems and management. And not 
amount-- stakeholders, but the questions were around benefits to stakeholders, 
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communications to stakeholders not what were the emotional impacts on the 
stakeholders?  You didn’t have -- they don’t have a question like that. 
 
In IT, everybody that’s at my level on IT, not necessarily everybody, but my 
level of people, all will agree with this statement:  Technology is the easy part, 
people are the hard part.  This is too wonky.  You got it?  It underestimates the 
emotional costs. It underestimates the emotional baggage and cost -- there was no 
question about work-life balance which is an emotional cost.  So, it doesn’t cover 
the people piece adequately.  From the emotional impacts of it and the work-life 
balance, I would have added a question- how successful were you as an 
institution at supporting your staff and continuing a good work-life balance?  
That’s the question I would ask if I were you because that’s a big deal, and our 
success was much more checkered.  You and your wife were separated for three 
months, and you worked till 10 o’clock at night for three months.  That’s not a 
real successful maintenance of a work-life balance, okay.  Donna burned out for 
as much I’ve ever known Donna to be burned out after the experience, pain and 
scars and pain. 
 
That’s the areas that it doesn’t address.  Partly because of what it is, partly 
because -- I mean the instrument, the boundaries -- probably because they’re 
short sighted.  They should ask those questions as part of a knowledge of work, 
okay. They are missing. I am taking it out of its…out of its total context, but 
you’re not a great company if you do it on the backs of your people.  You’re not 
a Baldrige winner if you do it on the backs of your people.  Because -- here’s the 
business side of me - in the long run, it will cost you more than you gained, 
okay?  It’s a typical short term-long term situation (Interviewee #5, personal 
communication, 7-29-11).  
  
 With the possible exception of these two areas, many of the others participants 
felt that the framework overall was fairly comprehensive in nature.  Each respondent felt 
that the Quality Texas Foundation- Engagement Level Criteria provided a framework 
where they could describe the crisis response from their perspective, and even though 
several identified a few questions that they not did not feel exactly fit with a crisis 
response review, many respondents were able to answer every question with some aspect 
that they felt was important enough to be mentioned.  As one participant described: 
No, I mean, the questions were not exactly in line with what you’ve done, but I 
tried to work in everything I thought was important here.  I think that you 
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covered the gamut pretty well as I was able to give you what I thought was 
important here.  This isn’t a perfect match, but I try just to take liberties to fill in 
the blanks there and describe the important things that were done here 
(Interviewee #11, personal communication, 9-9-11). 
 
Summary 
 Although one of the questions in the Quality Texas Foundation- Engagement 
Level Criteria is specifically focused on disaster and emergency preparedness, the 
criteria were not developed to assess crisis response.  In fact much of the value of the 
Baldrige framework in a crisis mode would come as a result of the extent to which the 
organization had used and was using the Baldrige Criteria as an ongoing performance 
management framework.  The extent to which an organization had well-defined and 
functioning systems, including taking care of the workforce, which enable the 
organization to adjust more quickly in a crisis situation and provide a much needed 
stability in the face of rapid and unintended changes.  With that being said, many of the 
operations of an organization continue throughout a crisis.  If the operational systems 
continue throughout the crisis, then an argument could certainly be made that the 
Baldrige Criteria (Quality Texas Foundation- Engagement Level Criteria) would be 
useful in assessing those systems and providing opportunity to learn from the crisis.  In 
fact with crisis response being more reactive by its very nature, the Baldrige framework 
is much better suited for the systemic assessment and learning which can then be utilized 
to develop a stronger, more systemic approach in mitigating future crises.  The counter 
to this argument is if there is something unique to crisis response that would not occur 
during the regular day to day processes for which the Baldrige Criteria ( Quality Texas 
Foundation - Engagement Level Criteria) was designed.  
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 In considering the data, the Baldrige Criteria (Quality Texas Foundation - 
Engagement Level Criteria) successfully provided a framework to assess TAMUG’s 
crisis response to Hurricane Ike.  The general areas of  leadership; strategic planning; 
customer focus; measurement, analysis, and knowledge management; workforce focus; 
process management; and business results are broad enough to capture most of the 
activities that occurred within the realm of the crisis response.  This was particularly true 
when the interviews included all of the members of the TAMUG Crisis Management 
Team which was structured to include all major operational leaders.  Through this 
process, an extremely rich description of the crisis response was developed, and the vast 
majority of participants felt that they were able to share everything that needed to be 
shared about the response.  
 However there were two areas that interviewees felt were not emphasized enough 
to truly capture vital information in a crisis response.  Crisis communications is often 
one of the major factors that determine an organization’s success or failure in responding 
to a crisis.  Although some interviewees discussed the communication process in their 
response, others felt dedicated questions needed to be in place to ensure that 
communications were discussed. 
 Secondly, several interviewees felt that there was not an availability under the 
framework to truly discuss the impact of the crisis on the workers.  Issues such as 
work/life balance, morale and fatigue can play major roles in the long-term success of 
the organization, and whereas there certainly was the opportunity to explore this area 
under work force focus, some of the interviewees did not feel as if the standard Quality 
 319 
 
Texas Foundation- Engagement Level Criteria easily lead to that discussion and 
advocated the addition of several questions that specifically addressed this issue.  
Key Findings 
1.  The Baldrige Criteria (Quality Texas Foundation - Engagement Level Criteria) 
provides broad categories to review those systems that would generally occur 
during the normal course of operations as well as a specific question concerning 
disaster and emergency preparedness.  Most if not all of these systems will 
continue to operate during a crisis response, although some may be more 
impacted than others.  Just as it is important to secure all key operational 
managers’ participation in doing a Baldrige assessment during normal 
operations, it is even more critical to include all key operational managers in 
doing an assessment of a crisis response.  Luckily most crisis management teams 
will include such a group, but failing to include a manager in a significant role in 
the assessment could easily bias the assessment of a crisis response when so 
many things are occurring at such a rapid pace. 
2. Communications play a major role in crisis, and a poor communication plan has 
often resulted in a minor crisis growing into a major crisis.  In seeking to provide 
as much detail concerning the Hurricane Ike crisis, the interviewees found ways 
under the Baldrige framework to discuss the communications plan.  This may be 
as a result of all of the interviewees feeling the response overall was successful.  
In a situation where there was not a feeling of success, the respondents may not 
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be so proactive in discussing their communication plan without having more 
pointed questions covering this important component of crisis management.  
3. A crisis can impact an organization in many ways.  One way that may not be 
readily apparent is the long-term personal effect on employees as they are often 
dealing with additional crisis at home.  Damage to their homes, injured or 
deceased loved ones, long hours resulting in bad work/life balance, continued 
employment concerns, and many other issues can occur in high frequency as the 
crisis that impacted the organization also impacted the surrounding community.  
Failure to assess this impact on an organization can certainly lead to detrimental 
effects for the organization. Although the Quality Texas Foundation- 
Engagement Level Criteria certainly provides the broad area of workforce to 
explore this issue, a more directed line of questioning dealing with crisis may be 
more necessary to truly assess an organization’s crisis response.   
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Introduction 
 The purpose of this study was two-fold: (1) to examine the Texas A&M 
University at Galveston’s Crisis Management Team’s approach, deployment, and 
learning as a consequence of Hurricane Ike in the effort to return the campus to Pre-Ike 
status; (2) to evaluate the Quality Texas Foundation- Engagement Level Criteria as a 
framework for assessing crisis management in higher education.  The relocation of 1700 
students to another campus and perhaps equally important, the continuation in many 
ways of that campus community within the boundaries of the mother campus had never 
been attempted, so it was important to document the approach, deployment and learning 
that occurred as a result of the crisis.  Unfortunately each response is unique in many 
ways to the specific crisis that is to be mitigated so there is not a standard process for 
documenting and assessing crisis response.   
 With that being said, the Baldrige Criteria are an internationally recognized 
criteria for identifying organizational systems and processes as well as determining 
whether assessment and learning are taking place, critical components to managing and 
potentially preventing future crisis.  As the actual Malcolm Baldrige process can take 
years for an organization to implement fully, a modified, scaled down process developed 
by the Quality Texas Foundation and based on the Baldrige Criteria was used as the 
framework to interview all members of the TAMUG Crisis Management Team.  The 
 322 
 
researcher hoped to use this framework to develop a thick, rich description of TAMUG’s 
crisis response to Hurricane Ike as well as identify the specific approach used, the 
manner of deployment of that approach and the learning that took place as a result of 
that response.  Lastly the instrument itself would be discussed with the interviewees to 
determine if it was an appropriate instrument to utilize for future crisis response 
evaluation.  
 
Summary of Findings 
Research Question 1 
Research question one asked what approach did TAMUG utilize in their crisis 
management process. The TAMUG Crisis Management Team was charged early on with 
developing an appropriate response to any crisis situation that could negatively affect the 
university.  Although plans were developed for a number of contingencies, TAMUG’s 
location on the Texas coast required that an appropriate response to a hurricane strike 
was the highest priority.  The TAMUG Crisis Management Team developed an approach 
to dealing with this possibility that was methodical, based on best practice, and as 
detailed as practical.  
The first step of this approach was a strong leadership team that was 
comprehensive and empowered.  Consisting of a broad array of individuals with 
operational responsibility over all major components of the campus, the group was broad 
enough to provide valuable information to the team but lean enough to make major 
decisions in a timely fashion, a critical ability during times of crisis.  Members were 
 323 
 
added to the team during the crisis as necessary, but the group was successful at being 
knowledgeable of and representational for all components of the campus and was highly 
regarded by the campus community.  The TAMUG Crisis Management Team took their 
assignment seriously and worked together to develop an extensive response plan in case 
of a direct hurricane strike.  In addition when teamed with their counterparts in TAMU-
College Station, they worked well to accomplish the organization goal of relocation.   
The crisis response plan that was developed from their meetings played a critical 
role in the institution surviving Hurricane Ike.  Developed from years of experience with 
near misses and even a few direct strikes from hurricanes, the plan carefully laid out a 
well-rehearsed approach to an impending hurricane strike, detailing numerous processes 
for evacuating students and securing the campus.  It was a living breathing document 
that was updated after each use, and probably most importantly was added to upon 
witnessing the impact of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita on other institutions.  The 
development of the business continuity component and resulting table top exercises 
provided a well thought-out guiding document during the actual crisis that proved 
immensely valuable in the initial days of the crisis. The interviewees repeatedly referred 
to the timeliness and critical nature of the plan that despite its flaws provided a roadmap 
during a time of confusion and unknowns. 
The approach was very broad based with most emphasis placed on a series of 
white papers that were developed between TAMUG and TAMU-College Station 
counterparts, teams developed to formally address various functional areas such as 
financial aid, housing, dining services and others.  These teams developed a series of 
 324 
 
priorities and agreements but much more importantly developed strong relationships that 
would become critical during the crisis response. 
The approach taken in developing the relocation to TAMU-College Station was 
extremely intentional.  The alignment of multiple processes, access to common 
databases, interaction with highly trained specialists, and deeper staffing resources were 
just some of the specific benefits to the plan.  Furthermore, the infrastructure of the 
50,000 student TAMU-College Station could easily assimilate an additional near 2000 
TAMUG students with their large dining facilities, adequate parking, and larger 
academic community. 
Unfortunately much less attention was focused on the workforce and actual 
student body in the plan.  Certainly the safety and security of all faculty, staff and 
students was the very highest priority in the evacuation of the campus, but very little 
detail was provided as to what would happen with the staff and faculty who weren’t 
identified as necessary in the relocation.  There was also little detail provided beyond the 
series of one page white papers of what would be done with the students once they were 
assimilated into TAMU-College Station.  The approach of placing students into ongoing 
TAMU-College Station courses with new faculty had great potential for problems for 
students who were already experiencing a crisis.    
 Lastly the approach was a struggle with the unknown.  The evacuation and 
securing of the campus was a process that had been repeated and improved upon.  Even 
though every storm was slightly different, the campus had enough data to develop strong 
action plans to prepare for most crises.  The new addition to the plan was a different 
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animal.  Not only had TAMUG never relocated its student body before, but as far as the 
TAMUG Crisis Management team could determine, no one else had either. Without 
having any baseline information – how many students would relocate, how much 
housing was needed, how much support would be needed – it was extremely difficult to 
provide the level of detail beyond the broad approach taken by the team.  TAMUG 
utilized multiple approaches in developing its crisis management plan including best 
practices research, table top exercises, a strong leadership team empowered to address 
the challenge, multiple cross-university agreements, and multiple other approaches to 
develop a plan that had never been attempted before.  It was as solid of an approach as 
could be developed under the circumstances. 
Research Question 2 
 Research question two asked what strategies did Texas A&M University at 
Galveston deploy in applying their approach consistently and ensuring the approach was 
utilized by all appropriate work units.  Crisis often causes confusion.  The approach 
provided broad agreements and specific tools and processes to achieve those goals.  The 
first strategy in applying the crisis management plan was to further refine the broad 
goals set forth by the original plan.  A major component in TAMUG’s crisis response 
was the development of a more specific organizational vision and specific guiding 
principles to drive decision making beyond the crisis management plan.  A crisis 
management plan cannot address all issues that arise as a result of a crisis, so the guiding 
principles provided a framework for all university employees to employ in making 
decisions in a timely and consistent manner.  These vision and guiding principles also 
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worked to reinforce many of the organizational values and principles among the 
organization members as well as highlight some of the first priorities in the response. 
Secondly, although there wasn’t too much detail placed on the student in the 
original plan, that quickly changed in the deployment phase.  A high level of emphasis 
was focused on the students in the process.  From ensuring their safety through the initial 
evacuation to identifying safe housing and meal plans, the team utilized heavy 
communication throughout the process to assess their status.  Counseling sessions, 
financial support, and donation drives were just some of the activities that were 
implemented to help students recover from the trauma of the relocation.  The approach 
of placing TAMUG students in as many TAMU-College Station courses was quickly 
discarded to keep students with the TAMUG faculty and classmates.  Some team 
members felt that the academic quality of the instruction during the relocation was 
substandard but others felt it was a much better solution than simply cancelling the 
semester.  Several events scheduled to help the TAMUG students retain their “Sea 
Aggie” identity also contributed to increasing morale among the students.  The retention 
of the Sea Aggie culture became a priority for those supporting the relocation. 
A similar emphasis was made to support the workforce.  Securing the campus 
and even offering shelter and food to the workers who remained in Galveston 
contributed to a sense of loyalty to the mission.  Job responsibilities were shifted when 
necessary to ensure all employees remained employed if they desired.  The same was 
true of faculty and staff who relocated or commuted to College Station to continue 
operations.  Housing, flexible schedules, revamped course schedules and distance 
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education options were all put in place to facilitate faculty and staff continuing to work 
with their students in College Station.  Every faculty and staff member was allowed to 
retain their job throughout the entire crisis, something that few other organizations in 
Galveston could state.  
The TAMUG Crisis Management Team documented results to further guide 
them in their planning.  Results and measures were difficult to obtain during the actual 
time of crisis, but measureable results were actively sought during the crisis for review 
after the crisis to modify the plan in the future.  Various surveys were conducted with 
students and faculty as well as after action reports conducted with staff and 
administration to document perceptions.  Financial reports and other data were 
consolidated to provide a financial picture of the crisis response. 
Measures were also taken to ensure consistency in the deployment of their 
approach.  A crisis response should seek to reduce or even eliminate confusion, and this 
is best achieved by a clear, consistent approach.  TAMUG developed and implemented a 
well thought out approach and worked diligently to ensure the approach was enacted by 
all of its work units.  The organizational structure of TAMUG already lent itself to a 
systemic approach in that it is a smaller organization that was reduced even smaller by 
the relocation of some of its workforce.  This system approach was further facilitated by 
the College Station administrative relocation team being compressed mostly in two 
areas, rather than spread out by department across the sprawling TAMU- College Station 
campus as were some of the faculty.  Indeed, simply the fact that the staff were relocated 
to a new community themselves away from their typical friends and often time family 
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resulted in the staff socializing and relying on each other outside of the long work hours.  
The very environment further reinforced the strong sense of familiarity with one another 
and their operations.   
With that being said, the university utilized several strategies to ensure the 
university’s approach was deployed consistently.  The first of these was the use of a 
broad operational group that utilized shared decision making to inform their approach.  
This group met frequently early in the crisis response, sometimes more than once a day, 
and then utilized direct, rather than indirect, communication to subunits to ensure that 
rapid, but accurate information and instructions were deployed as well as received.  As 
the organization was fairly flat in nature, this was an efficient process and ensured that 
information was consistently distributed throughout the organization.  Furthermore, the 
organization evolved to bring more people to the table when necessary to ensure the 
group’s access to quick reliable information was preserved. 
A strong organizational vision with strong guiding principles was another 
strategy used to great success.  The guiding principles clearly defined the university’s 
approach to all employees and provided a valuable framework to guide staff in their 
decision making.  The guiding principles were not easily achieved and the very effort 
necessary to accomplish the first few steps toward those guiding principles demonstrated 
that the university was committed to this approach.  In addition the guiding principles 
demanded a series of action for the staff to work on in the early stages of the crisis which 
further emphasized the approach.  Even the list of frequently asked questions, developed 
to facilitate communication with the students and their families, were shaped by the 
 329 
 
guiding principles and facilitated employees’ understanding of the operations of all 
components during the crisis response.  
The biggest failing in this consistency of deploying the planned approach, and 
perhaps of the entire crisis response, was the waiving of the necessary approval of 
distance education courses.  In working to facilitate faculty teaching, the rigorous 
standards required for distance education were waived.  This allowed faculty who 
possibly were not prepared to teach courses that may not have been suitable for distance 
education and in doing so, potentially reduced the academic quality of the relocation 
experience, despite maintaining high academic quality being one of the primary guiding 
principles. 
The TAMUG Crisis Management Team deployed a number of strategies to 
ensure the survival of TAMUG.  Although the approach provided a framework to initiate 
the crisis response, the team, along with all of the employees of TAMUG and many of 
TAMU-College Station, worked incredibly long hours under difficult circumstances to 
ensure the university survived the crisis.  Academic progress without significant 
financial costs, preserving the Sea Aggie identity, and job security for all employees 
were significant objectives that were achieved by the deployment of the TAMUG’s 
crisis management plan.   
Research Question 3 
 Research question three asked what learning occurred as a result of refining the 
approach through cycles of evaluation and improvement.  Hurricane Alicia devastated 
TAMUG in 1972.  Its impact on enrollment took years to recover from, but TAMUG 
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never worked to mitigate the possibility of another disaster for over thirty years.  
Certainly the university assessed and tweaked each evacuation process after each near 
miss, but TAMUG’s crisis management plan for the most part was to hope for continued 
misses and play the odds.  After Hurricanes Katrina and Rita so dramatically affected 
many of the universities along the Gulf Coast, the TAMUG Crisis Management Team 
learned that this was not a worthwhile strategy for the long term.  The TAMUG Crisis 
Management Team looked to the experiences of the affected universities to determine 
that the suspension or even cancellation of a school semester was prohibitive for 
TAMUG and that other alternatives would need to be investigated.  Even though the 
TAMUG Crisis Management Team learned of a number of strategies to enhance 
recovery from such a disaster, the relocation of Katrina refugees, and more specifically a 
number of Tulane University’s athletic teams, to Texas A&M University provided 
another model for consideration.  The Business Continuity Plan, that proposed the 
relocation of Galveston students to College Station, began to be developed soon after 
that with strong collaboration between Galveston and their TAMU- College Station 
counterparts.   
 The plan was a new one that had never been attempted before, so as the plan was 
implemented, a great deal of information was learned through the attempted deployment.  
The original plan was necessarily broad so the first thing that was learned was the need 
to better refine the organization vision and more clarified instructions to the managers 
based on the now available data.   Data such as how many students would relocate, the 
best method for building a course schedule around another campus’s course schedule, 
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where to put classes and how to outfit them appropriately was all new data, so every new 
action whether successful or failure was new valuable information to be learned.  All 
information had to be gathered, decisions made rapidly, and the next issue addressed 
while preserving measurements and data for later assessment and reflection.  The rapid 
fire environment did not provide time for much evaluation of these decisions, so time 
was made later for proper reflection.    
As the urgency of the crisis subsided, however, a concerted effort was made to 
document the learning, assess the decisions, and incorporate the improvements into the 
future plan.  Surveys of students and faculty, open forums, after action reviews with 
various decision makers, and extensive discussion groups provided valuable information 
as to what had been successful in the implementation of the Business Continuity Plan 
and what was less so.   This focused process accumulated data from a wide array of 
individuals which was then reviewed by a wide array of individuals to greatly enhance 
the educational benefits of the information.  Broad lists of problematic issues and areas 
of great success were further reviewed and boiled down to lists of lessons learned and 
governing principles for future use of the plan.  These lists were predominately strategic 
in nature and incorporated into the new plan.  Problem issues that were more operational 
in nature were circulated to the responsible departmental managers to consider in their 
own departmental crisis plan.  As a result, TAMUG will have successfully learned a 
great deal from their first venture in the relocation of students and have a more effective 
process to use the next time relocation is called for. 
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Research Question 4 
 Research question four asked to what extent is the Quality Texas Foundation- 
Engagement Level Criteria an effective framework for assessing crisis management in 
higher education.  At first look, the Baldrige Criteria (Quality Texas Foundation - 
Engagement Level Criteria) cover all of the major systems in an organization: 
leadership; strategic planning; customer focus; measurement, analysis, and knowledge 
management; workforce focus; process management; and business results.  Furthermore, 
organizations are compelled to continue their most critical functions, even during a crisis 
situation.  As such, the Quality Texas Foundation- Engagement Level Criteria 
internationally recognized for its effectiveness in identifying and assessing 
organizational processes and systems, seems to be a perfect instrument for assessing the 
activities of any organization, whether in crisis or not.  It is particularly effective as a 
framework for the development of approach and organizational learning; however, crisis 
deployment is often responsive in nature so it cannot be the perfect instrument for 
assessing all actions taken during the course of a crisis.  With that being said, the 
comprehensive analysis provided by the instrument can provide leadership with a highly 
effective, systemic approach to normal operations vs. crisis situation and facilitate 
institutionalized support where it is most appropriate through the learning process.  Most 
of the interviewees confirmed that the framework allowed them to share all of the details 
they found important to truly detailing the crisis response.  In fact, all of the interviewees 
felt that the framework, with some minor tweaking with regards to the reality of crisis 
response, would serve as an effective framework for reviewing a crisis response.  The 
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researcher also found this to be true as long as all managers of important operations 
would be included, as is often the case with the composition of crisis management 
teams. 
The two areas that were identified as potential areas of concern were 
communication and the personal aspect of the workforce, many of whom might be 
personally experiencing crisis during the organizational crisis management response.  In 
both of these cases, the framework provides the ability to discuss the issue under current 
subject areas – communication under process management and employee personal 
situation under workforce focus- but neither provide the specific directed questioning 
that would highlight these two areas as specific areas of concern.  The possible addition 
of a section or at least specific questions focused on these issues could be added to 
ensure the issues were addressed in a crisis response review. 
The Baldrige Framework was not designed to be a tool for crisis management 
assessment.  There are certain challenges in considering the reactive nature of crisis 
response that do not completely align with the planning and learning processes that are 
emphasized as part of the Baldrige framework.  That being said, the framework provided 
a valuable instrument to consider the approach, deployment and learning of the TAMUG 
Crisis Management Team’s response to the Hurricane Ike crisis and could continue to be 
effective in future crisis response assessment. 
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Conclusions 
Hurricane Katrina and Rita had a devastating impact on a number of Gulf Coast 
colleges and universities, but in many ways had a positive impact on TAMUG.  By 
learning from the successes and failures in those schools crisis responses, TAMUG was 
able to reassess their current crisis management plan which only described the 
evacuation and preparation for the storm and add the much needed Business Continuity 
Plan.  Based on the impact to the enrollment and financial situation of those schools 
impacted by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, it is questionable whether TAMUG would 
have survived closing for a semester.  As such, the relocation and continuation of the 
semester was essential.   
 Even though the relocation and continuation was critical, the process of 
achieving this endeavor was complicated.  It had never been attempted before, and there 
was really no way to determine how many students would relocate.  Without a model to 
follow or even a starting number to plan for, it was a difficult process to develop, but 
four things proved to be vital in the development of the process.  The first was a strong 
relationship between TAMU- College Station and TAMU-Galveston.  The familiarity of 
staff and faculty, alignment of numerous processes, and even basic understanding of 
organization all proved vital in moving the Galveston campus under the umbrella of 
College Station.  Secondly, the crisis management plan developed collaboratively 
between various counterparts of TAMU- College Station and TAMUG allowed many of 
the most complicated facets of the relocation to be thought out and discussed before the 
urgency of the crisis was upon the campuses.  Although the plan was certainly not 
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without problems, so much of the plan was successful that it allowed more time to be 
focused on the few shortcomings.  Third was the vision and guiding principles provided 
by the campus leadership which provided the guidance to staff to fill in the gaps that the 
crisis management plan failed to cover.  With hundreds of decisions that were at such a 
detailed level that the plan could not be expected to address, a unifying set of guiding 
principles ensured that decisions were all aligned toward the same goal.  Lastly, the 
commitment of the staff and faculty, and even students, to persevere through the crisis 
despite many facing personal crises of homes destroyed themselves, was critical.  There 
was no one else to do the necessary work to ensure the relocation was successful.  Long 
hours, extended commutes and difficult time away from homes and families were 
commonplace in the response in the successful execution of the Business Continuity 
Plan that helped TAMUG survive. 
 Although much of the initial plan was at the strategic level, the university was 
successful at developing an approach that used a variety of methods to accomplish the 
goal of continuing TAMUG within the boundaries of TAMU- College Station as well as 
supporting the faculty, staff and students of TAMUG.  Keeping students with their 
classmates and faculty, housing them together, providing activities and locations for 
them to congregate and socialize were only a few of the methods used to preserve the 
Sea Aggie identity.  Working with faculty in their class schedules and research and 
providing support to faculty, staff, and students further served to pull the campus 
community together.  Part of this approach included the support of the surrounding 
community by offering beds and classrooms to the University of Texas Medical Branch, 
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meeting space for the Sunshine Group, and housing to the Galveston Independent School 
District as well as several trips by staff and students to Galveston to work on homes 
affected by the storm.  It was a broad approach that impacted many in College Station as 
well as those still in Galveston. 
 To ensure this approach was deployed consistently throughout the organization, 
TAMUG developed a new group, the Strategic Operation Team that still meets to this 
day several years later.  They employed multiple meetings and a communications 
strategy that operated on a number of levels to ensure consistency and documentation of 
the crisis response.  Once the immediate response slowed to some extent, surveys, after 
action reports, and forums were held to learn from this incredible experience so that it 
might be improved if ever required to be implemented again.  This document added 
further insight to the consistency of the deployment.  
 Lastly, the Baldrige Criteria, or more specifically the Quality Texas Foundation - 
Engagement Level Criteria, provide a solid framework for assessing crisis response. The 
series of questions cover every aspect of an organization’s operations and thereby 
provide the opportunity to discuss all aspects of a crisis response. Certainly there are 
areas that could be further developed to provide more targeted questions at critical areas 
of a crisis response like communications, but Quality Texas Foundation - Engagement 
Level Criteria provide a good starting point to develop an instrument geared specifically 
toward crisis response assessment particularly if the next level of the Quality Texas 
Foundation is considered. Obviously as you move into the more detailed levels of the 
Quality Texas Foundation’s criteria, the more specific of an assessment process will take 
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place. The Quality Texas Foundation - Engagement Level Criteria provide a very solid 
foundation upon which to build. 
  
Recommendations for Practice 
1. Organizational culture and identity are extremely important, and are tested to a 
great extreme in crisis.  In TAMUG’s crisis, Hurricane Ike literally destroyed 
much of the environment and structure of the institution in forcing the university 
to integrate into the operation of its mother campus.  In many ways, this posed an 
additional crisis in that much of the student enrollment preserved by the 
relocation could easily be lost to TAMU-College Station if the students no longer 
identified with TAMUG.  Through multiple efforts of communicating and 
reinforcing the values, and building familiar structure and environment, TAMUG 
was successful in retaining the Sea Aggie culture and identity and retained record 
numbers of students as well as faculty and staff.  This certainly reinforces what 
Chaffe and Tierney (1988) state: 
Several important organizational benefits arise when culture, strategy, 
and leadership overlap.  When identity is clear and coherent, all who are 
involved with the organization have a star to navigate by in their efforts to 
contribute to the group.  They see what the organization is and, with 
consistent strategic leadership, they see where the organization is headed.  
People generally will choose to leave an organization that they do not 
find comfortable and to contribute actively to those they believe in.  The 
organization with a clear identity and direction attracts those with similar 
aims and encourages them to find ways to help.  As this dynamic unfolds, 
participants in the organization develop a sense of worth, both for 
themselves and for the organization.  They feel competent and needed.  
Their commitment and loyalty to the organization increase, often bringing 
ever-greater efforts to contribute.  In other words, a coherent identity can 
create an upward spiral of achievement and satisfaction (p.183) 
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TAMUG retained its identity through the active alignment of multiple strategies 
and the institution benefited greatly.  Institutions facing/going through crisis 
should be intentional about maintaining institutional culture through deliberately 
attending to the values, environment, and structure that foster that culture. 
2.  Organizations should have a strong crisis management team made up of key 
operational members.  This team must be empowered to make whatever 
decisions are necessary, but should also have the breadth of knowledge of 
organizational functions to be informed in making those decisions.  This can be 
accomplished by placement of all key members upon the team or in the case of 
very large organizations, a streamlined organizational structure that provides 
rapid transmission of important information.  
3. A strong crisis management plan that is based on best practice, is routinely 
updated, and has been practiced through table top exercises and drills not only 
provides a critical path to follow when crisis actually strikes, but the constant 
updating and practicing keeps the mind fresh and relevant in the minds of those 
who must use it.  The plan must be strategic in nature but provide as much detail 
as possible while still offering the flexibility to respond to the unique nature of 
each crisis. 
4. A strong organizational vision and guiding principles are critical components to 
ensuring that all decisions made outside the plan, and there will be many, are still 
aligned with the vision set forth by leadership.  Having guiding principles can 
further expedite the crisis response as decisions made at the lower levels of the 
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organization will not always need to be run up the command chain as long as 
they fall within the principles. 
5. Process is incredibly important in times of crisis. TAMUG was incredibly 
benefited by being able to continue to operate in an organization that utilized 
similar processes, terms, and language.  That familiarity made for one less thing 
that students and even staff and faculty had to worry about as they dealt with the 
numerous other new challenges of operating in a new community on a different 
campus.  Keeping students with the same instructors and same classmates with 
the same syllabi was just one process that when kept the same reduced quite a bit 
of the anxiety on the student side. 
6. Communication during crisis is critical, and lack of accurate communication can 
often act as a multiplier to the crisis situation.  In today’s world of multiple forms 
of communication, it is important to consistently communicate with stakeholders 
with a clear and timely message.  TAMUG was fairly successful through their 
use of webpage, social media, email, student forums, and podcasts to keep 
students updated with the most current information. 
7. Course scheduling was one of the most complex processes that occurred during 
the relocation.  Managing multiple schedules in a rapidly changing inventory of 
classrooms with faculty, staff, and students each with their own schedule of 
commuting and work schedules would be extremely challenging in normal 
situations, exponentially so in the urgency of a crisis response.  Giving careful 
consideration to how this might occur in advance of the crisis is critical. 
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8. In a relocation scenario where the university would have several issues to address 
with regards to housing, food plans, campus clean up, even though the exact 
locations and specifics cannot be identified, the development of contracts and 
agreements can be accomplished well in advance.  This advance development 
allows for better consideration of options as well as timely review by legal 
counsel so that documents are simply able to be executed, rather than developed 
on the spot.  If developed in advance, the possibility of bidding and negotiating 
for some services becomes possible than having to deal in a crisis situation. 
9. A crisis management team must not only look to the survival of the organization, 
but also must be aware of the crisis’ impact on their workforce.  The organization 
is only as strong as the people working for it, and without proper support, the 
workforce will not be able to continue in their mission.  TAMUG not only did 
not lay off a single person as a result of the crisis, but also provided housing and 
meals for many of its employees when they needed it most. 
10. The small staff and flatness of the organization contributed greatly to the 
coordination of the university’s approach.  Meetings with key operational leaders 
were able to be kept small and efficient and allowed for the rapid dissemination 
of important information as well as the collection of valuable feedback and data. 
11. The commitment to meet by the major decision makers at least once a day during 
the early part of the crisis was vital.  People are incredibly busy especially during 
a crisis situation, but the commitment to get everyone in the same room to 
provide a broad perspective and make decisions as a group not only allowed for 
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decisions to be based on large amounts of information, but also provided for a 
constancy in getting those decisions out to the front line. 
12. The elimination of the standard of approval for the distance education courses 
turned out to be one of the worst decisions in the crisis response based on student 
surveys.  Universities must be careful in forgoing some of the well-grounded 
policies for the sake of expediency as they can eventually lead to negative 
consequences for the population they are trying to serve. 
13. The learning that takes place by a crisis management team needs to be ongoing 
and continuous.  Although each crisis is unique, there are several opportunities 
for learning from others’ experiences and developing best practice as well as 
conducting regular reviews of the approach.  TAMUG benefited greatly from 
looking at the other institutional responses to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 
14. Having a formalized process to assess the response is important.  During the 
actual crisis response, there is no time to stop and evaluate.  Documenting 
decisions and processes to be assessed later is important, but just as important is 
the commitment to formally undertake that process. 
15. The TAMUG Crisis Management Team developed a list of ten 
institution/professional lessons learned as well as an accompanying list of ten 
personal lessons learned (p. 305-7).  These lists, accompanied with the twenty 
governing principles developed by Drs. McMullen and Mileski (p. 307-12), are 
extremely valuable insights from people who were on or very close to the front 
 342 
 
line of this crisis response.  These lists and the insights provided within them 
should be included as key findings of any analysis of TAMUG’s crisis response.  
16. The Baldrige criteria, and more specifically the Quality Texas Foundation - 
Engagement Level Criteria provide a valuable framework for use in crisis 
management.  By considering the multiple questions during the approach, a 
Crisis Management Team is assured of fully considering the most vital areas of 
an organization.  Secondly, the use of the Baldrige Criteria (Quality Texas 
Foundation - Engagement Level Criteria) following a crisis during the after 
action review provides an extremely comprehensive framework to fully consider 
all vital operations of an organization and how they responded to the crisis. 
 
Recommendations for Future Research 
1. This study used the Baldrige framework to develop a case study of TAMUG’s 
response to Hurricane Ike.  By interviewing all of the TAMUG Crisis 
Management Team members and asking questions about the major operational 
systems of an organization, it is hoped that a realistic portrayal of what occurred 
during the relocation of the students is created.  Unfortunately there is a valuable 
perspective that is missing from this case study, and that is the perspective of the 
TAMU- College Station staff and personnel who were incredibly valuable team 
members in making the relocation occur.  Documenting the Hurricane Ike 
response using the Baldrige Criteria (Quality Texas Foundation- Engagement 
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Level Criteria) from TAMU- College Station’s perspective could provide 
additional valuable insight to this case study. 
2. The Baldrige Criteria (Quality Texas Foundation - Engagement Level Criteria) 
cover the broad systems occurring in organizations.  When used to document and 
assess crisis response, there seemed to be several questions that did not fit, per se.  
For instance, many felt that asking about workforce training and education 
seemed out of place in a crisis situation.  In addition, several interviewees 
advocated additional questions targeting the communications during a crisis and 
the crisis effect on work life balance of employees.  Still the Baldrige Criteria 
(Quality Texas Foundation - Engagement Level Criteria) provided an effective 
framework to develop this case study of the Hurricane Ike despite these possible 
shortcomings.  Based on the solid foundation provided by the Quality Texas 
Foundation- Engagement Level Criteria, investigation as to whether an 
instrument could be developed that is more tailored to crisis response could be 
helpful to future crisis response assessment. 
3. The relocation of an entire student body during a semester was a dramatic 
response to a dramatic event.  Although the university fared well based on 
continuing enrollment trends and financial records, the students were impacted as 
much as anyone.  As the last students impacted by Hurricane Ike graduate and 
leave TAMUG, a study could be conducted to consider the effects the response 
had on them personally and how it has impacted their future endeavors.  Many 
people speak to valuable life lessons that possibly come from such a situation.  
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Now several years away from the response, do they look back favorably on the 
relocation response or less so, and could their perspective now add to the crisis 
response dialogue.   
 
Closing statement 
 Hurricane Ike was a tremendous storm that inflicted an enormous amount of 
damage to the Gulf Coast.  Several universities were impacted negatively, but none was 
affected more than TAMUG.  Fortunately due to their timely review and update to their 
crisis management plan, TAMUG was prepared to take extraordinary steps to save the 
semester and possibly even the university.  Through the extraordinary teamwork and 
commitment from the staff of both campuses, a relocation of nearly all of their students 
to the mother campus in College Station was accomplished in an amazingly short nine 
days.  It has been an incredible experience to meet with the Galveston team members 
and discuss the details and many decisions that occurred leading up to those nine days 
and the months following.  This thorough, systemic examination of the TAMUG Crisis 
Management Team’s approach, deployment, and learning should be helpful in the crisis 
response planning of TAMUG and other universities facing similar crisis in the future as 
well as support the use of the Baldrige framework in assessing future crisis response, 
particularly the approach and learning phases. 
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APPENDIX A. BALDRIGE CRITERIA (TEXAS QUALITY 
FOUNDATION ENGAGEMENT LEVEL) 
Category 1 Leadership 
Creating & Sustaining an Environment for Excellence 
(1) How did your senior leaders set and communicate the organizational vision, values and performance 
expectations during the Hurricane Ike crisis? How did senior leaders include a focus on creating and 
balancing value for students and other stakeholders? 
(2) How did your senior leaders create an environment that fostered and required legal and ethical 
behavior during the Hurricane Ike crisis?  How did you promote and ensure ethical behavior in all of 
your interactions? 
(3) How did your senior leaders create an environment for organizational performance improvement and 
accomplishment of  your mission and strategic objectives during the Hurricane Ike crisis?  What key 
things did leaders do (include the key performance measures regularly reviewed by senior leaders)? 
(4) How did you address the impacts on society of your programs, offerings, services, and operations? 
What key things did you do (Include key practices, measures, and targets for regulatory, safety, 
accreditation, and legal requirements)? 
(5) Did your senior leaders identify key communities and determine areas of emphasis for organizational 
involvement and support? What key things did you do? 
 
Category 2 Strategic Planning 
Developing Strategic Objectives and Action Plans for Competitive Advantage 
(1) Did you have a strategic planning process for dealing with crisis? What key things did you do (include 
key steps and key participants and the short- and longer-term planning time horizons)? 
(2) How did you establish short- and longer-term strategic objectives? What key things did you do? 
(3) How did your strategic objectives address challenges presented by the Hurricane Ike crisis? What 
Strategic Objectives and key things do you do to ensure balance among all stakeholders during the 
Hurricane Ike crisis? 
(4) How did you achieve your key strategic objectives by developing and deploying action plans? What 
key things did you do? 
(5) Did you have performance measures for tracking progress relative to your action Plans?  What were 
your Action Plans and Measures?  
 
Category 3 Customer Focus 
Understanding Your Students and Stakeholders 
(1) How did you identify educational programs, offerings, and SERVICES to meet the requirements of 
your students, stakeholders and market segments?  How did you listen to students and stakeholders to 
obtain information and feedback on your educational programs, offerings, and SERVICES, and your 
student and stakeholder support? What key things did you do? 
(2) How did you build relationships to acquire and satisfy students and stakeholders thus increasing their 
engagement with you? What key things did you do? 
(3) How did you determine your key mechanisms to support use of your educational programs, offerings, 
and  services and enable students and stakeholders to seek information and otherwise utilize your 
programs, offerings, and SERVICES?  How did you ensure that these contact requirements are 
deployed to all people and processes involved in student and stakeholder support?  What key things 
did you do? 
(4) How did you determine student and stakeholder satisfaction, engagement, and dissatisfaction?  How 
did you use this information for improvement?  What key things did you do? 
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Category 4 Measurement, Analysis, and Knowledge Management 
Managing by Fact to Drive Performance Improvement 
(1) How did you use data and information for tracking daily operations and for tracking overall 
organizational performance?  How did you review organizational performance and capabilities? What 
key things did you do? 
(2) How did you analyze data and information to support organizational decision making?  How did you 
use data and information to assess progress toward your organization’s strategic objectives and action 
plans?  What key analyses did you perform? 
(3) How did you make needed data and information available to your workforce, suppliers, partners, and 
students and stakeholders, as appropriate?  What key things did you do? 
(4) How did you manage organizational knowledge to accomplish the collection and transfer of 
workforce knowledge and the transfer of relevant knowledge from students and stakeholders? What 
key things did you do? 
 
Category 5 Workforce Focus 
Developing and Realizing the Full Potential of Your Workforce 
(1) How did you organize and manage work and jobs to promote cooperation and your organizational 
culture?  What key things did you do? 
(2) How did you deliver employee education, training, and development?  How did your education and 
training approach contribute to the achievement of your action plans?  What key things did you do? 
(3) How did you ensure workplace health, safety, and security?  What key things did you do? 
(4) How did you determine the key factors that affected workforce engagenent and workforce 
satisfaction?  What key things did you do? 
(5) How did you use formal and/or informal assessments and measures to determine workforce 
engagenent and workforce satisfaction?  What key things did you do? 
(6) How did you benefit from the diverse ideas, cultures, and thinking of your workforce?  What did you 
do?  
 
Category 6 Process Management 
Designing Work Systems to Deliver Value to Students and Stakeholders  
(1) How did you design your work systems and determine your key processes to deliver student and 
stakeholder value?   What were your key work systems? What were your organization’s key work 
processes?   
(2) How did your work systems and key work processes relate to your core competencies?   
(3) How did you design work processes to meet the key requirements of students, stakeholders and 
partners as appropriate?  What were your key requirements for these processes? 
(4) How did you ensure work system and workplace preparedness for disasters or emergencies? 
(5) How did you implement and manage your work processes to ensure they meet design requirements?  
What were your key performance measures or indicators used for the control of your work processes? 
 
Category 7 Business Results 
Tracking and Using Key Results 
(1) What results do you have for key measures or indicators of student learning and improvement in 
student learning? What results do you track (display in graphical form where possible)? 
(2) What results do you have for key measures or indicators of student and stakeholder satisfaction and 
dissatisfaction?  What results do you track (display in graphical form where possible)? 
(3) What results do you have for key measures or indicators of budgetary, financial, and market 
performance?  What results do you track (display in graphical form where possible)? 
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(4) What results do you have for key measures or indicators of workforce engagement and workforce 
satisfaction?  What results do you track (display in graphical form where possible)? 
(5) What results do you have for key measures or indicators of the operational performance of your work 
systems and your key work processes?  What results do you track (display in graphical form where 
possible)? 
(6) What results do you have for key measures or indicators of accomplishment of your organizational 
strategy and action plans?  What results do you track (display in graphical form where possible)? 
(7) What results do you have for key measures or indicators of ethical behavior?  What results do you 
have for key measures or indicators of breaches of ethical behavior? What results do you track 
(display in graphical form where possible)? 
(8)  What results do you have for key measures or indicators of regulatory and legal compliance?   
(9)   What results do you have for key measures or indicators of your organization’s fulfillment of its 
societal responsibilities and your organization’s support of its key communities?  What results do you 
track (display in graphical form where possible)? 
 
Do you consider the response to Hurricane Ike a success or failure and what are the various factors that 
you base your decision on? 
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APPENDIX B. INTERVIEW INTRODUCTION 
AND PROTOCOL 
 
I appreciate you taking the time to meet with me.  This study will be really helpful in 
trying to develop a comprehensive description of the TAMUG crisis response to 
Hurricane Ike through the use of a management performance system.  Are you familiar 
with the Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Award?  Very briefly it is a very 
prestigious, national quality award that was established by Congress to try and improve 
performance of American organizations through the use of quality tools and assessment.  
Basically organizations apply for the award by answering a series of very specific 
questions concerning their organization which then goes to a review team to assess the 
application.  It is a very intensive application process and implementing all of the quality 
processes can take years to implement.  As a result, another organization here in Texas, 
the Texas Quality Foundation, that has taken the Baldrige process and broken it down 
into a series of application steps to facilitate organizations eventually applying for the 
Baldrige -- so an organization are working off a very preliminary/introductory 
application that is not as intense and then, a progression stage that is more detailed, etc. 
all the way through until the organization eventually applies for and hopefully receives 
this national quality award.  The award looks at a number of different industries, and 
education is one of them. 
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So, knowing that most educational institutions have not initiated the Baldrige process on 
their campus, my study investigates whether you can take that very preliminary stage 
without anybody having any background of the Malcolm Baldrige and overlay that over 
a crisis management response to see if the questions in the introductory model of the 
Texas Quality Foundation would be good questions to comprehensively describe and 
possibly even assess a crisis management response using our response to Hurricane Ike 
as a case study. 
 
So these questions are coming straight off of that introductory model from the Texas 
Quality Foundation which is really geared toward organizational performance rather 
than specifically toward crisis response.  As a result, we might find that some questions 
may not be directly relevant - like people don’t collect this kind of data during a crisis -
and that’s going to be a perfectly fine answer towards my study.  And there may be 
times possibly that we may not have any answer at all to it, but I wanted to see by using 
the Hurricane Ike crisis, how much of this stuff is directly relevant to our crisis response 
and by asking the questions of all of the crisis response team, do we end up with a fairly 
comprehensive picture of the crisis and response.  Does that all make sense? 
 
So starting with that and I certainly realize there may also be some blanks because we 
are talking three years ago, but if you could just start with your recollection of when the 
crisis response for Hurricane Ike started from your perspective.  Ike landed early 
morning Saturday on the 13th but a lot of the preparations occurred long before that.  So 
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my first question is when did the campus first start preparing for Hurricane Ike and what 
did that entail?  
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APPENDIX C. IKE AFTER ACTION REVIEW 
Conducted by Dr. Richard Cummins 
December 10, 2008 
Dr. Loftin: 
 We have an amazing array of people here today.  Carter has plenty to do right 
now besides being here today.  All of you have lots going on right now because of this 
week being the ultimate week in the year at the university.  So your being here today is 
quite a testimony.  I think that you want to help us.  Our purpose is very simple to state 
but very hard to accomplish. 
 We’ve gone through an extraordinary period of time over the last three months 
and those in this room made it possible for us to succeed and survive at times.  We want 
to do one thing before we actually leave College Station and go back to Galveston and 
resume some degree of normalcy and that is to try to really understand what went right 
and what went wrong or didn’t go as well, shall we say, during these last three months.  
Especially that time at the very beginning we made a decision to relocate our students 
here and we had to solve many, many problems.  I was quoted in the paper this morning 
as saying that we had to solve a thousand problems.  At least a thousand problem were 
solved over a period of about a week or two. 
 So we need to do a few things before we actually go back to our lives of 
normalcy to try to capture some of those things.  Otherwise, if you’re like me, your 
memory evaporates after a while and you don’t remember all the details that were so 
clear to you at one point in the past. 
 Rodney asked me to kind of take a few moments today to orient us to talk about 
the timeline and history, so I’ve adapted a presentation I gave early after the event to the 
Board of Regents.  It’s not as long as that, but it gives us a sense of what happened over 
the first few days over this particular period. 
 First of all, this is a picture taken from satellite of the Gulf on September the 11th.  
And you can see that the eye of Ike is right here.  Galveston is right here.   
 And so to this point in time we knew Galveston was going to be affected.  There 
was still no real way to understand how much the effect would be because these things 
can take a life of their own and move substantial difference either up or down the coast.  
But at this point in time Galveston likely was going to be directly in the eye of the storm 
and, of course, it was. 
 Well, we’ve taken as a motto here and many of you aren’t old enough to 
remember the phrase in the 50s, but this time we don’t like Ike. 
 I’m sure that many of you have been to Galveston have not been to Galveston.  
This will remind you of where we are.  This is the causeway corning over from the 
mainland right here.  Our historic campus is right here on Avenue U and 50th Street Fort 
Crockett Campus.  The Mitchell Campus is here on Pelican Island protected by a thin 
bastille bridge and roadway here.  The university home where I live is right here.  And 
we also have a small campus on Teichman Road right close to where I-45 terminates 
coming onto the island. 
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 All of these places were affected, these two least of all.  The seawall is along 
here and did its job very well.  But the primary affects were on Pelican Island and the 
Teichman campus. 
 Remember that in this event 75 percent of Galveston Island was under water at 
one time.  75 percent.  Fortunately the home I live in and Crockett Campus was not, nor 
were the major buildings on Pelican Island. 
 This is a photo of Mitchell Campus.  Again, this is the bridgeway coming onto 
the campus right here.  All these buildings here were high enough to escape the storm 
surge, which is about 11 feet on the island above mean sea level. 
 The damage to us was primarily along the waterfront.  But water did intrude 
along the edge of the campus here, and you can see where the brown grass and dead 
trees and the dead brushes are right now, giving you a sense of where the saltwater came 
to. 
 The buildings to receive serious damage here were out largest dormitory here, 
which lost its roof, and what we call the Sea Aggie Center, a converted warehouse here, 
which lost part of its roof and sidewalls, as well. 
 Again, along the waterfront here, the dock area took a great deal of damage.  
Almost all the small boats docked there were destroyed.  It so was a serious hit to us, but 
by no means a catastrophic hit.  This is what really happened. 
 We have a fairly well-used plan for how we actually monitor hurricanes once 
they appear to be likely to enter the gulf.  And so well over a week before Ike made land 
fall into Galveston, we were really watching the storm very carefully. 
 The man right there, Brad McGonagle, is kind of the key guy keeping his eye on 
things, watches the models, the update several times a day and alerts me and others on 
the campus as to the status we should be considering as we go forward. 
 The key thing happened on 10 September.  That morning I was in the office 
about 7:00 o’clock and the latest models which are 8:00 o’clock Eastern Time were 
showing Ike still going pretty far to the southwest of us, so I was not too uncomfortable.  
I was actually looking at date showing the largest enrollment of student campus of 9% 
over the previous fall, so I was feeling pretty good. 
 As the day wore on, though, I got less good because each model update was 
showing a progressive trend of the storm track towards Galveston.  And we had a social 
event for one of our employees in the service area that afternoon at 2:00 o’clock.  At 
2:30 I gathered my senior staff who were at the event and we talked about it and we 
decided at 2:30 to close the campus as of 5:00 o’clock that day.  Very serious even for us 
based on what we were seeing at that time, and so the right thing to do was to get the 
students away, get the staff, and kind of shut things down and ourselves get away, as 
well. 
 So we closed the campus at 1700, 5:00 o’clock.  By 7:30 a bus left our campus 
for this campus with those students on board who lacked transportation of their own.  At 
that point in time all the students had left our campus.  Most students had left Galveston 
Island. 
 Of course, those who live off campus we had no way to control them.  Those 
living on the campus were definitely gone by that time.  There was not as there had been 
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when Rita was threatening Texas, there was not an evacuation prospect for Houston, so 
there was really no difficulty leaving Galveston at all. 
 The next day a lot of things happened.  We relocated the ship across from the 
Mitchell Campus where it’s pretty exposed to a slip at pier 40, which has three sides 
covered.  That gives us more security.  The last thing you want is a 17,000 ton ship 
loose.  That could be extraordinarily devastating.  There was no way to move it 
anywhere else but just to get it across the channel with tugs. 
 We also were able to move our electronic web services, the mail, here to College 
Station.  Early that morning it was up again.  And we opened up a communication center 
here manned by Karen Bigley by 8:00 o’clock that morning, as well. 
 So by early on Thursday morning essential services were in place here.  We had 
a person on the ground, we had telephone lines, we had web services up, and we had 
electronic mail up here.  Safe from the storm and that was really an extraordinarily good 
thing to happen because that was our primarily communication was the website from 
that point on. 
 At 12:30 that day I was told that our staff had completed security on the campus 
the best they could and were leaving.  So at 12:30 that day we really had completely 
evacuated everyone with the exception of eight people, four campus police officers 
stayed.  They ultimately sheltered with the Galveston Police Department which was 
standard procedure for them; and we had four officers remaining on the clipper who 
stayed there through the entire storm. 
 Then of course at 2:10am on Saturday the 13th the center of hurricane Ike’s eye 
crossed the shore into Galveston.  And it was over an hour in fact crossing the island.  So 
people were able to come outside in calm weather, actually, for quite some time during 
that passage. 
 We think that the Sea Dorm roof was lost when the backside of the eye reached 
Mitchell Campus there, because amazingly there was no water damage on the fourth 
floor of the dormitory.  That side of the storm was dry as far as the front side the storm, 
so the winds changed direction, went under the roof, picked it up, and took it off, but we 
didn’t have any water damage.  Very fortunate for us. 
 What we did in preparation is, again, a well-established process.  Bill, what’s the 
average number of evacuations?  One a year or one every other year? 
 
Mr. Pickavance: 
 Probably one every third year or so. 
 
Dr. Loftin: 
 You were there 30 odd years and you saw a number of evacuations over time.  So 
we practiced a number of the evacuations a lot.  One of the things we do is we capture 
information on where students, faculty, and staff were to be.  That was done on paper up 
until (inaudible) and it was pretty – I spent with some staff here in College Station about 
a day on paper trying to track that stuff. 
 So we built after that a form and so every student, staff were asked to tell us 
where they were going during the storm and how to reach them.  So we had a database 
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available to us that Karen Bigley was actually in charge of, which to be used to 
interrogate and find out where anybody was at any one point in time.  It was very useful 
to us, as well. 
 The key thing the staff did was secure or remove specific things.  There was a 
long list of things we can’t afford to lose.  Many were I believe aboard the ship.  We 
were able to move pallets aboard the ship.  The ship safe was used to secure our cash, 
records from HR, for example, were moved onto the ship.  And some things were 
brought here. 
 And so we have, again, a well-established process and plan for what to take with 
us, what to leave behind, how to secure that as best we possibly can.  We bring out dry 
ice, for example, to make sure scientific specimens can be stored over a period of time 
without power.  All of that was done prior to departing from the island. 
 We were able to, of course, within the various buildings there cover up things 
that were moisture sensitive, and we lost almost nothing inside the buildings, although a 
few things, windows were blown out, and some water intrusion occurred from rain, but 
nothing was damaged seriously in our buildings because of that.   
 Ike was a rather odd storm.  We normally measure hurricane strength by the wind 
velocities and under those measurements Ike was a category II storm.  And there have 
been quite a few category II storms that crossed Galveston and came close by.  So at first 
people weren’t too worried about Ike, because it wasn’t much of a storm, but you saw 
the picture I gave you earlier how big the storm was.  It was a very, very large storm.  
The extent was equal to what category IV and V storms typically exhibit.  And that size 
contributed to a much larger than a category II expected storm surge. 
 Actually we were very lucky in Galveston.  The storm surge in Galveston was 
around 11, 12 feet max and crossed Galveston Bay to the east of Bolivar towards 
Gilchrist it was well over 15 feet.  Some recorded almost 20 feet. 
 So had the storm gone ashore around Freeport.  Not in Galveston itself.  We 
would have had much more damage than we did and we would have had major water 
intrusion almost certainly into our buildings on Pelican Island. 
 So, again, it was a bad storm.  Galveston was hurt very badly, but it could have 
been much worse by a 40-mile shift of the land fall of the storm. 
 We were very fortunate that after we experienced summer of 2005, we felt it very 
important to establish an operational continuity plan.  The last time there was a major 
storm that caused serious damage to the Galveston campuses was in 1983.  I wasn’t 
there then, but Bill Hearn was, and it was a pretty serious blow because we lost housing, 
for example, both on campus and on the island.  And it seriously impacted the 
enrollment at Galveston for at least a year, if not more.  And we were much smaller than 
we are today. 
 So during the summer of 2005 after I arrived as CEO in May of that year, we are 
talked about the need for us having a plan for properly returning operational normalcy 
here in Galveston or elsewhere if we had a major storm affect us.  That thinking process 
was accelerated after Katrina hit New Orleans in August of 2005, and I was here the day 
we decided to close the campus in Galveston because of Rita in September of 2005. 
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 I spoke to Bob Gates, who was president then, and Bob and I decided the right 
thing to do was to allow for a relocation of academic and student services to College 
Station if we could not return to Galveston within a two week period of time after 
evacuation. 
 And during the fall of 2005 a team of people, many of whom are in this room 
right now from both Galveston and College Station, worked together to build that lplan.  
We tested only in simulation – tabletop simulation after (inaudible) until now when it 
was actually utilized. 
 So we had a meeting here that Russ Cross convened at 4:00 o’clock Sunday 
afternoon in the President’s Conference Room in 1030 Rudder Tower.  And about 4:30 
that afternoon the decision was made we had to activate the plan.  It was clear we could 
not return to Galveston in two weeks. 
 The plan was turned on and folks got very busy.  The clipper was, of course, 
basically unharmed by the storm.  Our plan was in fact to move it back to the campus 
very quickly.  It could power pretty much the entire campus.  Unfortunately Ike did 
something else to it.  Besides water and wind, it brought silt.  We had nine feet of silt 
accumulate so that little piece of our plan didn’t work too well. 
 But Monday morning bright and early folks in this room began working on what 
it would take to bring to Galveston students here to College Station.  And a week later 
they began to show up. 
 Of course all of you pretty well know where the problems were.  We had a huge 
amount of work to do to find housing and appropriate classroom, lab space here on 
campus to take care of the students.  What we early on set out two principles.  We 
wanted to make sure we had the best academic experience for our students even though 
they had to leave their original campus location.  And we had we wanted to make the 
process as cost neutral as possible for the students, the staff and (inaudible). 
 Ultimately over 1600 of what had been 1772 the day I closed the campus 
relocated here.  That’s 91 percent of the student population.  I think that’s pretty 
extraordinary.  Realizing that we were two weeks into the semester, we had a lot of new 
Freshman.  Large freshman class in Galveston by our size, and so their loyalty or sense 
of belonging was tenuous to some extent at that point in time had we not chosen to come 
here. 
 We had a variety of ways to support them.  We, of course, had several staff and 
faculty who actually moved here and lived here through the entire fall semester.  But we 
had many faculty living on the mainland who weren’t affected by the storm except for 
power loss for a few days.  They commuted up here and spent two or three days a week 
here teaching and lived at home the rest of the time. 
 We had some faculty adjuncts who had jobs.  They couldn’t just relocate with us.  
And we were able very quickly to put into place for them online learning approaches so 
they could teach their students using distance learning technology. 
 And that was, of course, rough because we had little time to make that work right 
and they learned how hard it is to teach that way.  Many of us spent three or four times 
the amount of time that we spend in regular classes because of all the individual 
interaction of students. 
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 I had faculty teaching classes of 90 by themselves, no TA, no help answering e-
mails every day.  You can imagine how much time that would take.  We did one thing 
other, as well, here.  We actually told students you have two choices.  You can come to 
College Station with us to take care of you.  If you can’t relocate because of whatever 
reason, no matter what it is, if you can’t come with us you have two choices.  You can 
drop out completely and we will refund the allowable amount of tuition and additional 
fees, or we will turn forward a hundred percent of tuition and fees from the fall semester 
to the spring semester when you turn them in. 
 That was a very calculated thing because we wanted to incentivize as much as 
possible the students who could not come here to come back to us in the spring semester.  
I’m not sure if I can shows cause and effect, but certainly we’re showing right now a 
very strong spring enrollment.  So maybe that had an effect, maybe it didn’t.  We don’t 
know that, but we are seeing a very strong enroll for the spring semester, which is very 
gratifying for all of us. 
 I’ll leave with you with this.  This is a – many of you may have seen this.  It’s 
actually on the seawall right around 49th, 50th Street.  It’s a statue built in honor of those 
who survived the storm in 1900 who persevered and remained in Galveston. 
 This picture was taken on Friday before the storm struck on Saturday, early 
Saturday morning.  You can see the spray coming over the seawall where the waves 
crash against the seawall behind it there.  That statute is exactly today where it was then.  
It became a symbol of the city that the spirit of Galveston.  We showed something in this 
particular event that’s important to all of us.  The Aggie Spirit. 
 I don’t know any university anywhere in the world would have done what we 
did.  We did something very extraordinary in a very short period of time and you people 
here in this room plus the people who couldn’t be here today are the reason it worked.  
No one ever told me we couldn’t do it.  Maybe you thought it.  Or it was too hard or it 
wouldn’t work.  We just did it.  That’s what it was all about. 
 I thank you for all you did.  We’ll do more as we have time to show our 
appreciation in many ways, including open bar at 4:30. 
 Right now I’m going to give Rodney our chance to get, us going on our task 
today and try to begin the process of capturing what we found out about this whole 
process.  Thank you, Rodney. 
 
Dr. McClendon: 
 Thank you, Dr. Loftin, and thank all of you for being here today.  I haven’t 
worked here until March of this year.  I often joke since Hurricane Ike that we didn’t 
need all of this to get me to come back for a visit.  Now that I’m here it’s good to see all 
of you again and to work with you closely and we have a lot of work to do today. 
 Let me kind of set the stage as to how we will go forward and give you a little 
housekeeping.  This is Melissa McPherson and she is our stenographer for today.  She is 
here to record everything that goes on so that Dr. Cummins and his staff can record this 
and go back and identify the lessons learned, the things that we did right, the things that 
we could have done better. 
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 And so what she had needs for you all to do is when you are asked to speak or 
when you volunteer to speak, to speak loudly and to introduce yourself at the beginning 
so that she doesn’t have to look out at your names.  So it will be redundant.  So every 
time you talk, give your name, speak loudly so that she can get it accurately recorded. 
 At this time let me make an introduction that is a true honor to make.  When we 
came up here I know that we would need to do an after action review and Dr. Loftin and 
Dr. Cross said we will do an after action review. 
 Well, before I even got into that stage of it, I knew that there was one person that 
when we got to this point would be the one that I would ask to this after action review.   
 Dr. Richard Cummins is a faculty member in Agricultural Leadership Education 
and Communication as well as the Bush School of Public Service.  He is the Director of 
the Corps of Cadets Leadership Excellence Program and he has had extensive 
background in being an entrepreneur. 
 But more so than all of this biographical information, Dr. Cummins is a teacher’s 
teacher, he is a professor’s professor, and, for me, he is a friend’s friend.  And I owe him 
a lot because he helped me get through my dissertation last year.  He gets the floor.  I’m 
going to turn it over to him and he will explain where we’re going from here.  You all 
give Dr. Cummins a round of applause. 
 
Dr. Cummins: 
 I’ve got quite a job.  I’m standing you between you and an open bar.  A few 
things that we’re going to do this afternoon is step through and look at this plan.  I’ve got 
just a few slides.  Sara Pena is here with me today.  Sara works in my office with me.  
She’s another set of ears, so she will be listening closely.  I will be listening closely, our 
stenographer will be capturing this information here.  So your job today is simply to 
participate and help us step through. 
 We are evaluating a plan.  This is not a performance review of an individual.  
This is looking at a plan, as Dr. Loftin pointed out here.  We’re trying to find out the 
things that need to be looked at.  Obviously we want to introduce the things that work 
and keep them in the plan. 
 But as we step through here, if you are from Galveston and you were the lead or 
you had a key part in the particular area that we’re talking about, you get first cut at 
whatever the topic is.  And then those of us that were up here supporting you, we would 
like to have an opportunity to give some input in terms of how things actually worked. 
 So this is a no-fault discussion.  This is simply looking at the plan as we move 
through it.  Sara, you’ve got – everyone has got a copy of how we’re going to proceed 
here?  And I’m ready for the slide, if it’s ready. 
 I am somewhat of a history buff.  I study the presidents.  I love this particular 
president for some of the things that he did.  He said a lot of very interesting things, but 
one of the things that’s most important about you and why this quote is up here.  You 
didn’t just talk about it.  You actually did the work.  You were the ones that were here. 
 Now I know the fire chief does not put out the fire.  It’s the firemen.  I know that 
the engineer does not build the car, it’s the mechanic out on the line.  But I know that 
some of you served as the top person and also right there on the front line, as well.  So 
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you’ve got some great input that you can give us today as we go through this particular 
plan. 
 This is the progression that we’re going to go through today in terms of looking 
at the different parts of the plan.  Rodney was very gracious and made a copy of the plan 
available to me, and so I am working from the document that was designed for this 
particular set of events the Dr. Loftin has point out here.  This is what you have in your 
hand. 
 So we’ll begin with that concept of operations in terms of what we were actually 
trying to do.  And a key point down here is this cost neutral piece.  That was very, very 
important.  That was pointed out to me as something that need to be talked about a bit, 
and trying do that is certainly got to take into account a number of factors here.  
 Obviously this is not just about money.  Dr. Loftin, you’re going to get a bill for 
what this all looks like. 
 
Dr. Loftin: 
 I’ve already gotten quite a few, as a matter of fact. 
 
Dr. Cummins: 
 But it’s just not about the money in terms of what happened in the last 90 days as 
you had to relocate here. So in terms of how you proceed to try to make something cost 
neutral here, Rodney, where are you?  If you’ve got something you’d like to say about 
some of the things that did happen in terms of the community support, et cetera, why 
don’t you give us some feedback on that and how that helped us approach this cost 
neutral piece. 
 
Dr. McClendon: 
 Absolutely.  Of course the university itself was there opening arms when we 
relocated here, but we have classes all over the community and churches and any corner 
that you can.  The community gave great donations so that we could give clothing and 
household supplies to students, faculty, and staff that were displaced.  The Association 
of Former Students donated or contributed $200,000 to help students who lost things 
they couldn’t replace. 
 The Aggie Moms that some of our colleagues will say were absolutely 
phenomenal.  Give it to an Aggie Mom and it will get done.  And so they got materials 
together, they came as far from Waco, Fort Bend, et cetera.  And then the A&M students 
in true Aggie fashion were always there for us.  And this is not a complete list.  People 
let us utilize their databases, their distribution list, their newspapers, et cetera.  So it was 
both physical as well as technological and resource wise. 
 
Dr. Cummins: 
 I can’t let this opportunity pass.  I work with the Corp of Cadets, which are great 
young men and women.  They gave a student, one of ours, Matthew May from 
Galveston area, his family did suffer some of the damages.  He went down there, 
checked on them, came back had a great idea.  We need to do something to put together 
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some kind of support for all the people that are suffering.  He had a great idea.  He got a 
great plan with some wonderful people, and he did the thing that is ubiquitous to A&M 
students: sold t-shirts.  Over $35,000 worth of shirts were put together in that sale in a 
three week time.  So a lot of people up here were very interested in helping you. 
 Now from your perspective in terms of keeping something cost neutral, what 
should be included in a plan like this? 
 
Mr. Hearn: 
 I’d add one thing that we can do much better is a better list of what students 
might evacuate with.  In particular I’ve been asked to come back in and assist with the 
Corp of Cadets a little bit.  I know we did not send the Corp of Cadets away from 
campus with even a minimal number of uniform and things.  We could come up with a 
much better list.  When you leave, leave with these things.  Years ago we learned to say 
when you leave, clean your refrigerator before you go.  We learned that after Alicia as a 
lesson learned.  I think we can do that. 
 
Dr. Cummins: 
 Very good.  Something else? 
 
Mr. Conway: 
 One of the things along with our students is a faculty to take their stuff.  And 
we’re in a somewhat digital world and with devices as you’re able to communicate 
there’s a lot of ability for departments here to support us with computer equipment 
almost immediately, but the data they didn’t necessarily have with them.  And we don’t 
have a central repository for all data on the campus as you don’t here, either. 
 So that’s something else we need to talk about with particularly faculty.  
Teaching notes both paper and digital ad digital copies. 
 
Dr. Cummins: 
 Okay. Someone else? 
 
Ms. Susan Lee: 
 I have one.  I may be speaking out of context here, Grant, but you can help me on 
this one. 
 I think there were a lot of textbooks that were ordered prior to this storm and they 
stayed in the bookstore; is that correct? 
 
Mr. Shallenberger: 
 Uh-huh 
 
Ms. Lee: 
 And they had some curling of pages started to affect those books.  So I think one 
of the things we might want to think about is if books have not been distributed prior to 
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an evacuation, we should properly try to transfer them to a safe place, perhaps aboard 
ship. 
 
Dr. Cummins: 
 Any other comments on cost neutral? 
 
Mr. Shallenberger: 
 I might add – I think this is an appropriate place.  We need to remember cost 
neutral has some complicating things.  I think when we came up here and we thought 
about cost neutral to students, we thought about what I call the traditional students who 
live on campus or live off campus and they’re renting.  Even those who are renting or in 
leases, are they required to continue to pay?  We’ve heard this over and over again.  Are 
they required to continue to pay, are they released from their rents?  If they aren’t 
released, how do we assist them up here?  The non-traditional student might own a home 
back in Galveston.  So cost neutral we have come to see, at least in some instances, is 
pretty challenging. 
 
Dr. Loftin: 
 If I could add here -  We need to be very careful next time this is done to define 
that term well.  We caught grief.  Neal caught.  Grant caught grief.  I caught grief.  Many 
of us caught grief because parents or students interpreted in their own way.  And we 
need be much more clear, I believe, up front in explaining exactly what we mean by 
using the term at all, in fact.  What does it really mean because everyone has their own 
sense of what that meant to them. 
 Give you an example that was very difficult for us.  Our intent was that we would 
arrange for housing.  As you might expect, there was some very proactive parents who 
leaped ahead before we even got the students here and for their particular kids got their 
own housing; and were very upset with me and others because we wouldn’t reimburse 
them for that.  Our intent was to take care of it collectively through dormitories or 
contracts with other complexes or other groups like that so it was going to be managed. 
 And these folks that took their own initiative to go out and do that thought they 
were do doing the right thing.  So we must be very clear about the rules.  Over time we 
evolved those rules but we didn’t’ have them in hand to begin with and we paid the price 
for that especially the personal abuse that a few of us took, especially you and Cassie, I 
think, Neal.  You really had a hard time dealing with those many, many phone calls, 
people yelling at you about their money. 
 So that’s – money is an important thing to people.  We learned that the hard way.  
Defining what we mean by that or defining it in a different way, expressing it is 
important for us. 
 
Dr. Cummins: 
 I’ve heard so far we need to define what “stuff” is.  For the students to take your 
“stuff” with you.  We need to define to the faculty what “stuff” is.  We need to be 
cognizant of assets that we’ve got that not have been distributed, take care of those.  And 
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we really need to include a definition of what some of these terms will mean.  So your 
next plan will have a glossary, Rodney? 
 
Mr. McClendon: 
 Yes, sir. 
 
Dr. Cummins: 
 A list of terms of what this actually means.  Okay.  Anything else on cost neutral 
that we should consider for next time? 
 
Dr. Cepeda: 
 There are things that are – it’s going to be hard to make a cost neutral approach.  
For example, the faculty, people who are doing their research and certainly those who 
are tenure tracts.  They risk losing three, four months of work.  Put them behind.  And so 
we already – they are ways we can minimize that loss by giving tenure extensions, 
things like that, definitely those individuals may need additional mentoring and support 
during that time to review for that. 
 
Dr. Cummins: 
 Okay. 
 
Dr. Donna Lang: 
 Beyond the glossary that you’re describing, it might be a document that looks 
like a shared set of expectations.  What does cost neutral mean as far as pets and children 
and spouses.  And it may not be always a definition but just kind of setting an 
expectation to people about what the university’s responsibility is, because I think we 
did bear a great deal of responsibility to take care of our people in this. 
 
Dr. Cummins: 
 Excellent point.  Anyone else? 
 
Dr. McClendon: 
 We also – and considering what we do for folks we need to clarify for them that 
it may have tax implications for them when they’re making a cost neutral.  And what are 
the consequences to the person we’re serving doing the right thing but are we also 
causing them some financial or tax challenges? 
 
Dr. Cummins: 
 Excellent point.  At the same time by fixing the problem we make it worse. 
 
Dr. McGonagle: 
 One thing to think about, too, not only on this end but one thing we experienced 
in Galveston, we had staff that came back and were working that didn’t have homes.  
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And we were to accommodate them as best we could on campus and areas around 
campus. 
 But we looked at cost neutral opportunities for them to stay in accompanying 
dormitories and houses next to the campus and defining what cost neutral looks like to 
them and what that means in terms of rents they were paying in relation to rents we 
would ask them to pay if they’re going to stay in properties that we own and things of 
that nature.  So it’s not only up here, it was still effected down there, as well. 
 
Dr. Cummins: 
 Any other comments?  I understand some work has already been done on the 
evacuation plan.  The things that I know about in terms of discussions that have gone on 
certainly three phases to that: pre-storm, evacuation, and then things that happened 
afterward. 
 What are some of the things just briefly those of you that were working the pre 
storm worked about the plan that you would want to see included or what are some 
things that need to be examined in terms of before the big move comes on? 
 
Ms. Tammy Lobaugh: 
 I know one thing that we were faced with the physical plant and Marine terminal, 
we were trying to allow departments to continue using their documents as long as they 
possibly could throughout the day.  But by doing such that prolonged the preparation, 
the load-out of the documents.  So that was one thing that there was a little bit of lag 
time where we were waiting on departments to close out their documents, prepare their 
documents, and make them ready to actually physically be load up and transported to the 
ship or placed on a truck to be transported to College Station. 
 And, you know, I’m being selfish in that I want the departments to have use of 
their documents, but at the same time, I’m looking at staff there in Galveston that are 
taking part in this that need to get back to their homes and dwellings. 
 
Dr. Cummins: 
 So something like decision points when things need to be done by? 
 
Ms. Lobaugh: 
 And if things – I don’t know if it’s feasible in all cases for information to have be 
duplicated, or if we can as a campus – it’s not going to be an easy situation.  I clearly 
understand there was departments that needed to continue use of the equipment or – not 
the equipment but the data. 
 They were trying to continue their task at hand as long as they possibly could, 
where we’re sitting back, eager to get our hands on it and physically secure it. 
 
Dr. Cummins: 
 Okay. 
 
Dr. McGonagle: 
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 One thing we did last week, we had a small meeting of the non-academic, non-
student affairs folks who were in Galveston and did a small after action report then. 
 And one of the recommendations, which I thought was great, was to establish a 
code system for the campus similar to that of Homeland Security where we would have a 
level 1 through 5, 5 being hurricane evacuating, 1 being June 1st, first of hurricane 
season. 
 But each level, every department would formulate their own internal plan for that 
level.  Which we have that now, but it’s not quite as definitive as laying it out in that 
manner.  But each department would know that when we were in level 1 these are the 
things we do.  Steve and I talked about that yesterday.  We, Dr. Loftin made the decision 
to go to level 2, these are the things that happened. 
 Departments do that in a formal some do it on an informal basis, but put more 
teeth and more meat into that type of a structure so that everybody knows.  Donna has 
always advocated the checklist.  So that we know when we go to level 2 this is what 
happens specifically. 
 Like I say, again, we have that to an extent, but not drilled down beyond more of 
just a “this is the things we’re going to do versus the things we need to do.” 
 
Dr. Cummins: 
 Formalizing protocols and publicizing protocols, education, whatever is required 
in terms of as we move through various stages these are the things that we’re expecting 
to be done with your plan and in your department? 
 
Dr. McGonagle: 
 A lot of folks have that but it’s just not as – not necessarily disjointed, but it’s not 
as cohesive as it could be in what we’re discovering. 
 
Mr. Pickerance: 
 Brad, along those lines, do we tie into the EOC in Galveston in any way with 
that?  Because they usually have a set of criteria that we ought to…  
 
Dr. McGonagle: 
 We do through our police – campus police. 
 
Mr. Pickerance: 
 I mean, do we have liaison with them? 
 
Dr. McGonagle: 
 Yes, thorugh the police department.  That’s about it.  I mean, we don’t – we 
interface with the county and the city, but far following their stages, we just basically 
wait for the evacuation call to come or anticipate it coming, then we make the move.  
But we’re not integrated with the city or county in terms of their EOC program, per se. 
 
Ms. Lobaugh: 
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 Along those lines, in that meeting that Brad is speaking of, we were envisioning 
something similar to a sandwich board dual-sided with color codes, and, you know, 
maybe even staging those throughout campus to where the communication is intensified 
to where there’s nothing falling through the cracks. 
 The campus as Grant was talking a minute ago about some of our students that 
are older students living off campus.  They might not be getting the e-mail 
communications that we’re sending out.  They might not be hearing the phone messages 
that are going to the desk or dormitory rooms. 
 This way it could be staged throughout campus, we could reach vendors, we 
could reach contractors, guests, as well as all of our student body. 
 
Dr. Cummins: 
 So quality of communication? 
 
Ms. Lobaugh: 
 I think more of an intensified thorough. 
 
Dr. Cummins: 
 Okay. 
 
Ms. Norma Duran: 
 In response to what Brad said, one thing that I noticed was, at least in our 
department, the cohesiveness, you know, we hear the word, we leave campus, but there 
isn’t that – you know, the details.  Where are the details?  I think something as simple as 
a schematic on having some sort of escalation process that when we get the word that 
it’s time to leave, well, what’s the escalation process?  What’s going to happen when 
Brad sends out that text message?  What’s going to happen when Brad sends out that 
text message?  What’s going to happen when we don’t return?  When I left the campus I 
knew I was going home, but after that, what happens after that if we don’t return?  So 
again it goes back to communication even if it’s just a schematic department wide, but 
on top of that you have to follow it up or it’s a good idea do follow it up with training.  
Each department needs to be trained.  There needs to be a hurricane logistics strategist 
that does campus-wide training every three months or every two months.  However 
many months it needs to be.  There needs to be a schematic and there needs to be follow-
up training.  Because then when it does happen, you don’t hear all this talk about, well, I 
didn’t know.  I didn’t know that that’s what they were going to do.  Because there was 
so much shock and there was so much pain and the emotions were high we were dealing 
with – I worked with the housing.  It was so hurtful that it was hard to get them into 
housing.  So even if it’s something as simple as this.  In each department having, okay, 
this is the escalation process.  This is what’s going to happen when Brad sends out the 
text message.  There has to be some sort of escalation process and you have to follow up 
with training and having a hurricane logistic strategist or whatever we want to call it.  
Then everyone knows.  Everyone is on the same page.  Even if it’s something just as 
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simple as this.  When there’s an emergency, this is the escalation process that we follow 
and then everyone is on the same page.  But, again, it must be followed up with training. 
 
Dr. Cummins: 
 So widely disseminated plan that people know about. 
 
Ms. Lobaugh: 
 I’m in full agreement with you.  And this is the same type of information, format 
that we were discussing.  You know, stage one hurricane watch in the Gulf.  Not watch 
as a watch or warning.  Hurricane tropical storm number so and so.  You know, watch 
your weather report.  Short and simple.  When it escalates to the next stage.  Tropical 
storm number two is now intensified.  Continue to monitor the warnings.  At that point 
make sure your medications are filled, make sure to start a tentative plan on evacuation, 
communicate with your professors to see what the campus as a whole is looking at doing 
if you have exams coming up.  The next escalation.  University prepares to shift the ship.  
Utilities will be brought down within a 24-hour period.  And just spell it out.  And, you, 
know, define that.  I think we’re become – there’s a tier that’s become very familiar with 
hurricane evacuation and there’s another section that has never, ever gone through it.  
And I think that there was some uncertainty there.  And I think if we could have a format 
along those lines that were just described or what we discussed in Galveston last week, 
short and simple.  Don’t bore people, don’t confuse people, don’t overload people.  Back 
it short and simple where the recognition is as a tier stage and what you need to focus on 
in those next 24 hours is very well spelled out. 
 
Mr. Pickerance: 
 What I’m hearing here a little bit is trying to establish some sort of battle plan.  
Where we have some sort of a situation, set up a room, whatever setup at Galveston as 
well as here at A&M where you start exchanging not only the ideas, what we have to go 
through at Galveston but also start coordinating with the moves that have to be taken up 
here other than the unofficial lines, which obviously were great.  I wasn’t here. Having 
gone through five of them at the Kennedy Space Center, that was extremely important.  
That’s the reason I brought up the EOC.  Because all of a sudden those guys are closing 
bridges on you, you have to have some lead time.  I’m going to bring up a point here at 
some point about what we do with the ship, because we’re very fortunate that the ship 
didn’t end up on the dock down there.  It could have.  As a sailor, you want to be out of 
port.  There are all kind of extenuating circumstances.  But that gives you an opportunity 
to back this stuff up if everybody is hooked up by telecoms and talking on a particular, 
you know, a particular routine basis where everyone is involved, including the people up 
here that have to make room, the engineering buildings and other areas, classrooms, and 
that kind of stuff. 
 
Dr. Loftin: 
 I stood up because looking around the room here we’ve really integrated 
Galveston College Station.  We haven’t talked much about what should College Station 
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do, if anything, to get ready if we’re getting ready in Galveston.  Because there could be 
some things to be here that might have made things easier, if we had done them in 
advance.  As it was, I don’t think anything was down here to really prepare for our 
relocation before we started on the 15th of September with that process.  And so we 
knew almost two weeks earlier there is a possibility of this.  Having said that, we go 
through a hurricane, you know, monitoring process several times a summer, typically.  
So you don’t want to pull the trigger too fast, either, but there has to be some way for the 
folks in College Station need to be thinking about and knowing about before we actually 
do an evacuation. 
 
Dr. Cummins: 
 Good point there.  A couple of things let’s keep in mind here.  We’re looking at 
the big plan.  I’m recommending that you meet in the groups for which you’re 
responsible and do this same kind of things and come up with the level of the detail 
we’ve got here. 
 
Dr. David Parrott: 
 In response to that, I would add because of the really strong collaborative effort 
between System Real Estate and off-campus student services, we were able to locate 
housing and contracts for it did a wonderful job.  I’m wondering if we shouldn’t 
consider on an annual basis seeing if we can identify with contracts in place that are 
contingent upon (inaudible) so we don’t have to put System Real Estate through the all 
the torture.  I’d like to hear from System Real Estate on that. 
 
Ms. Melody Meyer: 
 Yes, there needs to be training or some – prior to – we got involved not even the 
Monday after it was the Wednesday about noon. And by Friday night when we left, we 
had contracted 700 some odd beds for students,  and 72 for houses, units, apartments, 
duplexes, whatever for faculty and staff.  The remainder of the 800 was by Monday 
morning.  And then we weren’t told that it was moved from Tuesday until Monday.  We 
were trying to contact people, you know, and get – y’all were already in the big meeting.  
No one had communicated to us that that meeting had been moved up a day.  So, yeah, 
communication even when we’re here and maybe earlier notification or getting us 
involved definite more training and more, yeah. 
 
Mr. Golemo: 
 I really like there being a tier system.  I’m from Illinois and, I don’t know, it was 
interesting for me to be a part of this because especially after Gustav.  Gustav was kind 
of like a head fake, and I noticed how I feel like – I have more of a kinship with some of 
the College Station people because I noticed how when this was corning through 
everybody because a hurricane expert.  Oh, it’s just a 2; oh, it’s just a 5.  Can I buy a 
vowel, please?  And so I like the ideas of there being something very concise and having 
a way to get in contact with knowing at what point do I need to back up my computer, 
things like that because I – that’s something I didn’t realize until I got up here.  When I 
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came up here with the students before there was a lot of stuff I wish I would have done.  
Any proof that I worked there in the two years before this would have been gone if it 
would have.  And so that’s just me. 
 
Ms. Bigley: 
 One of the things I want to mention is that evacuation and relocation are clearly 
very different things.  We did this, I believe two times, is that correct, David, before Ike 
as far as moving communications or working on moving the operation center up here.  
And that portion of it I think has worked exceedingly well as far as being able to get, get 
to things, get resources done so we can put messages out should we need to evacuate 
campus or close campus, either one.  I think that’s significant to remember in this that 
that worked very well. 
 
Ms. Cassandra Boyd: 
 Just addressing the housing portion in relation to faculty and staff housing.  I 
think an idea that we need to consider would be in terms of pre-storm or preplanning 
would be addressing an appropriate needs assessment form.  That was something that 
was developed in College Station days after the hurricane, but it was something that 
could have been available before with accurate data or making sure that we were asking 
questions, who would need shelter?  Who would need housing?  Who had special needs?  
Or needed special accommodations for their families?  And I think that information 
could have been available to Melody and her staff beforehand and I think that could have 
been connected to the communication components that Steve Conway was talking about 
a little bit earlier.  Instead of afterwards conducting a phone banking system that was 
successful.  But that was something that could have saved in terms of time in allocating 
resources if we had a more direct estimated amount.  We would have had access housing 
that was researched by that staff. 
 
Dr. Cummins: 
 Okay. Anyone else? Yes, sir. 
 
Mr. Tim Coffey: 
 I’m with the General Counsel’s Office and I also have supervisory authority over 
the System Real Estate office.  If we knew what the evacuation plan was, nobody told 
us.  If anybody in our offices knew, I didn’t know.  I don’t think anybody in the System 
Real Estate office knew.  So that communication was missing.  We didn’t even know 
when this came who was going to sign leases with the department.  Was it apartments?  
Was it going to be the university system, the university, the students, the faculty?  A 
decision was just made automatically that the system, because the system policy had to 
be the tenants on the leases.  And then we realized that we don’t have any kind of 
agreement with students.  We’re going to allow students to move into space we’ve 
leased, but we don’t have any obligation of a student to follow the rules, to keep the 
place clean, to leave it clean.  And we didn’t want to – we came up with a contract and 
 384 
 
we didn’t want to give them a 25-page contract with all sorts of indemnities and all this 
stuff – 
 
Dr. Cummins: 
 You actually did want to but you said that wouldn’t work. 
 
Mr. Coffey: 
 Still would like to.  So that the concept came up very quickly.  We didn’t have 
much time.  Was to try to come up with a one-page document that had the most 
important things in it.  Who are they?  Where are they?  What unit are they in?  They’ll 
follow these rules.  Sign right here.  And then we did the same thing with faculty.  One 
of them ended up being a page and a half.  I can’t remember.  But we tried.  There was 
nothing in the tank.  You know, we just quickly had to come up with something.  So I 
think going forward, we’re going to need, you know, some plan for having the 
contractual relationships that we’re going to have with the students and with faculty 
when they move into housing that we are ultimately responsible for.  And of course we 
also, this may come up later, we also – every apartment or unit that we found, of course, 
is different.  Their amenities are different.  Some students, when you’re talking cost 
fairness, were getting free internet, a pool and all these other things.  And some of these 
other students were luckily to have air conditioning.  We had to go to with what may not 
have been the nicest facilities for some of the students.  And, of course, the students that 
moved into lesser units were anxious to get into the nicer units and so they started 
moving around and we didn’t know.  In fact to this day I think there may still be some 
question as to where are some of them?  Do we actually have a contract with every one 
of them?  We may have a contract with them to be in Reveille Ranch, but they’re over at 
the Plaza somewhere.  So the communication issue there, contractual relationships, and 
how we handle that. 
 
Dr. Cummins: 
 Some kind of database to track students. 
 
Mr. Coffey: 
 Frankly, I think – I’m hoping that based on experience we can revise that 
contract so that it will actually be 20 pages.  But it will – we don’t have, as far as I know, 
Melody was telling me one of the issues that came up last week was the students were 
moving out.  They’re moving out earlier than our lease.  Our lease runs to the end of the 
month but we need the students out before that, but we don’t really have anything to tell 
them they have to be out.  Little things like that just need to be incorporated in that. 
 
Ms. Meyer: 
 The unfurnished apartments that we moved furniture in, the university would like 
to move the furniture out before we’re out for the holiday break.  Well, we have a lease 
through the end of the year and the students, I guess, think they can stay in through the 
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end of the year.  We didn’t make any arrangements to tell them they needed to be out 
ahead of time.  This didn’t come up, so that’s something we need to think about it. 
 
Dr. Cummins: 
 Definitely is in the detail. 
 
Mr. Coffey: 
 One last comment on that.  A lot of the students didn’t realize, I guess, that the 
Office of General Counsel doesn’t represent the students.  So when they’re having these 
problems in Galveston with their landlords, we really can’t help them.  So what we 
ended up doing with Rodney’s help and some others, we ended up just putting on the 
Galveston web page some general statements about what Texas law is when you have 
damage to your apartment.  I don’t know what the solution to that is, but some of the 
students were having to hire attorneys or their parents attorneys and they started calling 
the apartments and we had issues like that. 
 
Dr. Cummins: 
 We’re off the track just a tad.  We’re talking about the pre-work that could be 
done in general terms. 
 
Mr. David Morrison: 
 I work with the Office of Facilities Coordination here at A&M and I also work in 
the General Services Complex building, which is the building that was identified through 
kind of an informal/formal agreement executed, I don’t know, what, about two years 
ago?  As the location for Galveston staff to initially come in the event of, as in Karen’s 
case, having to set up the communications center or in the event of a minor evacuation of 
the campus.  And as such, I was involved with some of the pre discussion about what’s 
going to happen and also became the discussion about what’s going to happen and also 
because the recipient of a lot of phone calls with regard to activities that were being 
executed at Galveston in order to bring students here and in order to bring staff here.  
But that no one here seemed to be aware of what their role was in help9ing to 
accomplish that activity.  And so saying that, I would say – I would echo the 
communication aspect of what people have brought up right now.  There was a plan in 
place at Galveston.  There was a plan in place for continuity of operations to bring 
Galveston to Texas A&M University.  There was no plan in place to let Texas A&M 
University folks that were going to be doing certain things know what it was they were 
expected to do, in my opinion. 
 
Dr Cummins: 
 That’s a valid concern.  Love to help you, what am I supposed to do? 
 
Dr. McGonagle: 
 One thing Steve Conway and I talked with (inaudible) spoke with us yesterday 
and Steve being a strategist had a great analogy of this.  Strategically if we had a solid 
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plan and everyone had contact with College Station.  But given the scope of what we had 
to execute, tactically that would be practical to try to implement or tabletop.  But 
tactically on David and I’s side, we met several times and (inaudible) gave us a little 
wake-up call on that as far as drilling down beyond just he and I working together on 
providing space for Karen and Dr. Loftin and Rodney and so forth to come up and work 
for a couple of weeks and go back.  So this is the tactical side of the strategic aspect of 
that plan. 
 
Dr. Cummins: 
 Another comment? 
 
Dr. Cepeda: 
 One of the things that helped a lot were those professors or faculty who already 
had contact here at Texas A&M.  So in some departments, because they worked very 
closely with those faculty, they pretty much had already set themselves up here by the 
time we started meeting and trying to figure out where we were going to put them.  So 
there may be other faculty members who could identify departments here in our campus 
that they have some kind of relationship with them to engage in to getting to know these 
faculty and have more contact because it did make it hard – a big difference. 
 
Dr. Cummins: 
 Okay. Anything else? This is still pre work.  A couple of comments here, if I 
could get in terms of the lockdown protocols, actually gathering data.  Dr. Loftin 
mentioned you knew where everyone—you knew where they were?  Did you actually 
now where they were?  Did everyone get into the database. 
 
Ms. Bigley: 
 No, not everyone got into database.  It is – there’s no mechanism for making sure 
that everyone does that before they leave.  What we do is throughout the course of the 
evacuation process was send out reminders through our E2 Campus, which is equivalent 
of Code Maroon here in College Station to notify people that they needed to make that 
change.  Because it was such a lengthy even, we also had to send out notifications to 
remind if they moved locations to go back in and enter their new data.  Some people 
evacuated somewhere and were there for two or three nights and after that had to find 
another place to stay.  So that – it really evolved as the storm progressed and this even 
progressed. 
 
Dr. Cummins: 
 Any other comments? 
 
Dr. McGonagle: 
 One other thing that came out of our meeting last week in some departments on 
our campus have it and some don’t.  That’s master service agreements with vendors in 
advance of the storm or even now really is a good time to start doing that.  For example, 
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we had a contract with a disaster recovery firm to bring in dehumidifiers and generators 
and so forts and that was well established last year.  They fell through on it – not fell 
through, but they just didn’t perform very well, which is a whole other animal and we 
shifted gears and true aggie fashion made it work.  But having those type of contracts in 
place eliminates the procurement issues that you run up against post hurricane.  I know 
Donna in dining services mentioned that.  And even on the ship we had to go back and 
get a contract for the operation of the ship for a short period of time that had to be put in 
place after the fact instead of beforehand.  So our departments on campus and maybe 
even some up here that would be impacted by our coming up here would want to look at 
a state-certified or state-procured master contract on various services that they would 
use.  The governor relaxing some of the procurement requirements helped a lot as we 
moved forward because they moved pretty quick afterwards.  That was a great point that 
was brought up last week. 
 
Ms. Lee: 
 I have an HR comment that I think would fall under this category, and I’m not 
really sure what the solution is but I can describe what I think the problem.  I think there 
is no set of true expectations administrative expectations or employee expectations as to 
where they needed to be after the storm.  Here or there?  When it’s just a three-day 
evacuation and you go back to Galveston it’s real clear everybody understands what that 
is.  When departments may need to be split and some folks might be considered essential 
in Galveston and some others may be essential in College Station, could that be 
predefined to some extent?  I realize someone may – some particular circumstances may 
preclude someone from really fulfilling being an essential personnel, but some cities or 
municipalities have that definition.  And we actually have that, College Station has that 
as well, for those short-lived disasters, but this one I think we can term as a longer-lived 
situation and employees don’t know they’re expected to relocate here or commute here 
and do what they need to do that’s considered essential here as opposed to Galveston. 
 
Dr. Cummins: 
 Any other comments on pre work?  You have been sitting for an hour and a half.  
Would you like to take a nine-minute break and then we’ll reconvene and spring to the 
finish? 
  
(Recess taken from 2:51 to 3:01pm) 
 
Dr. Cummins: 
 As we reconvene here, the next topic – we’ve already covered some of the things 
but we’re talking specifically about the relocation of the students here.  Let’s begin with 
course continuation.  We’ve got three students in here.  Identify yourselves.  Hands up.  
We’re going to get some students input here in just a few minutes in terms of course 
continuation.  So those of you that were working with scheduling, et cetera.  I’m 
interested in what you’ve got to say about how the plan worked or things that we need to 
consider for the plan. 
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Mr. Carter: 
 Our part in the relocation or my office’s part, which was handled by Donna and 
Andy here, were helping to relocate classrooms and lab spaces as best we could for the 
Galveston sections.  And of course we worked very close with Dan and Cheryl and 
Truman in that regard.  One of the problems that we ran into quickly and, of course, it’s 
a no-brainer to say this that had we taught the classes on the time patterns that we 
offered here on our campus, we would have been able to fill a lot of the sections.  But of 
course because of the consequences of the faculty just driving up one day or two day, we 
had to make shifts and teach classes in three hours.  And so that limited very much the 
amount of available classroom space that we have on our inventory to put these courses 
in.  So consequently Donna and Andy went off campus and contacted a lot of the 
churches and agencies and many of them were very, very helpful in giving us their 
classrooms.  I was disappointed and it’s something we will have to look at internally 
here because it had nothing to do with your campus, your people, but we ran into some 
reluctancy from some of our academic departments and agencies located here in 
Bryan/College Station to make available empty space in a timely fashion.  And that 
cause some problems on our part.  But I think overall given the breadth of what had to be 
done and the short period of time that we had to do it in, I think everything worked fairly 
well. 
 
Dr. Cummins: 
 Course continuation.  Donna, do you want to say anything about schedule 
groups? 
 
Mr. Armstrong: 
 I was going to mention some things that we did prior to Wednesday at noon 
when we found out they were coming is that Monday we did take a look at all of the 
degree candidates that had applied for graduation, look at what courses they were taking 
and how we could facilitate some of those up here.  We also did a check on our 
inventory to see what rooms we did have available to move those courses over.  And 
something we were talking about as far as recordkeeping is that the error that we made 
was that we thought that maybe half would show up.  When we got 91 percent, by the 
time we realized it, we should have moved everyone record wise to main campus and 
then backed those out that shouldn’t – that didn’t come.  That didn’t show up.  The nine 
percent.  That would have been a lot easier on recordkeeping. 
 
Dr. Cummins: 
 What did you do? 
 
Mr. Armstrong: 
 We moved them all.  By hand.  And it took the better part of that weekend to 
move all of the to the correct section that we had set up to show records that they were 
here at the College Station campus. 
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Mr. Carter: 
 Some of the problems that Donna and Andy experienced was something that was 
mentioned earlier about some of the faculty on y’all’s campus with housing campus that 
had close contact with departments and faculties up here and they made their own 
internal arrangements about teaching labs and stuff like that.  And had we known some 
of that in advance it would have caused less confusion and us trying to find space and 
they already had space and things like that.  But I just assume things are going to happen 
like this.  But it worked out.  I mean, we got the kids in class and it worked out. 
 
Dr. Lang: 
 I think there is another guiding principle here that needs to go into the plan and 
that was we had a fundamental idea that students would continue with the faculty 
member that they started with.  That guiding principle drove how we built the schedules, 
that there were no conflicts, that we did reregister the students in an open format. Andy 
is exactly right.  We would have had that assumption no matter what because we 
underestimated how many students would come.  If I would have used a different model 
I would have had the wrong model there, too, because I didn’t have enough space.  But 
keeping the faculty member with the students they started with was paramount.  The 
other thing I think we need to set some guidelines for are the distance education courses 
and those that we shift to electronic format with the course continuation that we just 
need to do some work on that.  To set down which ones are going to convert and which 
are not good courses to convert.  They didn’t fit right or they weren’t far enough along. 
 
Mr. Conway: 
 We have a process in place for approving distance courses where it goes up to the 
department head and then up.  We waived that process.  In retrospect that was a mistake.  
We should have kept that process in place and had those delegated to the faculty without 
some review.  Faculty who hadn’t done distance for any of you that had, it’s a whole 
different animal and, very bluntly, they were over their head in deeper water than they 
realized fairly quickly.  Just because they didn’t understand what they were getting into 
when they said that.  And I think some of the department heads are much more aware of 
that and would have been able to counsel them and work with them for a more 
appropriate balance or more appropriate educational format. 
 
Dr. Montelongo: 
 And I think it went along the comment of it there is some kind of training as part 
of hurricane relocation plane that if there are faculty that may be interested in doing 
online courses, that that be part of some kind of training component.  That if you’re 
teaching a traditional class at the moment, you know, if you think that you may do an 
online course to have that training already happening prior to the relocation.  So that way 
some of the issues technology wise or course preparation wise may already be known 
rather than as they’re going along. 
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Dr. Rowe: 
 I think we should go a step further than that and I think we should incorporate in 
Galveston in our pre-fall semester training period with the faculty the realization that this 
is going to happen and that they – the new faculty and the old faculty have to incorporate 
from the beginning the possibility that they may have to teach and teaching here. And I 
think – I think we need to provide that with the training that we give the faculty that 
week before school starts.  And I think we in Galveston have to incorporate that corning 
fall just because we know this is going to happen every ten years, 20 years.  Who 
knows?  A hundred years? 
 
Dr. Cummins: 
 Other points of course continuation? 
 
Mr. Martyn Gunn: 
 I’d like to follow up on what Donna was saying about the paramount idea we had 
was to keep the students together with the faculty member which is why we went to the 
three-hour class periods which caused such a problem with Don and his people.  I would 
like to take this opportunity between hurricane seasons to exam how important that is to 
the students.  Is that really important?  They are going through an emotional strain, as 
well to the evacuation.  Maybe it is important that we do this and maybe it isn’t, but I’d 
like to get some idea about that.  Because it would certainly make it a lot easier to do our 
regular class schedules, one hour sessions. 
 
Dr. Cummins: 
 Go ahead. 
 
Mr. Mike Spiers: 
 I’m the Student Body President down in Galveston and kind of to respond to that, 
one thing that I would think you need to look at is the course and then if – really if the 
professor is vital is keeping the professor with that group of students really vital to the 
students for that class.   Because I can tell you some classes it doesn’t matter if you keep 
them with the same professor, some classes it does.  It’s more along the lines of an 
individual basis.  And that’s kind of what you have to assess as far that that.  And that 
might be hard because that changes, too, with student opinion.  And student opinion kind 
of guides that.  Kind of also just so y’all know some of the concerns that I have heard 
about as far as classes go from the students, first of all, Donna, let me ask you this.  Was 
there any trying to get around having Saturday and Sunday classes the way there were?  
No?  That was one major concern I did hear.  I think students understood but it’s just 
having Saturday classes, Saturday morning classes.   
 
Dr. Lang: 
 What?  You didn’t like that part? 
 
Mr. Spiers: 
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 There were also other issues that are addressed.  I don’t think were.  I don’t think 
were thought about, as far as that goes.  Think about students who had purchased 
football tickets and they end up getting Saturday morning class?  They can’t go to 
anymore football games.  That’s a lot of money, especially for students who just lost a 
lot of things.  So as far as the online courses go, I think y’all kind of hit the nail on the 
head when it comes to having professors know how to teach an online course.  Or even 
TTVN.  That was another problem that I heard.  A lot of students had problems with the 
same professor, you’re interacting with that professor, although the class is completely 
different and it’s almost being taught a different way because it’s through, you know, a 
TV.  It is hard for a student to sit there and watch a TV in a dark room for three hours 
sometimes about a boring subject.  So I got to tell you, I was in classes like that where 
90 percent of the class had to leave because a professor couldn’t correlate the – or you 
know, get the information out to the students in a way that kept them, you know, focused 
on it.  Also one last little point is to kind of think about what courses can be taught 
online.  Fully online.  In my major, Maritime Administration, and I’ve talked to a lot of 
students who have had – who were doing well – like the best example I can give you is 
accounting.  I mean, for a majority of MARA students I have interacted with and talked 
to accounting is a class they cannot take online. They did well because they had a 
teacher explaining it to them, you know, before the storm.  And then once they once they 
saw it online, they just see the material, no one toe explain it to them and, you know, 
you’re kind of out of luck there.  And so that’s another things that can be addressed as 
far as really looking at what courses can actually be taught online and what course need 
a teacher there. 
 
Ms. Betsy Bremer: 
 I think students are concerned with what classes they have to (inaudible) but the 
two and a half hour lectures were a challenge because that is a lot of information to 
receive in a big chunk.  And a course like organic chemistry I talked to a lot of friends in 
that course and they said they really struggled with absorbing that amount of information 
and only having it once a week and not being able to re-enforce it and getting it in one 
big chunk.  They would be more concerned with having it in a more feasible course 
layout than maybe keeping the same professor. 
 
Ms. Kelly Borden: 
 Another point to look at is most of our labs were late at night.  Both of my labs 
were from went to 10:00 o’clock that night.  And then our next class the next day was at 
8:00am and the fact we only have class once a week we had an exam almost every other 
week and so you have labs late at night and go right into an exam the next morning at 
8:00am.  That was definitely a difficult challenge for a lot of students.  
 
Ms. Bremer: 
 I also found a lot of the lab spaces – I know this was a big challenge – were 
inappropriate.  My microbiology lab was originally places in a conference room.  And 
we need microscopes and Bunsen burners and so we couldn’t function in that space.  So 
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within the departments just working with them finding appropriate spaces and large 
enough spaces to accommodate the lab situation. 
 
Dr. Loftin: 
 Marty’s point is very well taken and I appreciate the student comments, as well.  
One thing to remember back to Mike’s point.  It depends.  Hurricane hit us in August or 
October or even November.  And so don’t forget the time factor.  It may matter when the 
storm happens how you react to it.  If the classes haven’t even started yet, you have a 
different option perhaps than if you’re now into October.  We were two weeks into 
semester when this happened.  That’s a singular type of situation, but it may be very 
different next time. 
 
Mr. Taylor: 
 International Student Services.  Just to add a little bit of complication with 
international students is that certain visa categories cannot take more than 3 credit hours 
of distant learning courses.  That’s controlled by Homeland Security regulations. 
 
Dr. Lang: 
 And I think – I think everyone at College Station is going to agree with this, 
because I think you’re movement on this is no surprise.  One of the preparatory things 
that will help immensely is that College Station needs a centralized repository of you 
facilities and spaces. 
 
Mr. Carter: 
 May I add to that, please? 
 
Dr. Lang: 
 I thought I would hear some hear, hears across the room there.  It was one of the 
main issues.  Everything here is so compartmentalized and so territorial.  And Donna 
Chester, I mean, you’ve got gold stars everyone from here because she was pivotal to 
making this happen.  Without her, everything went to a standstill.  So you’ve got the 
system is not in place here for your own use as well as us moving in and out or even 
trying to identify the proctors for different buildings and different floors and who the 
contact person is very cumbersome on this campus. 
 
Mr. Carter: 
 We are at the process of reviewing bids for a software scheduling system.  
Campus-wide software scheduling system.  Had we had it in place when all this storm 
hit and y’all had moved up here, I think it would have made our job a lot easier in 
helping y’all.  We hope we will have it in place next year if y’all come back. 
 
Ms. Cynthia Hernandez: 
 And this is a little bit related in that we didn’t begin the transition of students to 
our campus.  One of the things we were trying to wait on was the building of the class 
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schedules.  And I think one of the things that we realized is that perhaps that transition 
doesn’t have to wait until those schedules were built.  I think they actually started some 
of the housing assignments and all of that even without the schedules being fully built.  
So that’s just something to look at.  Because what that did is when we were waiting for 
the schedules to be built, that compressed the amount of time that we had to really focus 
on some of these other transition issues which created longer lines and not enough time 
to process the students to get them into housing and get them their meal plans, to get 
them their parking permits and those types of things.  So it’s just something to look at.  
The question is do the students want to look at their schedules before they make the 
decision to come, or do they want to look at their housing before they make the decision 
to come.  And we try to get those together at the same time, so I don’t think it’s 
dependents we don’t need to wait on that transition dependent on class schedules. 
 
Mr. David Morrison: 
 This kind of ties back to pre storm and it also deals with relocation not only of 
the students but also the faulty.  For lack of a better term, we were fortunate this time in 
that there was space that was basically sitting unused on campus, which is an aberrant 
event that allowed us to move faculty in for office spaces, move administrative staff in 
for office spaces, to move students in for classrooms and lab section sand those things.  
This was an aberrant case.  For the next three years, given the fact that the memorial 
students center operations are going to be closed down, that space is going away to a 
large extent and so any pre planning that takes place from this point forward needs to 
account for there is going to be a dirth, a lack of space at this campus to do some of the 
things that we did relatively easily this time, even though it wasn’t all that terribly easy.  
It was still relatively easy compared to what we might face in the future. 
 
Dr. Cummins: 
 Okay.  Continuation of courses.  Any other comments on that? 
 
Mr. Golemo: 
 I know this isn’t my bowl of soup, but is there any way we can classify ahead of 
time the courses?  Like what courses would lend themselves better to be TCN or all that 
stuff.  Is there any way that we can do that in the beginning of the semester or in the 
catalog ahead of time?  If the course is – I mean, the professors and departments would 
know best, wouldn’t they?  So I mean, I don’t know.  Is there any way we can maybe 
have that?  I mean, that sounds like if it’s a case-by-case basis.  Is there any way we can 
make that case ahead of time? 
 
Dr. Rowe: 
 One of the things we could consider, we’re a very specialized campus but we are 
a branch campus of this campus.  So we have all the same core curriculum.  And if 
ahead of time we were to position ourselves department by department course by course 
with allies up here, people down, you know, our instructors in Galveston who could look 
to equivalent people up here and say could you incorporate and the department heads up 
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here could say who among you would be willing to have a dozen Sea Aggies in your 
course with visiting professor sitting in the back to help out.  Something like that.  So if 
you figure that even if about half of our courses are core curriculum courses, we could 
perhaps do some of that.  The upper division courses, you know, the reason we are what 
we are, those are all specialized courses.  So those really have to be done by our folks 
somewhere.  So what Neal is suggesting is something we can think about.  It’s not 
something we can promise.  But we can look into that.   
 
Mr. Conway: 
 One of my experience as a faculty member teaching courses that I’ve 
incorporated for distance and in fact I’ve taught my course from distance to a small 
group of students, it ‘s not the courses, it’s the preparation that you do.  It is probably 
more prep to build a distance course than it is to build a course (inaudible) even if it’s 
the same course.  I’ve spent a lot of my time doing it and still it’s not fully distance.  So 
it’s not so much the course but has that prep work been done?  And to follow up with 
what gill said earlier, if you move to more of a hybrid model where you’re using soe of 
these technologies in a face-to-face course, it’s much easier to transition to a fully 
distance course or even a hybrid course.  So it became a hybrid course and it eased the 
impact on the students to some degree.  At the same time, they had some continuity 
because they had activities they did in the off week to try to balance the continuity and, 
you know, keeping up with it. 
 
Dr. Lang: 
 I think it kind of goes back to the guiding principles are what’s important.  The 
tactics and the model is going to have to be developed depending on the timing of the 
storm and some of those issues.  We looked at a simulation but even without students 
missing two weeks, when you take would weeks out of the middle of calculus and 
physics and chemistry, I don’t know that these students could have survived assimilating 
them into the current classes in College Station.  Katrina where you had a different 
model where you registered them internally here was at the very beginning of the 
semester and those students could get in fast enough and get going with those faculty 
members.  That’s very different than being 18 days in, losing two weeks and now you’re 
in your fourth or fifth week of the term.  If we were hit in November, the model that we 
would implemented this semester might have even looked very different than what we 
had.  I think those tactics are really going to be things that we’re still going to have to 
make the decision at the time and the intensity of the storm and some of those decisions 
are going to still depend on the leadership in place at the time that it happens. 
 
Mr. Bob S: 
 I was teaching one class in Galveston.  One professor couldn’t relocate up here 
(inaudible) started in Galveston.  I experienced that the class started in Galveston with 
the other professor struggled much more.  I think it can make a difference; it does make 
a difference where the students get the information even though it was the same course, 
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the professor used a different textbook.  There are going to be a lot of issues trying to 
integrate that class once it’s already started. 
 
Dr. Cepeda: 
 One of the things I think was out of this scheduling of these course was that we 
didn’t know the availability of the faculty could come over and whether they wanted to 
stay here two or three days, come back, commute.  There are different models we were 
talking about and I think if faculty were not willing to commute early on because they 
wanted to understand what this neutral cost meant and as well as they wanted to see 
where they would be living and the what would the conditions be.  And so that was hard 
to handle.  So I think that I go back to what was said, anything that we can sort of define 
beforehand so that less unknowns is time we have – we are ahead of time and that’s a 
good thing. 
 
Dr. Cummins: 
 Anything else about continuation of courses? 
 
Ms. Duran: 
 I think one thing that would be helpful because obviously this is somebody said a 
logistics nightmare.  Doing a survey at the beginning of every semester and its very easy.  
You can do it on google docs.  You go to form, you create a survey, you calculate the 
statistics and you survey your students and you survey the faculty in case this happens.  
Then you have some sort of percentage and you have a number. Because y’all mentioned 
that y’all were surprised at the number of students that came.  If you incorporate that into 
the orientation – the new student orientation because they’re Sea Aggies.  They already 
know we’re on an island, there’s potential for a hurricane.  If you do those surveys at a 
new students conference  and you survey your faculty periodically then you know some 
sort of numbers, hey, if we don’t return to campus, this is the percentage of people in the 
fall semester that said they would go over they would commute.  So if you do those 
surveys prior, you’re already implanting in the mind of that faculty member and that 
students there’s going to be this possibility and of course you follow it up again with 
departmental training. 
 
Mr. Mike Spiers: 
 Norma, I love you, but I’ve got to make a comment about that.  I don’t think that 
doing a survey is the best way to do it because there’s just too many variables that after a 
hurricane that allows or that make a student make that decision.  I mean, a student 
doesn’t know if they’re going to lose everything they own or not and that had a lot to do 
with whether or not students came back.  A lot of different variables and situations that 
determine whether a student can come back or not.  A survey really wouldn’t be a very 
accurate form to assess.   
 
Mr. Carter: 
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 Donna, has anything been done about the 160 students that did not return?  Did 
y’all do anything to find out why they didn’t return at all?  Is there something we could 
have done that would have got more of them. 
 
Dr. Lang: 
 No, actually we personally contacted every single A&M Galveston student by 
phone or we had personal contact with every student, and in almost all of those cases it 
was in surmountable personal difficulties, loss.  For some it was trauma.  They might 
have been out of state.  They just couldn’t handle the whole process of things that 
happened.  The other thing is right now there is an assessment survey that is up that 
Mark Troy from (inaudible) helped put up.  And I think we’ve got about 450 responses 
so fa where the students are responding, so that’s going to give us a significant amount 
of data, as well, after this. 
 
Ms. Boyd: 
 I just wanted to inquire in terms of having a student development perspective and 
talking about retention, I just wanted to ask the students how they felt unifying – being 
unified with fellow peers if hat helped them in terms of their academics and being 
retained to continue in the spring semester. 
 
(Mr. Speers asked a question I could not hear.) 
 
Ms. Boyd: 
 In terms of if you have the option of being assimilated with college (inaudible) or 
if you have the opportunity based on your experience in having classes that were with 
students that you started the semester with. 
 
Mr. Mike Speers: 
 That – I mean, really that, I think, is a little – it’s too hard to kind of answer that 
question because there’s – there’s just – I think it goes by a situation and it kind of to 
answer that you have to look at such a broad answer that it really doesn’t clarify 
anything.  I mean, you got to think about – you know, I can think about different classes 
like freshman, sophomores, freshman maybe after two weeks of class maybe they can 
assimilate a little better in College Station than someone who’s been with the same 
students for four years.  The classes – I mean, different classes assimilating or it could be 
different.  It could not.  And that could effect – I mean, there’s too many factors to be 
able to narrowly define that. 
 
Ms. Bremer: 
 I think we definitely kept our identity as Sea Aggies, because we did keep the 
same classes and we were living with people in groups. I don’t think there was any time 
that you had to really mix with College Station people.  And I think he’s right.  The 
freshman – if we weren’t forced to.  So what I’m trying to say.  It’s like you didn’t have 
classmates that were College Station students.  I think like even freshman hadn’t formed 
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their groups in Galveston yet and they did get to know more people.  But juniors and 
seniors, they’ve got their friends, they knew who they were going to hang out with.  
They did what they were going to – what they’ve already done just in a new setting. 
 
Dr. Cummins: 
 Us and them. 
 
Ms. Bremer:  
 At point it did seem like that. 
 
Dr. Cummins: 
 If I could get a few comments.  We’ve got a lot of comments on and off campus 
housing.  Any comments on on campus housing?  
 
Mr. Shallenberger: 
 I remember sitting in the GSC and we’re talking about relocating – broad point.  
You know when we were sitting in the GSC we were going to relocate and, okay, we’re 
going to relocate and that question went back to what Don said how many?  Two things 
came to mind: how many and how much?  How many students are going to relocate and 
how much is it going to cost?  Data points were extremely are extremely important.  
Now we have one.  We have one data point.  That’s better than we had three months ago 
to know what might we expect to get or expect to need in the future.  So that’s kind of a 
broad comment.  I’d like to kind of hear from some of the other experts that were in the 
trenches. 
 
Dr. Cummins: 
 Colonel Groves, do you want to talk about housing? 
 
Col. Groves: 
 Ron might talk to you a little bit better in the bigger picture of housing. 
 
Dr. Cummins: 
 Is anyone here from housing? 
 
Mr. Jeff Wilson: 
 Ron had to leave.  I can talk to some of the issues that we’ve specifically 
addressed with the on campus housing.  And, Grant, hit it right on the head.  The 
expectation was a much smaller crowd.  We did not think anywhere near 91 percent was 
going to come back to College Station.  We were under the impression it might be closer 
to 25 or 30 percent.  Kind of need to paint the perfect storm we had on campus, too.  
Admissions had gone up.  Enrollment had gone u.  and we were at 99-plus percentile 
with on-campus housing to begin with.  We already had about 28 students contemporary 
assignments going into Galveston.  So when we brought in (inaudible) we really 
stretched our capacity to do this.  So there were lots of lessons learned.  We were not 
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anticipating, one, that big a crowd or for that long period.  We thought it was more of an 
evacuation versus relocation.  Big difference.  Sustainability, we were doing it for 
(inaudible). 
 
Mr. Todd Sutherland: 
 The housing folks up here were phenomenal I’m sure that extends to a number of 
you in the departments.  When we went through and started to assign, I think having the 
realization we followed certain philosophies, as well.  We saw the on campus as being 
the premier situation.  I know some folks went out to Reveille Ranch and I get my whole 
apartment with brand new volleyball court.  We ran into some real challenges with some 
of the students saying, wait a second.  We’re stuck in a closet with a cot and they started 
switching on us.  That really became a challenge.  We talked about trying to keep the 
Sea Aggie identity.  We tried to follow the philosophy of grouping and we probably used 
some of the properties that probably weren’t as nice versus sprinkling them all out.  In 
keeping the Sea Aggie community (inaudible) out of Facebook and look at the 500 
freshman who were over at Melrose Place without a lot of supervision there were a lot of 
challenges. 
 
Dr. David Parrott: 
 Just to state some obvious things, obviously the type – as our real estate folks 
told us, the types of property that were available, they were new to the market and hadn’t 
been rented yet or they weren’t as attractive to the students and were available.  So that 
gave us nothing in that middle.  We had brand new properties and older properties.  I 
think that to the credit of the Galveston students, the mindset while they were waiting to 
get housing assigned and after they got housing assigned was marvelous with a few 
notable exceptions.  And its hard to communicate to the parents of some of those 
students that obviously the reason why those properties were available is what I 
described.  So a couple of people wondered (inaudible) our housing counterparts much 
more that our College Station counterparts dealt with.  It is a general feeling sometimes 
that somebody got placed for special reasons rather than by happenstance.  And it was 
kind of hard to work through that with some folks.  Don’t have a solution, just one of 
those problems (inaudible). 
 
Mr. Jeff Wilson: 
 I’ll tell you the on campus had the same issues.  There were places on campus 
that weren’t being used for the same reason.  He other places that were considered more 
desirable.  Some of the places we had available were just what was left. 
 
Col. Groves: 
 From one standpoint we talked about one data set.  In the housing data set you 
can expand what you’ve got to some degree useful by going back to the Galveston 
students that came here and say given that this happened before school started when it 
happened at the first of October at the first of November, would you have chosen to go 
to Texas A&M?  And you can develop some more reasonable data points.  A lot of this 
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stuff you can’t survey very well exactly for the reason you said.  There are so many 
contingencies and so many variables.  But I think that one you probably could.  If the 
storm was the same, if the university result was the same, would you go to Texas A&M 
in those conditions?  So you can develop a little bit of better planning and information, 
but you’re right when there’s not much available, there’s not much you can do. 
 
Mr. Shallenberger: 
 One of the things that I thought was done well, you know, we only had a certain 
number of available beds on campus.  And we had a number of beds available off 
campus.  And we had to determine who was going to get the on campus beds, whether 
that was within the Corps housing or in the non-reg housing up here.  Fortunately we had 
given that forethought and Tod and Neal and some other folks, I’m sure, were involved 
with trying to make that work.  That may be something that we want to reevaluate.  We 
may decide that was the way to go.  And of course some of that’s going to be predicated 
on in the future what might be available if College Station is at 105 percent.  That’s a 
dramatically different issue than 99 percent.  So that’s – that was a positive thing that 
was – that we gave that some thought to see who was going to have priority. 
 
Dr. Parrott: 
 One thing to note, we put out a call for (inaudible) give up space in the 
community and homes and we got a pretty significant response.  That was not attractive 
to most students.  Most students chose not to go live in somebody else’s house for a 
variety of reasons. 
 
Mr. Golemo: 
 As a matter of fact I’ll tell you just this highly anecdotal.  I spoke with more than 
a few people who they were willing to come up here and pay almost twice the rent that 
they were paying in Galveston, which I’m sure wasn’t real cheap, because they were 
afraid they were going to get stuck in some weird guy’s garage. 
 
Dr. David Parrott: 
 You should have told them Grant was not going to rent. 
 
Dr. McGonagle: 
 Grant’s garage? 
 
Mr. Golemo: 
 It was great.  It was really, really great from standpoint, but they just got wind of 
that.  I don’t know, a lot of that might come back to some of the communication that we 
gave.  I think we did excellent under the circumstances, but I noticed very much and – 
man, I love – I got some really nice things said about me and us about the housing thing.  
I think we made some big mistakes.  We had a failure of imagination on some places.  
But I just – I was overwhelmed with when we don’t give out enough information,  even 
if it’s just giving them updates in where we are in our decision making process.  When 
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we don’t, these students make up their own.  They fill that vacuum of information with – 
I mean, I heard crazy things.  And people talking – literally I heard that more than once, 
some weird guy’s garage.  You know, like I don’t want to be – I don’t know.  So I think 
– I’m sorry I had a really weird visual of Grant. 
 
Mr. Shallenberger: 
 I don’t have a garage. 
 
Dr. McGonagle: 
 Just weird. 
 
Mr. Golemo: 
 I think that in so far as what we did with the housing, I think that what – we did 
what we could.  And I think one thing that we could do better would be to go back and 
come up with a philosophy of priority of where we’re going to put everybody and then 
assign ahead of time as many off campus people, as well.  In the assembly we were 
making decisions right then and there, and we took two staff members doing that and I 
think that slowed things up a lot more.  In making those assignments treating them as de 
facto off campus or de facto campus housing would have helped a lot. 
 
Ms. Hernandez: 
 I just wanted to echo that.  And one thing we talked about in the beginning was 
this notion of cost neutral, and that really did play into the housing decisions for 
students.  Because we didn’t have that defined, students were having a hard time making 
the final decision, do I want this place over here at 2818 place that’s going to cost me so 
much a month versus being in the Plaza, which is going to cost so much a month.  And 
because we couldn’t answer what the university could supplement or was willing to 
supplement because nobody had those answers made it a little bit tougher.  So going 
towards that definition would help a little bit. 
 
Mr. Wilson: 
 I agree completely.  Having folks in those buckets and that bucket may be 
defined based on how much they’re paying for their current rent or for where they are 
would really help us out significantly.  If you had folks that are used to staying Motel 6 
versus the Marriott, if they’re coming from the Marriott moving into the Motel 6, their 
expectations were problematic.  Versus the other way around.  We had some folks who 
weren’t used to staying in air conditioned places that really got some really nice 
accommodations for the same cost that they were paying from where they came from.  
Big problem.  Same issue happened on campus.  So if there a way to differentiate those 
folks, what are what are you paying now versus what’s the closest place we can put you 
in here in that price range. 
 
Mr. Golemo: 
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 The biggest complaint that I got again it’s anecdotal, but I handled a few phone 
calls and the biggest complaint wasn’t the size of the room, even though in comparison 
our residents halls are cavernous compared to they’re just really big.  That’s one of the 
first things I noticed when I showed up on the campus.  But we have all suited 
bathrooms.  People freaked out when they saw community baths.  They lost their minds.  
I went to Baylor and I lived in one of the smallest, oldest residential halls on campus – in 
fact it was the oldest residence hall on campus – and I shared a bathroom with nine other 
guys and they’re some of my best friends to this day.  And you now, I thought it was 
charming.  I thought I was being charming.  I said, you know, you get to know people 
when you have the same – (laughter).  I saw people turn white so when I told them that.  
It was little things like that having expectations and things like that. 
 
Dr. McClendon: 
 One of the things that we’ve clearly got to do in regard to on campus and off 
campus students is decide up front whether we’re going to treat them all like students off 
campus students regarding how much were you paying in rent, have you filed for 
FEMA, and other things.  But then we were checking it because we thought we needed 
it, but we didn’t know ahead what to do with it nor did we have the personnel power to 
reconcile this person was or was not able to get out of their lease in Galveston and so 
what’s our response to that?  And what we were trying to do is be fair to the on-campus 
students who had paid us a fee and honor that and the off-campus students who had not 
paid a fee for housing.  How do you reconcile that in the context of making sure that you 
have the personnel power to keep with the data and manage it and then go back and try 
to collect certain funds.  Secondly thing I want to say to this, Leonard Ross, who is the 
owner of the Plaza Hotel, who was gracious enough in working with us on many issues 
that was related to housing.  I wanted to give him an opportunity to offer any 
observations that he may have. 
 
Mr. Leonard Ross: 
 You put me on the spot.  Well, I’m taking it in at this point.  I’m kind of 
gathering what everyone has to say.  I think one of the things – well, keeping people 
together especially if they’re coming from outside of College Station is very important 
wherever that may be.  So if  you can concentrate a large number of students that’s better 
than when you can’t.  and if you have some supervision that’s also good, especially 
when you’re coming from a strange place, don’t know anybody, don’t know the 
environment.  Parents get concerned, of course, depending on the age of the students.  So 
that’s an issue.  I think in the long run one of the things I recently realized is when Texas 
A&M either built or acquired housing facilities, if they build the rooms large enough that 
are comfortable for two students but able to accommodate three students and they have 
on campus part of Texas A&M housing program at least a provision in the event of 
emergency that a third student might be put in their unit.  Well, that could accommodate 
hundreds of students with no cost to Texas A&M because you’ve already got the rooms.  
So that’s – I don’t know if this is the group who is involved, but that’s something to plan 
for in future perhaps. 
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Mr. Wilson: 
 We do have that plan, sir.  Our modular halls all have that capacity.  We made 
the conscious decision up front not to do that with our Galveston counterparts and part of 
it was to keep the Galveston students assimilating them with the College Station 
students. 
 
Mr. Hearn:  
 But that’s in a case where you’ve got a lot of students and sometimes it won’t be 
as concentrated in a whole, you know, Galveston University. 
 
Mr. Wilson: 
 I won’t go counterpoint on that, sir, but we have to remember the Texas A&M 
students that’s paying that tuition, too, and they’re already in a capacity and their 
expectation is to (inaudible). 
 
Mr. Mike Spiers: 
 Just kind of something to go along with that, you said you had that provision.  Is 
there any way if this were to happen again that you could consider that going done but 
only for like freshman.  Especially freshman who are living on campus and then got 
thrown into off campus.  The reason I say so, sir, is because of the problem that 
happened over at –that has occurred over at Melrose or the District now that Todd hit on 
earlier.  Freshman who were living on campus in Galveston got thrown to an off campus 
position with no supervision and they just ran wild.  They ran wild all semester and then 
they’re going to have to readjust to that again next spring.  I know because I live over 
there.  But is there any way that if this were to happen again you could provide that for, 
say, just freshman?  At least freshman who are on campus? 
 
Dr. David Parrott: 
 This is the third campus I’ve worked on and worked some capacity close to 
housing or students on campus and off campus.  If you look at research and my own 
personal experience on tripling students, what you actually would be doing is having a 
tremendous negative effect on you retention rate.  Students that are tripled leave in 
droves and don’t come back.  If that’s the effect we want to have.  And do I think there 
is a benefit to having particularly freshman on campus.  When you triple them up, the 
environmental effect particularly for students today has such a negative impact on their 
experience in college they go away and don’t come back. 
 
Mr. Sutherland: 
 I agree whole heartily.  In that situation I think you automatically end up putting 
the Sea Aggie as the odd man out in that situation.  I think the Plaza and the – over at the 
district now were a God send.  I think if we do this again we could use some of our 
leasing and control sanction, put in better structure to have them living in an extension of 
campus.  We still have community leaders and still have control of those type of things 
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to help some of the people running wild but also some of the other stress and trauma and 
some of the – I think just with everything going on we had a tendency to get into that.  
But with so many things going on, we didn’t have time to do it.  Trying to get them in a 
group but really looking at some type of structure possibly taking our community to 
these folks and better supervising and keeping them together. 
 
Mr. Wilson: 
 Going full circle back to you Mike.  We did look at that.  The freshman were the 
priority in trying to keep them in the community.  We were also at an over capacity issue 
as Dr. Parrott pointed out.  That tripling issue came a non issue very, very quickly as we 
were trying to keep them together. 
 
Mr. Carter: 
 Donna, did you all say you all were David Bark was surveying your students up 
here or doing a survey?  Is it to gather information like we’re talking about, what was 
positive about academics, what was positive about housing and all these other things; 
what was negative so we can, you know, have that?  Kids have a pretty good idea every 
once in a while. 
 
Dr. Lang: 
 No, it’s not a comprehensive.  We did away with end of course evaluations 
because of the process wasn’t going to work in the format we were in this semester, so 
this is an academic instrument.  And it will gather quite a bit whether the student was on 
campus, instructors,  the three-hour course format, the Saturday, the lab environments, 
their perception of quality.  It won’t address the housing issues or student life issues. 
 
Dr. Parrott: 
 I think one of things we consider if we put a group of freshman off campus is to 
put a group of staff off campus with them.  That may be something we want to consider 
whether it’s practical – 
 
Background: 
 I’ve been living with them, thank you, very much. 
 
Dr. Parrott: 
   – we can relieve the pressure of putting three or four or – (background talking) 
--  and then also pay attention to people want to be together with a group that’s similar to 
them.  Keeping Sea Aggies together was probably important to them.  We might want to 
add a little more staff. 
 
Mr. Golemo: 
 That was one of the things we’ve actually already discussed.  I lived on campus.  
It was wonderful that I was able to walk to work every day and things like that, but I was 
superfluous when it came to that.  They were covered and that’s one thing we had 
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definitely discussed with my supervisor. I probably should have been out at Melrose 
now that I think about it. 
 
Dr. Parrott: 
 I think Grant should have been there. 
 
Mr. Golemo: 
 We’ve got a garage for him.  But absolutely you’re – (laughter). 
 
Dr. Cummins: 
 Last comment on housing then we’re moving on. 
 
Mr. Mike Speers: 
 I agree and I understand with what you said about three students per room, but 
one thing I don’t think y’all have considered, too, is if you do add on like additional CLs 
and places like that, it also creates a job market that was really desperately needed by a 
lot of students.  A lot of students needed jobs up here that they just could not get because 
people wouldn’t hire them for two, three months.  They counted on that revenue to 
support themselves and by increasing you amount of CLs, that kind of helps out students 
on that aspect.   
 
Mr. Golemo: 
 Really two things I’d like to point out, one of them goes directly with that.  I put 
five of my team leaders, we assimilated them right into staff positions as RAs because I 
wanted my most experienced ones and I wanted them to keep their jobs.  And we didn’t 
know at the time if we were going to be able to keep them or what their roles were going 
to be and I think that’s something we fleshed out.  And another thing, I think that a lot of 
the problems we had especially with assignments and a lot of the confusion is that we 
didn’t’ know how many spaces like up until like game time we didn’t know exactly how 
many spaces, exactly how many people were going to show up; and we were never able 
to make the commitment that we were going to be able to house them.  You came up 
through us and you came up through that day and you sat in line for 18 hours or 
whatever it was.  You were going to get housed.  And I think a lot of people they freaked 
out and they did their own thing and that’s where that vacuum of information comes in 
and I think that’s where a big problem came from.  In the future maybe if we can try to 
make more of a commitment, or if we would have known about the space at the Plaza 
earlier we could have done that.  But making that commitment to students I think really 
would have helped out a lot if there was any way we could have done that. 
 
Mr. Coffey: 
 Could I make one last comment?  The fact is the university helped find a lot of 
apartments and, as you can imagine, at some point we ended up with less desirable 
places where you and I wouldn’t want our children to be.  And Mr. Ross stepped up with 
the Plaza Hotel.  There were a lot of issues up front converting a hotel into a dormitory 
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for 300-something students.  I don’t remember the number exactly.  A lot.  A lot of 
students.  And more importantly I think is don’t forget a lot of these apartments were 
unfurnished.  We didn’t have any furniture so we had students and no furniture.  Or 
apartments.  And Mr. Ross, again, kind of reiterating what Rodney was saying offered 
furniture.  And he had some furniture in his storage rooms and he provided furniture for 
a lot of these apartments that we would not have had.  So in your future if Mr. Ross is 
not around when this happens again, we need to plan for furniture.  Got to have beds, got 
to have drawers.  Things like that. 
 
Dr. Cummins: 
 Dining services.  Anybody here from dining services?  Talk to us about dining 
services.  What worked, what do we need to work on? 
 
Ms. Donna Van Duyn: 
 Dining services here at College Station totally allowed me to (inaudible) and 
create for our students here their own meal plans.  That were not College Station meal 
plans, but they were similar.  And I think by and large it worked very well and support 
from dining services. 
 
Mr. Shallenberger: 
 One of the things we found kind of as we got into the semester is that because of 
student schedules, because of the rescheduling from the three times a week or one time a 
week that sometimes a student might not be on campus near the number of times they 
would have in Galveston.  Instead of going on campus Monday, Wednesday, Friday – 
or, you know, Monday, Wednesday, Tuesday, Thursday, it was Monday, Thursday, and 
Friday or something like that.  And so we did end up making – not a lot but we did end 
up making some accommodations for students whose schedules really just didn’t make 
sense for them to have a meal plan that they didn’t need.  It was really the majority of 
those students were in the students contracted off campus space.  I think the students on 
campus they probably ate more meals than they knew they had.  They did well.  I heard 
something last week somebody was using their meal plan at a rate of five meals a day.  
So but, you know, again, another appreciation, Sherry, as well as your crew just how 
smooth  your transition was at least appearance wise it appeared smooth.  I can’t imagine 
the amount of work that went on behind the scenes to make it all happen. 
 
Ms. Bremer: 
 I think the meal plan in large worked perfectly.  At the transition we had what we 
needed.  One thing I think got overlooked was students that didn’t have a meal plan were 
placed in the Plaza that didn’t have a kitchen.  That was one place they would have had 
to purchase an additional meal plan or eat out or by meals for the entire semester. 
 
Mr. Wilson: 
 The on campus meal plan worked well.  The housing and meal plans were pretty 
much the same process.  The off campus from what I got and I got a lot of e-mails the 
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expectation, I didn’t have a meal plan at Galveston.  I’m living on campus here.  Do I get 
a meal plan at A&M?  Going back to the cost neutral discussion, the expectation was if 
you didn’t have one there, the expectation was you wouldn’t get one here.  Lots of 
dialogue over that.  I don’t have the capacity to cook where I’m at now.  How does that 
work? 
 
Mr. Shallenberger: 
 Our meal plans are cheap.  They get a good value. 
 
Ms. Van Duyn: 
 We did have a number of students purchase A&M College Station meal plans 
when the had not had meal plans in Galveston, and because they have so many options 
that seemed to be viable.  If they were paying for meals or cooking there. 
 
Mr. Wilson: 
 Again, I agree.  But again, it was that expectation.  That expectation it was free 
and when they told them not so much, it changed their expectations whether or not they 
were going to buy or not.   
 
Dr. Cummins: 
 In the interest of time, I’m going to be a bit more assertive here.  We need to 
move to relocation of faculty and staff.  We really want to know about housing and some 
of those things.  We’ll move through this list here beginning with teaching materials and 
resources.  We’ll work our way down there.  Those of you that were helping faculty get 
relocated. 
 
Dr. Montelongo: 
 Kind of related to faculty as far as much like we’re talking about.  Like we’re 
talking about housing relocation or the services we provide for housing, I think it’s 
important to recognize the student’s academic support as needed.  IE my services, 
academic advancement, the writing center, and anything that is in relation to the teaching 
of the courses while we make this move that, you know, there’s an understanding that to 
make sure those services are going to be in place, you know, day one and God bless the 
students learning center near College Station.  They welcomed my staff with open arms 
and provided us tutor rooms. In fact our Galveston tutors tutored the College Station 
students up until last night.  So I think it’s important to make sure that those academic 
support services are discussed and that those that are associated with those services, 
including the Galveston folks, which I don’t think – I mean, College Station folks I don’t 
think they’re in this room, are included in future discussions with us. 
 
Ms. Lobaugh: 
 Just so we’re taking notes, something to look at for future action is we – with the 
physical plant we recently received a call from a faculty member who evidently had 
acquired furnishings here and had set up housing and he had heard that we had trucks 
 407 
 
coming this week and next week to relocate textbooks and lab equipment and wanted to 
get scheduled to have his furnishing picked up from his apartment to move back to 
where he was going to be housed on the island. 
 
Dr. McGonagle: 
 That he didn’t pay for? 
 
Ms. Lobaugh: 
 Yes.  Here again, expectations.  We’re coming to get the equipment and 
textbooks and stuff, bt we’re not set up to move everybody’s homes. 
 
Dr. Rowe: 
 When is that?  When is that? 
 
Dr. McGonagle: 
 We have an attorney here.  We’re going to need one. 
 
Dr. Cummins: 
 More comments about this continuation. Research?  Some of those concerns 
you’ve heard things that need to be taken into account. 
 
Dr. Rowe: 
 I think all of these things were handled quite well.  All of them need written 
down plans ahead of time.  And I think this goes back to fall semester indoctrination of 
the faculty about what to expect.  And once we get these things written down, and if 
things likes continuation and research, increasing the contact between like departments 
down there and up here.  If anything that has happened about this is that we now have a 
lot more communication between researchers there and researchers here.  And I think if 
we emphasize that in the future, most of these things will be worked out.  I’m still a little 
concerned about the housing in that I’m not so sure that with the faculty and staff it 
might be just as well to give them a housing allowance and turn them loose on the real 
estate industry.  There’s a thriving real estate industry here.  That would allow people to 
meet their specific needs.  I’m delighted with what was provided for me, but it’s too 
much.  I don’t need as much as what I have.  I think everybody among those staff and 
the faculty might feel the same way.  At least perhaps given a choice. 
 
Dr. Cummins: 
 In terms of a plan that should be examined --  
 
Dr. Rowe: 
 As a possibility, an alternative. 
 
Ms. Boyd:  
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 In response to the contracted housing, I think it kind of also reflects the College 
Station community and what was available and I think at that time in the semester it was 
broken down into again what were those newer accommodations and what were those 
older markets.  And I think everyone is correct that echoed the expectations. And so in 
terms of what were those expectations and again what were the priority of those that 
needed in reflection to their household.  And also those that required more permanent 
housing, what was the expectation of their job performance in comparison to those that 
needed to be available in College Station to teach or transition students in comparison to 
those that could commute or work from home who were writing or doing research in 
different locations.  So I think that also had a number of housing assignments in terms of 
making that request for faculty and staff. 
 
Ms. Duran: 
 In working with faculty and staff, I think we have to keep in mind, too, that there 
were staff members and faculty members that had pregnant wives.  So when, you know, 
there’s no control over what the housing that’s contracted, so there’s going to be a level 
of shock, there’s going to be this emotional roller coaster and whoever deals with that 
part of the housing for faculty and staff has to be patient because you’re going to have 
people come in – and I have many, many stories of people coming in, I mean, literally 
crying after they saw a property and granted the housing was contracted under the 
circumstances, but whoever is – whoever has that job has to have some experience in 
outreach and community and understanding and if you have a background in counseling 
that helps.  But we literally I mean I dealt – Cassandra not as much, but I dealt literally 
with people crying right in front of me because they did not like the house they were in 
at all whatsoever.  So you have to keep in mind if someone has a disability, if the woman 
is pregnant, when is she due, where are they going to live?  You have to remember to 
keep that in mind, that emotional aspect changes everything no matter house you put 
them in because their expectation is they want to be somewhere like they were in 
Galveston and that’s just not going to happen.   
 
Ms. Taryn Cornelius: 
 We need to outline what the expectations are for houses.  I’m not living 
somewhere that I would have ever chosen to live on my own for a variety of reason, 
however, I live there, I have a roof over my head, I have a utilities that are paid for and 
the school supplied air mattresses.  Is that comfortable to sleep on for three months?  No.  
but if you’re that upset about it I acquired furniture because I talked to a church and they 
said, here, we don’t need this.  Borrow this.  I think we really need to outline what the 
expectations are for what we’re going to do with faculty and staff.  Because they’re 
going to be people who are going to want what they have.  I would love to have what I 
had in Galveston.  I would have loved to have a yard for my dogs.  However, you have 
to deal with that.  The university needs to be able to put their foot down and say, be 
happy with what you have or you can go and pay this out of pocket. 
 
Dr. McClendon: 
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 We took a bath on this issue financially.  Because early on we asked people 
whether they needed a location and that the university would provide it, it would be cost 
neutral to them.  Ad a number of individuals needed a place to live for the duration of 
the time that we were going to be here.  But either because their personal situations 
changed in Galveston where their homes may have been livable or they chose not to 
accept what we have.  We have 40, 50 units that have gone – that we’re paying for that 
are vacant.  So whether it’s stipend or whether it’s contracted, there has to be some sort 
of an agreement that this is what it is and we’re out of money now.  That bill is, you 
know, is due. 
 
Dr. Cummins: 
 So in the plan that obviously has to be taken into account. 
 
Ms. Boyd: 
 Also in terms of reflection this the relocation assignment for faculty and staff 
happened before the students arrived on campus.  It was still a competitive market in 
terms of the College Station community also looking for available housing at the 
beginning of the semester.  Then it was the urgency of having faculty and staff be 
placed.  And I remember the phrase of faculty and staff need to be here yesterday, so that 
the students can then be assigned housing.  So that was another part of the plan in terms 
of the timetable.  There was an urgency to get the faculty and staff settled before.  So 
sometimes we did have some properties that necessarily met the needs, met more than 
the needs, met less than the needs, but that was based also on the urgency of making sure 
that they did have a roof over their head so that they could perform their duties for the 
students.  So that’s another thing to keep in mind.  But again, I also want to say thank 
you to those who spent endless hours in communicating with off campus properties for 
those that were not familiar with the College Station area in terms of what would be a 
livable space in a very critical, immediate time frame.  So, again, thank you so much to 
off campus housing. 
 
Dr. Cummins: 
 Do some of you have some comments or concerns about medical services or 
health issues or some of those things that should be lumped in here – not lumped in but 
should be addressed? 
 
Dr. Cepeda: 
 I was going to comment along those lines.  We organized a couple of orientation 
meetings where faculty could come and go and get informed about housing as well as 
things that are around College Station and facilities and medical care and things of that 
nature.  So it would be good to have kind of a directory of where the most important 
things that people are going to need and materials that is going to help them navigate 
College Station and Bryan.  And so we did on the spur of the moment called the 
Chamber of Commerce and we got maps and we did gathered, put together whatever we 
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could some of the same things we do for our faculty orientation when we come here.  
But there might be other things that need to be directed to people who come.   
 
Dr. Lang: 
 Related to this and I plug both of the superintendents, as well.  Both Bryan ISD 
and College Station ISD went above and beyond to take care of all of our children and 
anyone in the community that can pass that word on.  They were fabulous what they did 
to assimilate and that was a huge relief to all of us and for those of you that don’t know.  
We have done 21 sea camp days now in the local school district with the kids to have 
Galveston here in College Station while we were here. 
 
Mr. Shallenberger: 
 Real quick on medical services and I’ll be honest with you, I don’t know if this is 
an issue or not, but I haven’t asked the question of Brad about HR.   Being in Galveston 
and Blue Cross Blue Shield, are we in network or out of network?  I thought of that 
question before anybody in my family had to use medical services, but didn’t ask it.  
Subsequently my family has had to use it and now I’m wondering are we in or out of 
network and that may be something for the future that we may need to work out. 
 
Ms. Lallah Howard: 
 To go back to Gil’s point.  Doing – the expectations of the faculty and staff 
before they come that in the case of an emergency.  You will receive a stipend and it’s to 
help offset the cost that you may incur in moving to an alternate location and really 
outline in that expectation what this very specific designated amount is to them offset.  
Not intend to cover it all.  You may still have out of pocket, but then they go to the local 
community to get the goods and services they need.  There are tax implication on that, 
too, but at the same time it is a very set expectation and they know it up front when they 
sign a contract. 
 
Dr. Cummins: 
 Anything else? 
 
Ms. Boyd: 
 I just have one point that I think would be helpful.  Antonio mentioned it and in 
one aspect of having a directory.  I know that the facility in the MCS, which is 
Multicultural Services, provided the operation for faculty and staff relocation and 
assignments and I think that was a great location. However, it acted as a hub for a lot of 
things that faculty and staff experienced whether they were looking for medical advice 
or insurance or whether they were looking for a place to wash their clothes in the 
community.  I’m thinking in the future there would be maybe an alternative location or 
hub that would be a centralized response area.  I know that the GSC operated as one, but 
I think there should be another one that would disrupt or kind of complicate or intervene 
in the operation and interference of daily activities from other departments. 
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Dr. Bob Sindylek: 
 Still employee assistance counseling was relying on UT being pretty much they 
could meet their own needs so we turned to Texas A&M and they were unable to 
respond.  So we were able to put into place some private contracting, but we probably 
need to do some work in that area, make sure that if a disaster of this magnitude were to 
occur again, that’s a piece that we already have in place tying into a national network or 
something. 
 
Ms. Lobaugh: 
 I just want to reiterate of what was just said.  In having the counselor there in 
Galveston was helpful.  You know, we came back in day three and as staff members, 
essential members started coming onto the campus it still looks like a bomb went off.  
These are people who had three, five, eight, ten foot of water in their homes, no home to 
sleep in or go home too, invalid parents, children and having the counselor there just 
available was very helpful.   
 
 
Ms. Cornelius: 
 I think something along with the counseling that we need to plan on in the future 
we need to have two counselors or we need to have a counselor who can equally 
distribute their time between Galveston and here.  Because there were probably people 
here who would have loved to talk to somebody, but how are they supposed to leave 
here when their responsibilities are here and they go back to Galveston.  So I think it’s 
very important to have two separate people or someone in both places.   
 
Ms. Doran:  
 And also not to mention the hours that we were all working.  We were all 
working 15- to 18-hour days.  And that – that’s a huge factor because we’re already 
under a lot of stress. Everyone is away from their family and that’s something that needs 
to be taken into account because there are great consequences after someone goes 
through that much stress after all this is over.  There’s going to be things that happen 
after all of this that will surprise this.  You don’t see the effects until way after a year 
after when someone gets an illness because you went through so much stress, you put 
your body through so much stress and that needs to be taken into account.  Again, the 
emotional aspect, you know, going through a private situation and making sure there’s 
more than two counselors available for the staff in Galveston and for the faculty and 
staff her in College Station.   
 
Dr. Cummins: 
 If I could get a few comments about students services and communications. 
 
Dr. Parrott: 
 Just want to give some information about TAMUG students use of student 
(inaudible).  Disability services provide services to less than ten TAMUG students.  The 
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transition for those students with disability was more difficult than the students 
themselves had anticipated.  If makes sense.  It’s a bigger campus, different barriers, 
different challenges and so forth.  Contact with TAMUG – contact, information, so forth.  
From an accommodation from those students waned towards the middle of the semester 
and may work better if TAMUG with data on students who are currently receiving 
services in Galveston and reach out and contact them rather than wait for students to 
come to disability services.  Student counseling services providing services for less than 
40 students, close to 100 appointments over the course of time here.  Currently working 
on with the students that provided services to.  We have one outstanding issue and that’s 
continuity of care.  We need to talk about that.  Also the Dean of Student Life with 
TAMUG staff.  Student fraternity worked on a number of A&M students in terms of 
lease issues.  That was with a student attorney.  Students services needs to pay for it.  
Students had access to that one poor beleaguered attorney but (laughter).  Certainly we 
worked with off campus housing, worked with students in terms of (inaudible) also.  
Student Health Service provided service to 251 TAMUG students, 539 appointments.  
And their main challenge was having to manually load Sims data so that students could 
make their appointments on the web and so on and so forth. 
 
 
Ms. Hernandez:  
 Talking about the student’s assembly.  I think it worked well having both the 
TAMU contact and TAMUG contact.  I think it was helpful to communicate with on 
those issues.  It was great having the TAMUG staff present to be able to talk to the 
students and the family members there.  One of the things we talked about if housing 
assignments are going to be made at the student’s assembly in the future, obviously more 
time is going to be needed to process those students.  A day and a half was a little bit too 
short a window to go through all of that.  The assembly may not be need to be drive by 
when schedules are ready.  And then perhaps having more student data in advance might 
have been helpful.  I know when I talked to the parking representatives they talked about 
if they had known who had parking permits on Galveston campus, if they had that data 
ahead of time, they might have been able to do some different things.  It might have been 
helpful with meal plans, and housing and those types of things.  But I think out of all of 
this if we could shoot over some of this data ahead of time, it might make some of those 
processes a little bit easier here when they’re transitioning to our campus.  It wasn’t 
necessary or it didn’t seem necessary to have the assembly where TAMUG offices were 
housed.  It was convenient, I think, for TAMUG staff to go back and forth, but I don’t 
think it was necessary to have it housed right there where hose offices were, which was 
one of the primary reasons we picked that particular location to have the assembly.  And 
the other thing I wanted to talk about was students community giving effort.  Publicizing 
point of contact in student services, TAMUG contact or giving efforts.  We intended to 
have a whole bunch pop up around campus and sometimes they were competing and 
asking for different things.  And then just recognizing the limitations of current students 
and staff serving as volunteers, especially as we got further into the semester.  I think 
everyone had the volunteer spirit, but then they  were also getting into their own courses 
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and their own issues so out volunteer and level of involvement tended to wane a little bit 
as we got later into the semester.   
 
Mr. Taylor: 
 On communication, there may be a group of students we need to flesh out are the 
graduate students who are doing research in Galveston but are not enrolled in Galveston.  
They may not be on the Galveston alerts and so forth, so they would have to – we had 
several international students in that situation.  Some of them were on the ship who 
eventually came back in and found their apartment gone.  I think that’s an area that we 
may need to flesh out a little bit more.   
 
Ms. Bremer: 
 Before the transition actually happened, the call line was opened and some 
people had the expectation that they could call that line and get information, but there 
was only one phone line that was servicing that so those hours it was constantly busy so 
I think people had a hard time getting the answers they wanted and that just added to the 
trouble.  If we had had more than one line, more people can man those phones and get 
additional help. 
 
Ms. Cornelius: 
 I’m kind of going along with what Betsy was saying.  I think there were two 
(inaudible) with the hotline /W-PL.  for starters at the beginning of this hurricane season 
we actually established a hotline updating every time (inaudible) was three separate 
times we had to monitor storms.  And unfortunately because that phone line was based 
in Galveston, we lost it when the storm came through.  As a result, two different phone 
numbers began rolling to the same phone line.  One was 187 Sea Aggie, which is our 
800 number; and the other was 979 number that was posted online.  Like Betsy said, it 
was a nightmare.  We had to open it late and shut it early so we would actually have two 
hours a day that we could try and get work.  Most of the phone calls were probably 20 to 
30 minutes long because lots of times you just had parents who wanted to talk.  So it 
became more of a counseling line as opposed to an information line.  The other big 
problems that went along with was that was you were handling information that not just 
anyone needed to be distributing.  You needed to make sure people were getting the 
correct facts at the correct times.  For example, if there was something going on with 
housing that wasn’t official yet, you  needed to make sure that wasn’t getting out even 
though in the area where we were working, a lot of people knew a lot of information that 
wasn’t official yet.  And so when we finally had students workers showed up, it was 
wonderful and excluding Betsy, several other student workers showed up in the 
beginning.  But several weeks into this when we actually had regular student workers, it 
was great to have people, but I don’t think more than one or two of them were ever 
actually put on the phone because there wasn’t time to train them on what was 
appropriate, how to be professional, and what you could say or couldn’t say.  So I think 
there needs to be something in lace, there needs to be a training session, and you need to 
know that someone is going to speak professionally and they’re going to be able to 
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handle it.  There was a lot of emotion for a lot of us.  So I think when everyone else is 
working 16- and 18-hour days to spend those entire day stalking on the phone with 
people who are upset and people who had no clue what a hurricane was, there needed to 
be some sort of reprieve for that. 
 
Mr. Golemo: 
 I spent a lot of time on the phones, too, and a lot of it came back to that vacuum 
of information.  I got to see it was a great experience for me in a way because I got to 
see a lot of the decisions and how the higher-ups made those decisions and there was a 
continuum between, you know, information that we – we never wanted to give out any 
information officially that wasn’t one hundred percent true.  But then also that meant 
there was a lot of decisions, a lot of information that we couldn’t give out.  And so it was 
very sporadic in dealing with students it was the fear of the unknown.  They didn’t know 
what was going on and this was very – I think that was honestly  one of the most 
traumatic things for them was just all kinds of rumors and stuff like that.  And I don’t 
know, I think if there is was one thing I would change maybe we could see what kind of 
leeway there is in that.  If we had a time there was going to be updates.  Every day we 
would send them updates.  This is where you can check.  I know when I explained to 
parent the situation like, you know, this is why that decision was made, they were more 
than understanding.  And they said, okay, I understand that and when can I find out 
more?  Just having a steady line of information.  I don’t know, I think having a time 
when we were going to dump what we had or whatever every day or also one having one 
particular place. I’m really big, is anybody, on information.  We had sending out 
Facebook messages and MySpace and doing NEO and stuff like that, but I wonder if we 
didn’t spread it out too much.  Maybe we should have said this is the place where you 
can come get your information and this is where – like you know, chicken and the egg 
type thing.  Nobody checks their NEO because nobody ever uses it.  I wonder if maybe 
we missed an opportunity there to get people in the habit of checking their NEO account 
every day because that’s where they could go for information. 
 
Ms. Parrott: 
 There are a number of documents that were generated both in the, for the group 
meeting, and by group meeting that we had  a regular basis for and various other 
purposes.  Do you want those documents for any reason? 
 
Dr. Cummins: 
 How many of them are there? Yes, I would be interested. 
 
Ms. Parrott: 
 I think the president’s office are going to have those. 
 
Mr. McClendon: 
 I’ve got those. 
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Ms. Cornelius:  
 I think the important thing is to not make the 1-800 number our main contact 
number because since then in the midst of all this you’re getting questions about 
admissions or campus tours or I want to join the Corps of Cadets, what do I do?  I think 
that’s another reason we really need to not use that number. 
 
Ms. Hernandez: 
 I think one of the things that helped, too, is when we were able to finally answer 
some frequently asked questions and they could check on the website.  I think that 
minimized some calls.  Obviously some wanted more clarification and I think what that 
enabled us to do, too, and what’s good (inaudible) documents was that now that we have 
a list of frequently asked questions, we can answer those questions ahead of time so that 
we will have those answers or be thinking about those questions and those answers more 
in advance than we had this time around. 
 
Dr. McGonagle: 
 I want to defer to Norma. 
 
Ms. Duran: 
 Real quick.  A lot of the calls that were funneled through me, I don’t know how 
they got to me, but it was great that I was able to answer the questions was the custodial 
staff that were Spanish speaking.  They didn’t know what was going on.  So thankfully I 
was able to answer their questions, because they didn’t know if they were going to get 
paid, they didn’t have internet access so it’s very important to somehow disseminate that 
information in Spanish somehow because they didn’t know what was going on. 
 
Dr. McGonagle: 
 I know we’re getting ready to wrap up.  One thing that’s going to be imperative 
to Galveston, especially and we’ll hammer on this when we get back, but also it’s going 
to apply to College Station is an experience that we’ve had since Ike and that’s FEMA.  
We have a FEMA consultant that’s helping s with our FEMA reimbursements and 
project worksheets and so forth.  But basically what our consultant has asked us to do is 
basically recreate everything we did from September 11, the time when we made the 
decision to leave, until the present on a by-minute basis nearly because of the 
opportunity to reimburse for over time, straight pay, equipment used, all the things that 
come with FEMA reimburse.  So that’s one thing we’ll definitely hammer on in 
Galveston, but we want to look at what that means to College Station, as well.  And 
Kevin McGinnis over at Risk Management can help with that. 
 
Ms. Meyer: 
 Gary Jackson, as well. 
 
Dr. Cummins: 
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 What you’re going back to, you talk to getting back to normal.  It’s a new 
normal.  You’ve been gone for three months.  I have no idea what you have experienced.  
I have not gone through what you have gone through.  I do have great admiration for you 
and certainly we’re glad to help you.  But there’s more to be done when you get back.  
And we’re standing ready to help you out.  Keep these things in mind.  That’s where I’m 
going to turn it back to Dr. Loftin. 
 
Dr. Loftin: 
 I won’t keep you long.  A couple of words then. The last comment made was 
important.  This is not the end of our learning on this experience.  We really want you to 
come together today as a group and deal with this in this particular context, but we 
couldn’t obviously get everything learned today.  So what’s important is that we want to 
tap into your mind about this over the next few months before, again, things get too 
volatile and you forget what happened.  Expect to hear from us and by all means please 
provide us with comments you might have. 
 
Mr. McClendon:  
 Do you want them to come to you?  Rodney will be your point of contact.  He 
will channel you.  We might put together some helps.  We’ll have a plan. 
 
Dr. Loftin: 
 We want to make sure you have an opportunity to add more to this.  We got you 
started today thinking about this.  I heard lots of great comments things I didn’t know 
and I didn’t understand.  I know have a better grasp.  I know we have in mind all of it 
because there are many more of you here than we could hear from this short period of 
time.  So my point is even though there is an open bar upstairs, there is no such thing as 
a free drink.  We’re going to expect to learn from you more over the next few weeks and 
couple months, basically as we try to put this into a manageable form. We send back out 
to you what we gathered from the transcript here today and resources so you can 
comment on them.  I know it’s a pain, but think about his.  The next time this happens.  
We won’t have to reinvent so much.  That’s what I’m interested in trying to get past my 
retirement hopefully.  But if we can do things right now, we wont only save yourselves 
potentially, but other generations who will work here a lot of grief.  If we can really 
learn from this experience and codify what we’ve learned and make sure it’s available to 
us in the future.  That’s the key thing.  So upstairs on the tenth floor we have an open bar 
and some snacks for you.  The bar will be open for only a limited period of time.  Our 
resources are limited.  Thank you for two things.  Thank you for being here today.  Most 
of all, thank you for those many hours, days, weeks of work you put in to make this all 
possible. It was an extraordinary event.  I pray I never go through it again.  It wasn’t 
perfect.  It was the best we could do.  That’s all we can as.  It was the best we can do.  
Thank you all. 
 
(End at 4:38) 
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APPENDIX D MEMO CONCERNING POST-IKE 
AFTER ACTION REVIEW 
 
 
November 5, 2009 
 
MEMORANDUM 
 
TO: Dr. R. Bowen Loftin, Interim President 
  Texas A&M University 
 
FROM: Dr. Rodney P. McClendon, Acting Vice President and CEO 
  Texas A&M University at Galveston  
  
SUBJECT: Post-Hurricane Ike Evaluation of Emergency Response 
Plans 
  
Following the evacuation and implementation of the Emergency 
Response Plan, specifically the Emergency Short-Term and Long-Term 
Recovery and Business Continuity Plan (BCP), Texas A&M University at 
Galveston and Texas A&M University conducted an After-Action 
Review.  Additionally, throughout the last year, the Strategic Operations 
Team has regularly discussed “lessons learned”.  As I vacate my 
position as Acting Vice President and CEO, I think it important to commit 
to writing the fact that the findings and recommendations of our 
comprehensive review resulted in very modest modifications to the 
existing plan.  The most significant findings are outlined below. 
  
First, in an effort to ensure continued goodwill and communications 
between both campuses, the Incident Command Team members and 
those with delineated responsibilities within the BCP at TAMUG have 
been tasked with initiating conversations with their counterparts in 
College Station prior to the start of hurricane season and immediately 
upon activation of the team.  The expectation is that these continued 
discussions will facilitate any future implementations of the plan.  This is 
particularly valuable in terms of identifying space on the College Station 
campus and in the community should a relocation become necessary. 
  
Second, Dr. Donna Lang created a matrix (see attached) identifying the 
anticipated actions based on severity of the storm and the time of 
arrival.  Vetted through the Strategic Operations Team (comprised 
largely of Incident Command Team members), this tool will aid in the 
decision making process.  It should be noted that this document is for 
internal use and not for publication with the Emergency Response Plan. 
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 Third, individual departments throughout campus were tasked with 
improving their response and adjusting their participation in the 
implementation of the BCP.  Individual department documents were 
created, collected and stored on a web accessible drive to ensure 
portability.  These documents include department specific plans for the 
relocation of and reinstatement of services. 
  
Finally, a significant amount of time was spent discussing and re-aligning 
the individual elements of the plan with the related official/group in 
College Station. Most of these changes were minor in scope and are 
therefore not spelled out in this letter.   
  
The most recent version of the Emergency Response Plan and all the 
component pieces are available at 
http://www.tamug.edu/emergency/EmergencyResponsePlan.htm. 
 
Attachment 
 
C: Mr. Bill Hearn 
 Dr. Alex Kemos 
 Strategic Operations Team 
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  CAMPUS POLICE  409 740-4545 OFFICE 
    409 771-5185 AFTER-HOURS 
 
  FACILITIES SERVICES 409 740-4547 OFFICE  
    409 771-5185 AFTER-HOURS 
 
  GALVESTON POLICE 409 797-3702 24-HOURS 
 
  AMBULANCE  409 797-3702 24-HOURS 
 
  FIRE   409 797-3702 24-HOURS 
 
  COAST GUARD, AIR RESCUE 1-800-874-2154 24-HOURS 
 
  SEABORNE CHALLENGE  409 740-4852 OFFICE 
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 713 408-1826 AFTER HOURS 
 
National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration (713) 337-5074 
Galveston Public Works (409) 766-2115 
Houston Lighting & Power (713) 228-7400 
Southern Union Gas (409) 763-8551 or  
(800) 582-4565 
American Red Cross (409) 763-5971 
Texas General Land Office (spill responses) (512) 475-1560 
TNRCC (water/waste) (713) 625-7900 
Center Point Energy (713) 207-2222 
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Definitions 
 
Campus Emergency Declaration: Any incident that significantly impairs the normal 
operations of the University and the campus community. The Emergency Event may 
have an impact requiring immediate action to be taken by the President or in extreme 
circumstances the TAMUG Police Department officer in charge to ensure that 
institutional operations are restored and a safe environment exists. 
 
Incident Command Team: Upon declaration of a Campus Emergency Event that 
results in a Campus Declaration of Emergency, members of the ICT will assemble in the 
Emergency Operations Center (EOC), located on the 3rd floor of the OCSB.,  
 
Incident Command Post: (ICP) is the location at which the primary command 
functions take place. The Incident Commander is located at the ICP, and there is only 
one ICP for each incident. 
 
Emergency Operations Center (EOC): The primary command center shall be on the 
3rd floor of the OCSB, or any other locations that may be designated for such usage. 
These locations shall NOT be publicized to the general public or the news media. 
 
Campus Shelter in Place (SIP): This process shall require all university employees, 
students, and visitors to remain within the current building(s) and may close or deny 
entry to the campus by anyone other than emergency responders and essential personnel 
with appropriate credentials. During a SIP all students, faculty, staff and visitors must 
remain in the classrooms, offices, residential hall rooms, or areas they were at the time 
of the SIP, unless directed otherwise by the Incident Commander through emergency 
response personnel. If necessary, persons may be denied permission to enter the 
university proper or portions thereof. 
 
Essential Staff: Pre-determined individuals who are permitted access to campus if an 
emergency event has precipitated a campus SIP and campus closure/evacuation. A list 
shall be kept at TAMUG Police Headquarters and sent to the ICC at the outset of the 
emergency event. 
 
Critical Incident Media Site: Once an Emergency Event has resulted in the 
declaration of a campus emergency, the Director of Communication and Media 
Relations or her/his designee will determine an appropriate Media Site that will not 
interfere or potentially compromise the emergency operations, rescue efforts, or 
resulting investigations.  
 
Parent/Family Information Site: Upon notification that the President has declared a 
campus emergency, the AVP for Student Affairs, or her/his designee, will determine a 
need for, and an appropriate location of a parent information site that will not interfere or 
compromise emergency operations. The Parent Information site will never be located in 
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the same locale as the Media site; nor will the media be given access to the Parent 
Information Site without the express permission of the Incident Command Team. 
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Mission 
It is the mission of Texas A&M University at Galveston to provide policies, education 
and training to enhance the protection of lives and property. Emergency Management 
will coordinate and integrate all TAMUG resources to mitigate, prepare for, respond to, 
and recover from emergencies that affect Texas A&M University at Galveston 
 
Since an emergency is, by definition an incident that may occur suddenly, without 
warning, at any time, or any place, Texas A&M University at Galveston (TAMUG) has 
developed this Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) and Public Information Manual.  It is 
designed to provide the basic administrative structure and procedures necessary to cope 
with emergency situations. 
Texas A&M University at Galveston’s EOP was created to address emergencies that 
may happen on campus or at a TAMUG facility.  The EOP is designed to assist TAMUG 
leaders with the ability to coordinate emergency response and minimize the effect on 
employees, students, visitors, and facilities.  TAMUG is committed to providing 
continuous education and research opportunities to all of its staff and students.  This plan 
recognizes that any interruption of service to staff or students is a potential emergency 
and that TAMUG will use all resources to quickly and safely mitigate the emergency. 
TAMUG and its operations are susceptible to emergencies such as natural disasters, 
severe weather, and other hazards.  Because an almost limitless number of emergencies 
may be encountered, the EOP was designed to serve as a template for the many possible 
responses.  Procedures have been designed to comply with applicable regulations, 
including TAMUS policy 34.07 and 34.07.1 Emergency Management Plan for System 
University Campuses. 
The EOP is the foundation for the TAMUG Comprehensive Emergency Management 
Program.  This program consists of plans, procedures, training, drills and exercises, to 
acquire resources and equip facilities based in the National Incident Management 
System (NIMS).  It has been developed to coordinate with Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA); State of Texas DPS Emergency Operations, Galveston 
County Office of Emergency Management (GCOEM), and City of Galveston 
Emergency Operations Plans and to maintain emergency response capabilities.  It is 
designed to interface with community response organizations and anticipate potential 
emergencies which may affect any operation or service. 
The key elements of the Emergency Operations Plan of Texas A&M University at 
Galveston has an emphasis on three goals: 
•        to protect life 
•        to protect property 
•        to resume normal operations 
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These three goals can only be achieved when TAMUG administrators, faculty, 
maintenance personnel or staff, support staff, students, government entities, and all other 
outside resources become involved in the development and implementation of the 
EOP.  This meticulous preparation, through education, and training, and the systematic 
implementation during an emergency, will allow TAMUG to survive an emergency or 
disaster so it can resume normal operations. 
The three goals of the plan are strengthened by a framework of four fundamental phases: 
•        preparedness – planning for an emergency or disaster event 
•        response – the planned response to an emergency or disaster event 
•        recovery  - the process of returning to normal operations 
•        mitigation – steps taken to prevent the effects of an emergency or disaster 
These four phases, when used together, will lessen the impact of an emergency and its 
latent effects that could disrupt TAMUG’s operations more than the actual emergency or 
disaster itself. 
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SECTION 1. Incident Command 
 
General Procedures 
For minor emergencies, TAMUG and local responders will handle the appropriate 
response. The county may be called upon to provide supplemental assistance and 
coordination whenever the consequences of an emergency exceed University and local 
capabilities. 
 
If the disaster, emergency, or terrorism incident exceeds the capabilities of the Galveston 
County resources, the regional counter-terrorism task forces can provide assistance in 
the form of specialized response teams. Additionally, the State of Texas will be 
requested to provide assistance. If needed, the State can mobilize an array of resources 
including, specialized response teams, support personnel, and specialized equipment to 
support disaster or emergency affairs. 
  
Direction and Control 
In all emergencies, it is essential that there be a planned and predetermined command 
structure to take control of the scene, maintain control, and direct emergency response 
operations. The Incident Command System (ICS) will be followed at the scene of the 
emergency. 
 
1. The ICS organization is built around five major functions: 
 
• Command  
• Planning  
• Operations  
• Logistics  
• Finance/Administration 
 
 2. The focal point of the ICS is the Incident Commander. The ICS organization has 
the capability to expand or contract to meet the needs of the incident, but all emergency 
incidents, regardless of size or complexity, will have an Incident Commander. Initially, 
the Incident Commander will be the senior first responder to arrive at the scene (e.g., the 
Police Chief). The Incident Commander is responsible for on-scene management until 
command authority is transferred to another person, who then becomes the Incident 
Commander. Unified Command allows all agencies with responsibility for the incident, 
either geographical or functional, to manage an incident by establishing a common set of 
incident objectives and strategies. 
  
3. The Incident Command Post (ICP) is the location at which the primary command 
functions take place. The Incident Commander is located at the ICP, and there is only 
one ICP for each incident. The ICP should be located:  
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• Away from the general noise and confusion associated with the incident.  
• Outside the area of present and potential hazards.  
• Within view of the incident, when possible. 
 
 4. Command Staff. The Incident Commander can use three primary aides if needed to 
help control the emergency: 
 
 • Liaison Officer – This is a police officer designated by the Incident Commander. The 
chief responsibility of the Liaison Officer is to act as the go-between for other 
emergency responders and agencies and the Incident Commander. 
 
• Safety Officer – The Director of Safety DS) is the Safety Officer and acts as a resource 
to provide the Incident Commander with health and safety related information pertaining 
to the emergency. The Safety Officer makes determinations as to whether it is safe to 
approach the scene of the emergency, whether emergency responders may be putting 
themselves at risk by responding to the emergency, and offers recommendations on how 
to protect the health and safety of emergency responders during the response. 
 
• Public Information Officer (PIO) – The Director of Communications and Media 
Relations is the PIO and acts as the go-between for the Incident Commander and the 
media. All information coming from the scene of the emergency goes through the 
Incident Commander to the PIO before it is disseminated to the public or the media. 
 
 5. The EOC has been identified, and may be activated by the University President, 
Designee, or Senior Administrator, during an emergency. 
  
6. This plan embraces an "all-hazards" principle that most emergency response functions 
are similar, regardless of the hazard. The University will mobilize functions and 
personnel as required by the emergency situation. 
 
 7. Overall emergency operations will be directed from the EOC. The emergency field 
operations will be directed from an established ICP. 
 
By approval of the TAMUG president, the Emergency Operations Plan delegates the 
implementation of the plan to the Chain-of Command listed below: 
1. President  
2. Provost/ Senior Vice President  
3. Vice President for Academic Affairs 
4. TMA Superintendent  
5. Assistant Vice President of Student Affairs 
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Campus Incident Command Team  
 
Incident Command (ICT) Team 
This group provides overall leadership and guidance to the University community during 
an emergency or disaster. They may meet as a separate entity or elect to assemble the 
Campus Emergency Resource Team to assess the greater effect of the incident on the 
University. 
The ICT will meet at the Emergency Operations Center to better assess the emergency 
and determine response.  
 
During this time of assessment the ICT shall also be in contact with the Director of 
Safety, the University Police, and the Emergency Response Coordinator. This group will 
decide any appropriate immediate action deemed necessary to help stabilize the 
University during the emergency and future operations during the course of the 
emergency. 
The ICT will receive constant and current updated status reports from the EOC, 
University Police, and the Director of Safety at regular intervals or at the request for any 
additional information needed. 
 
The TAMUG Incident Command Team consists of the following: 
• President 
Advisor to the President 
• Senior Administrators 
          Provost/Senior Vice President  
          Vice President of Academic affairs 
    Superintendent of Texas Maritime Academy 
      Associate Vice President for Student Affairs 
 
 Director Information Services  
 Director of Communications and Media Relations 
 Emergency Response Coordinator 
 Chief of Police 
 Director of Safety 
 Director of Facilities Services  
 
 
 
RADM Robert Smith  C: ***-***-**** C: ***-***-**** 
MG Bill McClain  C: ***-***-**** 
Dr. Bill Seitz   C:  ***-***-**** H: ***-***-**** 
Mr. Grant Shallenberger  C: ***-***-**** H: ***-***-**** 
Dr. Donna Lang   C: ***-***-**** A: ***-***-**** 
RADM William Pickavance C:  ***-***-**** 
Mr. John Kovacevich   C: ***-***-****  
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Chief Sam Martinez  C:  ***-***-****  
Capt. Allan Post  C:  ***-***-**** 
Mr. David Watson  C:  ***-***-**** 
Cathy Cashio-Bertrand C:  ***-***-**** 
Will Heidel    C:  ***-***-**** 
Campus Police  C: ***-***-**** (after hours) 
    O: ***-***-**** (8-5 M-F) 
 
 Primary Contacts in the event of an emergency:  
 
Campus Police  C: ***-***-**** (after hours) 
    O: ***-***-**** (8-5 daily) 
Chief Sam Martinez  C:  ***-***-****  
 
C = Cell Number 
H = Home Number 
A = Alternate Number 
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Emergency Operations Center 
Emergency Operations Center Mission 
The Emergency Operations Center will function as the primary physical location for 
campus coordination and management of the crisis or emergency situation.  The 
authority and decision to activate the Emergency Operations Plan resulting in the 
opening of the Emergency Operations Center will follow the Chain of Command 
beginning with the President and CEO.  If the  President and CEO is unavailable, the 
administrator in charge will activate the plan: 
The Emergency Operations Center will remain operational until the President and CEO 
or administrator in charge declares the crisis or emergency incident to no longer be a 
threat to the campus and the campus is returned to normal operations. 
Coordination of center set up and operational support will be managed by the 
Emergency Response Coordinator and the Executive Administrative Coordinator.  Once 
established, administrative management of the center will revert to the Executive 
Administrative Coordinator. 
Emergency Operations Center Location 
 The primary EOC shall be located in the 340c of the Ocean and Coastal 
Studies Building, #3029, and shall be the base of operations 
 Secondary safe location RM 114 of Bldg. 3003 
 3rd safe location Wardroom of the T/S General Rudder 
 TAMU College Station ICC, General Services Building 
Facilities Planning suite.  Coordinate with TAMU VP 
Administration to activate. 
 A remote secure location has also been established with the 
City of Galveston office of Emergency Management should 
the need exist 
 The President and CEO or designee will lead the Incident Command 
Team and is solely responsible for making all decisions and 
statements concerning an evacuation of campus facilities.   
 In addition, the President and CEO is the only individual 
authorized to order re-entry on to campus property and the 
only authority offering media statements.   
 In the absence of the President and CEO, his designated 
representative shall assume these responsibilities. 
 The Emergency response Coordinator  will be responsible for 
administering the system and remaining fully informed as to the status 
of operations 
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Emergency Operations Center Evacuation 
 
Once the President and CEO or delegate decides an evacuation of the TAMUG Campus 
is required the Emergency Operations Center is relocated to TAMU College Station.  
The Executive Administrative Coordinator will depart TAMUG campus with 
Emergency Operations Center gear and set up operations in College Station at the 
designated location.   
Incident Command Team Members who will evacuate to College Station first and set up 
the College Station Emergency Operations Center are. 
President and CEO 
Executive Administrative Coordinator 
Secretary to the President 
Special Advisor to the President 
Communications Director  
Communications Specialist 
VP for Academic Affairs 
Associate VP for Student Affairs and Auxiliary service 
Director of Information Services  
Assistant to the Vice Presidents 
 
Incident Command Team Members who will remain on Campus to coordinate 
evacuation.   
The evacuation should be completed in no more than 8hrs from the time the order is 
given.  
 
Senior VP and CAO 
Emergency Response Coordinator 
Director Facilities Services 
Director of Student Affairs 
Chief of Police 
Safety Director 
Senior IS staff member 
Waterfront Operations BCIII 
 
Once the evacuation is complete and the campus is closed the remaining ICT members 
will evacuate to College Station as needed or appropriate.  
Emergency Operations Center Coordinator 
To better facilitate the operations of the Emergency Operations Center, the Executive 
Administrative Coordinator to the Office of the President will serve as the Emergency 
Operations Center Coordinator whose duties will include but are not limited to: 
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 Assisting with the administrative needs of the available Incident Command Team 
members located in the center. 
 Answering Emergency Operations Center phones, screening calls and directing 
the staff as needed. 
 Daily situation reports. 
 Copying and creating a filing system; filing.  
 Ordering food and beverages.  
 Recording minutes of daily meetings.  
 Coordinating communications with TAMU, TAMU System and any outside 
agencies such as Galveston EOC as required. 
 Staffing of the Emergency Operations Center as needed.  
 Maintaining an incident log as necessary of all activities. 
 Securing additional resources as required maintaining center operations.  
 Securing office supplies including batteries.  
The Emergency Operations Center Coordinator will also coordinate the acquisition and 
delivery of center equipment needs which includes but is not limited to: 
 Voice IP Phones and a satellite phone (to be provided by the Waterfront 
Operations). 
 Computers. 
 Walkie-Talkie radios (to be provided by the Waterfront Operations). 
 Copy and fax machine. 
 Basic office supplies. 
 Police 800 series radios (to be provided by Campus Police if available). 
 A generator to power radios (to be provided by Facilities Services). 
 Vehicles including trucks, cars, electric carts, gas-powered carts, boats and 
trailers. 
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Emergency Operations Center Organization 
 
The Emergency Operations Center operations will be under the leadership and direction 
of the President and CEO or the administrator in charge.  Access to the center will be 
controlled by the Campus Police.  Access is restricted to members of the Incident 
Command Team, their designated alternates and campus community members essential 
to the operations of the center. 
This plan has been developed based upon the structure of emergency management 
within the State of Texas. This plan serves as an emergency management link between 
TAMUG, the municipalities, and the County; and also coincides with the concepts of the 
National Response Plan. This plan employs a functional approach that groups the types 
of assistance that the University is likely to need based upon the twelve federal 
Emergency Support Functions (ESFs). The functional areas have been grouped 
according to the categories of the National Incident Management System (NIMS). 
 
COMMAND 
 
 Senior Administrators: 
    (President, Associate Provost, and Vice Presidents or Designee) 
   1. Declaration of emergency if the situation warrants. Overall Command of the 
Situation 
President and CEO:  The President and CEO or administrator in 
charge will take the lead in conveying the administration's response to the 
crisis, showing that the campus has control of the situation, calming 
public concern and providing leadership for the entire campus.   
Associate Provost and Chief Operating Officer:  Will be 
responsible for the logistical and tactical operations of the crisis response 
and recovery.  The Emergency Response Coordinator and the Associate 
Vice President for Student Affairs and Auxiliary Services will assist as 
directed.  These responsibilities include but are not limited to: 
1.Strategic and tactical planning and coordination of the response 
activities. 
2.Coordinating campus security efforts by the Campus Police and 
Facilities Services staff members to insure the campus perimeter and 
all campus facilities are secured.  
3.Directing Incident Command Team members who are on-site of the 
crisis or at the emergency location. 
4.Coordinating recovery efforts and restoration of campus operations 
after crisis has passed. 
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5.Assessing resource needs for response with Emergency Operations 
Center Coordinator. 
Vice President for Academic Affairs:   
During the crisis, the Vice President for Academic Affairs will 
provide guidance and leadership in the areas of academic affairs as the 
situation dictates.  He/she will be responsible for coordinating the 
restoration of all academic programs and activities following the crisis or 
emergency situation 
1. Coordinate class schedules and/or location changes. 
2. Coordinate the relocation of academic programs and activities away 
from areas affected by the crisis. 
3. Coordinate the relocation of academic courses and services to TAMU 
if necessary. 
4. Notifying and coordinating with external agencies regarding the 
disruption in academic activities. 
5. Coordinate the reallocation of financial aid and enrollment services as 
necessary 
 Emergency Response Coordinator 
    (Waterfront Operations Director) 
    1. Manages the overall University administrative response, manages NIMS 
        compliance and support 
    2. Works with the Administration and others in assessing the emergency and 
preparing   the University’s specific response. 
    3. Provides for CERT Communication and Coordination. 
    4. Establishes the EOC. 
 
 University Chief of Police 
    1. Coordinates the overall University emergency response. 
    2. Determines the type and magnitude of the emergency and implements the 
        appropriate emergency response. 
    3. Initiates immediate contact with the EOC and University administration, 
and begins assessment of the University’s condition. 
    4. Notifies University Police, Director of Safety and, if necessary, community 
leaders in order to maintain safety and order. 
    5. Notifies and conducts liaison activities with appropriate city, county and 
state organizations such as fire, police, state, and federal officials, etc. 
    6. Obtains the assistance of utility companies as required for 
emergency operations. 
    7. Ensures that appropriate notification is made to off-campus staff when 
        necessary. 
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    8. Performs other related duties as indicated by the campus emergency. 
 
 Director of Safety 
    1. Provide direct assistance to the President or the Emergency Response 
Coordinator and the Chief of Police in the areas of damage assessment, 
communicating with needed resource providers, coordinating recovery 
and restoration strategies in affected areas. 
    2. Identify spin-off hazards and vulnerabilities that may affect the 
University and its ability to effectively address the emergency or disaster. 
    3. Coordinate with all responders to ensure that all personnel are 
equipped with the appropriate Personnel Protective Equipment (PPE) necessary 
and are following safe working procedures in accordance to all State and Federal 
guidelines. 
 
 Director of Communication and Media Relations 
    1. Advises the President of all news reports concerning the emergency. 
    2. Establishes liaison with the news media for dissemination of information 
as requested by the President. 
    3. Establishes liaison with local radio and TV services for public information. 
    4. Prepares news releases for approval and release to the media concerning the 
emergency. 
    5. Establishes press conferences and news release information on a 
regularly scheduled basis during the emergency. 
    6. Establishes a press center and briefing room for all media. 
    7. Updates the status of the campus emergency on the TAMUG website under 
the emergency update section. 
    8. Arranges for photographic and audio-visual services. 
Operations 
 
A. Emergency Operations 
    (University Chief of Police) 
B. TAMUG Police 
1. Notify the University Administration of emergencies or disasters. 
2. Take immediate and appropriate action to protect life, property, and 
to safeguard records. 
3. Coordinate security and law enforcement services 
4. Establish security and protection of critical facilities, including the EOC 
5. Coordinate traffic and access control in and around affected areas. 
6. Assist as appropriate with route alerting and notification of threatened 
populations. 
7. Assist as appropriate with the evacuation of affected students, staff, 
or faculty, especially those who are immobilized or injured. 
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8. Conduct training exercises (Table-top, advanced table-top, and 
controlled drills) for police force in emergency management techniques, 
policies and procedures. 
 
C. Immediate Health Services 
Galveston EMS and Campus Emergency Response Team (CERT) 
1. Respond to the EOC or the field, as needed. 
2. Coordinate medical activities within campus, including triage. 
3. Coordinate medical services as needed to support shelter operations. 
4. Coordinate with Counseling Center as needed for support 
 
D. Communications Services 
    (Director of Information Services) 
    1. Coordinate the University website to post updates regarding the campus  
        emergency or disaster. 
    2. Coordinate staffing to complement all equipment utilized during the  
        emergency or disaster. 
    3. Arrange for separate lines of communication (computer, TV, and phone) to  
        be fully operational at all times at the EOC. These lines of communication  
        shall not be connected to, or in conjunction with, existing forms of  
        communication on campus. 
    4. Arrange for any additional communication equipment needed at the EOC. 
    5. Coordinate TAMUG computer technicians in their effort to re-establish  
        computer service on campus, if lost. 
 
E.  Associate Vice President for Research and Graduate Studies:   
 
1. Coordinating the relocation of research activities away from areas affected by the 
crisis. 
2. Coordinating the relocation of graduate study academic courses and services to 
TAMU if necessary. 
3. Notifying and coordinating with external agencies regarding the disruption in 
research activities. 
4. Coordinating needs of researchers who must relocate animal research specimens 
and collections.   
5. Notifying the Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee (IACUC) that 
deviations in animal oversight and control are being undertaken as a result of the 
crisis or emergency situation. 
6. Coordinating the removal of hazardous or radioactive materials with the 
TAMUG Safety Officer.  
 
F.  Superintendent Texas Maritime Academy 
 
1. Coordinating the relocation of the T/S General Rudder if necessary. 
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2. Coordinating use of the T/S General Rudder as a command and control or 
support platform during the crisis and recovery thereafter if needed. 
3. Notifying and coordinating with external agencies regarding the disruption in 
cadet teaching and training activities. 
4. Assessing impact of crisis to training and credentialing aspects of the maritime 
program. 
5. Coordinating all services needed to ensure efficient ship operations during the 
crisis or emergency situation. 
6. Identifying funds for recovery and restoration of the maritime program and if the 
T/S General Rudder is used. 
7. Organizing cadets as a support force when a decision is made to use them as 
volunteers during a crisis. 
 
Planning 
 
A. Emergency Response Coordinator (EOC) 
    1. Establish a University emergency management organization. 
    2. Provide for continuity of operations. 
    3. Establish lines of succession for key positions. 
    4. Prepare and maintain this EOP in collaboration with the local and County  
        Emergency Operations Plans. 
    5. Establish, an EOC. 
    6. Identify hazards and vulnerabilities that may affect the University and  
        municipalities in coordination with the municipal emergency management  
        agencies. 
    7. Identify resources within Galveston and adjoining counties that can be used to 
        respond to a major emergency or disaster situation. 
    8. Develop and maintain an on-going emergency Procedures for  
        the students, faculty, staff, and administration of TAMUG. 
 
B. Student Life Issues 
    (Associate Vice President for Student Affairs and Auxiliary Services) 
    1. Develop and maintain trained managers and staff who shall be available on short 
notice to assist with emergency and work in emergency or disaster or disaster. 
    2. Develop and maintain a team of student staff to be available for tasks such as 
posting information, running errands, driving shuttles, taking head counts in evacuations, 
and other duties as the emergency or disaster dictates. 
    3. Ensure that managers are available to coordinate residence hall evacuations if 
necessary. 
    4. Develop and maintain a housing staff designated to locate off-campus or on-campus 
housing for affected students. 
    5. Ensure that Residence Life Staff and others are available to assist with staffing 
phones and speaking with concerned parents. 
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C. Executive Director of Student Life 
    1. Oversees all areas of assessment, planning, and the collection and dissemination of 
information as it pertains to the students and their families. 
 
D. Director of Counseling  
 
    1. Ensures Psychological First Aid is available to students, staff, faculty and  
        administrators 
 
E. Associate Provost / Senior Vice President 
    1. Oversees the effort to collect, assemble, analyze, and disseminate  information in 
regards to available resources and their respective participation in relation to the 
restoration or continuation of academic functions. 
    2. Reviews resources available during the emergency or disaster and allocates 
accordingly to the needs of the University in effectively managing the emergency or 
disaster. 
 
F. Executive Administrative Coordinator  
    1. Coordinates the effort to collect, assemble, analyze, and disseminate information 
about an emergency and the necessary response and recovery operations, particularly to 
facilitate the provision of disaster assistance. 
    2. Reviews and ensures that the resource list and contact information is available for 
the EOC. 
    3. Tracks all resource participation and all available records incurred during the 
emergency or disaster. 
 
G. Human Resources 
    (Executive Director of Human Resources) 
    1. Compile information on all employees affected by the emergency or disaster 
incident. 
    2. Develop and maintain a support mechanism for all affected employees. 
    3. Coordinate the labor force, overtime costs, and obtain any temporary labor force, 
etc. 
    4. Provide any necessary counseling services. 
 
H. Department Heads  
    1. Distribute building evacuation information to all employees with follow- -
up discussions, on-the-job training or explanation as required. Contact Safety Office for 
assistance. 
    2. Schedule time that can be allowed for training employees in emergency techniques 
such as fire extinguisher usage, first aid, CPR and building evacuation procedures. 
Contact the Safety Office  for assistance. 
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    3. Consider alternative means of communication in the event of a utility failure. 
 
Logistics  
A. Damage, Repair, and Control 
    (Director of Facilities Services) 
    1. Provide equipment and personnel to perform shutdown procedures, hazardous area 
control, barricades, damage assessment, debris clearance, emergency repairs and 
equipment protection. 
    2. Provide vehicles, equipment, and operators for movement of personnel and 
supplies, assigns vehicles as required. 
    3. Furnish emergency power and lighting systems as required. 
    4. Survey habitable space and relocates essential services and functions. 
    5. Provide facilities for emergency generator fuel. 
    6. Provide storage of vital records at an alternate site. 
    7. Coordinate with building managers for liaison and necessary support. 
    8. Work in conjunction with others in writing a report assessing the  
        emergency and final outcome. 
 
B. Housing 
    (Assistant Director of Residence Life) 
    1. Provide for relocation of students displaced from their living quarters by the 
emergency or disaster. 
    2. Provide housing as needed for emergency workers who are required to remain on 
campus to provide assistance during the emergency or disaster. 
     
C. Food and Water 
    (Director of Dining Services) 
    1. Maintain an emergency inventory for a minimum of three days of food and water 
for TAMUG resident students. 
    2. Maintain a listing of food assets within the University and its suppliers. 
    3. Coordinate the dissemination of information and supplies to the food community 
within the surrounding communities. 
    4. Coordinate the distribution of food to emergency workers and emergency/disaster 
victims. 
    5. Develop and maintain written agreements on emergency food and water delivery by 
the University’s suppliers. These agreements will call for a minimum of one (1) 
truckload each of individual bottles of drinking water, gallon size bottled water, and non-
perishable foods. These are to be delivered to the University upon request by the 
University during an emergency or disaster. 
 
D. Building/s with incident 
    (Assistant Director of Facilities Services) 
    1. Provide assessment of all structural and non-structural damage to the building(s). 
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    2. Coordinate emergency repairs to mitigate damage to the facility. 
    3. Safely salvage all capital assets (files and equipment) and relocate to a safe 
location. 
    4. Shut off all utilities to the facility. 
    5. Assist with the furnishing of emergency power and utility service to facility as 
practical. 
    6. Secure the facility as best as the emergency or disaster will allow. 
 
Finance  
 
A. Vice President for Finance 
1. Assess any and all financial damage, if any, immediately affecting 
the University. This is especially important in a cyber attack on the campus. 
2. Facilitate, allocate, and release funding for the emergency procurement of 
materials and supplies as needed. 
3. Develop and maintain a list of all state contracts that may be needed in the event 
of an emergency or disaster. 
4. Apply for federal post-disaster funds, as available.  
5. Insuring the continuation of payroll services and accounts payable during and 
after the crisis. 
6. Assessing fund balances in relation to clean up and recovery costs following the 
crisis. 
7. Coordinating business continuity activities with the TAMU Vice President for 
Finance and Comptroller’s Office. 
Incident Command Team Initial Activities 
 
Once convened, the available Incident Command Team members will:  
 Immediately consider which other individuals may need to be added to the team 
to manage the crisis at hand. 
 Review details of the crisis.  
 Determine further/ongoing crisis management and response activities. 
 Identify target audiences and determine communications strategy.  
 Specify communication procedures to internal and external. Constituencies.  
 Prepare communications brief for TAMU and TAMU System. 
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Incident Command Team General Procedures  
 All members of the Incident Command Team will designate a backup who will 
be available to respond to a crisis situation at all times.  All backup members will 
remain on standby/alert for the duration of the crisis.  
 The Director of Media Relations and Communications will remain in the 
Emergency Operations Center when not in the media center and will collect and 
coordinate the information provided by members of the Incident Command Team 
and others across campus who are engaged in managing or resolving the crisis.  
The Emergency Operations Center Coordinator will document all information 
provided along with the time and person reporting.  When relocating to College 
Station the Director of Media Relations and Communications will work with the 
TAMU VP of Administration to set up a media center. 
 All members of the Incident Command Team will assess staffing and resources 
needs associated with responding to the crisis and recovery. 
 Should the Emergency Operations Center relocate to TAMU, the Emergency 
Operations Center Coordinator will collaborate with the TAMU Vice President 
for Administration in activating the TAMU site, if necessary providing 
information to TAMUG campus community members who are relocating to 
College Station and securing housing for those relocating.  Executive 
Administrative Coordinator will immediately book hotel rooms in CS for 
arriving ICT members.  
 If external agencies (i.e. local police, fire and EMS) are integrated into the 
Emergency Operations Center operations, space within or adjacent to the 
Emergency Operations Center will be provided to such agencies for required 
logistical and communication support. 
 
Staffing During Emergency Response/Adverse Conditions  
 
During an emergency, it may become necessary to suspend routine campus operations and 
move to emergency response status.  Under such circumstances, all essential employees are 
expected to report to and/or remain at work to sustain services and protect campus assets.  In 
doing so, the following procedures will be followed: 
 
 The Incident Command Team will direct all actions during the emergency 
 No faculty or staff member will be allowed to leave campus until released by his/her 
supervisor 
 
Remaining at Work/Time Reporting 
o During a declared emergency time will be recorded as: 
 Regular time worked and any applicable overtime 
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 Administrative leave will be granted for each hour worked to be taken 
within 180 days of accrual and approved by the supervisor 
 Employees released from work should not expect to use TAMUG facilities as a shelter 
for themselves or their dependents during an emergency 
 Non-benefit eligible employees will not be eligible for Administrative Leave 
 
Order to Re-open Campus/Return to Work Notification 
o Once employees are released from work by his/her supervisor, campus 
employees should monitor local news media and the campus website 
www.tamug.edu for information on when the campus will re-open and when 
employees should return to work 
o The Office of the President and CEO will determine when to re-open the 
campus  
o The media will be asked to announce that the campus has been re-opened and 
normal operations resumed or an evacuation is ordered 
o Voice mail numbers in College Station and Galveston will be available to 
provide up-to-date information regarding the re-opening of campus.  The 
campus website will also provide this information: 
 (409) 740-4545 
 (979) 862-8245  
 www.tamug.edu 
 Radio/Television Station 
 KHOU -TV Channel 11 
 KTRK -TV  Channel 13 
 KTRH – Radio 740 AM 
o Failure of an employee to return to work as instructed by his/her supervisor or 
the President and CEO once the campus is reopened may result in disciplinary 
action to include termination in accordance with campus rules and System 
regulations 
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Campus Closure Protocols  
 
Authority to Close Campus 
 
Authority and decision to close the TAMUG campus will follow the Chain of Command 
beginning with the President and CEO.  The President and CEO or administrator in charge will 
approve the message and use of Sea Aggie Alert and SchoolClosings.us whenever possible.  If 
the President and CEO is unavailable, the administrator in charge will initiate the campus closure 
and notification protocols. 
 
However, if time is of the essence, any administrator in the Chain of Action is permitted to send 
an Sea Aggie Alert and/or SchoolClosings.us message without prior consent should the situation 
warrant immediate notification. 
 
Notification Process – Chain of Action 
 
The Chain of Action for sending Sea Aggie Alert and SchoolClosings.org is as follows: 
 
 Capt. Allan Post       C: ***-***-**** 
 John Kovacevich, Int. Director, IS H: ***-***-**** C: ***-***-**** 
 Sam Martinez, Chief of Police  H: ***-***-**** C: ***-***-**** 
Grant Shallenberger, AVPSA&AS  H: ***-***-**** C: ***-***-**** 
 
Campus closures will be based on the following: 
 
Severe Weather (Hurricanes/Tornado/Flood) 
Chemical Release at Refinery 
Chemical/Radiation Spill 
Impending Danger 
 
It is incumbent upon all TAMUG campus members to register for Sea Aggie Alert through the 
TAMUG website at www.tamug.edu or www.Sea Aggie Alert.com/my/tamug/signup.htm 
 
In the event of a crisis or emergency situation, campus members will be notified immediately via 
the Sea Aggie Alert and SchoolClosings.us systems by the Emergency Response Coordinator.  If 
the ERC is not available, the next administrator in the Chain of Action will initiate the message.  
Any administrator in the Chain of Action is permitted to send an Sea Aggie Alert and/or 
SchoolClosings.us message without prior consent should the situation warrant immediate 
notification. 
 
Website Update 
 
The website will be updated by the IS Director or designee who will provide updates at least 
every four hours as the crisis or emergency persists.   
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Authority to Re-Open Campus 
 
The authority and decision to re-open the TAMUG campus will follow the campus 
Emergency Response Plan Chain of Command protocols as initiated by the President and 
CEO.  If the President and CEO is unavailable, the administrator in charge will initiate the 
campus re-opening notification procedures. 
 
All campus members will be notified to return to campus via the Sea Aggie Alert and 
SchoolClosings.org systems as well as by postings on the campus website.     
 
Additional Information 
 
 All campus employees will be advised to contact their supervisors for specific information 
about reporting to work.   
 Information updates to the Campus Website will be provided at least every four hours or as 
determined by the President and CEO or administrator in charge. 
 All external local government agencies (City Mayor, County Judge, etc.) will be notified of 
any developments with the crisis or emergency situation as soon as possible. 
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SECTION 2. TAMUG Business Continuity Plan 
 
The TAMUG Long-Term Recovery and Business Continuity Plan is based upon the concept that 
the TAMUG campus will be closed for at least the remainder of one semester to an indefinite 
period of time.  The focus of the plan is the relocation of students, faculty and staff to the 
Bryan/College Station area and the resumption of classes and services on the TAMU campus.  
The Short-Term Recovery plan focuses on the time the campus will be closed but will not 
require the relocation of students, faculty and staff to College Station. 
  
Objective – TAMU College Station will accommodate all currently enrolled students, courses, 
campus services, and research from the Galveston campus 
 
Concept of Operations – If determined necessary and appropriate. TAMUG students, 
faculty, and available staff will relocate to TAMU for the remainder of the semester and 
subsequent semesters.  TAMUG and TAMU faculty, staff, and services will work in tandem to 
educate students, provide housing and food, and maintain faculty research.  Behind the scenes 
operations, such as student record management and billing for services, appear seamless to 
Galveston students. 
 
Employee Actions  
 
The University will designate prior to the start of Hurricane Season June 1st employees 
who are essential to the campus.  These employees will be designated Tier I and Tier II.  
At the declaration of evacuation these persons must check in with their supervisor to 
enact the evacuation plan and to prepare for the recovery phase as well.  All Tier I and 
Tier II employees must report to the work location, date and time designated by the 
Incident Command Team and disseminated by respective department heads and 
supervisors.  Failure to check- in and report for work at the designated place, date, and 
time will be reviewed and may result in disciplinary action.  
 
It is vital that all Tier III non-essential TAMUG employees must monitor the TAMUG 
website www.tamug.edu , email, and news media while evacuated.  When the decision 
has been made to enact the business continuity plan and re-open TAMUG (either at 
Pelican Island campus, hosted at TAMU College Station or another designated venue) it 
will be announced and posted.  Return to work instructions and contact information will 
be made available by department on the website www.tamug.edu.  A hotline phone 
number will be created and disseminated by Sea Aggie Alert for all employees to call 
and check on their return to work status.   At that time all employees must check in with 
their supervisors to be given return to work instructions.   
 
All employees must report to the work location, date and time designated by the Incident 
Command Team and disseminated by respective department heads and supervisors.  
Failure to check- in and report for work at the designated place, date, and time will be 
reviewed and may result in disciplinary action.  
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Evacuation 
Pre-Storm  
The order to evacuate the campus will be given by the President and CEO or designee at which 
time the campus Emergency Operations Plan will be implemented: 
 
Announcements will be communicated through department heads to their personnel and 
students, campus AggNews, voice mail, Sea Aggie Alert and the Houston/TAMUG area media.  
Campus occupants will be ordered to evacuate the campus at least 72 hours prior to projected 
arrival of Tropical Storm Force Winds.    
TAMUG does not have a rental fleet available to transport students to College Station.  A 
TAMU shuttle bus will be dispatched to Galveston to transport TAMUG students that had no 
transportation to College Station at TAMUG’s request.  Or TAMUG will have use of some 
TAMU vehicles if needed.   
 
Students with no transportation and no destination – These students will be evacuated by 
TAMUG to TAMU, utilizing TAMU transportation services.   Note: Historically, this group has 
never been more than 10-15 students. 
 
The protocols established in the Long-Term Recovery and Business Continuity plan 
between equivalent TAMUG and TAMU departments regarding continuity of services 
following a hurricane will be observed in the event of any unforeseen circumstances.  
All employment actions as the result of a hurricane are governed by TAMUG, TAMU, 
and System Personnel Policies in addition to State and Federal employment laws.   
 
The activation of the Short-Term Recovery phase of the plan will be determined by the 
President and CEO or designee based on the assessed condition of the campus and the 
projected requirements for reopening within a reasonable period of time. 
 
Short-Term Recovery Plan (Campus down time:  7-10 days) 
 
College Station Staff Contingent 
 
Once the TAMUG campus is evacuated, the following members of the Incident Command Team 
will relocate to the General Services Building on the TAMU campus to set up the TAMUG 
Emergency Operations Center and conduct operations pre and post-storm: 
 
President and CEO 
Executive Administrative Coordinator 
Secretary to the President 
Special Advisor to the President 
Communications Director  
Communications Specialist 
VP for Academic Affairs 
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Associate VP for Student Affairs and Auxiliary service 
Director of Information Services  
Assistant to the Vice Presidents 
Support Staff Contingent 
 
Supervision and oversight of evacuated students and camp children in  
College Station will be provided by the Office of Student Affairs and Outreach.  Essential 
support staff will be asked to relocate to College Station to provide these services.     
Members of these departments will be in continuous communication with the Command Post. 
TAMUG Staff Contingent 
 
Senior TAMUG Campus Police Officers and the campus Safety Officer will remain in TAMUG 
in a designated safe location throughout the storm, evacuating only if required by city/county 
government 
Phased Return to TAMUG 
 
Initial Return:  Once local authorities determine it is safe for essential personnel to return to 
Galveston Island and the Galveston Causeway is re-opened, the following protocols will be 
followed by TAMUG: 
 
In order to be allowed entry across the Galveston Island Causeway all responders must have 
TAMUG photo ID with a responder designation on it.  This ID must match the photo of the ID 
that checkpoint officers will have of TAMUG first responders. 
Tier I:  First Responders 
 
•  All TAMUG personnel designated as Tier I:  First Responders are required to return to 
campus when notified. 
 •  All remaining TAMUG Campus Police will return to campus to provide perimeter 
security.  Texas National Guard may be requested to assist if necessary and available. 
• The designated members of the Campus Incident Command Team will return to 
campus to assess conditions and begin the campus restoration process.  This team will 
consist of the following personnel: 
- Allan Post, Waterfront Operations Director, Campus Emergency Response 
Coordinator  
- Grant Shallenberger, Assistant Vice President for Student Affairs  
- Will Heidel, Director, Facilities Services  
- Sam Martinez, Chief of Police 
- Dave Watson, Campus Safety Officer 
•  The Campus Safety Officer will be responsible for assessing the overall safety of the 
campus and determining areas of accessibility. 
•  Essential Facilities Services and Waterfront Operations staff will return to begin 
damage assessment and initial campus clean up. 
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•  Auxiliary Services staff members will be notified to return to campus to provide 
assistance in the clean-up of auxiliary operations areas and begin providing initial 
services such as dining facility operations and residents housing.  
 
Tier II:  Essential Personnel 
 
Campus Incident Command Team members on campus in collaboration with the President 
and CEO will determine when the campus is safe for all faculty and staff to return prior to 
re-opening campus for classes.  In doing so, each department head will be notified that 
he/she is to contact all department personnel regarding the designated return date and time.  
This information will also be communicated via the TAMUG website that is maintained in 
the Command Post, Sea Aggie Alert and through local media.   
 
•  All TAMUG personnel designated as Tier II:  Essential Personnel are required to 
return to campus when notified. 
•  All employees will be expected to return to their positions by the designated date and 
time.  Failure to do so will result in disciplinary action unless approved by the 
department head.   
•  At this time the Command Post in College Station will be reduced to a skeleton crew 
that will coordinate the closure of the Command Post and conduct after action reviews 
of the hurricane with TAMU personnel.  
•  Normal operations will resume at TAMUG prior to the official re-opening of campus.   
•  Auxiliary services will open to provide services for  returning on-campus residents 
prior to the re-opening of campus. 
 
Re-Opening of Campus:  The President and CEO will announce the date and time in which the 
campus will re-open for classes.  At This announcement will follow the resumption of normal 
campus operations. 
 
 •  All TAMUG personnel designated as Tier III:  Non-Essential Personnel are required 
to return to campus when notified. 
•  Students will be notified to return to campus via the campus website and local  media. 
•  Once the campus is re-opened the Command Post will be closed and all media, parent 
and other external inquiries will be directed to the Director of Communications at 
TAMUG. 
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Medium-Term Plan (Campus down time:  11- 45 days) 
 
College Station Staff Contingent 
 
Command Post operations in College Station will be expanded to include essential personnel in 
Student Affairs, Academic Services, IT Communications, and Financial Management Services.  
Continuation of these services will be determined according to protocols established by TAMUG 
and TAMU.  Supervision for students and camp children evacuated to College Station will be 
coordinated through the Command Post with Student Affairs and Outreach personnel. 
Phased Return to TAMUG 
Tier I:  First Responders 
 
Once local authorities determine it is safe for essential personnel to return to Galveston Island, 
the following protocols will be followed by TAMUG: 
 
•  All remaining TAMUG Campus Police will return to campus to provide parameter
    security.  Texas National Guard may be requested to assist if necessary and 
available. 
•  The Campus Command Team will return to campus to assess conditions and begin the 
campus restoration process.  This team will function as the on-site administrative body 
for the campus. 
•  Essential personnel including Facilities Services and Waterfront Operations staff, IT 
Communications, Auxiliary Services and key support staff will be asked to return to 
help identify the resources needed and provide operational support for renovation, 
repair and clean up of the campus. 
•  Should the campus be deemed uninhabitable for an extended period of time, System 
personnel polices and protocols established in collaboration with TAMU will be 
followed. 
 
Tier II:  Essential Personnel 
 
The Campus Incident Command Team will coordinate the secondary return of Tier II:  Essential 
Personnel through the Command Post at TAMU on an as-needed basis.  Tier II:  Essential 
Personnel may be called upon to assist with a phased re-opening of the campus once 
infrastructure repairs are completed and various campus operations are resumed.  Personnel not 
participating in the clean up and repair process or those who have not been requested to return by 
their immediate supervisors, will not be allowed to return to campus until further notice.  
   
Partial and Official Re-Opening of Campus:  The President and CEO will announce the date and 
time in which the campus will re-open for classes.  This announcement will follow the 
resumption of partial campus operations.  At this time all Tier III:  Non-Essential Personnel will 
return to campus. 
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Long-Term Recovery and Business Continuity Plan (Campus down time:  Beyond 45 
days) 
 
College Station Staff Contingent 
 
In the event the campus is unable to reopen within 45 days of the hurricane or is immediately 
determined to be closed for an indefinite period of time by the assessment team, the Command 
Post operations in College Station will transition back into the TAMUG Executive Team and 
will activate the Long-Term Recovery and Business Continuity Plan in accordance with the post-
hurricane protocols established through the mutual agreement between TAMU and TAMUG. 
Relocation – Students 
 
Responsible Parites 
TAMU Lead Position:   Associate Provost and Dean of Undergraduate Programs or 
Designate 
TAMUG Lead Position:  Director of Student Life 
 
Assembly 
 
TAMU Lead Position:   Associate Provost and Dean of Undergraduate Programs or 
Designate 
TAMUG Lead Position: Assistant Vice President for Student Affairs & Auxiliary 
Services or Delegate 
 
1) Students will be directed to a central location upon arrival to TAMU for information and 
instructions. 
2) One location will be designated and set-up for registration and student service 
information/enrollment, billing, financial aid, and new or adjusted ID card. 
3) One welcome program, or similar event, will be scheduled for students and family 
members.  The program will feature TAMUG and TAMU leadership, “familiar faces,” 
and information 
4) Program should be offered once, at a time when the majority of students have arrived at 
TAMU 
 
Student ID Services – Responsible Parties 
 
TAMU Lead Position:  Aggie Card Office Manager 
TAMUG Lead Position:  Executive Director of Enrollment Services 
 
All TAMUG students relocating to TAMU and living in the residence halls and dining on 
campus will have IDs (provide description of the student ID service at TAMUG) 
 
1) TAMU ID Services will issue TAMUG students with Guest Student Identification Cards. 
a) TAMUG students will be instructed where to get new ID Card 
b) TAMU ID Card Services will coordinate access needs with appropriate TAMU services 
 457 
 
 
Housing – Responsible Parties 
TAMU Lead Position: On Campus Housing – Director of Residence Life or designate 
 Off Campus Housing – Director of Student Life or designate 
 Corps of Cadets - Commandant or designate 
TAMUG Lead Position: Assistant Vice President for Student Affairs & Auxiliary 
Services or Delegate 
 
Given TAMU will not have on-campus housing to accommodate all of the students that are 
displaced by the disaster, TAMU will provide accommodations in the TAMU residence halls for 
as many TAMUG students as possible including limited linens, at a minimal fee.  Additional 
housing needs will be assessed and accommodated as the need arises.   
 
All Galveston students relocated to the TAMU residence halls will be issued a student I.D for 
residence hall room access.   
 
Food Services – Responsible Parties 
 
TAMU Lead Position:  Interim Director of Food Services 
TAMUG Lead Position:  Director of Food Services 
 
All Galveston students will have a student ID card that is bar-coded for food service facility 
access.   
 
1) Short-term Solution – TAMU Food Services can provide Conference meal cards as a short-
term solution or an immediate interim solution.  Internally numbered cards would be issued 
to correspond with the student's name and UIN. The amount of meals placed on cards can be 
determined by the projected possible length of time for stay. Additional meals could be 
added as needed. Information can then be provided on how many meals total as well as 
time(s) and location(s) a student dined on the College Station campus. 
 
2) Any special dining arrangements can be made for students on a case-by-case basis.   
 
3) TAMUG students with existing meal plan – TAMUG Food Services and TAMU Campus 
Dining Office will utilize names, UINs, and individual student meal history to transfer 
unused meals from TAMUG plans to TAMU Food Services.   
 
4) New Meal Plans – The sale of entirely new TAMU Food Services’ meal plans will be 
handled just as those for current students and function as is currently published.  
 
5) Additional Information – Locations for dining will be based on hours of availability and 
areas designated for stay, if appropriate.  Location of housing does not necessarily need to be 
a priority in arranging meals and providing on campus services for meal use through 
Conference Cards or meal plans. However, some decisions for determining dining locations 
may be needed due to circumstances directly related to the emergency situation or other 
possible criteria, such as meal requirements for TAMUG members of the Corps of Cadets. 
Meals can be designated as limited to certain areas or locations, such as using the “all-you-
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care-to eat” facilities Duncan and Sbisa, or be permitted to work as current student meal 
plans with eat on campus “anywhere any time” choices. 
 
International Students – Responsible Parties 
 
TAMU Lead Position:        International Programs Office – International Student Services 
(ISS) (979) 845-1824 or 1825 
TAMUG Lead Position:  Assistant Director for Diversity  (409) 740-4582 
 
1) Overall Issues: 
a) U.S. and foreign documents 
i) If at all possible, international students, faculty, and scholars should take with them 
all original U.S. and foreign documents (e.g. passport, I-94 card, etc.) for themselves 
and accompanying dependents. 
ii) If these are lost or irretrievable, TAMU International Student Services (ISS) can 
assist in obtaining replacement documents. 
b) Undocumented alien students should check in with ISS to receive advising about 
potential options (e.g. HB 1403). 
 
2) Immigration Issues for Students 
a) All enrolled international students at TAMUG are issued documents by and/or 
monitored by ISS already, so there should be no major immigration issues, as long as 
students continue to follow all regulations governing their visa type (e.g. enroll full time, 
maintaining accurate addresses in SEVIS, etc). 
b) TAMUG officials will maintain a headcount and contact with TAMUG international 
students so their location and addresses can be updated immediately in SEVIS as per 
federal regulations if they must leave Galveston. Students leaving the U.S. must contact 
ISS prior to their departure. 
 
3) Other Issues for International Students 
a) Assistance in evacuating TAMUG international students to College Station will be 
provided for those students who may be without cars. 
b) ISS will provide nationality contacts in College Station to assist with housing relocation 
of TAMUG international students, if necessary. 
c) TAMUG international students should carry ISS emergency contact cards in case they 
need access to an ISS advisor in emergency circumstances. 
d) ISS and TAMUG will have emergency contact information for all international students 
e) TAMUG staff will contact an ISS staff member to assist with an international student’s 
death or other emergency medical situation.  The ISS emergency phone number is 979-
255-6005 and is manned by an ISS advisor 24/7/365.  Galveston staff should feel 
comfortable calling that number in any emergency situation. 
 
Parking and Transportation – Responsible Parties 
 
TAMU Lead Position:  Associate Director, Transportation Services 
TAMUG Lead Position:  ExecutiveDirector of Student Affairs 
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TAMUG students taking a vehicle to campus are required to purchase a hang tag and display the 
tag from the rear view mirror.   
 
1) Identify temporary and permanent (length of stay) parking areas for students living both 
on campus and off campus 
2) Transfer student parking data from TAMUG to TAMU 
3) If possible, utilize the TAMUG hang tag as the student’s permit in College Station.  
Determine cost, if any, to students needing parking at TAMU who did not have parking 
at TAMUG 
4) Because TAMUG does not have a shuttle bus system, students will need an orientation 
to both the off campus and on campus bus systems. 
5) Because TAMUG students will not have paid the Transportation Fee at TAMU, a 
determination will be made by TAMU and TAMUG officials as to the applicability of 
any costs for TAMUG students to access shuttle bus services at TAMU. 
 
Orientation – Responsible Parties 
 
TAMU Lead Position:    Director of Student Life or designate 
TAMUG Lead Position: Vice President for Student Affairs & Auxiliary Services or 
Delegate 
 
1) Students will be provided with an orientation session and campus tours prior to 
beginning classes at TAMU if possible. 
 
 
Relocation – Faculty and Staff 
 
Assembly 
 
TAMU Lead Position:    Dean of Faculty (for faculty) 
    Employee Services (for staff) 
TAMUG Lead Position: Associate Vice President for Academic Affairs or Delegate 
 
1) Faculty and staff will be directed to a central location upon arrival to TAMU for 
information and instructions on office location, research labs, teaching assignments, job 
responsibilities. 
2) One welcome program, or similar event, will be scheduled for faculty and staff. The 
program will feature TAMUG and TAMU leadership, “familiar faces,” and information 
3) Faculty and staff will be encouraged to attend the welcome program scheduled for 
students.  
 
Housing – Responsible Parties 
 
TAMU Lead Position:  Employee Services 
TAMUG Lead Position:  Director of Human Resources or Delegate 
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Faculty will follow evacuation procedures and will be provided with TAMUG contact 
information for updates on status of facilities and semester courses.  It will be each faculty 
member’s responsibility to access the TAMUG update information and adhere to the timeframe 
for arrival at the TAMU campus.  Communication will follow the TAMU Emergency 
Communication procedures (Add LINK). 
 
Faculty and staff members may need temporary or permanent (for length of stay) housing in the 
College Station area in order to maintain their responsibilities with TAMUG.  Coordination of 
available housing will be provided through Student Affairs Off Campus Housing to identify 
community resources for impacted faculty and staff. 
 
1) A central location for information and referrals for housing will be established at TAMU 
2) The TAMUG point of contact will include information on housing options in the 
College Station area 
3) TAMU and TAMUG will work together to coordinate short-term and temporary housing 
with flexibility in length of lease. 
 
International Faculty – Responsible Party 
 
TAMU Lead Position:     International Programs Office (IPO) – International Faculty and 
Scholar Services (IFSS) (979) 862-1719 
TAMUG Lead Position: Human Resources Department (979) 740- 4532 
 
1) Overall Issues 
a. U.S. and foreign documents 
i. International faculty and scholars will bring with them all original U.S. 
and foreign documents (e.g. passport, I-94 card, etc.) for themselves and 
accompanying dependents. 
ii. If these are lost or irretrievable, IFSS can assist in obtaining replacement 
documents. 
b. International faculty and scholars will report to IFSS for advice on how to 
proceed with their continued employment 
 
2) Immigration Issues for Faculty 
a. International faculty and scholars will be required to update their addresses and 
contact information on TAMU H.R. Connect.  In addition they will provide 
IFSS with notice of change of address and file Form AR-11 with the United 
States Citizenship & Immigration Service (USCIS) once they have an address 
that can be used for more than 30 days. If the international faculty and/or scholar 
has a pending case with USCIS they will need to call the USCIS customer 
service at 1-800-375-5283 to update their addresses. 
b. Each International Faculty or scholar will be responsible for contacting IFSS for 
assistance to prevent jeopardizing their immigration status.  Determinations will 
be made on a case-by-case basis depending on the length and seriousness of the 
evacuation. 
c. J-1 scholars may need a new DS-2019 indicating a location change. SEVIS 
records will need to be updated with change of personal address and work 
location information 
 461 
 
d. H visa holders may need wage adjustments to comply with labor laws and the 
refilling of an LCA and a new H-1B petition 
 
3) Other Issues for International Faculty 
a. IFSS can provide nationality contacts in College Station to assist in housing 
relocation of TAMUG international faculty and scholars if necessary. 
b. TAMUG-HR will facilitate reporting of its own emergency contact information, 
in accordance with TAMUG evacuation plans, to their international faculty, 
scholars and employing department heads in case of death or emergency 
medical situation of an international faculty or scholar. IFSS, however, will 
provide assistance to TAMUG-HR by means of facilitating the following 
support telephone number 979-862-1920 for the above stated emergency 
contact. 
 
Parking and Transportation Services – Responsible Parties 
 
TAMU Lead Position:  Associate Director, Transportation Services 
TAMUG Lead Position:  Executive Director of  Human Resources  
 
1) Provide information on temporary parking for TAMUG faculty relocating to TAMU 
campus 
2) Identify permanent parking location for TAMUG faculty on the campus of TAMU 
3) Develop method for communicating parking information to relocated TAMUG faculty, 
either through central location or through Zone Administrators and/or department 
contacts. 
4) Orient TAMUG relocated faculty to the TAMU shuttle bus systems 
 
Faculty and Staff ID Cards – Responsible Parties 
 
TAMU Lead Position:  Aggie Card Office Manager 
TAMUG Lead Position:  Director of Human Resources or Delegate 
All TAMUG Faculty and staff relocating to TAMU and living in the residence halls and/or 
dining on campus will have IDs (provide description of the student ID service at TAMUG) 
 
1) TAMU ID Services will issue TAMUG Faculty and staff Guest Identification Cards 
a) TAMUG Faculty and staff will be instructed where to get new ID Card 
b) TAMU ID Card Services will coordinate access needs with appropriate TAMU services 
 
Faculty and Staff Office Space – Responsible Parties 
 
TAMU Lead Position:    Deans or designee 
TAMUG Lead Position: Vice President for Academic Affairs 
 
Faculty Research – Responsible Parties 
 
TAMU Lead Position:    Vice President of Research 
TAMUG Lead Position: Associate Vice President for Research & Development 
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Employee Assistance Services- Responsible Parties 
 
TAMU Lead Position: Employee Services - Faculty and Staff Counseling Services 
(979) 845-3711 
TAMUG Lead Position:  Director of Human Resources or Delegate 
 
1) TAMU will act as liaison to TAMUG Employee Assistance Services 
2) TAMU will provide TAMUG faculty and staff access to TAMU services 
3) TAMU will coordinate and respond to request for counseling including crisis 
intervention and referrals for specialized care and follow-up.  Faculty and Staff 
Counseling Services psychologists may service in declared shelters and other locations 
to provide services to evacuees and shelter support personnel 
 
Student Services 
 
Student Medical Services – Responsible Parties 
 
TAMU Lead Position:  Director of Student Health Service or designate 
TAMUG Lead Position: Assistant Vice President for Student Affairs & Auxiliary 
Services or Delegate 
 
1) TAMUG students will be given access to A.P. Beutel Health Center and its services, 
including the pharmacy. 
2) TAMUG students will receive information on the services at the Health Center and how 
they can access those services 
 
Student Counseling Services – Responsible Parties 
 
TAMU Lead Position: Director of Student Counseling Services or designate 
TAMUG Lead Position:   Director of Counseling or Delegate 
 
The Galveston Offices of Counseling and Career Planning & Placement are responsible for a 
number of student services provided by three professional staff.  All three are either licensed 
professional counselors (LPC) or LPC interns.  Primary areas of responsibility include personal 
counseling, educational counseling, services to students with disabilities, career planning and 
placement services, and providing related student programs.  Secondary responsibilities include 
assisting TAMUG international students, acting as liaison to our contracted medical service 
provider and overseeing our health and wellness initiatives. 
 
If classes resume in College Station, it is essential that TAMUG students have ready and 
immediate access to TAMUG counselors early during the relocation period – especially those 
that were receiving services prior to the relocation.  Ideally, this access would be available in the 
main assembly area.  In addition, a secure location will be needed to maintain confidential 
student files.  In doing so, TAMU will: 
 
1) Provide immediate and public access to information on counseling services to TAMUG 
students 
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2) If possible, have TAMUG counseling staff visible and available to students as they 
arrive on campus and proceed with relocation process. 
3) Provide TAMUG students access to TAMU services. 
4) Provide TAMUG counseling staff with appropriate and secure office space on TAMU 
campus. 
5) Locate secure storage for confidential student counseling files that is accessible to 
counseling staff 
6) Utilize TAMU Counseling Service if counseling services are beyond the capacity of the 
TAMUG staff 
 
Services for Students with Disabilities – Responsible Parties 
 
TAMU Lead Position: Director of Disability Services or designate 
TAMUG Lead Position:  Director of Counseling or Delegate 
 
The TAMUG Counseling Office handles the responsibility of providing services to students with 
disabilities. 
 
1) TAMU will honor the accommodations determined by TAMUG’s Counseling Office 
staff and provide all accommodations supported by the student’s documentation 
2) TAMU will generate the accommodation letters for any students who were receiving 
accommodations and services through TAMUG’s disability services at the time of the 
evacuation. 
 
Career Services – Responsible Parties 
 
TAMU Lead Position: Executive Director, Career Center 
TAMUG Lead Position:   Director of Career Planning & Placement or Delegate 
 
An office identity for TAMUG students seeking career services will be maintained.  Due to the 
unique nature of TAMUG’s academic programs and the maritime academy, TAMUG staff must 
be on hand and have available space to conduct employer meetings and interviews.  In doing so, 
TAMU will:   
 
1) Provide TAMUG students access to TAMU Career Services 
2) Allow Galveston students to pay a career services fee to register for TAMU career 
services 
 
Student Financial Aid – Responsible Parties 
 
TAMU Lead Position: Assistant Provost for Student Financial Aid 
TAMUG Lead Position:  Executive Director of Enrollment Services 
 
Because TAMUG is a branch campus of TAMU, all federal financial aid applications (FAFSAs) 
are sent to the main campus, and program funding is part of the allocation to the main campus.  
All state financial aid programs are allocated independently and directly to each campus, but 
TAMU has access to TAMUG’s state financial aid programs in COMPASS and FAMIS. 
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In the event of a hurricane that temporarily disrupts processing at the Galveston campus, the 
Department of Student Financial Aid at TAMU is prepared to provide office space for TAMUG 
financial aid staff and/or take over processing of TAMUG financial aid.  Therefore, under 
emergency conditions, TAMU’s Department of Student Financial Aid will become the 
responsible office should TAMUG operations be diTAMUGpted. 
 
1) Emergency Funding for Short Term Needs 
a) Short Term Loans – The first, and easiest to accommodate, is the short term loan 
programs.  Through a manual process, TAMUG students could apply for and receive 
funds same day.  These funds would need to be repaid, but would provide immediate 
relief.  This option also would not impact aid packages that may have already been 
provided. 
b) Emergency Scholarship Funds – The second is to allocate emergency scholarship funds, 
either from existing program funds or from TAMU reserves to support these students.  
The need for this emergency funding will be largely dependent upon the severity of the 
diTAMUGption and the timing of the diTAMUGption.   
 
2) Financial Aid Documents and Awards 
a) All financial aid applications and awards are stored in COMPASS.  There is no impact 
on awards.  All historical financial aid documentation is stored in the TAMU imaging 
system.   
 
3) Access to Financial Aid System 
a) TAMUG staff and students will still be able to access financial aid information through 
COMPASS, FAMIS, and HOWDY. 
b) At least one staff member at TAMU will have access to TAMUG financial aid systems 
with the THECB and with TG.  TAMUG processing will be continued in College 
Station by TAMUG staff or TAMU staff. 
 
4) Work Study and Student Employment 
a) TAMUG students can be added to the Jobs for Aggies database and given access to 
apply for TAMU student worker jobs in the event of a long term closure of the TAMUG 
campus.  Since TAMUG work study jobs are primarily in financial aid, TAMU’s 
Department of Student Financial Aid will employ those on work study funding at 
Galveston or find other employment for them in College Station. 
b) For a short period of time (evacuation and 1-2 weeks clean-up), the need for providing 
this service is minimal. 
 
5) Processing Checklist – In  the event of an evacuation or other diTAMUGption at Galveston, 
TAMU and TAMUG will take steps to ensure the following occur: 
a) Contact will be made by the Financial Aid Campus Director at TAMUG with the 
Assistant Provost for Student Financial Aid at TAMU to start temporarily disabling 
processes or start transferring operations. 
b) TAMUG staff will be provided office space and computers in College Station. 
c) COMPASS staff will be notified of changes in TAMUG operations. 
d) TAMU’s Financial Aid website will be updated with information on Galveston’s 
financial aid. 
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e) NEO email will be distributed to Galveston students to notify them of the availability of 
TAMUG financial aid staff and the availability of resources for assistance. 
f) Galveston loan processes will be immediately handled by TAMU loan staff to maintain 
compliance and continue to transfer funds. 
g) Notification of TG and THECB of changes in processes for loan disbursements. 
 
Providing TAMUG Students Classes in College Station 
 
Class Schedules and Room Assignments – Responsible Parties 
 
TAMU Lead Position:  Registrar 
TAMUG Lead Position:  Executive Director of Enrollment Services 
 
The TAMU Registrars’ office and the TAMUG Office of Admissions and Records (ADRC) 
have a long history of good relationships.  Class Schedules and Room Assignments will be 
highly inter-related to Teaching Assignments.  Many decisions will be impacted by the timing of 
the storm as well as the level of damage.  If it is determined to establish academic operations in 
College Station, the following process shall serve as a basic guideline: 
 
1) Call in essential staff to TAMU including Director of Admissions and Records, and at 
least three (3) designated ADRC staff. 
2) Implement phone bank to contact TAMUG faculty.  Determine availability of faculty to 
relocate. 
3) Explore feasibility of relocating ship to other Texas port, and establishing maritime 
curricula aboard vessel.  If not feasible, explore relocating maritime students to other 
State Maritime Academy (possibly California or Maine). 
4) Define areas of specialization and course offerings with available faculty. 
5) Define areas that overlap with TAMU courses, and TAMUG faculty are not available 
6) Define areas of shortage where faculty is not available and TAMU cannot offer expertise 
7) Identify available classroom facilities for TAMUG faculty 
8) Allow flexibility for night and weekend scheduling of TAMUG courses/labs 
9) Define registration (either independent TAMUG or merged with TAMU) 
10) Determine feasibility of distance education methodologies to deliver courses to students 
not able to relocate and/or to deliver courses to TAMU by faculty not able to relocate 
(possibly using IBT or other Houston site).  
11) Implement a student hotline to check in and declare intent to continue enrollment prior 
to arrival at TAMU. 
12) Post arrival date, times, and place to website including instructions to call hotline 
number if possible. 
13) Begin to “re”-register students with new schedules based on their intention to enroll.  
(Every effort should be made to enroll the student in a similar schedule to their “pre-
storm” enrollment.  Enrollment in the numeric term should minimize difficulties with 
financial aid, billing auditing, and reporting). 
14) Establish a centralized service center at TAMU including a process for those that have 
indicated intent and those that have not. 
15) Establish a method for students not intending to continue enrollment to withdraw 
without visiting campus. 
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16) Develop an audit process and determine process for those students not able to continue 
enrollment (most likely to no record drop students). 
17) Negotiate reporting process with Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board. 
 
(This process will require discussion and consideration that financial transactions will be handled 
at the institutional level and not by student level accounts.) 
 
Teaching Assignments - Responsible Parties 
 
TAMU Lead Position:    AOC/GOC Deans 
TAMUG Lead Position:  Vice President for Academic Affairs  
Assigning Students to Classes- Responsible Parties 
 
TAMU Lead Position:    AOC/GOC Deans 
TAMUG Lead Position:  Vice President for Academic Affairs  
 
Grades and Transcripts – Responsible Parties 
 
TAMU Lead Position:  Registrar 
TAMUG Lead Position:  Executive Director of Enrollment Services   
 
TAMUG registration, grades, transcript, and student academic records are all a part of the 
TAMU COMPASS system and are differentiated by a campus code. This campus code may be 
utilized in the event TAMUG students moved to the main campus during the period of recovery 
to allow tracking of the TAMUG students while enrolled on the main campus and provide them 
with all necessary record/registration services. 
 
This process will be invisible to students. 
 
Textbooks – Responsible Parties 
 
TAMU Lead Position:    Executive Director of Financial Management Operations 
    General Manager, MSC Bookstore 
TAMUG Lead Position: Assistant Vice President for Student Affairs & Auxiliary 
Services or Delegate 
 
The effect of a major hurricane on students’ access to textbooks depends primarily on what time 
of year the storm hits.  In the event that a major storm is forecasted for landfall in Galveston, the 
campus will make every attempt to relocate textbooks and critical supplies to College Station so 
that when classes resume, students will be able to have immediate access to their academic 
needs.   
 
1) If TAMUG is able to relocate textbooks and critical supplies, TAMUG would like to be 
able to sell them through a retail outlet established on the TAMU campus. 
2) TAMUG would need to establish a retail outlet on the TAMU campus, including 
supplying or borrowing from TAMU necessary retail supplies, such as cash registers, 
establishing cash management procedures, and locating secure storage.  The Director of 
Bookstore Operations will serve as the TAMU lead on this operation. 
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3) If TAMUG is unable to relocate textbooks and critical supplies, the MSC Bookstore, 
operated by Barnes and Nobles, will work with TAMUG to order the books and supplies 
needed for TAMUG students and sell them through their own (MSC Bookstore) 
inventory.  The General Manager of the MSC Bookstore will work with the TAMUG 
representative to accommodate this need. 
4) If the storm hits far enough in advance of, or well after, the start of classes, most 
students will be required to have their materials and the campus will simply require all 
students to take their materials with them when they evacuate the campus.  Minor 
supplies may be relocated to College Station. 
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Billing and Fees at TAMU College Station 
 
Student Tuition and Fees – Responsible Parties  
 
TAMU Lead Position:  Executive Director of Student Business Services 
TAMUG Lead Position:  Director, Financial Management Services or Delegate 
 
An important issue will be the payment for services.  In most situations, fees will have been 
collected from TAMUG students and will be in Galveston budget accounts.  An important point 
to note is that Galveston and College Station fees are not necessarily the same in many of these 
areas.  Payment, once fair amounts have been determined, should simply be a transfer from one 
account to another.  TAMU services not routinely provided on the Galveston campus, but 
deemed necessary for TAMUG students in College Station, will either be paid from other 
Galveston funds, or be collected from TAMUG students in College Station.  In some cases 
services and fees will change requiring adjustments, i.e., a commuting student in Galveston 
moves into TAMU housing or vice versa. 
 
Accounts and Billing Services – Responsible Parties 
 
TAMU Lead Position:  Executive Director of Student Business Services 
TAMUG Lead Position:  Director, Financial Management Services or Delegate 
 
The TAMU Student Accounts and Billing Services Office at TAMU College Station currently 
has some processing responsibilities for TAMUG students for which limited access to TAMUG 
student accounts has been granted. 
 
1) In an extended emergency situation involving closure of the TAMUG campus, TAMU 
Student Accounts and Billing Services will be approved for full access and assume all 
processing responsibilities for TAMUG students until TAMUG Student Financial Services 
Staff can be housed and brought back on-line to resume their duties. 
 
2) Student Debt Management - TAMU Student Debt Management will offer assistance  to 
TAMUG students with extended payments if it becomes necessary 
 
Financial Operations 
 
TAMU Lead Position: Accounting Issues – Associate Vice President for Finance and 
Controller and Executive Director of Financial Management 
Services 
 Payroll Concerns – Director of Payroll Services 
 Expense Tracking and Reimbursement Efforts – Associate Vice 
Presidents for Finance 
TAMUG Lead Position:  Director of Financial Management Services 
 
 
 
Reporting to the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board 
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1) TAMUG staff will have access to financial and payroll systems through TAMU systems, 
as noted below. 
2) TAMUG will continue submitting required reports as long as feasible for TAMUG staff 
to handle. 
3) Should TAMUG staff need assistance, TAMU staff will be available to coordinate data 
and reporting needs. 
 
FAMIS Access 
 
1) TAMU Financial Management Operations (FMO) will provide TAMUG staff 
workstations to access FAMIS as necessary.  Locations for the workstations will include 
space in the FMO office and/or in the FMO training room located in the Teague 
building.  These locations will be made available to TAMUG staff as a base of 
operations until TAMUG is available. 
 
2) If necessary, FAMIS operations will redirect check printing from TAMUG to TAMU.  
TAMUG will provide check stock if available.  If not available, TAMU will process 
TAMUG payments on TAMU check stock through a restricted account.  TAMU would 
then bill TAMUG for expenditures paid on their behalf by TAMU. 
 
BPP Access 
 
1) BPP can be accessed from any computer hooked up to the Ethernet on the TAMU 
campus. 
2) Workstations provided above for FAMIS access could also be used to access BPP. 
 
Payroll Processing 
 
1) TAMU Payroll Services will provide support with payroll processing as needed.  The 
BPP system will be able to process payroll in College Station for all affected TAMUG 
employees. 
2) TAMU Payroll Services will assist in retrieving payroll related data and answering 
payroll related questions as necessary, including:  relaying management’s decisions on 
salary continuation if employees are unable to return to work; distribution of paychecks; 
availability of cash advances; changes in deposit information; posting of updates and 
communications on the Employee Services Web site, etc. 
3) BPP can be accessed from any computer hooked up to the Ethernet on the TAMU 
campus 
4) Workstations provided above for FAMIS access could also be used to access BPP; 
however, current TAMU Payroll Services staff are able to handle all the data entry, 
review and processing of TAMUG employees. 
 
Tracking and Documenting Costs for Reimbursement 
 
1) TAMU/TAMUG will establish a fiscal account(s) to track hurricane related costs paid 
by each institution.  Departments will be reminded to use the established account to 
record all hurricane-related expenditures and to maintain appropriate supportable detail 
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in terms of invoices, time sheets, etc. depending on the nature of the expenditure 
incurred. 
 
2) TAMU Division of Finance will establish contact with FEMA representatives should 
expenditures be of a nature that may be eligible for reimbursement.  TAMU Finance 
staff will prepare materials to submit invoices for reimbursement and track the status of 
expenditures versus reimbursements until no further action is warranted. 
 
a. Employee Services will provide guidance on the development of detailed job 
descriptions and personnel records for those employees responding to 
emergency conditions to permit maximum reimbursement through insurances, 
FEMA, and comply with State and Federal employment laws.  
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SECTION 3.  Emergency Communication Response Plan 
 
“Aggies Taking Care of Aggies” 
 
The Texas A&M University at Galveston Campus Emergency Response Plan has been 
developed to provide guidance during emergency and crises events that call for actions 
and operations beyond the daily operations of the institution.  The plan is composed of 
four parts providing guidance for campus communications, command center operations, 
media relations, and campus lock down and security protocols during critical incidents.  
This plan does not replace other emergency plans and protocols in place for severe 
weather, campus evacuation, post emergency campus recovery, fire and other safety 
response plans.  This plan should be used to complement other plans and procedures.  
Activation of this plan will insure that effective communication in the event of a crisis 
saves lives, prevents property loss and disseminates information to all campus members 
in a clear, concise and organized manner so that we are truly “Aggies Taking Care of 
Aggies.”   
No amount of planning can replace the solid leadership and sound judgment that must be 
exercised at all levels during a crisis or emergency situation.  This plan will always be an 
evolving document and is for guidance only.  In addition, all campus community 
members should become familiar with the Sea Aggie Alert system by registering all 
personal communication devices at: 
 
www.Sea Aggie Alert.com/my/tamug/signup.htm 
Campus Communications Procedures 
 
Assessment -- The individual who encounters the potential crisis or emergency should 
gather accurate information from the appropriate sources as quickly as possible. After 
fact gathering, the individual should contact the Campus Police immediately.  
Authority and decision to activate the Emergency Operations Plan as a result of the 
emergency will follow the Chain of Command beginning with the President and CEO.  
If the President and CEO is unavailable, the administrator in charge will activate the 
plan.   
 
In the event there is an emergency in progress, the Campus Police may take immediate 
action to safeguard the campus community through established police procedures while 
taking steps to notify the administration of the crisis or emergency situation. 
Response 
After assessing the nature and scope of the situation, the Executive Team member in 
charge will call together all available members of the Executive Team to execute the 
following plan: 
•   Designate a spokesperson:  In cases of a significant crisis, the President and CEO or 
administrator in charge will take the lead in conveying the administration's response to 
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the crisis, showing that the campus has control of the situation, calming public concern 
and providing leadership for the entire campus.   
•  Draft a fact sheet:  The fact sheet will contain a summary statement of the situation 
including all known details to be released to the media. This information will be made 
available to (and approved by) the President and CEO in addition to copies provided to 
the President and CEO, President and Provost.  This fact sheet should be scrutinized 
with respect to the public's right to know and concerns for privacy and security in 
consultation with the Office of General Counsel if necessary. 
•   Notify key constituencies:  Determine key constituencies that should be informed 
of the crisis. It is important to keep administration, faculty, staff, students and parents 
informed as appropriate of appropriate details and actions taken by the university during 
an emergency.  The President and CEO or administrator in charge will notify the 
President and CEO, President and Provost in College Station of the crisis as appropriate. 
• Alert the media:  Determine whether a news conference and or news release is an 
appropriate means of conveying information beyond the protocols used to notify faculty, 
staff, students, the news media and the public. The President and CEO or administrator 
in charge in consultation with the Director of Media Relations and Communications will 
determine logistics of the news conference including when, where and how the media 
will be contacted, which media will be contacted, who will supervise the news 
conference, who will appear, etc.   
•   Other spokespersons:  Identify any other individuals besides those on the Executive 
Team who may serve as spokespersons or who might be made available to the news 
media; assign a public information staff person to provide counsel to those individuals. 
Ongoing Procedures during Crisis 
During the crisis or emergency, the Executive Team in consultation with the Director of 
Media Relations and Communications will monitor all news media for reports or updates 
related to the crisis.   
• Open communications:  Over the duration of the crisis, open communications between 
the Executive Team and those responding to the crisis or emergency will be maintained.  
Redundant communication systems including the police 800 series radios, campus 
satellite phones and personal cell phones will be utilized in maintaining effective 
communication links. 
•  Outside resources:  In the event the campus resources and responders are 
overwhelmed by the crisis or emergency or additional resources are needed, the 
President and CEO or administrator in charge will contact the local Office of Emergency 
Management or local law enforcement to request assistance. 
Aftermath Component 
Following any crisis, appropriate action must take place to ensure that members of the 
campus community, and others as necessary, receive needed information and assistance 
to help bring closure to the crisis as well as relief from the effects of the event.  Attention 
also should be placed on identifying and implementing measures to improve the 
Emergency Operations Plan used during the crisis.  
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• Communications:  If needed, a public forum should be scheduled and 
coordinated by the Director of Media Relations and Communications to communicate 
details of the incident and events to all interested members of the campus. The timeliness 
of this meeting is critical and every effort should be made to see that it occurs within 
three work days from the close of the crisis. Representatives from the Executive Team, 
Campus Police, Student Affairs, Human Resources, Employee Assistance Program, as 
well as the Counseling Office should attend and be prepared to answer questions and 
share pertinent information. Specific departments and/or individuals also may be 
requested to attend and participate depending upon the nature of the crisis. 
• Immediately following a crisis:  It is imperative that the campus be sensitive to 
the needs of faculty, staff and students who may have been personally affected by the 
crisis.  There may be a need to assist a victim or victims with obtaining information 
and/or a referral to available resources.  Human Resources will be the contact for 
employee assistance and Student Affairs for student assistance.  
• Rumor control:  It is not unreasonable to expect that rumors would follow a 
crisis, further creating an atmosphere of anxiety.  As a preventative measure, the campus 
Website will continuously be updated following the crisis to address rumors and provide 
additional information as it becomes available.  All inquiries to the crisis will be directed 
to the Director of Media Relations and Communications. 
• Ten day follow up:  The Executive Team shall meet within 10 days following a 
crisis and review all actions taken as a result of the crisis to determine effectiveness and 
efficiency of operations and make any needed changes to the Emergency Operations 
Plan and Emergency Communications Plan and Protocols. 
Emergencies can occur at any time and without warning. Careful application of the 
Campus Emergency Communication Plan and Protocols will assist the Texas A&M 
University at Galveston campus community in responding appropriately to crises and 
emergencies and effectively manage the media.  Continued evaluation and refinement of 
this plan is necessary and should be initiated on an annual basis.     
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Media Relations Management  
In the event of a serious emergency or accident involving TAMUG students, faculty 
and/or staff, the campus will immediately enact the following procedures for managing 
the media: 
Responsibilities 
• Office of the President and CEO 
 The President and CEO will notify the Provost and President of TAMU of the 
crisis or emergency situation. 
 The Director of Media Relations and Communications will be responsible for 
interfacing with the TAMU Office of University Relations to inform the College 
Station campus of the emergency and coordinate additional support and secure 
their assistance, if needed for media relations. 
• Information Services 
 IS will establish a media center in Sea Aggie Center 601 or PE Building 107 to 
accommodate the electronic and data outlet needs of the responding media. 
 If the incident occurs at the Fort Crockett or Teichman Road campuses, media 
will be re-directed to Mitchell Campus on Pelican Island. 
 Campus Police will secure the crisis area and the media center. 
 Non-campus and non-emergency personnel will not be permitted in the area of 
the emergency. 
• The President and CEO or administrator in charge will serve as the chief 
spokesperson for the campus.  
• If employees or students are called by outsiders or members of the media, they 
should refrain from comment and refer the individual to the Emergency Operations 
Center.  
• As soon as reasonably possible, the Director of Media Relations and 
Communications will provide the media with a statement.  The statement will be 
constructed based on the best available information. 
• The media will be notified of the next update.  Updates will be given by either 
the President and CEO or administrator in charge. 
• Employees should be mindful of potential video cameras and cell phone 
photography and their coverage of the incident at the scene. 
• If/when a media representative arrives on the campus, anyone encountering the 
media should contact the Director of Media Relations and Communications at extension 
4830 or cell phone ***-***-****. If the Director of Media Relations and 
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Communications is unavailable, then contact campus administration.  An authorized 
administrator in charge will then act as necessary. 
• The Director of Media Relations and Communications will report to the 
established media center and activate assistance from one or all of the following groups:  
Financial Management Services, Human Resources, Admissions and Records, Naval 
Science or the Maritime Academy Corps of Cadets.  That group of media assistants may 
be assigned to either the main entrance of the Mitchell Campus or the North entrance of 
the Mitchell Campus or other locations to intercept and guide representatives to the 
media center.   
• The role of the media assistant will be to escort arriving media representatives to 
the media center. Staff members will not answer media questions about any crisis 
situation without the express consent and instruction of either the Director of Media 
Relations and Communication or administrator in charge.  
• Campus community members affected should be discouraged from agreeing to 
provide media with an interview.  If they do, assistance will be provided by the Director 
of Media Relations and Communications.  A designated member of the Executive Team 
should be present during interviews to insure that ground rules are followed and 
inappropriate questions are not addressed.   
• The Director of Media Relations and Communications will notify the following 
people in College Station and request assistance as appropriate: 
 
Steve B. Moore 
Chief Marketing Officer and Vice President for Communications 
TAMU Department of Marketing & Communications 
Office: (979) 845-2217 
 
Sherylon Carroll 
Associate V.P. for Communications 
TAMU Department of Marketing & Communications 
Office: (979) 862-2369 
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Steven B. Moore 
Vice Chancellor of Marketing and Communications 
Phone: (979) 458-6023 
Email: syscomm@tamus.edu 
 
Information concerning the emergency will be communicated as appropriate via Sea 
Aggie Alert, the TAMUG website and local media sources as information becomes 
available: 
 www.tamug.edu 
•   KHOU - TV Channel 11 News Desk (713-521-4384) 
Preferred method:   assignments@khou.com 
     •   KTRK - TV  Channel 13 News Desk (713-663-4600) 
Preferred method:    ktrk.newsalerts@abc.com 
•   KTRH - Radio 740 AM   News Desk (713-212-8740) 
Preferred method: ktrhnews@clearchannel.com 
•   KYST – Radio 920 AM   News Desk (713-779-9292) 
•   KPRC – TV Channel 2   News Desk (713-778-4910) 
Preferred method:  desk@kprc.com 
 KRIV – Fox 26       News Desk (713-479-2701) 
  Preferred method:     assignmentsdesk@fox26.com 
• Media updates will be provided at least every four hours or as deemed necessary 
by the President and CEO or administrator in charge. 
• All external local government agencies (City Mayor, County Judge, etc.) will be 
notified of any developments with the crisis or emergency situation as soon as possible. 
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Sea Aggie Alert Protocols  
 
Authority to issue an Sea Aggie Alert Message 
 
Authority and decision to issue an Sea Aggie Alert message will follow the Chain of 
Command beginning with the President and CEO.  The President and CEO or 
administrator in charge will approve the message and use of Sea Aggie Alert and 
SchoolClosings.us whenever possible.  If the President and CEO is unavailable, the 
administrator in charge will initiate the campus closure and notification protocols by 
contacting the Assistant Vice President for Administration or the next administrator in 
the Chain of Action.  
The Chain of Action for sending Sea Aggie Alert message is as follows: 
 Capt. Allan Post, Emergency Response Coordinator 
   C: ***-***-**** 
 John Kovacevich, Director, IS  C: ***-***-**** 
 Sam Martinez, Chief of Police   C: ***-***-**** 
Grant Shallenberger, AVPSA&AS   C: ***-***-**** 
If time is of the essence, any administrator in the Chain of Action is permitted to send an 
Sea Aggie Alert and/or SchoolClosings.us message without prior consent should the 
situation warrant immediate notification. 
Discretion should be exercised when issuing Sea Aggie Alert messages.  Certain 
dangerous or extreme situations may warrant the issuing of a message immediately:  
•   Tornado or funnel cloud near campus 
•   Imminent severe weather (preceded by a National Weather Service alert) 
•  Campus violence/criminal behavior on campus (shooter, hostage situation, bomb 
threat, violent actor, abduction on campus, violent assault, etc.) 
•  Utility emergency (ruptured gas line, downed electrical line) 
•  Chemical Release at Refinery 
•  Chemical/Radiation Spill on campus 
•  Fire in a campus facility. 
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Sea Aggie Alert messages will not be issued based on the following: 
•   Events/situations that do not pose an immediate threat to the campus or campus 
members (i.e. events off campus, events that do not impact Pelican Island, etc.) 
•   Events/situations that may create an even greater danger to the campus 
community or members if a message is sent. 
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APPENDIX: Specific Emergency Response Procedures  
 
Shelter In Place 
When emergency conditions do not warrant or allow evacuation from campus, the safest 
method to protect campus occupants may be to take shelter inside a campus building and 
await further instructions.  
The order to shelter in place will be given by the Office of the President and CEO at 
which time the following procedures will be implemented.   
 
The term Shelter-In-Place (SIP), means to seek immediate shelter and remain there 
during the emergency. Some emergencies require evacuation, but often, during 
tornadoes, exterior hazardous material releases, hostile intruder, and similar 
emergencies, it is safer to remain where you are, and await instructions. The most 
important aspect of a Shelter-In-Place (SIP) directive is to TAKE ACTION QUICKLY. 
 
The basic concept behind Sheltering-In-Place (SIP) is to put barriers between yourself 
and the danger, while maintaining awareness, communications, and safety. 
 
At TAMUG, an emergency Shelter-In-Place directive will be initiated through all 
possible communication methods, however, the most immediate and effective method of 
notification will be through the Sea Aggie Alert Text Messaging System. 
 
The Sea Aggie Alert Text Messaging System, will specify the type of Shelter-In-Place 
(SIP) emergency that is occurring. This includes, for example, tornado warning, exterior 
hazardous material release, violent person in a specific location, or building, etc. 
Therefore, the Sea Aggie  Alert Text Messaging System can prepare you to react 
accordingly to the specific type of emergency occurring. 
 
Below please read examples of the types of emergencies that could occur that could 
cause a Shelter-In-Place to be initiated. Each example provides procedures for you to 
understand, therefore, you would know how to react. 
 
Shelter-in-place, Hazardous Materials 
Should an interior hazardous material release occur, the instruction would be to evacuate 
the building and area. 
In the event of an exterior hazardous material release (including chemical, biological or 
radiological), either accidentally, or intentionally, a Shelter-In-Place may be initiated. 
Should an exterior hazardous material Shelter-In-Place (SIP) be initiated the following 
procedures are recommended: 
 
1. Move indoors and remain there. 
2. Once indoors, remain in office, classroom, residence hall room, or other indoor space. 
The best rooms to enter are interior rooms with no windows. 
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3. Encourage everyone to immediately go into rooms and out of large public areas. 
4. Close and lock windows, doors, and seal the room as much as possible. 
5. Shut off heating, ventilation, air conditioning (HVAC) units if possible. 
6. Pull down blinds, turn off lights and any other electronic equipment. 
7. Monitor your Sea Aggie Alert Text Messages, but remain off the cell phone unless a 
life and death emergency is occurring. 
8. Help others when possible, especially those who are physically disabled. 
9. Remain as calm as possible and know that the emergency situation is the central focus 
of emergency response personnel. 
10. If in a vehicle driving on campus, leave campus immediately – obeying traffic and 
speed regulations. 
11. Remain in Shelter-In-Place (SIP) until informed via Sea Aggie Alert Text Message 
or by University officials that it is safe to leave. 
 
 
Shelter-in-place, Violent Persons 
In the event that a person, or persons, poses a serious threat to campus a Shelter-In-Place 
(SIP) may be initiated. This would usually involve some form of violence, or a firearm, 
and necessitate immediate action. Should this SIP be initiated the following procedures 
are recommended: 
 
1. Move indoors to a safe location. 
2. If unable to get indoors, lie flat, get behind an obstruction, put distance between you 
and the danger and await police. 
3. Get into a room, office, residence hall room, meeting room, etc. and lock all doors and 
windows. 
4. Blockade the door if possible with large/heavy furniture, or other heavy objects. 
5. Pull down blinds, block windows to door in an effort to obstruct vision from hallway, 
turn off lights. 
6. Remain quiet, silence cell phones, and any other noise producing objects. 
7. Stay low to the ground, on floor, near solid interior walls, staying away from windows 
and doors. 
8. Take cover under furniture, or other large objects placing as many items as possible 
between you and the threat. 
9. Do not peek out windows, or doors, to see what may be occurring. 
10. Monitor your Sea Aggie Alert Text Messaging System. 
11. Do not evacuate if fire alarm is activated unless you are positive a fire is occurring. 
12. If possible, and safe to do so, report the location of the violent person if known. Do 
not remain on cell phone unless a life and death emergency is occurring in your 
immediate vicinity. 
13. Help others when possible, especially the physically disabled. 
14. If you are in a vehicle during a Shelter-In-Place (SIP) for violent person, leave 
campus immediately. Obey traffic and speed regulations. 
15. Remain in the Shelter-In-Place (SIP) until informed by police, Sea Aggie Alert Text 
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Message, or by University officials that it is safe to leave. 
16. When Police arrive do not run at them, or make sudden movements. Do not hold 
anything in your hand that could be mistaken for a weapon. 
 
 
Shelter-in-place Hazardous Weather 
Severe weather could suddenly develop which would initiate a Shelter-In-Place (SIP). 
The most likely scenario would be a tornado warning, or citing, close to campus. Should 
this occur, the following procedures are recommended. 
 
1. If outside seek shelter in the closest large building, go to the east or north walls. 
2. Do Not seek shelter in any large, free span room such as a gym, auditorium. 
3. Move to the lowest floor in the building, the basement is the best option if available. 
4. The best room choice is an interior room with no windows, or a small windowless 
first floor interior room like a closet, or bathroom. 
5. If windows are in the room, close and lock windows and doors, pull down blinds. 
6. Center yourself under large furniture, or other objects, and protect yourself from 
flying glass, or debris. 
7. Remain as close to the floor as possible, stay out of corners and away from outside 
walls. 
8. Turn off lights if possible 
9. Remain in Shelter-In-Place (SIP) until informed via Sea Aggie Alert Text Message, or 
by University officials that it is safe to leave. 
10. Remain off the cell phone, especially after a tornado strike. 
11. If anyone is seriously injured, contact University Police at 409-740-4545 or dial 9-
911 from campus phone and request assistance.  
 
 
Central Shelter In Place Location 
 
 Should an incident occur that requires all campus occupants to shelter in 
place in a central location, the Incident Command will notify each 
Department Head to have all students, faculty and staff under their area of 
responsibility or in the building in which they are located to report to the P.E. 
Facility immediately.  
 Once all campus occupants have reported to and have been accounted for in 
the                            P.E. Facility, further instructions will be provided by the 
Incident Command Team 
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Campus Closure (No Classes – No Evacuation)  
 
Under extreme weather conditions or general emergency, the President and CEO may 
decide to close the campus early or not to open campus offices and departments, 
provided that "essential services" will be maintained.  
 
Decision Not To Open Or To Close Campus 
  
Who makes the decision? 
  
The decision to close or not to open the campus will be made by the President and CEO 
or delegate. The President and CEO may consult with various individuals on campus and 
ask for recommendations, but the President and CEO will make the final decision. 
  
Conditions that may require a decision to close or not to open the campus should be 
communicated through Emergency Response Coordinator to the President and CEO at 
the earliest possible time. Public safety is the primary consideration in closure decisions. 
In this regard, the Emergency Response Coordinator (or designee) will be responsible 
for advising the President and CEO for Administration on safety-related conditions. This 
advisory and/or recommendation will be made after consultation with other appropriate 
agencies, such as Galveston County of Emergency Management, the National Weather 
Service, and/or applicable agencies. The Emergency Response Coordinator will then 
advise or recommend to the President and CEO an appropriate course of action. 
  
When is the decision made not to open the campus? 
  
Such a decision will normally be made by 5:30 a.m. of the effected day. 
  
What is the notification procedure? 
The Emergency Response Coordinator (or designee) will initiate an advisory call to the 
President and CEO. Once the President and CEO has made the decision, the Emergency 
Response Coordinator will communicate that decision to the following, since these units 
receive many inquiries regarding decisions on closing and/or have follow-up 
responsibilities: 
 Communication and Media Relations 
 Facilities Services 
 Student Affairs 
 Administration  
 
A Sea Aggie alert will be sent to all to advise all on the closure 
  
When is the decision made to close early? 
In the case of early closing, the decision may be made when the President and CEO (or 
designee) deems conditions warrant closing the campus. Some units may require 
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immediate notification of the potential to close early because they become obligated to 
perform certain services in such situations. The Emergency Response Coordinator will 
be provided a list of such units. 
  
Departments will be notified through their respective Vice President 
   
Personnel who are not required to work during an early release or sequential/staggered 
release may be released early under the guidance of the department head/supervisor. 
  
When is a decision made to re-open the campus? 
In the event of a campus closure, the decision to re-open the campus will be made by the 
President and CEO (or designee) and announced to the campus community and general 
public via Sea Aggie Alert. 
  
Who are essential services personnel? 
"Essential services" are those functions and personnel required to maintain or protect the 
health, safety, or physical well-being of campus personnel (students, staff, and faculty), 
academic mission, and facilities (including research projects), given the conditions of the 
emergency at hand. 
  
Determining Essential Services for Emergency Closures: The Senior Vice President, 
Associate Vice President of Student Affairs, Facilities Services Director and Chief of 
Police will determine which operations under their respective supervision should be 
designated as essential services (as defined above) and under what conditions specific 
individuals will be required to work during a general closing. The determination of 
essential services and personnel may vary depending on conditions of the emergency at 
hand. Examples of emergency conditions include, but are not limited to: snow, ice, 
flood, power failure, explosion, or extreme heat or cold. Lists of designated essential 
services and personnel should be disseminated to the appropriate unit supervisor; 
individuals included on such lists should be notified by their supervisors. Employees 
should contact their supervisors if they have questions about whether or not they are 
considered "essential services" personnel. 
 
  
 484 
 
Building Evacuation  
 
There are two (2) reasons that can require the evacuation of a building on the TAMUG 
campus or one of its off-campus facilities. 
   1. An emergency situation that presents a serious threat of injury, or life to the 
       students, staff, or visitors of TAMUG. 
   2. A planned operation, or drill for training, or for administrative purposes. In  
       these cases, the TAMUG President and CEO, or his designate, will be 
       the authority to determine the time, date, and conditions for such an event. 
                  
Building Evacuation 
 
A. Building evacuations will occur when a fire alarm sounds and/or upon notification by 
TAMUG Police. 
B. When the building evacuation alarm is activated, leave by the nearest marked exit and 
alert others to do the same. 
C. Take all personal belongings with you upon evacuation. 
D. ASSIST THE DISABLED IN EXITING THE BUILDING! Remember that 
elevators are reserved for disabled persons. In residence halls the elevators lock off when 
the alarm is activated. 
Note: Do NOT use the elevators in cases of Fire or Bomb Threat.    
E. Once outside, proceed to a pre-determined mustering point (clear area) that is at least 
500 feet away from the affected building. Keep streets, fire lanes, hydrant areas and 
walkways clear for responding personnel  
Campus Evacuation  
Campus occupants may be ordered to evacuate the campus in the event of a 
hurricane/adverse weather conditions, fire, refinery explosion, release of toxic or 
odorous gas, terrorist threat or attack, bomb threat or any other event that is deemed by 
the campus leadership to be a clear and present danger to the students, faculty and staff 
of TAMUG. 
The order to evacuate the campus will be given by the Office of the President and CEO 
at which time the following procedures will be implemented. 
 
General Evacuation Procedures and Guidelines (Campus):  
 Evacuation of the campus will be conducted in a calm and coordinated manner 
which will be overseen by the Incident Command Team 
 
 Announcements will be communicated through department heads to their 
personnel and students, campus AggNews, voice mail and the campus close 
circuit television channel  
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 The Incident Command Team will notify all subordinates of the decision to 
evacuate campus.  
o Door-to-door announcements will be made in the Residents Halls by 
Residential Services Staff members.   
o Fliers announcing the evacuation will be left on any door unanswered 
during the door-to-door walk through. 
 
 All employees are essential in the Campus Evacuation process and are required 
to remain at their duty stations until allowed to vacate the campus by their 
supervisor. 
 
General Evacuation procedures and guidelines:  
o Incident Command Team members shall insure that all students, faculty 
and staff have evacuated the campus  
o Personnel responsible for ships and boats shall see that all are secured or 
relocated and report the completion of this task to the Incident Command 
o Employees and students shall report to the Incident Command any special 
requests for utilities to remain on during the evacuation.   
o Building monitors shall report through the chain of command to the 
Emergency Operations Center after buildings have been cleared of all 
personnel 
o Campus Police shall inspect all accessible areas to insure that all 
personnel have evacuated.  All personnel that have not left the buildings 
will be escorted out by the Police Officers 
o Police Officers shall report to the Police Chief following an inspection of 
each building.  The Police Chief will then notify Emergency Operations 
Center 
o The Mechanical Maintenance Crew in the Facilities Services staff shall 
turn off all non-essential utilities within each building after evacuations 
are complete.   
 Exterior lighting around the swimming pool and field areas will 
be turned off after evacuation is complete.   
 Exterior mechanical room doors shall be secured 
 The Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor shall report to the 
Facilities Services Director upon completion of these duties   
o The Grounds Maintenance Crew in the Facilities Services staff shall 
make a final check of the grounds and remove and secure all non-
stationary items requiring security 
 The Grounds Maintenance Supervisor shall report to Facilities 
Services Director upon completion of these duties  
o The Transportation Department staff shall insure that all emergency 
vehicles are fueled and given a service check and make sure preparations 
are made to evacuate students to College Station if needed 
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o Before departing campus, all employees must complete an Evacuation 
and Emergency Information Sheet and return to their respective 
Department Heads or Building monitors.  No employee will be permitted 
to leave campus without completing and returning this form 
o Employees should notify family members that the campus is being 
evacuated before departing 
o Office preparations prior to evacuation are as follows: 
 Unplug all electrical appliances  
 Remove and dispose of all perishable items from refrigerator 
 Items should be thrown in campus dumpsters and not  
trash cans 
o Employees with vehicles are asked to share a ride with those who have no 
vehicles  
o Once transportation plans have been finalized, an Evacuation and 
Emergency Information Sheet has been completed and turned in and 
approval has been granted by the immediate supervisor, the employee is 
free to leave campus 
o Evacuation from campus should be along posted evacuation routes: 
 North on Harborside Drive to Interstate 45 North 
 If Interstate 45 is closed or inaccessible, evacuation should be 
along South along Harborside Drive to 25th Street.  Take a right 
on 25th and proceed to Seawall Blvd. 
 At Seawall, take a right and proceed West to exist the Island at 
San Luis Pass. 
 The ferry should not be used as an evacuation route 
Student Evacuation Procedures: 
 
o Students may be asked to evacuate the campus at which time the order to 
evacuate will be disseminated by the Student Affairs Office 
o Before departing campus, all students must complete an Evacuation and 
Emergency Information Sheet and return to Residential Services.  No 
student will be permitted to leave campus without having completed and 
turned in this form 
o Off-Campus students are encouraged to complete an Evacuation and 
Emergency Information Sheet and leave it in the Student Services Office 
o Students should notify family members that the campus is being 
evacuated before departing 
o Residence Hall room preparations prior to evacuation are as follows: 
 Unplug all electrical appliances  
 Clear all balconies and outsider areas of personal belongings 
 Remove and dispose of all perishable items in dorm refrigerator 
 Items should be thrown in campus dumpsters and not hall 
trash cans 
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o Students with vehicles are asked to share a ride with those who have no 
vehicles.  If a student can ride with fellow students, please notify Student 
Affairs of the destination of all vehicle occupants. 
o If a student cannot arrange for transportation, TAMUG will provide 
transportation to the main campus in College Station or other selected 
evacuation destination 
 Students needing transportation should notify Student Affairs 
immediately so that arrangements can be made 
 Food and shelter will be provided in College Station for the 
duration of the evacuation period 
 Transportation will be by campus van or vehicle and will be 
driven by a campus employee 
o Once transportation plans have been finalized, an Evacuation and 
Emergency Information Sheet has been completed and turned in and 
parents have been notified, the student is free to leave campus. 
o Evacuation from campus should be along posted evacuation routes: 
 North on Harborside Drive to Interstate 45 North 
 If Interstate 45 is closed or inaccessible, evacuation should be 
South along Harborside Drive to 25th Street.  Take a right on 25th 
and proceed to Seawall Blvd. 
 At Seawall, take a right and proceed West to exist the Island at 
San Luis Pass. 
 The ferry should not be used as an evacuation route 
Return to Campus Information for Students, Faculty and Staff 
o The media will be asked to announce both the cancellation and 
resumption of classes.   
o Voice mail numbers in College Station and Galveston will be available to 
provide up-to-date information regarding the re-opening of campus.  The 
campus website will also provide this information: 
 (409) 740-4545 
 (979) 862-8245  
 www.tamug.edu 
 Radio/Television Station 
 KHOU -TV Channel 11 
 KTRK -TV  Channel 13 
 KTRH – Radio 740 AM 
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Fire Emergency 
 
 
IN ALL CASES OF FIRE, THE TAMUG POLICE DEPARTMENT MUST BE 
NOTIFIED IMMEDIATELY! 
Contact the TAMUG Police at: 
Campus phone:  ext. 4545 
Public phone:  409-740-4545 
1. Know the location of fire extinguishers, fire exits, and alarm systems in your area.  
2. If a minor fire appears controllable, IMMEDIATELY contact the TAMUG Police. 
Then promptly direct the charge of the fire extinguisher toward the base of the flame. 
Never let the fire get between you and an escape route. 
3. If an emergency exists, activate the building alarm. CAUTION: IF THE ALARM 
FAILS TO GO OFF you must report the fire by phone. 
4. On large fires that do not appear controllable, IMMEDIATELY notify University 
Police. Then evacuate all rooms, closing all doors to confine the fire and reduce oxygen 
– DO NOT LOCK DOORS! 
5. When the building evacuation alarm is sounded, an emergency exists. Walk quickly to 
the nearest marked exit and alert others to do the same. 
6. ASSIST THE DISABLED IN EXITING THE BUILDING! DO NOT USE THE 
ELEVATORS DURING A FIRE. Smoke and toxic fumes are the greatest danger in a 
fire, so stay near the floor where the air will be less toxic. 
7. Once outside, move to a clear area at least 500 feet away from the affected building as 
rapidly as possible. Keep streets, fire lanes, hydrants and walkways clear for emergency 
vehicles and crews. 
8. If requested, assist emergency crews as necessary. 
9. An Emergency Site Coordination Post may be set up near the emergency site. Keep 
clear of the Coordination Post unless you have official business. 
10. DO NOT RETURN TO AN EVACUATED BUILDING UNTIL TOLD TO DO 
SO BY A UNIVERSITY POLICE OFFICER. 
Note: 
If you become trapped in a building during a fire and a window is available, place 
an article of clothing (shirt, coat, etc.) outside the window as a marker for rescue 
crews. If there is no window, stay near the floor where the air will be less toxic. 
Shout at regular intervals to alert emergency crews of your location.  
DO NOT PANIC! 
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Medical Emergency 
 
In the event of a medical emergency on campus or at a University facility, Emergency 
personnel should be notified immediately.   
 
 Emergency personnel should be notified immediately.   
 For ON CAMPUS EMERGENCIES, DIAL 911   
 Off Campus Emergencies, Dial 9-911  
 Provide Dispatcher with:  
 Location of emergency  
 Type of injury, if known  
 Brief description of injured person (gender, age, etc.)  
 Render First Aid, if trained 
 Make injured as comfortable as possible 
 The accident scene will be secured by responding emergency personnel 
 If the accident requires immediate response by TAMUG personnel, the 
Administration will be notified and the appropriate action taken 
 
Severe Weather (HURRICANE, TORNADO, FLOOD) 
 
Campus occupants may be ordered to evacuate the campus or shelter in place in the 
event of a hurricane/adverse weather conditions that are deemed by the campus 
leadership to be a clear and present danger to the students, faculty and staff of TAMUG. 
 
The order to evacuate the campus or shelter in place will be given by the Office of the 
President and CEO, please follow the campus evacuation procedures or the shelter in 
place procedures 
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Workplace Violence or Criminal Behavior 
o IN AN EMERGENCY DIAL EXT. 9-911  
o Campus Police are located in the Facilities Services Building and 
provides 24-hour help and protection. This service is provided seven days 
a week on a year-round basis.  
o Everyone is asked to assist in making the campus a safe place by being 
alert to suspicious situations and reporting them promptly.  
 Promptly notify Campus Police at 740-4545 or 771-5185 as soon as possible and 
report the incident, including the following information:  
o Nature of the incident  
o Location of the incident  
o Description of person(s) involved  
o Description of property involved  
 
 If you observe a criminal act, or whenever you observe a suspicious person on 
campus, immediately notify Campus Police and report the incident  
 
 Assist the officers when they arrive by supplying them with all additional 
information and ask others to cooperate 
 
 Should gunfire or discharged explosives hazard the campus, you should take 
cover immediately using all available concealment. After the disturbance, seek 
emergency first aid if necessary.  
 
 What to do if taken hostage:  
o Be patient. Time is on your side. Avoid drastic action.  
o The initial 45 minutes are the most dangerous. Follow instructions, be 
alert and stay alive. The captor is emotionally unbalanced. Do not make 
mistakes, which could hazard your well-being.  
o Do not speak unless spoken to; and then only when necessary. Do not talk 
down to the captor who may be in an agitated state. Avoid appearing 
hostile. Maintain eye contact with the captor at all times if possible, but 
do not stare. Treat the captor like royalty.  
o Try to rest. Avoid speculations. Comply with instructions as best you can. 
Avoid arguments. Expect the unexpected.  
o Be observant. You may be released or be able to escape. The personal 
safety of others may depend on your memory.  
o Be prepared to answer the police on the phone. Be patient. Wait. Attempt 
to establish rapport with the captor. If medication, first aid, or restroom 
privileges are needed by anyone - say so. The captor, in all probability, 
does not want to harm persons held by him or her. Such direct action 
further implicates the captor in additional offenses.  
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Armed Assault  
 
In the event that one or more gunman comes on campus with intent to harm 
university member (s) for any reason; 
 
A Single gunman looking for a particular target is usually very agitated and 
unstable.  They will harm others that get in their way and may be suicidal.  Any 
witnesses should call 911 as soon as they are aware of the threat and should only 
attempt to keep the actor in view so that they can report his/her position. If the 
witness knows how to call ahead of the gunman, they should call in a warning to 
the building that they are heading towards first, if not, the police department can 
help with that as they talk with the witness.  
 
o If a building gets a warning call, they should leave the building if they 
can, if not, they should simply lock the doors and remain out of sight.  
Someone will come and give the all clear when the situation is over 
 
o Witnesses should remain calm and take notice of the actors dress and 
appearance, the kind of weapon that they are carrying, etc.  This is 
information that can help save lives if the police can get it quickly 
enough.  The responding officer must be able to quickly acquire the 
actor’s location and accurately identify him in order to protect the rest of 
the campus 
 
o Officers should attempt to protect the intended target, but they must 
remember that there are many potential targets in the area that also 
depend on him for safety.  He must not engage in risky behavior, which 
might eliminate him from protecting everyone else, especially in the early 
goings before backup can arrive 
 
o Managing the target and other potential targets is just as important as 
confronting the gunman at times.  Extending your opportunity to engage 
the gunman is the key to successfully getting everyone out of the situation 
alive.  Time is your ally.  The more extended the incident, the more time 
that responders will have to successfully end the situation peacefully and 
safely. 
 
Multiple gunmen on campus usually indicate an assault on non-specified 
targets.  It may mean Administrators or anyone that may be in charge.  It may 
mean corps members or any student.  Or as in Columbine, it could be a wide 
range of “specific targets”. (Jocks, cool kids, certain members of certain groups, 
etc, that have offended the gunmen in the past 
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o Officers should once again, approach this situation quietly and unseen if 
possible.  Warning should go out and, the campus should be secured by 
locking all the doors and trying to evacuate the effected building.  The 
entrance and exits should be secured if possible, to shut off easy access 
by the intruders 
 
o Officers should try to get as much info on the group as possible and 
Galveston Swat should be notified of the situation.  While the Swat team 
is assembling, other officers will be arriving on the scene.  The initial 
officer needs to direct their approach so that they are not fired upon and 
so that the gunmen are not alerted to their arrival 
 
o Any of these threats may be armed with other types of weapons, 
including but limited to pipe bombs, firebombs, various sharp weapons, 
etc. Additional weapons might be detected as bags, cases or packages 
carried by the gunmen.   Each incident should be analyzed carefully to 
determine just what we might be facing, so that we can pass on the 
information to our backup units and other concerned parties.  The best 
way to get this information to a central command is to call everything into 
dispatch or designated command post 
 
o Police Supervisory personnel will establish a command post as soon as 
possible in order to direct the situation and collect as much intelligence as 
possible on the gunmen.  Once Galveston Swat arrives, they will take 
over the situation.  TAMUG supervisors will act as advisory consultants 
to the Swat team with significant ability to influence actions on campus.  
(Hopefully the ability to make things easier and cause less damage to the 
campus) 
 
o Officers will contain and isolate hostage situations, while evacuating all 
nearby University members.  Galveston Swat will be called and they will 
address the problem.  TAUMUG police supervisors will be advisors. 
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Command Procedures for Threat to Campus 
 
1. Threat card filled out during a call 
2. Person receiving threat calls 9-911 
3. Person receiving threat calls campus police X4545 
4. Person receiving threat finds and informs their supervisor and stands by for 
instructions from the President and CEO 
 
5. TAMUG Police calls President and CEO or delegate in charge, then begins 
coordination with city emergency responders 
 
6. President sends campus wide preliminary message (or asks delegate to call for 
him- Emergency Response Coordinator  most likely)   
 
7. President decides on location for incident command (most likely OCSB or 
Waterfront Operations bldg. 3003) 
 
8. President contacts (or asks delegate to call for him- Emergency Response 
Coordinator or Executive Administrative Coordinator most likely)  incident 
command members to mobilize (notified via Sea Aggie Alert, Email List, Phone 
Call) 
 
9. Group convenes and decides course of action depending on situation and threat 
 
 will campus immediate evacuate? 
 will campus lock-down? 
 select message to distribute to campus (Sea Aggie Alert, Website, CIS 
distribution) 
 contact appropriate city officials if needed (Police, City and County EOC 
) 
 Will full Emergency Operations Center activate/set up (chose location for 
this- OCSB, CLB, Ship, Waterfront, or alternate safe location) 
 Call President TAMU with situation report.  
 
Campus Lockdown Procedures 
 
When a crisis or emergency situation on campus warrants immediate lockdown of the 
campus, the safest method to protect campus occupants will be to take shelter inside a 
campus building and await further instructions.  
 
The order to lockdown the campus or campuses will be given by the Office of the 
President and CEO.  In the event there is an emergency in progress, the Campus Police 
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may take immediate action to safeguard the campus community by calling for the 
lockdown of campus(es) through Sea Aggie Alert and established police procedures 
while taking steps to notify the administration of the crisis or emergency situation.  If the 
order to lock down the campus is given the following procedures will be implemented: 
 
 An Sea Aggie Alert message will be issued immediately by the Emergency Response 
Coordinator or the next administrator in the Sea Aggie Alert Chain of Action 
providing specific instructions regarding the crisis and how campus community 
members are to respond (additional notification systems such as use of office phones 
and mounted speakers are in the process of being implemented).  
 
 The Campus Police will respond to the crisis scene and provide a threat assessment 
to the President and CEO or administrator in charge.  Should the situation warrant 
immediate additional assistance, the Campus Police will call in Galveston police and 
fire by radio and follow established emergency procedures. 
 
 The campus building proctors will also be notified via Sea Aggie Alert to alert their 
building occupants of the crisis or emergency situation and what should be done to 
remain safe. 
 
 Appropriate action will be taken by the Campus Police and TAMUG administration 
based on the threat assessment provided by the Campus Police and any Incident 
Command Team member responding on-site to the crisis. 
 
 The President and CEO will activate the Emergency Communication Plan and 
Emergency Operations Center 
 All campus community members will move to the nearest room, take cover and 
stay low. 
 Doors and windows will be locked and opened only to students and staff seeking 
safety or to the police.  
 Campus community members will remain quiet and shut off all audio-visual 
equipment.  
 Faculty will be responsible for providing leadership and maintaining calmness in 
the classrooms.   
 The campus will remain in the lockdown mode until an all-clear signal is given 
by the Campus Police or TAMUG administration. 
 Once the all-clear signal has been communicated via Sea Aggie Alert, verbally 
and by other means across campus, the Office of Student Affairs will commence 
notifying students’ parents as appropriate.  The Director of Media Relations and 
Communications will provide a scripted message approved by the President and 
CEO or next highest ranking Executive Team member that will be communicated 
to the parents and family of the students.   
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 All campus resources necessary will be made available to the Campus Police, 
TAMUG administrators and responding emergency personnel to resolve the 
crisis. 
Terrorist Threat / Attack  
Immediate Securing of Campus 
In the event of a terrorist attack or threat to the immediate area and conditions do not warrant or 
allow evacuation from campus, the campus will be secured to prevent any entrance or exist to 
the campus until the incident has been resolved. 
Command Procedures for Threat to Campus 
 
1. Threat card filled out during a call 
2. Person receiving threat calls 9-911 
3. Person receiving threat calls campus police X4545 
4. Person receiving threat finds and informs their supervisor and stands by for 
instructions from the President and CEO 
 
5. TAMUG Police calls President and CEO or delegate in charge, then begins 
coordination with city emergency responders 
 
6. President sends campus wide preliminary message (or asks delegate to call for 
him- Emergency Response Coordinator  most likely)   
 
7. President decides on location for incident command (most likely OCSB or 
Waterfront Operations bldg. 3003) 
 
8. President contacts (or asks delegate to call for him- Emergency Response 
Coordinator or Executive Administrative Coordinator most likely)  incident 
command members to mobilize (notified via Sea Aggie Alert, Email List, Phone 
Call) 
 
9. Group convenes and decides course of action depending on situation and threat 
 
 will campus immediate evacuate? 
 will campus lock-down? 
 select message to distribute to campus (Sea Aggie Alert, Website, CIS 
distribution) 
 contact appropriate city officials if needed (Police, City and County EOC 
) 
 Will full Emergency Operations Center activate/set up (chose location for 
this- OCSB, CLB, Ship, Waterfront, or alternate safe location) 
 Call President TAMU with situation report.  
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The order to secure the campus will be given by the Office of the President and CEO at 
which time the following procedures will be implemented.   
Securing Campus  
o No student, faculty or staff member will be allowed to leave campus until 
released by the President and CEO or designee 
o The Incident Command Team will report to the Emergency Operations Center to 
coordinate campus operations 
 Each Building Monitor will be contacted by an Incident Command 
Team member with instructions to secure his/her building by following 
Shelter in Place procedures 
 Additional information will be provided as it becomes available 
 College Station will be notified of the incident and the campus’ actions 
 All Campus Police Officers will be called to duty immediately 
o Campus Police will be dispatched to the main entrance of campus and to the 
intersection of Seawolf Parkway and Clipper Road  
 Campus Police will remain in radio contact with the Police Chief and 
Emergency Operations Center  
o Campus vehicles will be used as barriers to block the entrance and exit to the 
campus at both locations 
 Additional campus vehicles will be provided by the Facilities Services if 
necessary to provide a more secure parameter 
 Gate access to resident hall parking lots will be locked 
o Campus Police will coordinate communications with the Galveston Office of 
Emergency Management to ensure traffic is restricted on to Pelican Island from 
Harborside Drive 
o Remaining Campus Police Officers will continuously patrol interior of campus  
o Waterfront Operations Manager will secure all boats in Small Boat Basin and 
monitor the Boat Basin perimeter 
o T/S General Rudder personnel and duty watch will provide watch and report to 
the Emergency Operations Center 
o T/S General Rudder Shelter in Place procedures will be implemented 
o The Mechanical Maintenance in the Facilities Services staff shall turn off all 
non-essential utilities within each building as directed by the Emergency 
Operations Center through the Facilities Services Director 
 Exterior mechanical room doors shall be secured 
 The Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor shall report to the Facilities 
Services Director upon completion of these duties   
o The Grounds Maintenance in the Facilities Services staff shall make a check of 
the grounds and remove and secure all non-stationary items found 
 The Grounds Maintenance Supervisor shall report to Facilities Services 
Director upon completion of these duties  
o The Transportation Department staff shall insure that all vehicles are fueled and 
prepared for immediate evacuation assistance if necessary 
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Securing of the Waterfront Operations and T/S General Rudder 
o In the event of a terrorist threat/attack from the Master of the T/S General 
Rudder will be responsible for invoking the Facilities Security Plan regarding 
the protection of the T/S General Rudder as outlined in the FSP on file with the 
U.S. Coast Guard.   
o Campus Police will coordinate communications with the Galveston Office of 
Emergency Management to ensure traffic is restricted on to Pelican Island from 
Harborside Drive 
o Waterfront Operations Manager will secure all boats in Small Boat Basin and 
monitor the Boat Basin perimeter 
o T/S General Rudder personnel and duty watch will provide watch and report to 
the Emergency Operations Center 
 
Shelter In Place 
o The Office of the President and CEO will issue the directive to shelter in place 
in the event of a terrorist attack or threat to the immediate area.  Campus 
occupants will take shelter inside a campus facility 
Employees:   
o Move indoors or remain there – avoid windows and areas with glass  
o If available, take a radio or television to the room to track emergency status  
o Keep telephone lines free for emergency responders, do not call 911 for 
information  
o If hazardous materials are involved,  
 Turn off all ventilation systems and close all inlets from the 
outside  
 Select a room(s) which is easy to seal and, if possible, has a 
water supply and access to restrooms  
 If you smell gas or vapor, hold a wet cloth loosely over your 
nose and mouth and breath through it in as normal a fashion as 
possible  
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Bomb Threats  
This hazard is not limited to major universities, or those located in major metropolitan areas, all 
Universities are subject to this type of hazard. The stress and frustration that can mount on an 
individual(s) in a college atmosphere are fertile grounds for the development of this type of 
hazard and should not be dismissed. The effect of this type of hazard has far more reaching 
effects on a smaller college or university than a larger one, simply for the closeness of the people 
in the community itself. 
 
It is imperative that all faculty, staff, and students of TAMUG know how to respond to a bomb 
threat or hostage situation in the event one or both should occur. These procedures are designed 
to educate and train all faculty, staff, and students to respond calmly, quickly, and appropriately 
to the hazard. 
 
The individual receiving the bomb threat is responsible for carefully recording the information 
and then immediately notifying their supervisor and the TAMUG Police Department. 
 
RECEIVING THE THREAT 
1.) In the event of a call, obtain all the information possible from the caller. Be firm, calm, speak 
quietly and request the following information: 
     
If a Bomb Threat is Received by Phone, Take the Following Actions 
 Record any information regarding the bomb threat and have it available for the police 
when they arrive. 
 If your phone has a display, copy the number or letters on the window display. 
 1.) Record as much information as possible. 
     2.) Request the name of the building where the threat is located. 
     3.) Request the exact location of the device. 
          A.) What floor? 
          B.) What part of the building; north, south, etc. 
          C.) Type of device. 
          D.) Detonation time. 
          E.) Description of the package. 
Important note: 
It is crucial that you note the following information. These small details could very well 
be the ones that will save a life and bring a safe and successful conclusion to the hazard. 
1.) Gender of caller. 
2.) Accents. 
3.) Background noise. 
4.) Speech pattern. 
5.) Time of call 
6.) Age of caller 
     4.) Advise the caller that the building is occupied by people and the  
          detonation of a bomb could result in the death or serious injury to many people. 
     5.) Call the TAMUG University Police at: 
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Campus phone:  ext. 4545 
Public phone:  409-740-4545 
 
 Give the phone number and location of the phone that received the bomb threat. 
 When safe to do so, call Campus Police at 4545 or 409-740-4545 for further assistance. 
IF A BOMB THREAT IS RECEIVED BY NOTE, TAKE THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS 
 Do not handle the note. 
 Call 911 immediately. 
 When safe to do so, call Campus Police at 4545 or 409-740-4545 for further assistance. 
If a Suspicious Object or Package is Found, Take the Following Actions: 
 Do not touch or move suspicious object, or package. 
 Call 911 immediately. 
 When safe to do so, call Campus Police at 4545 or 409-740-4545 for further assistance. 
 Campus Police and/or other emergency personnel will evacuate the immediate area and 
stop anyone from entering the area where the object or package is located. 
If a Suspicious Package Arrives in the Mail, Take the Following Actions 
 Do not handle suspicious package. 
 Call 911 immediately. 
 When safe to do so, call Campus Police at 4545 or 409-740-4545 for further assistance. 
 Campus Police and/or other emergency personnel will evacuate the immediate area and 
stop anyone from entering the area where the object or package is located. 
Signs of a Suspicious Package 
 No return address. 
 Excessive postage. 
 Stains. 
 Strange odor. 
 Strange sounds. 
 Unexpected delivery. 
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 Physical appearance. 
Command Procedures for Threat to Campus 
 
1. Threat card filled out during a call 
2. Person receiving threat calls 9-911 
3. Person receiving threat calls campus police X4545 
4. Person receiving threat finds and informs their supervisor and stands by for 
instructions from the President and CEO 
 
5. TAMUG Police calls President and CEO or delegate in charge, then begins 
coordination with city emergency responders 
 
6. President sends campus wide preliminary message (or asks delegate to call for 
him- Emergency Response Coordinator  most likely)   
 
7. President decides on location for incident command (most likely OCSB or 
Waterfront Operations bldg. 3003) 
 
8. President contacts (or asks delegate to call for him- Emergency Response 
Coordinator or Executive Administrative Coordinator most likely)  incident 
command members to mobilize (notified via Sea Aggie Alert, Email List, Phone 
Call) 
 
9. Group convenes and decides course of action depending on situation and threat 
 
 will campus immediate evacuate? 
 will campus lock-down? 
 select message to distribute to campus (Sea Aggie Alert, Website, IS 
distribution) 
 contact appropriate city officials if needed (Police, City and County EOC) 
 Will full Emergency Operations Center activate/set up (chose location for 
this- OCSB, CLB, Ship, Waterfront, or alternate safe location) 
 Call President TAMU with situation report.  
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Evacuation Procedures 
 All persons shall move towards the nearest marked exit in a safe orderly fashion, if the 
exit is blocked move to the next nearest marked exit. 
 Wheelchair occupants or persons with mobility impairments have first priority for 
building elevators if elevators are operable and safe for use. 
 If it is safe to do so and time permits, take briefcases, purses, and jackets with you. 
 If it is safe to do so and time permits, close classroom doors, lock file cabinets and 
office doors as you calmly move to the nearest exit. 
 If it is safe to do so and time permits, secure all hazardous materials or equipment, 
close all hoods and drafts. 
 While evacuating, take care not to push, shove, or accidently knock others down. 
 If you see or know of someone having trouble evacuating and it is unsafe for you to 
help, please notify emergency personnel on site or call 911; you may also call the 
TAMUG Police at 4545 or 409-740-4545 . Make sure to give the exact location of 
the person(s) and the reason(s) why they are having trouble evacuating. 
Should the threat be determined credible and outside the resource capability of the University, 
the TAMUG Police Department will notify the Galveston PD through the 911 call center and 
radio. The 911 call center will ensure that the appropriate support agencies will be dispatched to 
assist the University with the hazard. 
The affected building or the entire University will be evacuated as determined by the ICT and by 
the authority of the President and CEO or delegate.  Follow the procedures located in the 
Evacuation of Campus section of this document.  
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Hostage Situation  
In the event of a hostage situation it is important that the TAMUG Police are quickly notified. 
Upon the receipt of notification, the following team will be assembled. 
• TAMUG Police Chief 
The Police Chief or a designated member of their staff will be responsible for serving as a liaison 
to the assisting Police Departments. 
• Director of Facilities Services 
The Director of Facilities Services shall ensure that the Police Department(s) has access to 
accurate building plans or drawings. 
• Director of Human Resources 
The Director of Human Resources shall be responsible for arranging counseling for the 
hostage(s) and affected faculty, staff, students, or rescue personnel. 
The faculty, staff, or student who recognizes or is notified of a hostage situation will call the 
University Police at: 
 
Campus phone:  ext. 4545 
Public phone:  409-740-4545 
Caller will need to provide the following information: 
    • The caller’s name, location, and telephone number. 
    • Number of persons being held hostage. 
    • Location of the hostages. 
    • Condition of the hostages. 
    • Demands of the hostage takers. 
    • Physical description of the hostage takers (sex, race, age, height, weight,  
       build, glasses, facial hair, hair color, hat, and clothing color and type), if  
       possible. 
    • Description of the hostage taker’s vehicle, if applicable. 
 
1.) The Police dispatcher will initiate the Emergency notification procedure and make any 
additional calls as necessary. 
2.) Faculty, staff, and/or students directly affected by the hostage situation should take their cue 
from the hostage takers. If the opportunity arises whereby escape can be accomplished without 
creating greater harm to themselves or others, then they should use their own discretion. 
TAMUG University does not recommend, endorse, or imply that any hostage take matters 
onto their own that could endanger themselves or others.  
3.) Faculty, staff, and/or students who have escaped or are not affected should remain away from 
the location and out of sight of the hostage takers. 
4.) The TAMUG Police will establish an Emergency Site Command Post (ESCP). The Directors 
of Facilities Services and Human Resources will report to the ESCP to provide immediate 
information about the facility or persons involved. 
5.) The TAMUG Police Chief may request the assistance of the Galveston Police (Sheriff) and or 
State DPS and its Hostage Crisis Team. Upon their arrival, the Police will in conjunction with 
the TAMUG Police Department resolve the situation. The TAMUG Police will then act in a 
supporting role to the responding police departments. 
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6.) The Director of Facilities Services will ensure the Police have accurate drawings or 
blueprints of the affected building(s). 
7.) The Director of Communication and Media Relations will provide the public notice as 
directed by the ICT. 
8.) In coordination with the Commanding Police Department the University/designee/ or 
supervisor of the area affected will consider the following: 
    • Evacuating the entire facility to assembly areas or an offsite location. 
    • Conducting a media briefing offsite if the Commanding Police Department’s 
       spokesperson cannot conduct one. 
    • Providing a location for the families of the hostages to congregate for  
       counseling. 
9.) The Director of Human Resources will provide or arrange counseling for faculty, staff, 
students, and their families if needed. 
Command Procedures for Threat to Campus 
 
1. Threat card filled out during a call 
2. Person receiving threat calls 9-911 
3. Person receiving threat calls campus police X4545 
4. Person receiving threat finds and informs their supervisor and stands by for 
instructions from the President and CEO 
 
5. TAMUG Police calls President and CEO or delegate in charge, then begins 
coordination with city emergency responders 
 
6. President sends campus wide preliminary message (or asks delegate to call for 
him- Emergency Response Coordinator  most likely)   
 
7. President decides on location for incident command (most likely OCSB or 
Waterfront Operations bldg. 3003) 
 
8. President contacts (or asks delegate to call for him- Emergency Response 
Coordinator or Executive Administrative Coordinator most likely)  incident 
command members to mobilize (notified via Sea Aggie Alert, Email List, Phone 
Call) 
 
9. Group convenes and decides course of action depending on situation and threat 
 
 will campus immediate evacuate? 
 will campus lock-down? 
 select message to distribute to campus (Sea Aggie Alert, Website, CIS 
distribution) 
 contact appropriate city officials if needed (Police, City and County EOC) 
 Will full Emergency Operations Center activate/set up (chose location for 
this- OCSB, CLB, Ship, Waterfront, or alternate safe location) 
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 Call President TAMU with situation report.  
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Civil Disturbance or Demonstration 
Most campus demonstrations such as marches, meetings, picketing and rallies will be 
peaceful and non-obstructive. Facilities utilized for campus demonstrations must be 
reserved in accordance with applicable university policies and procedures. If any of the 
conditions stated below exist, TAMUG Police should be notified and will be responsible 
for contacting and informing the President and CEO. 
 
The following conduct will not be permitted: 
1. INTERFERENCE with the normal operations of the University. 
2. PREVENTION of access to, or egress from, offices, buildings or other University 
facilities including the use of facilities which have been reserved according to the 
University’s normal room or space scheduling system. 
3. THREAT of physical harm to persons or damage to University facilities. 
 
Depending on the nature of the demonstration, the appropriate procedures listed below 
should be followed: 
 
1. PEACEFUL, NON-OBSTRUCTIVE DEMONSTRATIONS 
A. Generally, demonstrations of this kind should not be interrupted. Demonstrators 
should not be obstructed or provoked and efforts should be made to conduct university 
business as normally as possible. 
B. If demonstrators are asked to leave but refuse to leave by regular facility closing time: 
     1) Arrangements will be made by the TAMUG Chief of Police  
         to monitor the situation during non-business hours, or 
 
     2) Determination will be made to treat the violation of regular closing hours  
         as a disruptive demonstration. (See Next Section, Non-Violent Disruptive  
         Demonstrations) 
 
2. NON-VIOLENT DISTRUPTIVE DEMONSTRATIONS 
A. In the event that a demonstration blocks access to university facilities or interferes 
with the operation of the University: 
     1) Consideration will be given to videotaping the demonstration.  
         Demonstrators may be asked by the President or his/her designee to  
         terminate the disruptive activity.   
     2) The TAMUG Police will be informed that the demonstrators were  
         directed to terminate the disruptive activity. 
     3) If the demonstrators persist in the disruptive activity they will be apprised  
         that failure to discontinue the specified action within a specified length of  
         time may result in disciplinary action or arrest including suspension,  
         expulsion or possible intervention by civil authorities. 
     4) Efforts should be made to secure positive identification of demonstrators in 
         violation to facilitate later testimony, including videotape and photographs  
         if deemed advisable. 
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     5) After consultation with the President or designee, the Chief of TAMUG  
         Police, will take appropriate action. 
     6) If determination is made to seek the intervention of civil authorities, the  
         demonstrators should be so informed. Upon arrival of the Police  
         Department, the remaining demonstrators will be warned of the intention 
         of arrest. 
 
3. VIOLENT, DISRUPTIVE DEMONSTRATIONS 
A. In the event that a violent demonstration in which injury to persons or property occurs 
or appears imminent, the President and Assistant Vice President of Student Affairs will 
be notified immediately. 
During Business Hours 
   1) TAMUG University Police will contact the President and Vice President  
       of Student Affairs or designee. 
   2) The Vice President for Student Affairs or designee will advise other appropriate 
       officials. 
If appropriate, a university photographer(s) will be contacted and/or video taping 
equipment obtained and used and/or surveillance 
After Business Hours 
   1) TAMUG Police should be notified immediately of the disturbance. 
   2) TAMUG Police will investigate the disruption and notify the Chief of  
       TAMUG Police.     
 507 
 
Chemical/Radiation Spill 
 Any spillage of a hazardous chemical or radioactive material is to be reported to 
Campus Police or the Facilities Services at 740-4545 or 740-4547 
 When reporting the incident, be specific about the nature of the involved material 
and the exact location. Campus Police will contact the Facilities Services who 
will then notify and dispatch appropriate Hazardous Materials (HAZMAT) team 
personnel  
 The key person on-site should evacuate the affected area AT ONCE and seal it 
off to prevent further contamination of other areas until the arrival of the Campus 
Police and/or official personnel.  
 Anyone who may be contaminated by the spill is to avoid contact with others as 
much as possible. Remain in the vicinity and give names to Campus Police. 
Required first aid and clean up by specialized authorities should be started at 
once.  
 If an emergency exists, ACTIVATE the building alarm. PRECAUTION: ALSO 
report the emergency by telephone.  
 When the building evacuation alarm is sounded or an emergency exists: walk 
quickly to the nearest marked exit and ask others to do the same.  
 ASSIST THE HANDICAPPED IN EXITING THE BUILDING! 
Remember that elevators are reserved for handicapped persons. DO NOT USE 
ELEVATORS IN CASE OF FIRE. Do not panic. Remain calm.  
 Once outside, move to a clear area that is at least 500 feet away from the affected 
building(s). Keep streets, fire lanes, hydrants and walkways clear from 
emergency vehicles and crews. Know your area assembly points.  
 If requested, assist emergency crews as necessary.  
 An Emergency Operations Center may be set up near the disaster site. Keep clear 
of the Command Center unless you have official business.  
 DO NOT RETURN TO AN EVACUATED BUILDING unless told to do so by a 
University official.  
Chemical Leak at nearby Refinery  
Campus Evacuation during a chemical leak 
In the event of a chemical leak at a nearby refinery, campus occupants may be ordered to 
evacuate the campus  
The order to evacuate the campus will be given by the Office of the President and CEO 
please follow the campus evacuation procedures  
Shelter in place during a chemical leak  
If conditions created by a chemical leak at a nearby refinery do not allow for the 
evacuation of campus, the safest method to protect campus occupants may be to take 
shelter inside a campus building and await further instructions  
The order to shelter in place will be given by the Office of the President and CEO at 
which time the following procedures will be implemented.   
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Employees:   
 Move indoors or remain there – avoid windows and areas with glass  
 If available, take a radio or television to the room to track emergency status  
 Keep telephone lines free for emergency responders, do not call 911 for 
information  
 If hazardous materials are involved: 
 
o Turn off all ventilation systems and close all inlets from the outside  
o Select a room(s) which is easy to seal and, if possible, has a water supply 
and access to restrooms  
o If you smell gas or vapor, hold a wet cloth loosely over your nose and 
mouth and breath through it in as normal a fashion as possible  
Students: 
 Return to resident hall room - avoid windows and areas with glass  
 If available, take a radio or television to the room to track emergency status  
 Keep telephone lines free for emergency responders, do not call 911 for 
information  
 Wait for Resident Advisor or campus authority to provide further instructions 
 If hazardous materials are involved,  
o Turn off all ventilation systems and close all inlets from the outside 
o Select a room(s) which is easy to seal and, if possible, has a water 
supply and access to restrooms  
o If you smell gas or vapor, hold a wet cloth loosely over your nose and 
mouth and breath through it in as normal a fashion as possible  
Central Shelter In Place Location 
 Should an incident occur that requires all campus occupants to 
shelter in place in a central location, the Incident Command 
will notify each Department Head to have all students, faculty 
and staff under their area of responsibility or in the building in 
which they are located to report to the P.E. Facility 
immediately.  
 Once all campus occupants have reported to and have been 
accounted for in the                            P.E. Facility, further 
instructions will be provided by the Incident Command Leader 
Return to Campus Information for Students, Faculty and Staff 
o The media will be asked to announce both the cancellation and 
resumption of classes.   
o Voice mail numbers in College Station and Galveston will be available to 
provide up-to-date information regarding the re-opening of campus.  The 
campus website will also provide this information: 
 (409) 740-4545 
 (979) 862-8245  
 www.tamug.edu 
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 Radio/Television Station 
 KHOU -TV Channel 11 
 KTRK -TV  Channel 13 
 KTRH – Radio 740 AM 
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Hazardous Materials Spill 
  
In the event hazardous materials are involved: 
 
•  The Facilities Services will be instructed to turn off all ventilation systems and close 
all inlets from the outside.  
 • All campus community members will be instructed to stay inside and 
away from windows and doors until further notice. 
 •   The Campus Police will notify the Galveston Fire Department and Haz Mat 
response team of the spill. 
• The campus will remain in the lockdown mode until an all-clear signal is given 
by the Campus Police or Campus Administrator.  
• All required follow-up reports will be prepared and submitted  
      under the direction of the Campus Safety Officer. 
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Utility Failure 
 
In the event of an electrical power outage, the Incident Command Team (ECT) shall be 
assembled. All or portions of the Campus Emergency Response Team (CERT) may be 
activated, depending on the duration, size, and scope of the outage. 
 
In the event of partial power loss to a portion of the TAMUG campus, it may become 
necessary to shut down power to the entire TAMUG campus in order to restore power. It 
is important that all personnel that will be affected be notified of this procedure, should 
the need arise. The use of portable generators may need to be utilized for the protection 
of lab animals, freezers, or research projects that may be jeopardized by the loss of 
electrical power. 
 
Procedures 
In response to any electrical outage, regardless of the duration: 
1) Facilities and Residence Hall staff will check all impacted buildings to ensure that 
there is no one trapped in any elevators. 
2) Residence Life personnel will identify the possible location of all persons with known 
disabilities and/or other impairments in their respective building. 
3) Residence Hall staff will check on all faculty, staff, and students who require the use 
of any electrical device for basic needs and mobility campus-wide. 
4) During the outage Facilities personnel must provide timely updates and reports to the 
EOC as requested. These reports shall enable any affected faculty and researchers to 
adjust or cancel classes and protect any vulnerable research. 
5) Upon the restoration of electrical power, Facilities personnel will conduct building 
inspections to verify that all systems are restored and functioning properly. They will 
also clear the building for re-entry by all persons. 
 
Power Outage Notification 
1) In the event of a major utility failure occurring during regular working hours (8:00 
a.m. through 4:00 p.m., Monday through Friday), immediately notify the TAMUG 
Police along with Facilities and Planning at: 
TAMUG Police 
Campus phone:  ext. 4545 
Public phone:  409-740-4545 
 
Facilities Services 
 
Campus phone:  ext. 4752     
Public phone:  409-740-4752 
If there is potential danger to building occupants, or if the utility failure occurs after 
hours, weekends or holidays, notify the TAMUG Police at: 
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Campus phone:  ext. 4545 
Public phone:  409-771-5185 
2) In the event of an electrical power outage, be aware that PMEC, CLB, and OCSB 
have emergency power and lighting and therefore can be used as a staging area for 
affected individuals. 
3) If a vapor, fume, or gas leak is apparent, leave the area immediately. Post a DO NOT 
ENTER sign on all doors. Be sure police are aware of the situation. 
4) If an emergency exists, activate the building alarm. CAUTION: If the alarm fails to 
go off, report the emergency by telephone. 
5) All building(s) evacuations will occur when the alarm sounds continuously and/or 
when an emergency exists. 
ASSIST THE DISABLED IN EXITING THE BUILDING! Remember that elevators 
are reserved for the handicapped person’s use. DO NOT USE ELEVATORS IN CASE 
OF FIRE. 
6) If requested, assist the emergency crews as necessary. 
7) An Incident Command Post (ICP) may be set up near the emergency site. Keep clear 
of the Coordination Post unless you have official business. 
8) DO NOT RETURN TO AN EVACUATED BUILDING until told to do so by a 
TAMUG Police Officer. 
9) If possible check elevators to be sure no one is trapped. If people are trapped, notify 
the TAMUG Police.   
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T/S General Rudder Emergency 
T/S General Rudder Emergency – At Sea 
In the event of an emergency or accident involving the students and crew aboard the TS 
General Rudder while at sea or in port, the campus will immediately enact the following 
procedures: 
Securing Campus  
o If the situation warrants, the order to secure the campus will be given by 
the Office of the President and CEO 
 This order will be given only if there is a perceived threat to the 
campus associated with the emergency or accident on the T/S 
General Rudder (i.e. terrorist attack/threat). 
o No student, faculty or staff member will be allowed to leave campus until 
released by the President and CEO or designee 
o The Incident Command Team will report to the Emergency Operations 
Center to coordinate campus operations and campus response 
 College Station will be notified of the incident and the campus’ 
actions 
 All Campus Police Officers will be called to duty immediately 
o Campus Police will be dispatched to the main entrance of campus and to 
the intersection of Seawolf Parkway and Clipper Road  
 Campus Police will remain in radio contact with the Police Chief 
and Emergency Operations Center  
Communications  
Coast Guard and Galveston Emergency Management  
 The campus response to the emergency will be coordinated by the 
Incident Command Team with the U.S. Coast Guard and local law 
enforcement officials 
Parent Notification of On-Campus Students 
 Parents of students on campus will be notified following a report 
from Campus Police that the campus is secured and all occupants 
are accounted for 
 Notification will be conducted by the Office of Student Affairs 
 Parents will be instructed to contact their child in their residence 
hall rooms or through the main Emergency Operations Center 
number 
 If necessary, evacuation of the campus will commence according 
to campus shelter in place and evacuation procedures following an 
assessment of the situation by the Incident Command Team at 
which time the order to evacuate will be given by the Office of the 
President and CEO 
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Initial Notification of Family Members of Students Aboard T/S/ General Rudder 
 Family members of students aboard the T/S General Rudder will 
be notified by the Office of Student Affairs as soon as information 
is available 
 A list of students and personnel on board will be obtained 
from the Maritime Program Office or Campus Police 
 In the event of a death or hospitalization, notification will be made 
to the family/families affected, by the President and CEO or 
designee 
 Family members will be kept informed by the Incident Command 
Team as much as possible 
 If the family/families of the individuals involved in the emergency 
reside out of town, notification is appropriate by law enforcement 
agency with jurisdiction. Simultaneous telephone contact by the 
Incident Command Team should coincide with the notification 
 
Family Notification of Employees aboard T/S General Rudder 
 Family members of employees aboard the T/S General Rudder 
will be notified by the Office of Human Resources as soon as 
information is available 
 A list of personnel on board will be obtained from the 
Maritime Program Office or Campus Police 
 Campus employees will be allowed to contact their families 
following a report from Campus Police that the campus is secured 
and all occupants are accounted for 
 Information concerning the emergency will be posted on the 
TAMUG website and local media sources as information becomes 
available: 
 www.tamug.edu 
 Radio/Television Station Contacts: 
o KHOU -TV Channel 11 
o KTRK -TV  Channel 13 
o KTRH – Radio 740 AM 
Boating Emergency Procedures 
In the event of an emergency or accident involving the use of a campus boat(s) the 
campus will enact the following procedures: 
 Emergency personnel should be notified immediately.   
 For ON CAMPUS EMERGENCIES, DIAL 911   
 Off Campus Emergencies, Dial 9-911  
 Provide Dispatcher with:  
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 Location of emergency  
 Type of injury, if known  
 Brief description of injured person (gender, age, etc.)  
 Render First Aid, if trained 
 Make injured as comfortable as possible 
 The accident scene will be secured by responding emergency personnel 
 If the accident requires immediate response by TAMUG personnel, the 
Administration will be notified and the appropriate action taken 
  
Boating Responsibility  
o It is the responsibility of all vessel Master / Operators to abide by the 
Waterfront Operations Department Operations and Safety Procedures 
located online at; 
http://www.tamug.edu/waterfrontops/Documents/Final%20Draft%20Operati
ons%20and%20Safety%20Procedures%2007282010.pdf 
 
Communications  
o Coast Guard and Local Law Enforcement  
 The campus response to a boating emergency will be coordinated 
by the Incident Command Team with the U.S. Coast Guard and 
local law enforcement officials 
o Parent Notification of On-Campus Students 
 Parents of students on campus will be notified immediately 
following a report from Campus Police that the emergency has 
been addressed and all parties involved are accounted for 
 Students with cell phones will be asked to refrain from contacting 
family members until the full nature of the emergency has been 
assessed and the security of the campus ensured 
 Notification will be conducted by the Office of Student Affairs 
o Initial Notification Of Family Members  
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 Family members of students involved in the emergency will be 
notified by the Office of Student Affairs as soon as information is 
available 
 A list of students and personnel on board will be obtained 
from the Float Plan by Campus Police 
 In the event of a death or hospitalization, notification will be made 
to the family/families affected, by the President and CEO or 
designee 
 Family members will be kept informed by the Incident Command 
Team as much as possible 
 If the family/families of the individuals involved in the emergency 
reside out of town, notification is appropriate by law enforcement 
agency with jurisdiction. Simultaneous telephone contact by the 
Incident Command Team should coincide with the notification 
 Information concerning the emergency will be posted on the 
TAMUG website and local media sources as information becomes 
available: 
 www.tamug.edu 
 Radio/Television Station Contacts: 
o KHOU -TV Channel 11 
o KTRK -TV  Channel 13 
o KTRH – Radio 740 AM 
Immediate Support Services  
The Siebel Building will be used for a private area for families to gather following initial 
notification and upon arrival to campus.  Access to the second floor will be maintained 
by Campus Police  
  
 517 
 
Pandemic Health Hazard Response  
Background 
 
Pandemic Influenza emergencies are not new to the world.  During the last century alone, 
three pandemics and several “pandemic threats” occurred. The pandemic flu of 1918, known 
as the Spanish Flu, has been cited as the most devastating epidemic in recorded world 
history and is suspected of killing more than 20 million people-- more than the total number 
killed during World War I. It is believed that 20-40% of the world’s population was infected 
with this virus. 
 
 A pandemic flu emergency can be described as an outbreak of influenza occurring over a 
wide geographic area and affecting an exceptionally high proportion of the population, in 
multiple continents. This type of flu is easily transmitted from one human to another. It will 
most likely be transmitted through touch and the aerosolization of lung and nasal fluids, i.e. 
coughing and sneezing.  However, it also can spread through contact with contaminated 
surfaces.  The factors that separate a pandemic flu from ordinary flu are the level of 
virulence and the number of persons infected. During a pandemic flu, approximately 40% of 
the population may become infected.   The number of deaths will be a function of the spread 
of the disease and how serious the disease is in humans.    
Major Planning Assumptions 
 A pandemic influenza outbreak will result in the rapid spread or infection throughout the 
world. 
 The pandemic influenza virus will affect the population in multiple waves. 
 The pandemic influenza attack rate may affect 40% of the University student population. 
Illness rates may be higher with school-aged children and middle aged adults (25-40).  
 Populations most at-risk for severe illness from the current H1N1 are: pregnant women, 
all people between 6 months and 24 years old, health care providers and emergency 
medical services personnel, people between 25 and 64 years old with health conditions 
associated with higher risk of medical complications from influenza, and people who 
live with or provide care for infants younger than 6 months. 
 The number of ill requiring medical care may overwhelm the local health care system. 
 The demand for home care and social services will increase dramatically.  
 Vaccines for Pandemic Influenza strains will not be immediately available and may 
require an additional 4-6 months.  It is important to note that Seasonal Influenza vaccine 
is not protective against the current pandemic influenza strain (H1N1).  Therefore, 
protection from Pandemic Influenza can only be obtained through a separate pandemic 
influenza immunization.  
 Absenteeism may be up to 40% (or higher in certain professions).  With respect to public 
schools, the state may set arbitrary rates of absenteeism as triggers for the need to close a 
local educational facility.  
 There may be a significant diTAMUGption of public and privately owned critical 
infrastructure including transportation, businesses, utilities, public safety, and 
communications. 
 External resources may be exhausted, increasing the reliance on internal resources to 
solve local problems. 
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 The implementation of quarantine measures within populations will be a decision of 
federal, state  and local officials. 
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Selected Definitions Related to Pandemic Influenza  
 
 
1) Community Disease Control Measures – Practices in public health that aim to reduce 
disease exposure within the population (e.g., social distancing) 
 
2) Contact – A person who has been exposed to an influenza case in some way during the 
infectious  
   Period, but who has not become ill. 
 
3) Emergency Operations Center – A command and control location where people gather to 
perform  
   sustained emergency management operations for an organization. 
 
4) Epidemic – An excessive occurrence of a disease in a population. 
 
5) Executive Management Team – The senior management /leadership of the local Texas 
A&M system member. 
 
6) Incubation Period – The time from exposure to an infectious disease to symptom onset. 
The  
   Incubation period for influenza is usually 2 days but can vary from 1 to 5 days. 
 
7) Infection Control Measures – Actions taken to decrease the risk for transmission of 
infectious agents in health care settings (e.g., stay at home). 
 
8) Influenza-like-illness –  an individual with the following symptoms: Fever 100º degrees 
Fahrenheit or higher, AND cough, AND/OR sore throat (CDC case definition, accessed 
10/28/2009) 
 
9) Isolation – The separation and restriction of movement of people with a specific 
communicable  
   disease to contain the spread of that illness to susceptible people. 
 
10) Pandemic  – An epidemic on a world-wide scale.  
 
11) Pandemic Influenza - A flu pandemic occurs when a new influenza virus emerges for 
which people            
have little or no immunity and for which there is no vaccine. The disease spreads easily 
person-to- 
person, causes serious illness, and can sweep across the country and around the world in 
very  
short time (WHO – accessed 10/29/09).  Currently the strain has been identified as H1N1. 
 
12) Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) – Barrier (e.g., masks, gloves, gowns) protection to 
be used        by an individual to prevent disease transmission. 
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13) Prophylactic Drugs – Drugs used to prevent disease, such as antivirals. 
 
14) Quarantine – Measures to separate and restrict movement of well people who may have 
been   
exposed to an infectious agent, but who are not ill at this time. 
 
15) Seasonal Influenza – Contagious respiratory illness caused by influenza viruses, affecting 
5-20% of the US population annually and causing 200,000 hospitalizations and 36,000 
deaths (CDC website). 
 
16) Surge Capacity – The accommodation to transient sudden rises in demand for services 
following an incident. It is the ability of a health system to expand beyond normal 
operations to meet a sudden increased demand for service. 
The Texas A&M University System Pandemic Influenza Planning                                 
Emergency Response Levels 
 
Currently, epidemic phase and alert status recommendations of the World Health 
Organization (WHO) and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) do not 
address specific actions needed at the local level for of the Texas A&M System, nor do they 
effectively deal with issues related to the severity of the disease.  For example, widespread 
dissemination of mild disease may not require stringent control measures such as closing 
facilities or quarantine.  The current course of H1N1 Pandemic Influenza disease in the 
population remains mild-moderate, except in some populations (e.g., children, pregnant 
women). 
 
To deal with the current and future Pandemic Influenza, the Texas A&M System has 
developed four discrete emergency response levels of increasing severity that relate to 
specific risks on campus and subsequent emergency response actions:    
 
The Texas A&M University System Pandemic Influenza Emergency Response 
Level I:   
This is the expected level when there is no pandemic in progress.   Activities during 
these times focus on monitoring of world-wide influenza activity, and emergency 
response planning.    
 
The Texas A&M University System Pandemic Influenza Emergency Response 
Level II:   
At this level a new pandemic influenza virus is beginning to circle the globe (but not in 
the United States).  This requires increased national monitoring for illness. Texas A&M 
System members are urged to update their emergency plans and make contact with their 
local health departments.  
 
The Texas A&M University System Pandemic Influenza Emergency Response 
Level III:   
Pandemic influenza virus has been identified within the boundaries of the United States, 
but not in Texas.  Campus emergency response plans should be reviewed, and essential 
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personnel identified.  Measures to slow the spread of virus (e.g., hygiene and 
immunization) should be promoted or implemented. 
 
The Texas A&M University System Pandemic Influenza Emergency Response 
Level IV:  
At this level, pandemic influenza has been identified in Texas.  It is time to start 
identifying cases on campus, maintaining essential operations while focusing on 
additional measures to protect the health of students, faculty and staff.       
 
 
 
 
 
Emergency Response Level Planning Measures 
 
Each emergency response level has specific actions that are recommended to address the 
pandemic influenza. Constant communication and consultation with appropriate local and 
state health officials are essential for effective emergency operations.  Actions taken during 
all levels of a pandemic influenza response must ensure informational and support services 
to students, faculty and staff.  Usually, emergency response recommendations are additive as 
the severity of illness (or emergency response level) increases.  However, some emergency 
measures from higher emergency response levels may be appropriate at earlier stages in the 
epidemic. Planners must exercise some flexibility in developing their member plans. 
 
Level I: No pandemic influenza virus activity is occurring 
 
1. Monitor the transmission of influenza via local, state and CDC information resources. 
2. Review, evaluate, drill, and adapt current member Pandemic Influenza response plans. 
3. Encourage influenza immunization, if available. 
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Level II: Pandemic influenza virus activity identified, but none in the United States 
 
1. Monitor the transmission of influenza activity via local, state and CDC information 
resources. 
2. Communicate with Texas A&M System and local and state health department and other 
relevant  
   health and civic organizations and resources, including the American College Health 
Association. 
3. Information regarding visits to student health services for influenza-like illness, and class  
   absenteeism should be systematically collected, collated, analyzed and shared with 
appropriate     
   campus personnel for baseline and monitoring purposes.  Information should be shared 
with  
   Texas A&M System and with your local health department. 
4. Issue communications to the campus community regarding status of disease spread, self- 
   protection and member response. 
5. Encourage hand hygiene and cough etiquette for well and ill students, faculty, and staff.  
For more information, see: www.cdc.gov/cleanhands. 
6. Assure that travelers have the latest travel health information for affected areas 
(international and domestic), based upon recommendations from local, state, and federal 
health agencies.  See: http://www.cdc.gov/travel. 
7. Planning measures should include consideration for handling persons who return from 
abroad       
   from affected areas, who become ill with influenza-like-illness (e.g., confirmation, 
isolation,  
   standing recommendations. 
8. Inform employees of campus policies regarding working from home, travel, using sick 
leave, and  
      other human resources policies as applicable. 
9. Plan for influenza monitoring. Information regarding student health services and class 
absenteeism should be systematically collected, collated, analyzed and shared with 
appropriate Texas A&M System personnel for baseline and monitoring purposes.   
 
Level III: Pandemic influenza virus activity identified in the United States, but 
none documented in Texas  
 
1. Provide information regarding community control measures such as social distancing, 
and “stay at home if ill” recommendations. 
2. Implement influenza-like monitoring and refine reporting measures. 
3. Review infection control procedures.  a) If personal protective equipment (PPE) is part 
of your planning, determine who needs what level of protection, when they should use it 
and under what conditions.  Assure that appropriate personnel have adequate supplies of 
PPE as set out in your plan or as recommended by your local health department. For 
more information, see: http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/masks.htm. b) Determine how 
students who reside on campus who become ill will be handled. 
4. Distribute appropriate disinfectants (e.g. hand sanitizers) and encourage widespread use. 
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5. Adjust procedures for cleaning public areas to reduce viral spread.  
6. Provide necessary communications. 
7. Designate or activate Emergency Operation Center (EOC) activities, particularly with 
respect to communications.    
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Level IV: Pandemic Influenza Activity Identified Throughout Texas (includes cases 
on any Texas A&M campus)  
 
 
 
Key Planning Assumptions  
 
 If the severity of illness increases (higher mortality or increasing 
hospitalizations), more stringent disease control measures may be required to 
protect the health and well-being of students, faculty and staff. 
   
 Consequently, Level IV has been divided into two levels of Pandemic Influenza 
for organizing the emergency response: mild-moderate Pandemic Influenza 
(IV.A) and severe Pandemic Influenza (IV.B), for organizing the emergency 
response.   
 
 Mild-Moderate Emergency Response –  Level IV.A  (Current 
State) 
 Severe Emergency Response – IV.B 
 
 This division of the emergency response was developed to separate situations 
that impinge on essential services (Severe Pandemic Influenza) from those 
situations where most normal activities would likely continue (e.g. Mild to 
Moderate Pandemic Influenza).  
 
 The determination of what constitutes mild-moderate illness vs. more severe 
illness should be made by System Member leadership in consultation with public 
health officials at the local and state level. 
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Planning For Mild-Moderate Pandemic Influenza  
 
Emergency Response Level IV.A  
  
 
Level IV.A: For mild to moderate influenza illness (similar to seasonal influenza)  
 
1. Fully support the operations of student health services including deployment of 
additional resources as needed and available. Tracking the impact in our student 
populations and workers will be paramount to our ability to maintain essential 
operations.  The primary goal at this point is to slow the spread of disease. This 
level of severity is not expected to impinge on essential services. 
2. Information regarding visits to student health services for influenza-like illness, and 
class absenteeism should be systematically collected, collated, analyzed and shared 
with appropriate System Member personnel for baseline and monitoring purposes.  
Information should be shared with Texas A&M System leadership and with your 
local health department. During the height of the epidemic, there may be a daily 
reporting cycle. 
3. Review and disseminate student absenteeism and staff/faculty sick leave policies.  
Assure that such policies support staying at home when ill or caring for an ill family 
member.  Do not require physician note to confirm illness. 
4. Facilitate self-isolation of residential students with influenza-like illness within their 
dorm rooms or campus apartments.  Non-residential students, faculty and staff 
should self-isolate at home for at least 24 hours after they no longer have a fever. 
5. Discourage attendance at campus events by ill persons. 
 526 
 
6. Maintain communication capacity to coordinate official Member communiqués with 
system and other responders.  
7. All continuity of operations plans are activated to ensure essential services are 
provided. 
8. Establish regular cleaning procedures and schedules for high-touch surfaces 
(bathrooms, doorknobs, keyboards).  Provide disposable wipes for use by students 
on high-touch surfaces. 
9. Prepare to activate the point(s) of distribution for medications or vaccines as 
recommended by local public health department and as set out in points of 
dispensing plans.  Determine thresholds for activation. 
10. If a new vaccine is available, make every effort to ensure as many campus students, 
faculty, and staff are vaccinated.   
11. Provide necessary communications regarding the status of the Member. 
12. Continue to encourage hand hygiene and cough etiquette for all.  
13. Distribute personal protective equipment (PPE) to essential personnel as set out in 
your response plan, if PPE is part of your response plan.  
14. Actively communicate with your local health department to optimize the best 
response measures during the outbreak.  It is important that you receive information 
and that university members provide information to their local health departments 
during all phases of the outbreak. 
 
Planning For Severe Pandemic Influenza  
 
Emergency Response Level IV.B 
 
   
Level IV.B: For Severe Influenza Illness (epidemic begins to impinge on essential 
services) 
 
1. Continue all previous emergency response level actions.  Consider the spread and 
severity of illness and seek guidance from state and local health departments and 
member consultants regarding deciding on a course of action.  The primary goal at 
this point is to slow the spread of the disease and maintain essential member 
services. 
2. Consider suspending university special events and what trigger and procedures will 
result in the suspension of classes.  If classes/events are suspended, have a process in 
place for resumption of classes and events. 
3. Continue voluntary isolation of close contacts.  Extend the self-isolation period to 7 
days after the onset of their symptoms. 
4. Reinforce stay-at-home policies for ill persons. 
5. Expand communication capacity, as necessary, to coordinate official Member 
communiqués with system and other responders.  
6. Ensure essential university operations are performed, even if some member 
functions must be curtailed. 
7. Consider closing research facilities as set out in your response plan, except those 
that are deemed critical (e.g., animal care). 
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8. Maintain critical infrastructure and services. 
9. Fully enact policies regarding non-essential personnel. 
10. Fully utilize health/medical assistance, housing, food, telecommuting, and other 
assistance to reduce infection and support those who are ill, self-isolated or are 
unable to go home, while maintaining essential university operational duties. 
11. Enhance the medical support to accommodate increased isolation, if appropriate, for 
your campus. 
12. Initiate planning for recovery as set out in your plan.  
13.  
 
Summary  
The Texas A&M System  
Pandemic Influenza  
Emergency Response Levels 
 
Level  I CDC reports no cases related to Pandemic  
           Influenza worldwide 
 
Level  II CDC reports Pandemic Influenza cases 
outside    
           of the United States  
 
Level  III CDC reports Pandemic Influenza cases within  
           the continental United States               
    
Level  IV Texas DSHS reports Pandemic Influenza cases  
           within Texas    
           IV.A. Mild-moderate influenza illness reported    
         nationally  
IV.B. More severe influenza illness reported  
         nationally  
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Planning Considerations Related to Pandemic Influenza Emergency 
Responses 
  
A. General 
 
The basis of the Texas A&M System Pandemic Influenza emergency response is the 
preservation of health, safety, and the well-being of the campus community. It is 
paramount that each member of the system tends to the campus community to foster a 
healthy environment during an influenza pandemic. 
 
The basic order of operational priorities is: 
 
1) Maintaining the health, safety and well-being of the campus community. 
 
2) Maintaining continuity of operations and essential services to minimize negative 
economic diTAMUGptions. 
 
3) Maintaining critical infrastructure and/or facilities to support remaining campus 
residents and other essential duties and personnel. 
 
4) Resume normal system member operations. 
 
B. Direction and Control 
  
The Chief Executive Officer retains authority for making decisions affecting the  
Member.  These decisions may include issuing travel advisories, suspending  
mass gatherings (including classes), suspending research, suspending normal university  
operations and resumption of operations. Every effort should be made to coordinate 
decisions made by the local CEO with local or regional public health and with the 
system. 
 
 Planning should include thresholds or a decision-making process for the 
following: 
   
a. Issuance of Travel Advisories/Information 
b. Cancellation of Special Events(Note: limited to level not affecting 
graduation/accreditation) 
c. Cancellation of Classes (Note: limited to level not affecting 
graduation/accreditation) 
d. Initiation of Telecommuting 
e. Suspension of Research 
f. Cancellation of Member Operations (Note: System must participate in these 
decisions) 
g. Resumption of Normal Operations (Note: System must participate in these 
decisions) 
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C.  Continuity of Operations and Essential Services 
  
1. Continuity of Operations and Essential Services planning is critical before an 
influenza pandemic.  Maintaining continuity of operations will mitigate 
diTAMUGptions to critical services and infrastructure caused by pandemic 
influenza. As well as mitigating these diTAMUGptions, Continuity of Operations 
Planning enhances the recovery efforts caused by pandemic influenza. 
 
2. Services critical to member operations are financial services, human resources, risk  
management and safety, university police department, student health services, dining       
services, residential life, study abroad, and academic and student affairs.  Critical  
infrastructure support will also be critical from facilities management and 
information  
technology. Selected essential services relevant to the System are listed below: 
 
1. Security   
2. Campus Health and Safety, including worker safety 
3. IT Support  
4. Human Resources, including policies and procedures for absenteeism and 
leave 
5. Financial Operations 
6. Campus Housing 
7. Food Services 
8. Maintaining Critical Infrastructure 
9. Educational Services 
10. Research 
 
3. Planning should also identify essential personnel and duties. 
 
4. Continuity of operation and essential service plans should be routinely updated and a 
copy forwarded to the System, c/o Kevin McGinnis at: mcginnis@tamu.edu.  
 
5. For more information on planning for continuity of operations, please refer to 
www.fema.gov.  
 
 
Emergency Operations Center dealing with the SARS epidemic in 2003 
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D.   Communications  
 
1. General 
 
a. Pandemic influenza imposes exceptional communications requirements. 
Effective communication is comprised of redundant communication systems, 
effective internal communication and effective external communication 
(communication with external agencies and the general public).  This 
information is usually found in the Communications Section of your system 
member  “all hazards” emergency response plan. 
 
b. In an emergency, one or more communication strategies/systems can become 
disabled or ineffective. Therefore, it is critical that planning takes into 
consideration the need for backup communication modes, diversity of 
communication modes and redundancy.  
 
c. Each system member is requested to identify a Point of Contact for critical 
communications between system and system members related to Pandemic 
Influenza. 
 
     2.  Communication with member(s) of the system community traveling in affected 
regions must    
    consider: 
 
a. Affiliates of the Member that are traveling to affected regions as part of a 
member-sanctioned event will provide contact information before departure to 
the leading/sponsoring department and/or the Study Abroad Office per existing 
university policies. 
 
3.   Communicating Member Closures   
 
a. Any announcements regarding closures or cessation of  events will be 
communicated via the memberhome web page, email, television/radio 
announcements, or any other available means. All announcements to be posted 
on the home web page or made for television/radio will be routed through 
normal approval procedures. 
 
4.   Internal Communications 
 
a. General information regarding pandemic influenza will be distributed in the 
form of public service announcements (PSAs) through any and all available 
modes of communication (i.e., internet, email, telephone, radio, television, etc.) 
as appropriate.  Reference your crisis management plan for more information. 
 
b. During a Pandemic Influenza emergency response internal communication may 
need to include information related to the following areas: 
 
 Updates from local, state, and federal agencies 
 University response activities 
 Health guidelines 
 Media information 
 Emergency bulletins 
 
 532 
 
5. External Communications 
 
All public information made available through A&M system members will be 
directed through their Public Information Officer or other designated official. During 
a Pandemic Influenza response, there may need to be coordination with external 
communications by system and other members. 
 
E.  Major Health Service Considerations During a Pandemic 
 
1. Medical Support 
a. System members will have the initial responsibility for the health care 
services needed by students during a pandemic. In general, Student Health 
Services (or similar responsible party) should be enlisted to facilitate this 
planning. 
 
b. The local Health Department (or the DSHS Regional Health Department) 
will serve as the public health authority and as a resource related to 
management of the pandemic (e.g., screening, vaccine delivery, local case 
counts, tracking the course of the epidemic).   
 
        2. Isolation 
a.   During the early stages of a pandemic, people who are known to be ill with 
pandemic  
      influenza will be advised to voluntarily isolate themselves from others, 
typically in their     
      own homes. For ill students housed on campus and unable to be isolated at 
home, a    
      pre-designated location and support may need to be included in your 
planning.   
      However, at some point in the emergency response, it may be impractical to 
isolate all               
      victims who are ill because of the overwhelming numbers of those affected.  
   
3. Quarantine   
a.   Quarantine measures are usually within the purview of public safety and 
public health  
      authorities in Texas.  Direct discussions with the appropriate officials are 
critical to    
      determine if quarantine has any role in the management of Pandemic  
      Influenza on campus.   
 
F.  Management of Vaccines and Prophylaxis 
 
a. Currently, Pandemic Influenza vaccines are being provided through the appropriate 
local Health Department and distributed in accordance with the local government’s 
emergency response plan.  In the future, it is important to note that vaccines may be 
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distributed through other sites, such as Student Health Services.  If mass 
vaccination is part of your planning for Pandemic Influenza, delineate how this will 
be accomplished and who is responsible for implementing these programs. 
 
b. Currently The Texas A&M University System has no plan to recommend or 
provide mass prophylaxis of antivirals to students, faculty or staff. 
 
G.  Mass Fatalities Management 
 
The management of mass fatalities will be under the direction and authority of the local 
or regional Health Department in accordance with appropriate local government’s 
Interjurisdictional Emergency Management Plan. 
 
H.  Employee Well-being and Support 
 
The response to an influenza pandemic will pose substantial physical, personal, social, 
and emotional challenges to employees. Therefore, it is imperative that we provide 
support that enhances employee well-being. Each system member should provide 
support to enhance employee well-being.  Therefore, procedures to monitor the health, 
emotional status and other types of support should be included in Pandemic Influenza 
emergency response plans. 
 
Additional Pandemic Influenza Information Sources 
Understanding that the amount of information that will be available during a 
Pandemic Influenza situation will be vast, the following web sites may serve as 
useful information sources: 
 
 Texas Department of State Health Services 
http://www.dshs.state.tx.us 
 
 Pandemic Flu (comprehensive pandemic flu information)  
http://www.flu.gov 
 
 Of special interest:   
http://www.pandemicflu.org/professional/school/higheredguidance.html 
 
 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services                 
http://www.hhs.gov 
 
 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention                           
http://www.cdc.gov 
 
 World Health Organization 
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http://www.who.int/en/ 
 
